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**A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR
THEOLOGY**

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A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

BY

JAMES TEN BROEKE, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN McMASTER UNIVERSITY,
TORONTO, CANADA

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PREFACE

It has been my privilege in the intimacy of the classroom to become acquainted with some of the difficulties encountered in the effort to reconcile Christian faith with scientific and philosophical conceptions. This experience has largely determined the method and content of what has been written and those to whom it is addressed. The attempt is made to show that modern as compared with ancient thought affords a superior constructive basis for Christian faith, making it possible to form a theology that shall effectively promote present religious life. The need of such a theology is evident, for construction still yields to criticism, especially in the realm of systematic theology. I present the results of my experience with the hope that some of the needs, not only of the theological student but of the general reader, may be met. The difficulty and complexity of the subjects treated invite the reader's sympathetic consideration of any attempt to deal seriously with them at all. The spirit in which I have written is that of reverence

for the Christian faith in its past and present forms, and of desire to contribute to its establishment. For further explanation of my purpose, the reader is referred to the Introduction.

The references by means of exponent figures in the text are to works mentioned at the close of the book. No attempt has been made to give a bibliography of the subjects treated, but only partially to acknowledge my indebtedness to others. The references do not represent all that has influenced me, for of this I could not render an account.

CONTENTS

PART I

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	3

CHAPTER II

THE ANTECEDENTS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY	11
---	----

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY	51
---------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY	75
--	----

CHAPTER V

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION	118
------------------------------------	-----

PART II

A NEW PHILOSOPHY AS THE CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS OF A NEW THEOLOGY

CHAPTER VI

	PAGE
A NEW PHILOSOPHY: THROUGH SELF TO WORLD AND GOD	139

CHAPTER VII

A NEW THEOLOGY: I. RELIGION AS THE GOOD WILL	171
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII

A NEW THEOLOGY: II. RELIGION AS KNOWLEDGE	190
---	-----

CHAPTER IX

A NEW THEOLOGY: III. RELIGION AS FEELING	211
--	-----

PART III

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION	247
--------------	-----

CHAPTER X

THE RELIGIOUS SELF AND THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS	251
---	-----

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER XI

	PAGE
THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD	287

CHAPTER XII

SOME CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES AND MODERN THOUGHT . . .	317
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII

THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THEOLOGY	362
--	-----

NOTES AND REFERENCES	379
--------------------------------	-----

INDEX	397
-----------------	-----

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION ¹

RELIGION has been variously defined. It has been regarded as a consciousness of social values, as a feeling of limitations, of a more than can be made actual, as an instinctive response to some mysterious power, as the direct action of a supernatural Being upon man or a coming to consciousness of God in the soul, or as man's total reaction upon life with feelings of gravity and solemnity, and as such too varied in individual experience to admit of further definition. These diverse views of the nature of religion show that it is complex and involves the whole man in his social relations; as such, religion seems to have been present in some form at all stages of human life.

The history of religion illustrates the psychological principles of individual and social development. Activity in the early days of the individual and of the community is guided by instincts, habits, and customs, which promote well-being, rather than by reflective judgment on the part of the individual and by clearly defined legislation on the part of the community. The individual is born into a social order which has developed from these primary activities and relations. Religion forms a prominent factor in the life of the whole. Where the develop-

¹ For Literature see p. 379.

ment has produced a state, the religious performances are obligatory upon all citizens. These early religions consist of institutions and practices, and the worship is external, ceremonial, and ritualistic. In these early stages, the individual is not conscious of any other way of acting than that required by the common group life.

It is evident from the above that early religions have little or no creed and nothing that could be called a scientific theological interpretation of religious institutions and practices. Belief in the various mythological stories that might be regarded as attempts to explain religious acts was not required, but these acts, prescribed by religious traditions, were essential. Practice precedes definite religious ideas both in primitive religions and among certain classes in higher levels of development.

Out of the soil of these early religions grew the positive religions, which took up into themselves many of the more ancient conceptions and practices. While the founders of the positive religions react against the background of religious tradition, these religious geniuses are both demanded by the age in which they live and are created by it. They establish a new order, in which the self-conscious element is greater and definite conceptions of religion and worship, which give a deeper expression to the spirit of the age, are set forth.

In the analysis of a positive religion, it is important to distinguish between the primary experience of the Founder and the interpretation or dogma or theology which is developed, and which in its turn enters into a corporate form as the orthodox belief of the religious community. The individual is born into this objectified theology, and may adopt the religious practices and beliefs of his social station without any thought of forming his own theological conceptions. On the other hand, when a sufficient

development has taken place in the individual, there will be a new interpretation of the meaning of religious experience which will be, so far as that individual is concerned, a new theology. It will be personal and, if the thought and method are sufficiently comprehensive and adequate, the result of such individualistic thinking will be scientific theology. In other words, theology is the product of an individual thinker who independently interprets anew his own religious experience in the light of his social, intellectual, and spiritual inheritance. The Calvinistic theology, for example, was in the first place the utterance of Calvin's religious experience. But a theology may be abstracted from its author and embodied in the religious community as the standard of its orthodoxy.

There are, consequently, many distinctions to be made: there is, first, in the case of the positive religions, the experience of the Founder and his immediate teachings; there are, secondly, the numerous interpretations of the significance of the Founder's experience and teachings; there is, thirdly, the embodiment of these doctrines in the life of the religious community; there is, fourthly, the primary religious experience of the individual as he responds to his religious environment; and there is, fifthly, the individual's own interpretation of his religious experience in the light of all that he knows, which may be sufficiently comprehensive in thought and in method to be a scientific theology in distinction from the implicit theology involved in every religious experience.

Theology is, therefore, secondary and derivative compared with the primary religious experience of the individual, and is much further removed from the original experience of the Founder of the positive religion who is supposed to be followed by the believer. It is scarcely possible to avoid asking as to the value

of such secondary products as theology must be compared with these primary experiences of the Founder and of his followers. Theology as the science of God, or, as we may more freely say, the science of religious experience, must, therefore, be able to justify itself. The fact that theology is the subject of profound thought and often of bitter controversy seems to prove that it has an important office to fill. To determine in a measure what the sphere, function, and problem of theology are in the religious life, and to find a constructive basis for theology in present thought, form the motive of the following pages.

The theme just proposed is only a special case of the epistemological question concerning the relation of thought to its antecedents and of knowledge to what is believed to be reality. In order to understand our problem more fully, it is necessary to outline its statement from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge in general. The ideas arising in our minds on occasion of external excitation of our sense-organs are, as Lotze says, "coincident." The mind reacts upon these "coincident" ideas by establishing objective relations between them whereby these ideas "cohere" in an organic unity of knowledge. Thinking may be about anything, for example: physical things, social and political events, individual affections and moral and religious experiences. Thought is, consequently, secondary and derivative, and presupposes something to think about which is primary. Thinking does something with something that is found at hand. The resulting unity of ideas with the recognition of the grounds of their "coherence" is our truth and knowledge formed of judgments which are necessary and objectively valid. All that thought can ever attain to is just its necessary and universally valid product in adjustment to activity. The truth is always for use. Its validity, necessity, and universality are such only because these formulations are a

successful means to the satisfactory conduct of life. In varying situations, some particular act must be performed if the needs of the subject are to be satisfied. Conscious direction of activity in adjustment to the environment is the condition of preservation and welfare. Our reflective thought is always in behalf of some present interest or end. Through our knowledge, we are enabled to anticipate events and compel things in some measure at least to serve our purposes. We must know *what is* if we are to conduct life securely. We must also know how to guide our life so as to be in harmony with the means which measure the worth of actions in the light of propriety, morality, justice, and duty.

That thought is entirely in the service of life's ends is shown by the fact that we make mistakes and fail to attain our purposes. When once convinced of our error, we put aside as no longer of any use what we formerly held to be the truth, very much as the artisan throws away his broken or worn-out tool and takes up another. Likewise, we seek to replace our errors with the truth which shall be a better and more trustworthy instrument in the conduct of life.

While our thought carries within itself its own criterion of truth and refuses to pass beyond itself to an external standard, all thinking is undertaken with the implication that its results are a trustworthy guide in dealing with reality, whatever it is and however its relation to knowledge may have to be understood. It should, however, be recognized that this implication is clearly an assumption that the products of thought are as trustworthy as the antecedents of the thinking, and that the laws of our thinking which are necessarily followed in the connection of our ideas bring us to results that may be safely used in dealing with the real chain of events.

Let these principles be applied to theology. The

antecedents of theological reflection are individual and social religious experiences in all their endless variety. Included in these antecedents are the objective revelation of different sacred writings as something given for reflective treatment. Whatever this given material may be, it is primary, while the theology that results from its reflective treatment is secondary and derivative. If so, can the theological structure be accepted as knowledge of the divine Being with as much confidence as the primary experience and the objective revelation? In brief, what is the relation of theology to belief? What is its function in the religious life? This question should be answered from the general view of the functional nature of thought in the conduct of life. From this standpoint, every theological structure should be regarded, not as an end in itself, but as subservient to the needs and purposes of the religious life, for it was never intended to be anything but functional and instrumental, and, if the tool fits neither the subject that uses it nor the object to which it is to be applied, it should be put away. Consequently, the sphere, function, and problem of theology grow out of the application to religious experience of a form of the epistemological theory concerning the relation of thought to its antecedents and of truth to reality.

It is assumed throughout the discussion that the theology of each generation springs out of its intellectual, social, and religious life, which makes it necessary to view theological doctrines historically and to regard theology as both general in the sense that it forms historically a continuous whole, and particular in the sense of being the theology of a given age or individual. Since the earliest conceptions of theology were formed in the sphere of philosophy, and since there is a close relation between philosophy and theology in their history as well as in their content, Part I. presents an outline of the

chief movements in speculative thought preparatory to the rise of Christian theology and the general course of its development to the Reformation. Part II. shows how a new philosophy and a new theology sprang from the adoption of the principle of the Reformation. This second part is not intended for the philosopher or theologian as such, but for those who have long clung to the ancient Christian doctrines and are beginning to feel that they are in a language that is foreign to the modern spirit. Frequently the trained theologian or philosopher dismisses Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl with a few words of approval or criticism, presupposing the reader's familiarity with them. For the sake of those who may appreciate a simple statement of some of their doctrines, I have devoted considerable space to these great thinkers and to the lines of thought springing from them, convinced that they have made it necessary to go forward in the present to a new theology rather than back to the ancient conceptions of the Christian faith, while they give new life and strength to the essential Christian faith itself. Part III. assumes that the theology of to-day should be the utterance of the religious consciousness which reflects the period in which we live, and endeavours to outline some of the contributions which modern science, especially psychology and philosophy, make to theology. But, if modern science and philosophy differ from the ancient intellectual environment in which Christian theology had its origin, it is evident that the present basis of theology formed by modern thought requires a fresh statement of the Christian faith if theology is to appeal successfully to the age in which we live. Moreover, if modern science and philosophy afford a constructive basis for theology more favourable to the content of the Christian faith than the ancient speculations which furnished the conceptions used by the early theologians, may it not be possible

to appropriate modern scientific and philosophical thought in such a way as to produce a theology which shall best meet the needs of the present generation? To show this to be possible by an examination and comparison of some aspects of ancient and modern thought is the purpose of the following discussions. No attempt, however, has been made to present the history of thought exhaustively or to construct a theology. The sole object has been to make clear the relation of important movements of thought in the past and present to the subject under discussion, in the hope of preparing the way for the study and treatment of theology itself.

CHAPTER II

THE ANTECEDENTS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

It has already been shown that the early religions were institutional and ritualistic rather than doctrinal. Sacred writings appear comparatively late in the evolution of religion, while independent constructive thought upon what is believed is still later. In the case of Christianity, the interval between the simple faith of the first believers in Christ and the first efforts to formulate the contents of the Christian faith is brief compared with that of other religions. Christianity arose in the latter days of an ancient civilization which made a permanent contribution to the world's culture. Especially was this true of the Greeks. Judaism itself, out of which Christianity sprang, was permeated by Greek ideas and had become, particularly at Alexandria, something like a philosophy. Almost immediately were the Christians compelled to adjust themselves to their Judaic and Greek environment by efforts to formulate their own faith. The New Testament contains the germs of theology, as seen, for example, in the writings of St. Paul, while from the middle of the second century to the sixth the chief doctrines of the Christian faith took shape, although there have been subsequent additions and modifications.

The factors, therefore, entering into the construction of Christian theology were: first, the

significance of Christianity as it appeared in Jesus of Nazareth and was experienced by the believers in Him, that is, the "essence" of Christianity; secondly, the Semitic and particularly the Hebrew thought often modified by the influence of Greek ideas; thirdly, Greek philosophy or theology (Aristotle), which, through the medium of Greek conceptions used by the early theologians to formulate their faith, gained a foothold in Christian thought which has never been relinquished. Consequently our old as well as new theology are alike more than Christian—they are also Hebrew and pre-eminently Greek. Towards the thought of their generation, the leaders of the Christian community were partly conciliatory, partly apologetic, but chiefly did they seek so to express the significance of the Christian faith in the borrowed Greek conceptions as to produce a *means* of its defence and differentiation from the prevailing speculation. Even Tertullian and Lactantius, who bitterly opposed Greek philosophy, could not avoid the use of its conceptions, probably, however, without clearly understanding their meaning. It would seem, therefore, that Greek philosophy could not have furnished the Christian theologians such necessary conceptions, had it not been already a theology, except in name. As a matter of fact, Greek philosophy served as a theology for a large portion of the world before Christianity developed a theology of its own. It may, therefore, be expected that ancient philosophy will show in its historical development traces of a preparation for Christianity and a deepening of a sense of need among the Greek thinkers themselves, and that many of the views of life usually regarded as peculiar to Christianity were already familiar to the Greek philosophers. For, after all, what is philosophy but self-knowledge, as Kuno Fischer said, in which is involved the knowledge of the world and of God? Is it not an attempt

to think things together? To see things from the universal standpoint, which is to think them in relation to each other in a system which satisfies both mind and heart? If this may be accepted as a working definition of philosophy, it is scarcely different from the aim of modern systematic theologians, who would unite their conception of God with their conceptions of man and nature.¹ Such philosophy or theology cannot be a fixed science, but each individual and each age will have a philosophy which most completely expresses thought upon the ultimate questions relating to the universe and human life. I know that the content of the term, philosophy, has varied during the centuries. Nevertheless, I believe that, as we review the development of Greek philosophy, we are really tracing the course of what is a theology in the sense of "the reflective analysis of the consciousness of God in its distinctive form, and in its connection with all our other consciousness of reality." Indeed, Aristotle first used the term theology as "the science of the principles of Being and Knowing which finds its ultimate object in God." The thing itself lacking the name was found in Plato, who "might, indeed, justly be called the first systematic theologian."² Even from the beginning of Greek philosophy, there is the same striving to become clearly conscious concerning the self, world, and God.

The close relation that has evidently existed historically between theology and philosophy implies some common basis which is religion, the mother of them both. Religion is a general conception representing a complex experience springing from the constituent factors of man's nature. Religion, moreover, is an implicit philosophy of life and the universe. "A people's religion is a metaphysic, that is, the conviction of a truly existing super-sensible reality."³ It is an implicit interpretation of things and events and man's relation to them. Primitive man's religious

nature was awakened and developed in connection with his experience of his natural environment. Events which he knew were caused by himself needed no further explanation, but other events, such as movements and changes that were strange enough to attract his attention and interest, were easily regarded as produced by some hidden agency conceived after analogy with the self. Any particular object that repeatedly produced beneficial or injurious effects was regarded as the living author of such effects, and these agencies were then endowed with corresponding attributes. What more fitting than to wonder at and admire, or fear and tremble, before these beings, according as their deeds were favourable or unfavourable ! Let them be appeased and their favour won by petition, sacrifice, and worship !⁴ In brief, primitive man's religion was an implicit explanation of things and events by spiritual agencies which were really nothing but symbolized natural causes and effects not as yet recognized as such. Accordingly, when Homer founded the religion of the Greeks, as Herodotus says,⁵ by giving to them the Homeric world controlled by the gods, he idealized and personified natural causes and gave the gods human attributes. The more sober-minded Hesiod, in the latter half of the eighth century B.C., wrote his *Theogony* or genesis of the gods, which is also a cosmogony or an account of the origin of the world, and indicates progress towards scientific explanations.⁶ The next step in the order of development towards scientific thought seems to belong to the Orphic doctrines, which gave expression to a heightened interest in the future of the soul, regarding it as determined by the character of the earthly life.⁷ The Orphic "theologians," as Aristotle called them, were also not satisfied with the common mythology either in its morality or in its crude answers to the questions concerning the origin of things, and they

endeavoured to render the mythical interpretation of the world-order more complete.⁸

It is, then, sufficient to say in general that mythical beings in their relations symbolized the important conceptions of systematic unity, cause and effect of agencies in relation to each other, and served as the explanation of existence. It was only necessary to drop the symbol and explain things and events by natural causes to have philosophy in its primary meaning. This was what took place in the awakening intellectual life of Greece, for the popular conceptions of the gods lost their hold upon the people, and, in the upper circles at least, philosophy became the substitute of the discredited religion. But in doing this, religion was not neglected, rather was it deepened and spiritualized.⁹

The Christian theologian believes in God, who is a spirit manifested in the world of material and spiritual existences which come to be and pass away. But this conception of God treasures in itself the results of human development. Early Greek philosophy sought only the fundamental principle that makes the world what it is, and the "physiologers" defined that principle in terms of some natural element, like water, air, fire, without distinguishing the spiritual from the material. But these "physiologers" were really seeking to explain what is seen by some unseen unitary cause and to relate the world of things and events to it, assuming some sort of order in reality which reason may know; they were trying to understand such conceptions as substance and attribute, cause and effect, one and the many, permanence and change.

The Christian theologian has always had difficulty in showing how the eternal God is related to His world in which there are changes, imperfection, and death. So after the Greek reached the thought of an eternal ground of all things, it became almost

impossible to say just what its relation to finite existences might be. Many shut their eyes to the difficulty and exalted the oneness of Being. The way for doing so was prepared by the "theologian," Xenophanes (530 B.C.), who, in indignation towards the shameful deeds of the gods of Homer and Hesiod, exclaimed, "There is one God, supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind." God is not like anything man can fashion. "Without toil he rules all things by the power of his mind." Parmenides (495 B.C.) reaches a loftier point, speculatively, in what amounts to an idealism, when he says in his poem "On Nature": "One and the same are thought and that whereby there is thinking." Being is one, birthless, deathless, "whole and only-begotten . . . same in the same and abiding, and self through itself it reposes." The "notions of mortals" do not lay hold of this truth, but erroneously regard the things of sense as truly real.¹⁰

On the other hand, the changes in the world held the attention of Heraclitus (505 B.C.), who taught that all is fire, "all flows." Perhaps he used the term fire as a symbol of his meaning that all is process; but Heraclitus also finds a permanent unity in the midst of this change which suggests the Divine Logos of the Christian era: "Everything happens in accordance with the Word (λόγος)," which is "the thought by which all things through all things are guided." This Logos is the source of the social order, "for all human laws are fed by one divine law." Nor was Heraclitus without profound moral and religious thought: "It is hard to contend against the heart; for it is ready to sell the soul to purchase its desires. For the most part the knowledge of things divine escapes us because of our unbelief."

Pythagoras, too, and his followers attempted to unite the world and the supreme One by holding the

nature of things to be number, "and from the number One all other numbers spring, and the whole heavens are simply numbers." The number theory means that a thing is, at least for thought, the principle of its construction, and that this principle is number, a view that anticipates Plato's idealism. Since the number of the soul harmonizes with that of the world-soul, man may know the supreme reality. His knowledge lays hold of eternal Being. While Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus explained things and events by the combination and dispersion of elements differently conceived, each turns his thought away from the changes in the world to something that might be called divine unity, named, for example, *νοῦς* by Anaxagoras, and the Law of Necessity by Democritus. Thus the Pre-Socratic philosophers, for the most part, developed the conception of the World-Ground as a permanent unity, and recognized the problem involved in its relation to the transient world of things and events.

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle contributed most to the further spiritualization of the conception of the world principle, but with an increasing tendency towards dualism, for Greek philosophy never succeeded in bringing the world of particular existences with their imperfections and change into a vital unity with the World-Ground. The antithesis between the *τὸ ὄν* and the *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, being and not-being, deepened till in Plotinus an impassable abyss was thought to exist between the supreme One and matter. While Christian theology owes much to Greek philosophy, it received from Greek philosophy, in part at least, the unfortunate conception of this present, material, sensuous existence as something at enmity with the spirit and incapable of being united with it. A brief outline of this movement is necessary in order to show the intellectual environment in which Christianity developed its theology.

Although Socrates, like the Sophists, did not directly teach a philosophy of Being, partly because he believed it was not attainable but chiefly because it was lacking in ethical value and more practical problems were at hand, he viewed the world as morally trustworthy and governed by a divine Ruler who was not indifferent to human conduct. This belief was not systematically developed, but accompanied his theory of the moral life which refuted the Sophist's individualistic scepticism that affected the whole of human experience, particularly the moral and religious. The strong personality of Socrates left no room to doubt the reality of moral obligation and whatever is necessary to its fulfilment. But knowledge is necessary to moral action, and must therefore be possible, at least so far as the needs of the moral life are concerned. This must mean that the world-order is not indifferent to man's knowing and doing, for knowledge as such cannot fail of reaching Being. Knowledge cannot, then, be by sensations, as the Sophists taught, but by conceptions and judgments, which in their objectivity give a trustworthy report of reality. Hence the importance of seeking clear definitions of virtue, justice, and the good for the proper conduct of life in the world as it is. From this point, the Socratic view of the moral life passes readily into the belief in a supreme Ruler, whom he conceived after the analogy of the soul as the mind (*νοῦς*) dwelling in the world. "As the soul takes care for the body, so divine Providence takes care for the world, and especially for men," particularly in their moral struggles, to help those who would live well. Nor has Socrates any doubt of the relation of the human soul to the Divine, and is confident of another and blessed life.¹¹

Plato adopted the doctrine of Socrates concerning the moral life and the nature of knowledge, and extends it to the universe. Under the influence of Socrates,

he viewed everything in subordination to the supreme Idea of the Good. It is evident that Plato sought to unite the changeless Being of Parmenides with the ceaseless flux of Heracleitus, but not with complete success. Since knowledge is by conceptions and cannot fail to reach being, these conceptions or ideas may be thought of as changeless and permanent realities, a view which betrays the influence of Parmenides, who said in his poem "On Nature" that thought and being are identical. In these Ideas the things of the transient world participate and thus acquire whatever reality they possess. Such is the common interpretation of Plato's Ideas. Even Aristotle criticized Plato for assigning to the Ideas an existence apart from particular things, calling their participation in the Ideas a meaningless metaphor, which would seem to indicate that Plato did teach the independent existence of the pure Ideas.

A more satisfactory interpretation holds that Plato in his doctrine of Ideas was asserting the importance of the universal principle in the knowledge of particular things presented to the senses, and that this universal is "beyond" and transcends the sensuous particulars, only as a principle of unity common to the many individuals whose individuality contains much that differentiates them from the universal, without which the particulars could not be, for universal and particular are terms or categories that have no significance apart from each other. Plato also related these principles of unity, these Ideas, determining particular groups of things, to each other, and finally to the supreme Idea of the Good, which gathers up into itself the significance of the lesser Ideas and gives them unity in and through itself. Here again is a unity of differences which now appears as a supreme spiritual existence, which expresses itself in the Ideas to be realized as ends in the world-order.

The Platonic Socrates with much hesitation

endeavours to explain what the Idea of the Good means. In fact, it signifies the full satisfaction of the soul. "This good, then, every soul pursues, as the end of all its actions, divining its existence, but perplexed and unable to apprehend satisfactorily its nature or to enjoy that steady confidence in relation to it which it does enjoy in relation to other things." But this good of souls can only be realized in a spiritual community which was for Plato the ideal state. The Good is also the reason or cause of there being a world at all whose function is to reveal in its manifold forms the nature of the Good. The Idea of the Good also makes possible the union between the subject's knowledge and the objects known, for it "supplies the objects of real knowledge with the truth that is in them, and . . . renders to him who knows them the faculty of knowing them."¹² Still another implication of the Idea of the Good is that it is the final end or purpose of the universe being realized in particular existences, each fulfilling its own special end, which in turn is gathered up into the supreme Idea of the Good as the end of the entire cosmic process.

Plato found much difficulty in showing the relation of the eternal, changeless Ideas, which science lays hold of, to the world of things and events, which he would not, like Parmenides, call an illusion, for it has a certain phenomenal reality. In order to get over the difficulty, Plato assumed a formless substratum that receives all forms without itself retaining any, and which cannot be defined, for all definition is taken from a realm in which it is not found but which in some mysterious manner it assists. Plato spoke of this secondary principle as τὸ μὴ ὄν or non-being, unlimited, space, possibility. Plato, as so often, solves the problem of the relation of the Ideas to the world of things by resorting to a figure of speech. The secondary principle or formless matter is attracted by the Ideas—the Ideas culminating in

the Good—and moves of itself, impelled by the desire for form, to take on form; it is the maternal principle, and the Ideas are the paternal principle, and from their union comes the cosmos, “the only son and image of the invisible Divinity.” The cosmos has a body governed by necessity, a meaning, a “final goal for which it was made, an end to realize, a soul” by which the unity of the world is maintained and subordinated to the Creator¹³ (see reference for note on the different uses of the term *matter* and *non-being*).

It is of no avail to try to explain away Plato's dualism, for he introduces a secondary principle which receives forms but is itself formless and indefinable, and which is conceived as in some sense actively resisting the Ideas, giving rise to the ugly, the imperfect, and the evil both physical and moral. Even the entire realm of the sensuous and of opinion has something in it that cannot be fully brought into relation with intelligence. It also seems to determine Plato's view of the moral and religious life which consists in passing beyond this world of non-being, imperfection, and illusion to the world of Ideas, the true realities. This transient world of sense even has a deep use, for it reminds the soul of the ideal realities. Man belongs, indeed, to this perishing world and suffers its changes, but he is the embodiment of an eternal Idea which is the distinctively divine factor in his nature and the truly rational and immortal part of man. But the divine element in man finds the body a prison-house, for its powers are restrained so that it no longer has a clear knowledge of the true realities which were once experienced. Men are like prisoners in a dark cavern, seeing only shadows which are taken for the true realities, and which should arouse in the soul the reminiscence of its former experience in the eternal home of the Ideas. But when the soul once knows the truth clearly, the problem of

life becomes that of looking beyond the world of sense and pleasure to the ideal and living in harmony with true Being. But true Being in its final significance is the Good which is also called God, the Absolute, in whom all the other Ideas dwell. Hence it follows that man's well-being consists in living according to his knowledge of the divine reality. The divine element in man should so completely dominate his life as to produce that unity of the supreme virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, which is justice—a beautiful harmony of the powers of the self, like the harmony that prevails among the Ideas. It is clear that Plato's teachings concerning life are filled with a profound seeking for and resting in the Divine. Hence it is that Plato appealed so powerfully to the Church Fathers of the early Christian centuries, who found much in him for their use in the defence of Christianity. How beautiful is the following, taken from the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* :

“In God is no unrighteousness at all—he is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like him than he is of us who is the most righteous.” Since the good is heavenly and the evil earthly, “we ought to fly thither, and to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him is to become holy and just and wise.” “To know this is true wisdom and manhood and the ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice.” The reward of evil is to be increasingly evil and live with the evil, “but when they (the evil) hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools.” In Plato's description of the philosopher as the governor of his ideal state, he is really describing the moral and religious but wise man who is responsive to all that is good and of eternal worth. This righteous and gentle ruler so fits the regulations of society to men that they may come into the “form and likeness of God.” “And one feature they will erase (in the

human image) and another they will inscribe, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God.”¹⁴

Such are some of the features of Plato's philosophy of life which culminates in a religious belief and a theology, the centre of which is the doctrine of Ideas as a kingdom of truth valid in itself and superior to human opinion and choice. The conviction that there is such a realm of truth is the foundation of all progress in science, and imparts to the whole of life the most significant inner strengthening and exaltation as men attain their full and harmonious realization and perfection, having their souls drawn upward from the shifting shadows of the world of opinion, through understanding and reasoning (Dialectic), to the eternal world of reality in which the essential Form of the Good is supreme.¹⁵ While Plato cannot be freed from the charge of holding a dualism, it is, however, foreign to the spirit of his system, which is idealistic and spiritualistic, and implies that a supreme Intelligence is manifested in the world of finite existences whose function is to realize the Good as the highest meaning of the universe. Thus Plato approaches a theistic view of the world and lays the basis for a theology.

Although Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, is his master's most severe critic, there are no two philosophers whose views are so much alike. Aristotle often exaggerates the point he attacks, as in his criticism of the doctrine of Ideas, which he thinks Plato believed to exist in a realm distinct from the world of things, whereas we seem to find the true meaning of Plato in Aristotle's own view rather than in what he attributes to his master. The close relation between the two systems renders it unnecessary to enter into details. Aristotle makes an advance upon Plato by being more faithful to immediate experience, but he is no mere empiricist, for we can

only know things by their general principles. He is, therefore, more ready than Plato to patiently rise from the details of particular things to generalizations. He also advances beyond Plato by his deeper interest in the phenomena of life and by his ideas of organisms and development. Aristotle introduces the conception of the soul as distinct from the Intelligence, and declares the soul to be the form which realizes or brings into activity and actuality the capacities of an organic body. There is an ascending series of soul-forms which makes it possible to "look upon the whole ascending movement of organic being as an effort after the complete and self-determined existence which is found only in God. . . . In the ascending scale we reach at last the rational life of man, which at least, in the pure activity of contemplation, can directly participate in the eternal and the divine."

Aristotle, however, is not able to be consistent with the organic idea which appears in his conception of life and of the union of soul and body, for he introduces in an intensified form the conception of a material substratum which appeared in Plato. The dualism is more pronounced. Although Aristotle strives against the tendency to separate soul and body, he does not succeed, as in the view that the soul is not affected by the decay of the body. Besides, the reason of man "seems to be born in us as an independent substance, which is beyond decay and death," and at death memory and the affections cease with the body and do not attach to the pure reason, which is something divine and cannot be the subject of any such modes as these.¹⁶ This separable portion of the soul is evidently the pure active reason that knows the forms or universal ideas of things. This active reason in the individual is essentially identical with creative reason, the difference being that, in the creative reason, knowledge is

eternally actual, but "this knowledge is in time prior in the individual to knowledge as an actually realized condition." It is in so far as man's soul is identical with the creative reason that it is immortal, "whereas the receptive passive intellect (affected by objects) is perishable, and can really think nothing without the support of the creative intellect." ¹⁷

The dualistic character of Aristotle's doctrine of man which has just been presented appears in the antithesis between the pure reason which unites with the Divine while the memories and affections perish with the body. A similar dualistic tendency appears in his ethical doctrine, which makes the good the full realization of the soul's capacities; it is a perfection of man as he fulfils his supreme end as man in which is the highest happiness. The moral virtues are habitual modes of choice under the guidance of the practical reason which produces a symmetry, a proportion in the activity, a happy "mean" between extremes. These manifestations of moral excellences, such as noble ideas and acts of justice, are naturally pleasant, indicating that the ultimate nature of man is being realized, but appropriate feeling and love must accompany these acts, for "a man is not good at all unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds." ¹⁸ But the supreme and purest happiness is found in the vision of truth attained through the speculative or contemplative reason, the pure divine element in man whose exercise is superior to any practical or moral virtue which springs from our compound human nature. We ought, therefore, "to lift our thoughts above what is human and mortal (and), as far as possible, to put off our mortality and make every effort to live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties; for though it be but a small part of us, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. And indeed this part would even seem to constitute our true self." ¹⁹

A brief reference to Aristotle's conception of God must suffice, though it marks the culmination of his system which he designated as First Philosophy or Theology. God is the unmoved First Mover and final end of all things. God is pure actuality, pure Form, beyond the primal heavens, which are moved and in turn move the lower heavens and through them the world of things. God is the First Mover, not efficiently but teleologically as a desired object. Thus the Pure Form or God is the final purpose and cause of all things which have in them aspects of the Divine (forms), in so far as they are intelligible and exhibit in their several degrees the divine perfection.

Reasoning from what we experience when our life is at its best, we may say that God's self-activity is bliss. In rare moments, we experience the actual life of the intellect and attain the joy of pure speculative vision of the intelligible world. "If then God is always as well off as we are now and then, how wonderful it is! And if he is always better off, it is still more wonderful. But such is the fact. And life belongs to him; for the activity of the mind is life, and he is that activity. Pure self-activity of reason is God's most blessed and everlasting life. We say that God is living, eternal, perfect; and continuous and everlasting life is God's, for God is eternal life." The object of the divine thought must be the noblest and best, from which it follows that "the divine reason has itself for its object and its thinking is a thinking of thinking."

If now Aristotle's view of man's supreme good be brought into relation to this conception of God, it is evident that man's highest good is identical with the divine life to which man attains, and in which man finds his true self. From this standpoint, Aristotle's conception of God and man contains a mystical element and is a noble expression of the aspiration of the religious spirit.²⁰ The dualism,

however, is evident, for God as pure form has no clearly conceived relation to the world of forms and matter, though it is implied that these finite forms are all embraced in the supreme Form or divine Intelligence. Even so there is the material substratum beside the pure Form rather than in vital union with it. Moreover, the moral virtues that are produced by the practical reason in relation to the pleasures and pains that rise up from the irrational side of life are not to be compared for excellence with the exercise of the pure reason and the final vision of and union with the creative reason, a view that had great influence upon subsequent philosophy and upon theology. Nor does Aristotle seem to give any ultimate value to the moral virtues. Why do they not also suffer the fate of the memory and the affections, which perish with the body? In this connection, reference may be made to the opposite views held by Kant and Aristotle as to the relation of the theoretical or pure reason as contrasted with the practical in the apprehension of God. With Kant, knowledge cannot attain to God, but with Aristotle, the exercise of the pure reason in knowledge is the only function of man that can reach the divine Being. With Kant, the practical or moral reason reaches God by means of postulates rendered necessary by the moral law. With Aristotle, the practical reason deals with the irrational and particular, and cannot rise to God, which seems to cast doubt upon the ultimate worth of the moral virtues.

This sketch of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle leaves much unnoticed. Their systems are great empires of truth and mark the intellectual climax of the ancient world. One of Aristotle's pupils was Alexander the Great, who in his turn constructed a vast political empire, which brought the Greek learning into closer contact with Oriental thought, producing in the newly founded city of Alexandria in

Egypt a unique philosophical environment under whose influences many of the doctrines of the Christian Church were later formulated. Both these great empires broke up after their founders passed away.

There were the conflicting views of many schools. Both the Academy and the Lyceum were continued ; besides, there were Epicureans and Stoics, Sceptics, including the sensualistic school under the leadership of Pyrrho, and Eclectics whose attitude was characteristic of the Romans in their relation to the Greek learning after the final victory of Rome over Greece in 146 B.C.²¹

During this period, increasing emphasis was placed upon life—its meaning and destiny and the means to its fulfilment. There were many causes of this change, among which may be mentioned the destruction of the Greek state and its subordination to Rome. The Greeks had looked upon the state with peculiar devotion, expecting to find in it the fulfilment of their hopes. Plato and Aristotle each had a theory of the state according to which man's highest life could be realized, but now, in view of the changes that had taken place, men were turned from dependence upon the external to the inner life, in which it was felt that the solution of all problems must be found, if at all. Indeed, man must look to himself, his triumph must be a triumph of the soul. Consequently the period from Aristotle till after the coming of Christ was one of ever-deepening inner life ; men became more self-conscious, more sensitive to the fortunes of the soul itself. It was in many respects a dark, corrupt age, but beneath it was a growing soul-need, a profound longing for a completeness of life not yet attained. Sceptics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Eclectics were all seeking to discover the most fitting means of satisfying these demands of the soul. For a period of about one hundred and fifty years after Aristotle, these efforts were marked

by confidence in man's ability and self-sufficiency, and the period has been called ethical in contrast with the religious character of its latter part, in which there developed a conviction that man was not self-sufficient for the solution of the problems of life, and there was an increasing tendency to search far and wide for help. Instead of original investigations of independent thinkers, men appealed to what had already been done and said, to Plato, to Aristotle, or it may be to some prophet of Semitic origin. Toward the close of the period, there was even an attempt to reinstate the old religions to meet the keenly felt needs.

Only two examples of these changes need be mentioned, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics, who both sought to define the good which Socrates left in doubt when he said that the wise man was virtuous and happy, without defining the relation between happiness, wisdom, and virtue. The Cyrenaics were the antecedents of the Epicureans, whose views of life were in some respects superior. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) and many of his followers, as, for example, Lucretius (95-55 B.C.), were worthy men, and in the Greco-Roman period Epicureanism acquired such a character as to meet a real religious need. Its speculative basis is atomic materialism and sensationalism in knowledge, with a close relation to the philosophy of Democritus.

The ethical doctrines are, however, of chief importance. The first good is to live happily, of which pleasure is the beginning and end. Although every pleasure is a good according to its nature, not every pleasure is worthy of being chosen, nor is every pain to be avoided. Rather should the man of insight estimate all these things with a view to what is suitable for maintaining the health of the body and the tranquillity of the soul. This is pleasure as the chief good, and to live pleasantly is to live prudently,

honourably, and justly with holy opinions respecting the gods and fearless with respect to death. Why fear death? To the living, it is not; to the dead, existence is not. As Lucretius says, "All unconsciously imagine something of self to survive," to suffer loss, whereas it is immortal death. Of course, there is a note of despair in such views; nevertheless, they are a brave attempt in a dark age to accept willingly whatever the laws of the universe, of which man is only a part, bring to pass. To this extent Epicureanism was an answer to the soul's religious needs. But it was also a failure to appropriate the things and events of this transient world as factors in the realization of the good. The finite still appeared as something irreducible to the demands of the intelligence.

The Stoics reached a similar result along another line. Their ethical doctrine is supported by a metaphysic which is a compound of the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras and the "central fire" of Heraclitus, which is essentially activity guided by a rational order or Logos. The Stoics drop the dualism that appears in Plato and more emphatically in Aristotle, and regard matter and mind as different aspects of the same thing. Hence man is both material and spiritual and partakes immediately of God, who is at once the "central fire" and the spiritual principle in which all existences have their being. These finite existences have an individuality of their own, especially the self-conscious individuality of man, yet all are embraced in a unity as the modes in which the one divine principle is manifested and realized. Marcus Aurelius addresses the world as "Thou lovely City of God." Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, praises God in a noble hymn: "Most glorious of immortals, O thou of many names, All powerful ever, hail! On thee it is fit all men should call. . . . So will I make my song of thee and chant thy power

forever. . . . Nothing occurs on earth apart from thee, O Lord, . . . save what the wicked work through lack of wisdom.”²² Consequently, by living out his true nature, each man is both most truly individual and at the same time most universal, for he then brings himself into harmony with the divine Mind dwelling in himself and in the universe. It is because the universal rational principle is so important in knowledge and in man’s essential nature that to live in harmony with it is virtue, and renders all lesser objects of particular desires indifferent but not necessarily without value. “For all other pleasures,” says Epictetus, “substitute the consciousness that you are obeying God, and performing not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wise and good man.”

It is worthy of notice that the Stoic and the Kantian principles of morals are practically identical. Zeno said, “Act consistently on one principle.” Kant said, “Act so that you can will that the maxim of your action should become a universal law.” “Both views go upon the idea that the reason which makes us men is an impartial faculty, a faculty in us that abstracts from our own individual case, and, indeed, from every individual case; and both views imply that we cannot act consistently on one law or principle and yet act wrongly. . . . To universalize the maxim of an act, therefore, must mean, if it means anything, to conceive it as an element in the system of things, which can be realized consistently with the realization of all the other elements that make up that system.” This is the same thing as the Stoic idea of acting consistently with our own nature.²³

While the Stoic emphasized the importance of living according to universal reason in himself and in the world, he was unable to show how the particular interests of human life can in any way contribute to the realization of virtue, which is the sole thing in our power, in consequence of which all other

things are indifferent when seen in the light of the universal reason as the rule of action. For the Stoic, as Bradley says, "The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil." Consequently, the Stoic is ascetic and pessimistic towards the concrete facts of present life with its storm and stress, but becomes optimistic when he makes himself master of the world-thought, inwardly appropriating the whole to himself, seeing through his necessities, thereby transforming them into freedom. In the first case, man is a slave, in the other, the free master of things. As Seneca said, "To obey God is freedom." Thus one promotes his own true individuality and finds his freedom in self-surrender to the rational order of the universe—a position which can be consistently maintained only by recognizing the fundamental unity of the Divine and the human, thus avoiding the dualism that appeared in Aristotle. But the Stoics were not able satisfactorily to carry out this truth, for their error lay in not seeing that the divine reason in man and in the universe can only be realized in and through the particulars. While it may be necessary for the individual temporarily to sacrifice particular interests, it does not follow that they are indifferent; they are rather elements in the whole and the good will can only be realized through them, that is, through the family, the community, and the state. From this point of view, the finite with all its variety still appears to the Stoic as foreign and irreconcilable with the universal. But the Stoic in introducing the idea of God as the universal Mind manifesting itself in the world, however vaguely conceived, prepared the way for Christianity to take up this idea and vitalize it by bringing God and men into an immediate personal union with each other. On the other hand, in failing to appropriate the particular interests of this life in realizing the good will and in

declaring that the ideal life consists in identifying the rational self with the pure divine reason, the Stoic strips man of his individuality and prepares the way for the mystic union with God foreshadowed in Plato, and especially in Aristotle, but fully developed in Plotinus.

It is now clear that the Stoic philosophy of life met a real moral and religious need in an age which had largely given up faith in the gods. Since all men participate in the divine Mind, the Stoics were enabled to teach the organic unity of humanity and the brotherhood of men, which tended to lessen the hardships of slavery and to promote the care of the poor and sick as God's children. Especially towards the Christian era and after Christ came, Stoicism became increasingly religious in character, but it was only one of the movements that marked this long period. Everywhere there was an increasing sense of need and a deepening of the inner life. Consequently, there was more consciousness of self and more reflection upon life and its destiny. That there was much that was cruel and shallow is granted, but it is just possible that this very shallowness itself sprang from a despair which could only exist in an age of deep reflection and inner experience.²⁴

It is now necessary to outline another important movement, which contributed greatly to the condition of things in the first centuries of the Christian era, during which the Church Fathers gave formal expression to the Christian faith. Alexander the Great symbolized the union of the East and the West by the espousal of an Oriental woman. This union had an intellectual result which became a permanent possession of mankind. The two great streams, on the one hand, the Greek learning, on the other, Oriental religion and speculation, flowed together finally in the broad current of Alexandrian philosophy, which had a powerful influence upon the Church

Fathers. The causes of this union were, no doubt, partly political and intellectual, for frequent attempts were made to interpret the different lines of thought and belief in terms of each other ; but a deeper cause was the increasing need of the inner life, the growing conviction of failure to satisfy that need, and the consequent search after help from some source. The intellectual products of this syncretism are functional in their nature, and serve to adjust life to the changed environment.

In order to bring the two lines of thought together, their essential identity was assumed, resulting in a mutual accommodation which required radical changes. Take, for example, the two conceptions of God and the world. The Semitic, especially the Hebrew, who is of most importance in this movement, looked upon the Deity as transcendent, almighty Power, supreme Lord over all. The world was a secondary affair, almost a foreign factor, removed from immediate relation with the Divine. Of course, this statement is not strictly true, for I know that God was conceived as being in the thunder and the lightning, as feeding the beasts of the field and the birds of the air, and clothing the flowers with their beauty ; yet in the main the transcendence of Jehovah was emphasized to the neglect of the divine immanence. Certainly, Jehovah was conceived by the Hebrew to enter upon the course of earthly events in miraculous appearances and deeds, and inspired utterances of prophets. God is, however, regarded as in unique personal relation with man. The "covenant" was a moral conception, for it represented the relation between God and His people as due to a voluntary choice, and was a powerful agency in making morality conscious. Wrong ceased to be violation of custom and became voluntary rebellion in disobedience of the commands of the divine personal Lawgiver. The prophets were the most important

moral agency in Israel's religion, for they brought a message from a living source of authority intended for the immediate situation; they seized upon the inward purpose and social conduct of man as of essential importance. Righteousness could be gained only by bringing the will into harmony with the supreme Person. Under the influence of the prophets, sincerity and purity of motives were emphasized, and responsibility for sin was transferred from the group to the individual person, while all the moral conceptions were summarized in the inexhaustible Ideal of Life in the Messianic kingdom of justice, love, and peace. Thus there is a richness and depth in the moral conceptions of the Hebrew prophets which compares favourably with the purest Greek thoughts, and exceeds them in intensity of conviction and warmth of devotion.²⁵

On the other hand, it has been shown that the Greek taught the one God so far as he taught any, but the tendency was to identify the Divine with the world as a whole, which was a rational unity: certainly, a causally determined whole with causal relations which were inviolable. The Greek's thoughts were, then, world-centred, with definite conceptions of a fixed order which admitted of no interruption. Miracle and prophecy, in the Hebrew significance of these terms, were an abomination to the Greek mind. The Deity, so far as this conception was admissible, was immanent in the cosmos, yet with a dualistic tendency that became increasingly important. In the attempt to unite the Eastern and Western thought, the Greek acquired an interest in the specific Hebrew conceptions such as miracle and prophecy, while the Jews turned their attention to natural science and the causal relations of the world-system, developing a tendency towards fatalism. This fusion assumed many forms, only a few of which can be noticed.²⁶

Among the Hebrews, the teachings of the Wise

Men formed a link between the revelation of Old Testament prophecy and the best moral and intellectual attainments of other nations. Their doctrines grew out of reflections upon experience, and, because of the identity of human needs and of human reason, these doctrines often coincide with conceptions of life found among the Greeks, and prepare for and to some extent contribute to the union of Oriental and Occidental thought. The Wise Men shared with the priests and prophets the moral and religious training of the people. The priests looked after the details of the Levitical Law and the observance of the Mosaic institutions. The prophets passionately protested against formalism, and enforced the supreme importance of eternal laws. In a less exalted tone, the Wise Men taught the lessons of prudential experience, agreeing with the prophets concerning the inferiority of the ceremonial system, but with them the Messianic hope is not evident. Their counsels were valued, and served to bring the people into sympathy with the work of the prophets, who returned the kindly feeling with their commendation, just as the Delphic oracle approved the Wise Men of Greece who arose in a similar stage of culture.²⁷

The doctrines of the Wise Men are found chiefly in Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes. Outside of the Old Testament canon, there are various forms of Wisdom literature, of which the Wisdom of Jesus, the Son of Sirach or Ecclesiasticus (about 180 B.C.), and the Wisdom of Solomon (about 40 B.C.), may be mentioned. These writings present a development in the conception of Wisdom which to some extent reflects the fortunes of Israel itself. In the Proverbs, is the simple theory that righteousness brings prosperity. In Job, it begins to be recognized that the unrighteous sometimes prosper, yet the unknown author, although he does not understand the mystery, nevertheless consoles himself with trust in the divine

power and mercy (cf. also Psalms xxxvi., xxxix., xlix., lxxiii.). It is the era of difficulties. In Ecclesiastes, the Preacher clearly admits the disharmony between theory and practice, but learns from experience that, in spite of the apparent prosperity of the evil, good is best, and the only way to make life tolerable is to obey the law of God. The author of Ecclesiasticus does not seem to be in doubt concerning the ancient doctrine of the relation of righteousness and temporal prosperity, although the circumstances are unfavourable to the Jews. He also strives to reconcile the practical ethics of the Wise Men of old with the established forms of religion, and recommends the punctual observance of rites and ceremonies, thus differing from the older Proverb writers. The author feels the Greek influence, but resists it, remaining a true Israelite.

The Wisdom of Solomon responds to the Greek influence, and is an original fusion of Hebrew, Platonic, and Stoic conceptions of life which is now regarded as extending beyond the grave, a conception which does not seem to be clearly expressed in other Wisdom literature. It is an immortality determined in its character by righteousness.

Two questions now arise: How far was the doctrine of Wisdom influenced by Greek culture? What was the relation of Wisdom to the divine Being? Probably the later authors were more responsive to Greek culture than the earlier, but all may have known of the Wisdom of other peoples, including the Greeks, for political relations afforded sufficient opportunity, certainly after the campaigns of Alexander the Great. The Greek influence is, however, most clearly recognized in the Wisdom of Solomon.

Again, Wisdom is, for the most part, practically conceived, and as such is a general conception for the precepts that grow out of experience. But there are traces of an implicit metaphysic. Isaiah speaks

of the "Spirit of Wisdom" as one of the three chief manifestations of the Spirit of Jehovah (Isa. xi. 2). The Creator puts Wisdom in the inward parts and understanding in the heart (Job xxxviii. 36). There is also no time when it can be said Wisdom was not. Wisdom is the first-born child of the Creator, the Architect who presided over the birth of nature, and sends forth her messengers to turn men from evil, thus bringing nature into harmony with moral ends (Prov. viii. 22-31 and ix. 3). As this passage is a noble poetic personification of Wisdom, it is only by implication that it can be regarded as identical with the *λόγος* of Heracleitus and the Stoics and the *First-born Son* of Philo and Plotinus. In the Wisdom of Solomon, these metaphysical implications are more evident; for, Wisdom is "the worker of all things" and "goeth through all things." Wisdom "is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty. . . . She is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness" (vii. 22-26).²⁸

The later forms of Jewish and Greek thought are in some respects parallel, though the views of each people may have been formed independently. For example, as the Greek lost his City-State in the final conquest of Rome and gave utterance to a changed conception of life in a cosmopolitan philosophy and the ideal of the World-City, so the subjection of the Jewish nation made it necessary for the prophets to seek for the realization of the hopes of Israel in the ideal of the Messianic kingdom, which was to embrace all races. For both Greek and Jew, it was a faith in an unrealized ideal. What the Greek sought in an ideal which he believed to be one with the ultimate reality of things, the Jew conceived in the picture of a future in which the whole state of the world would be changed—a prophecy of the reign of

Messiah. The Jew turned from the world as it is, "waiting for the consolation of Israel" to come. The effect was to make religion inward, and to emphasize the immediate relation of the soul to God. In Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, it has been shown there was a similar inward response to the Divine, even with a strong tendency to a mystical union with the supreme Being. It was a subjective religion, originating both among the Jews and the Greeks, and preparing the way for the rapid success of Christianity.

Another parallelism between Jewish and Greek thought may be noticed. With the development of the idea of God among the Jews, there was an increasing tendency to think of Him abstractly and as transcending the world. Among the Greeks, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics exalted the divine Being, but were unable satisfactorily to explain the divine relation to the world. There appears now in both Jewish and Gentile thought a new conception, namely, that of mediation between the transcendent God and His world in the hope of overcoming the increasing tendency to dualism, which had already been a troublesome factor in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Among the Jews, this function of mediation was performed by the Divine Wisdom or Word, or by some angel who has a mission from God to men. In Greek philosophy, a similar function is assigned by the Stoics to the Logos, which is the equivalent of the World-Soul described by Plato in the *Timæus*, and is the organ of the manifestations of the supreme Being in the world. In both Jewish and Greek thought appears the view that man can reach God only in an ecstasy, in which he both loses and finds himself in the infinite One. We shall now consider two examples of this latest form of thought, as found in Philo, and Plotinus the chief representative of Neo-Platonism. Both of these systems of thought

form a large factor in the constructive basis of early Christian theology.

Although remaining an orthodox Jew, Philo of Alexandria (about 20 B.C. to about A.D. 40) undertook to unite the Hebrew and Greek thought, assuming their essential identity. Adopting the allegorizing method of the philosophers who reconciled Homer with Thales, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle, Philo was able to reconcile the Book of Genesis with the doctrines of Plato and the Stoics, who could have gained their philosophy only from Moses indirectly. God is exalted beyond any distinctions and attributes that man can conceive, and sustains only an indirect relation to the material world. Is this exaltation of God due to the Hebrew's conception of the transcendent sublimity of Jehovah or to an increasing sense of evil in man? God's existence is inferred from the purposeful order in the world which is due, not to the direct working of the divine Being, but to a created intermediate Logos or Son of God, which is little more than the sum of the Platonic Ideas which are the thoughts of God, the immanent plan of the world. This Logos or Son is not only mediator between God and the world, but, as High Priest, makes intercession for the world to God.²⁹ But Philo departs from Plato "when he personifies all the presuppositions of things and puts them into connection with the angelology, which had reached a high degree of development." Nor can his doctrine of the Logos be identified with the later Christian doctrine, since Philo conceives the Logos as the shadow of the Deity, which must not be called God.³⁰ But there is a relationship which will be considered later.

Philo also held the doctrine of degrees of being and approximates an emanation theory, although he does not distinctly formulate it. Just as the light shining in the darkness itself remains unchanged, but farther and farther away appears less distinct until perfect

darkness is reached, so the divine Being flows forth in a logical descending order of beings, ceasing in matter or non-being. This metaphysic forms the basis of an ethic which consists in freeing man from the material and sensuous, and his return to the Deity. Even the Old Testament stories are made to contain not only historical truth but deep ethical principles. The goal of this purification from sin is to lift man out of himself, until, in blessed vision, he beholds God while his own consciousness is merged in the divine light; and yet Philo, as a pious Jew believing in the divine personality, could not sufficiently sacrifice God's moral attributes, even with the aid of the allegorical method, to permit of his being a true mystic or pantheist. His system is, therefore, more that of an amalgamation than a real fusion of Hebrew and Greek thought, whose latent dualism he renders explicit. But Philo succeeded in stating more fully than had been done the problem of reconciling the divine transcendence above the world with the divine immanence in the world. The religious consciousness needs both to rise from the finite and relative to God and also to see God manifested in the finite and relative. Philo could do no more than externally subordinate one to the other. It was this problem—the centre of all speculative theology—which Neo-Platonism attempted to solve, of which Plotinus, the mystic of mystics, was the best representative, and it was just this problem with which the early Christian theologians in their turn had to deal, and which they treated largely upon the constructive basis furnished by the speculative thought of that time. There is a tradition that Plotinus, the head of a school in Rome (A.D. 244), and Origen were fellow-pupils, certainly they were pupils, at Alexandria, of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius-Saccas (A.D. 175-242), who had once been a Christian. This indicates the close relation that existed between early

Christian theology, of which Origen was one of the founders, and Neo-Platonism, the latest form of Hellenistic thought. If, now, we succeed in making clear the nature of this Neo-Platonic speculation, we shall have accomplished our purpose of exhibiting the philosophical antecedents of Christian theology which arose upon the soil of Greek philosophy, supplemented by Oriental religion and speculation.

Although Plotinus was neither a Jew nor a Christian, it is supposed that he felt the influence of the Christian doctrine of redemption, but only to endeavour to find a substitute for it. Consequently, his philosophy is a doctrine of redemption, and expresses that growing sense of need which was found to some extent in Plato, more fully in the Stoics and in Philo, and was the common problem of Jew, Gentile, and Christian. I believe we miss much of the significance of the development of Greek as well as of Oriental thought, if we fail to recognize that it issued in a deepened self-consciousness united with reflection upon the inner self and its needs, seeking eagerly immediate union with the Divine through a form of intuitive knowledge attained by the purest activity of the soul, which is at the same time a surrender to the divine light and peace.

This Neo-Platonic doctrine of redemption rests upon a speculative basis. It has been shown how Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics grasped the conception of the universal Reason, but failed to make clear how the perfect Universal can have a real unity with the changing and imperfect existences of the concrete world. There was an increasing tendency, in consequence, to a dualism which regarded the transient world as having in it a material substratum that could not be finally rationalized. Plotinus, not in consequence of Oriental influences, as some maintain, carries Greek philosophy to its logical conclusion along this line, missing, as I believe, its deeper

spiritual significance, which it was reserved for Christianity to interpret and appropriate. Plotinus represents the relation of God, the world, and man as an emanation of successively subordinate stages of being in lessening degrees of reality from the supreme Unity. It is not properly a pantheism, as we shall see, for, while all existences owe their origin to the Absolute, the One is not, because of its undifferentiated being, in the manifold distinctions of the finite and relative.

I shall now try to present Plotinus's doctrine of God, the world, and man, together with his view of sin and salvation, using so far as possible his own words.³¹

We may be assured that the primal Being or God is simply One in the following manner. Oneness or unity is found in every existence, for example, an army, a flock, a house, plant, or animal—each has a unity without which it would not be. Man, too, is a unity of the rational and the animal, and he is also a unity although he is a subject knowing objects, for both subject and object are a unity. Unity, then, everywhere stands in contrast to plurality, and is fundamental in everything. Hence the world of existences in their plurality is in contrast with the One to which they owe their origin. The One, then, is different from all that exists, and is the true reality, while the many are mere appearances and not finally real, or, rather, all that is real in them is the hidden Unity.

Nor can this One be described except negatively, for our thought derives its descriptive attributes from the world of sensuous experience. "The One being the Creator of all things is itself no one of them." Hence "it is not a thing, nor intellect, nor soul, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in space, nor in time, but is the absolutely 'monoform,' or rather formless, prior to all form, prior to motion, prior to rest. For

these things pertain to existence, and it creates them in their multiplicity." We cannot speak of this One as a "this" or a "that"; nor does it partake of the nature of understanding or absolute thought. It is infinite, not by virtue of being immeasurable in extension or number, but because its power cannot be comprehended or circumscribed; it wants nothing in relation to itself or to things. Happiness is not an attribute of the One; it is happiness. It does not think, for there are no acts of distinguishing and motion in it. It is not good, but super-good. Thus Plotinus exhausts his ingenuity to exalt the One above the world of different, distinct things and events.

Hence the need of mediators between God and the world which we know, but which we must not think of as the direct creation of the supreme One. And so the Intellect or *νοῦς*, the only begotten, the *εἰκών* or image is produced by the supreme Unity as mediator, but we cannot except figuratively describe how this is done. As a light shines in darkness, so the One "being perfect by reason of neither seeking nor possessing nor needing anything overflows as it were, and what overflows forms another hypostasis," for "how should the most perfect and primal good stay shut up in itself as if it were envious or impotent?" "The second hypostasis must come into being without any inclination or will or motion of any sort on the part of the One." Nothing comes from the One but what is greatest after it, which is the Intellect or *νοῦς* which, when generated, turns back to behold its source, becoming filled with intelligence, for "this vision is the Intellect." The content of the Intellect is an immediate possession and not a discursive thinking, and is, in the language of Plato, the ideal archetype of all things which the Intellect or *νοῦς* thinks as constituting its own nature and existing in itself. These archetypal Ideas form the ideal content

of the universe (*κόσμος νοητός*), and are the particular causes of events. They are called *λόγοι*, and the *νοῦς* of Plotinus takes the place of the *λόγος* of Philo and of the Christians.

The Intellect or *νοῦς* now in its turn becomes creator, and out of its own perfection pours forth a mighty power, the image of itself, the World-Soul, as Plato says in the *Timæus*. The World-Soul likewise turns itself to its source, namely, the Intellect, and is thereby formed and perfected. This World-Soul is indivisibly present in all things and in all lesser souls which are aspects of itself. Of these lesser souls there are three kinds: the first are divine or heavenly souls; the second are souls that waver between mind and body, heaven and earth, such as demons or geniuses, partly good, partly bad; the third are souls which dwell in matter and inhabit base bodies. The heavenly souls are supremely happy in their contemplation of God. Their bodies consist wholly of light (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 40). The other two classes of souls because of their contact with matter are not free from pollution and unhappiness.

The final stage of emanation is Matter, the limit in which the creative impulse dies out, immediately produced by soul, and, when produced, this Matter turns towards soul to be formed, and "the soul also immediately adds the form of concrete things to it, being pained by the indeterminate, as if afraid of being beyond the pale of real existences, and not suffering herself to stop long in the realm of not-being," and thus there springs into existence the sensible world which is a union of Form and Matter. But there always remains, exceeding the possibilities of Form, the formless, non-being or Matter. Matter may be regarded as evil in the sense of absolute lack, or want of the good, from which it follows that all that really is, is good. Souls are evil only if they give themselves over to Matter, that is, affirm the utter absence of the

good. Thus the material world of our perceptual experience is like a husk containing within itself the true spiritual reality, the good, which is finally the Divine.

It is now clear in what sin and salvation consist, according to Plotinus. The soul is not essentially vicious, but when, as in man, the soul inclines itself to non-being and comes into contact with Matter, her thought will be hindered and she will be filled with pleasures, desires, and griefs. Each soul is made to turn upwards towards its supreme Source, but may fall away from it, become estranged and fettered by the bonds of the body. "But her return to pure thought when, through her recollection of her former state, she gets a point of departure toward the vision of real existence, is called a loosening of her bonds and an ascent to the upper world. For despite her fall, the soul has always a higher part." But when the soul does finally gain the vision of the supreme One, like that One, there will be no consciousness of distinctions, no duality of seer and seen. On the contrary, it is by becoming, as it were, another than himself, and by neither being himself nor belonging to himself that the seer attains the vision. And having surrendered himself to it, he is one with God, as the centre of two circles might coincide. "The vision is hard to describe." Every distinction and every difference disappear, "as one might penetrate into the interior of the Holy of Holies, leaving behind in the temple the statues of the gods." "And when he proceeds out of himself, turning from a copy unto the original, he has reached the goal of his journey." Thus the soul presses through appearances to God by sinking into the depths of its own inner self. The world that is has worth only as it points the soul heavenward and to God, yes, to the God even within the soul, in whom is final peace and rest. Thus the philosophy of Plotinus becomes a

redemptive religion of life, for to have life is to lose the self in mystic union with God.

The emphasis placed upon the inner life and union with God was, however, so great that there was no room left for social relations and for the historical. Everything is subordinated to the mystic ecstasy in which the soul is transported out of itself into union with God, which happens when it is said, "Now the eye has become light." Nor is this inner life to be thought of as one of inner strengthening and development of a real personality. Here it is that the radical defects of Neo-Platonism begin to appear, for there is no real unity between the supreme One and the subordinate stages of existence. Plotinus failed to recognize that his supreme One is merely the creature of the logical abstraction of unity from multiplicity only in relation to which unity has any meaning. Although there slips into his view the thought of a blissful inner life of the Godhead, union with whom is the supreme goal of human life, there is no place for the conception of the divine and human personality in a union in which the individuality of each is conserved. Still less is there a recognition of the fact that it is just the nature of God as spirit to realize His life in manifoldly different forms and in the life and history of mankind. Nor is there an irrational quasi-existent material substratum which is the source of evil and eternally in conflict with the good. This Matter is as much a creature of logical abstraction from concrete existences as the absolute One, and both can only be spoken of in negations which make it possible that they are ultimately identical. And yet these unfortunate conceptions had long been developing in Greek philosophy, and Plotinus only carried these tendencies to their logical conclusion, and hence is rightly called the last important representative of Greek thought.

It was, however, reserved for Christianity to

appropriate the deeper implications of the Greek thinkers in the Christian conception of God as a personal Spirit, realizing His purposes in a kingdom of individual persons, whose joy and glory are found in fulfilling the will and thought of their heavenly Father, who dwells in them through His Spirit. Christianity affirms that God is personality who is the Creator of the world and of men. These conceptions were foreshadowed in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and even Plotinus, and one cannot help wondering why the less valuable tendencies of Greek thought, instead, were developed in the later centuries. One might perhaps say, by way of explanation, that the negations of a Philo, a Plotinus, and the Gnostics had to take place that the wholesome affirmations of Christianity concerning the nature of God as personality in relation to men might the more readily establish themselves and their worth upon the constructive basis for theology already provided by the Greek thinkers. But, while this is true, the Christians themselves mingled their wholesome doctrines with the unfortunate conceptions of their opponents. The significance of the course of Greek thought which has been reviewed is found in the great conceptions of life that developed in the changes that took place. The period should be judged as a whole. Some of its important features may be mentioned. There was, for example, a steady growth of the personal subject towards a fulness of life and activity. Greek speculation lifted man's soul into a position of ever-increasing significance. The Greek placed a value upon life and found joy in it. The soul's activity might be differently directed at different times, but the chief importance of this activity lay in man's ability thus to call forth the inner activity of his soul, indeed, to awaken to the Divine in his own nature. Even in asceticism and ecstasy, which may be due to an Oriental influence, the chief factor was an inner activity of the rational

nature accompanied by belief in life in the fullest sense of the term. There was also an increasingly bright hope of immortality, which would mean completeness of life. Towards the suffering and darkness of the world there was a certain stiff reserve, accompanied, however, by a fresh and elastic spirit of confidence in human ability to overcome evils through the splendid human powers which would surely enable life to be triumphant. A real contribution of Greek culture is found, likewise, in its conception of the beautiful, which became the type of what the genuinely spiritual life ought to be. As the beautiful conveys the idea of rest in the midst of ceaseless movement, so life has before it a like ideal; as the beautiful pleases for its own sake, not because of its uses, so the morally good is to be sought on its own account, and the evil is to be put aside because it is evil and is inwardly ugly, and ought to give place to the inwardly beautiful. There was, however, in the latter portions of the period under review, a tendency to reduce man's life to a mere shadow in the effort to maintain the purity and sublimity of the divine Being, and to withdraw from the historical and the social and become ascetic, but this tendency seems to be due, in part at least, to foreign influence.

The formulations of these great conceptions concerning man, God, and the world, and the free personal life of men in relation to each other and to the Father of Spirits, arose out of the needs of the time and fulfilled their function in ministering to the moral and religious life. They were nothing less than different forms of the theology of that age. But it was reserved for a new order of thought in the service of a new religion to take up into itself the logical implications of that splendid work of the Greek thinkers and carry it to its true fulfilment. Whether the final completion of the theology involved in the philosophical views of life taught by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics,

and Plotinus, has ever been written, even on a Christian basis, is not at all clear. It is rather yet to be developed, for the Greeks conceived and outlined the "persistent" problems of life, and ages later than our own will still seek their solution. "Thus next to the teachings of the Old Testament Greek philosophy forms the most important spiritual antecedent of Christianity." ³²

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY

THE preceding chapter raises the question whether Christianity introduced a new factor into the world which was not already present either in Hebrew or Greek thought or in their fusion. It may be objected that the difficulty of reaching a satisfactory reply is unnecessarily increased if it is implied that Christianity was miraculously thrust into the world without any connection with the previous history of mankind. Instead, Christianity came in the "fulness of time," and was both old and new; old in the sense that human experience and thought had prepared for it, and had, however meagrely, outlined some of its principles; new in the sense that these principles received in Christianity a completion and a vital quality never before possessed. On the other hand, does not this intimate relation of Christianity with the past somewhat increase the difficulty of distinguishing it from the antecedents with which it is so closely joined? Yet the impulse is strong to seek the differentiating significance of Christianity.

In the first place, the word Christianity is an abstract conception. To understand its meaning, the significance of the nature of a conception and its relation to experience is presupposed. For our purpose, it is sufficient to say that every conception is a sort of mental tool or instrument constructed by the individual thinker for dealing with experience. A

conception arises in connection with the needs of life and becomes a rule of action ; it is both a formulation of the modes of former conduct and an anticipation of the future, a map, a chart of life, trustworthy so long as it successfully serves us in our activity but always leaving the way open for a new and unique experience. Applying this view of conceptions to Christ's sayings and deeds as the Founder of Christianity, our interest lies in finding how Jesus understood the Way, the Truth, and the Life He was living. What Jesus said must be regarded as His way of expressing the modes of living, the principles or rules of action that were manifest in His life, all of which may be taken as the significance of Christianity. In this manner does Christianity become practical, a unity of rules or principles of living validating themselves as experience increases. If this be true, great interest attaches to the sayings of Jesus, since they are His formulations of the modes of life according to which all ought to live. In this sense is He "the Way, the Truth, and the Life."¹

The question as to what Jesus Himself taught has led to controversies that need not now be discussed. Textual criticism has shown the probable existence of a collection of the sayings, or Logia, of Jesus, which are taken up and absorbed in our Gospels of Matthew and Luke. This collection of the words of Jesus was probably older than Mark's Gospel, but is evidently not one of the sources of this Gospel. Mark, according to Papias, is the interpreter of Peter's preaching concerning the things said and done by Christ, and is the first narrative of the career of Jesus. Matthew and Luke use both the Logia and Mark as sources of their Gospels. Each Gospel has a large part peculiar to itself, in which the author freely arranges his material and changes the point of view as compared with the others and with the Logia. The writings of Paul, though some years earlier than the oldest of our

Gospels, do not deal directly with the history of Christ's life. We are therefore shut up chiefly to the Logia and the Synoptic Gospels for information concerning the historical Jesus of Nazareth. The Gospel of John introduces us to a later conception of our Lord, and may be regarded as mediating between the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline conception of Jesus.

Of these sources of information concerning Jesus, the Logia collection is the earliest and most reliable, because of its greater simplicity and directness. It is also freer from the interpretative, apologetic element which is found in all the Gospels, and represents the prevailing views of the developing Christian community. The critical distinction between this interpretative, apologetic element and the words that may be reasonably held to represent what Jesus actually said and taught, throws much light upon the historical Jesus. For example, Jesus Himself says nothing of the conditions of His birth, parents, birthplace or early life, indeed, the supernatural element that has entered into the Church's conception of Christ's birth, life, death, and resurrection does not appear. The portrait of these earliest sources of information is of one who responds to the divine call in the preaching of John the Baptist, and, after baptism, devotes Himself to the realization of the Messianic kingdom, the conception of which is deepened and enriched in His own experience. Then follows a mental conflict, variously represented by the three temptations in the wilderness, whose power sprang out of the popular conception of the Messiah. The rejection of a material, miraculous Messiahship was the result of this struggle, according to the Logia, and, for the most part, also the Gospel narrative. In these earliest sources of information, there is little of the personal element. Jesus appears as a teacher and regarded Himself as the greatest of the prophets and as the Messiah. He never defined His Messiahship, but seems to have

adopted this idea of His mission at the baptism. It was privately avowed at Caesarea Philippi, and only publicly acknowledged on the day of His death in reply to others. It is, however, clear that Jesus did not share the popular view but regarded the ministry of the Messiah as the culmination of prophetic ministry. Jesus thought of Himself as marked off from the prophets who had gone before by the possession of a complete knowledge of the Father, which implies an equally complete knowledge of men in relation to God. This unique knowledge of the Father revealed in His own self-consciousness was His chief resource in His ministry, and this saving knowledge He felt called to impart to others, and to this ministry He devoted His life. As to the nature of Jesus, our sources do not show that this was ever the subject of remark or reflection on His part. Nor are we warranted in saying that Jesus by His words or deeds made an absolute separation between Himself and others in the sphere of character. Instead, He was acquainted with temptation and felt the need of God's help, which is not, however, inconsistent with perfect moral integrity nor with full knowledge of the Father, which it was His mission to reveal to men that they might be saved.²

Reserving the interpretative, apologetic element in the writings of the New Testament for later consideration, a brief outline of the fundamental teachings of Jesus following directly from His unique knowledge of the Father may be given. According to the purest utterances of Jesus, the conditions of entrance into the kingdom are the better righteousness, the inner motive, and action in harmony with faith. In these sayings of Jesus appears the human and familiar element of His teaching, the direct appeal to the moral and religious consciousness. In the Beatitudes, the "poor in spirit" feel themselves superior to the world's actual poverty, and are filled with a

longing for the Divine, and by faith already have all things.

In the controversy with the Pharisees, Jesus frees the ethical life from subordination to externals, and love is regarded as the secret spring of the life, joined with humility, which involves receptiveness, expression of need, and prayer for God's grace and forgiveness. Thus morality and religion are united. These principles are universalized in the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." It is neither formalism, asceticism, nor mysticism, but a love of God that manifests itself in fidelity to concrete human relationships for the sake of personal worth, which shows that the relation of Jesus is pre-eminently social and practical. Fitness for the kingdom depends solely upon surrender to the will of the Father and willingness to receive what the kingdom has to give. While Jesus applies the conception, Messiah, to Himself as Son of God, Jesus considers it His mission to make known the Father and the filial relation to Him. Men are thrown back upon their own moral and religious consciousness, and what it declares to be the highest moral and religious end, God requires as that which it belongs to them to do and which they can do, else God would not require it of His children. The theme of Jesus' preaching is, therefore, the kingdom of God and its coming; God the Father and the infinite worth of the human soul; the better righteousness and the command of love. Each involves the entire significance of the Gospel. The kingdom of God is the reign of the holy God in the heart, and this kingdom comes when He enters the soul. God as Father and the infinite worth of the soul follow from the conception of the filial relation which finds expression in the Lord's prayer and in such words as, "Rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven"; "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them

shall fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered"; and, "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" Accordingly, in the conceptions of God the Father, divine providence, sonship, and the infinite worth of the human soul, the whole Gospel is expressed.³

The Gospel of John is doctrinal and apologetic rather than biographical. It defines the principle of salvation and of entrance into the kingdom as belief in the Son of God, which many regard as irreconcilable with the conditions found in the Synoptics. But why irreconcilable, for it is easy to identify allegiance to a truth with allegiance to the teacher of that truth, particularly if He be a living example of its practical significance? As Kant said, in believing in Christ we indeed identify ourselves with the principles for which He stands. The conditions of entrance into the kingdom, as presented in the Synoptics and in the Gospel of John, are essentially the same from this point of view.

Moreover, the moral element of Christianity and the religious principle of sonship in the kingdom of God required a form which would make a history possible. These moral and religious principles were identified with Christ, and Christ with the Messianic ideal of Judaism, which made it possible for the spiritual contents of Christianity, that is, the consciousness of Jesus, to be taken up by the historical development and become the consciousness of the world. After the death of Jesus, the belief in the resurrection lifted the meaning of Christianity into the eternal, and stripped it of the limitations of a particular people and age. Other movements contributed to the universalizing of the Christian principle of salvation, such as the death of Stephen, who died for its wider significance; also the liberalizing influence of the Church at Antioch in contrast to the Church at Jeru-

salem, which continued the Jewish ordinances. The Roman Church and its influence also tended to universalize Christianity in a practical way, freed from the danger of a return to the practices of the Church at Jerusalem.⁴

Our chief interest lies, not in critical problems concerning the authorship and doctrines of the New Testament writings, but in what their authors attempted to do, which was to express their own thoughts about Jesus for the sake of their own spiritual life and that of the religious community. How functionally important their writings became! Likewise, we long to make direct chronological connection with Jesus through the authors of the Gospels, believing that we shall thus experience directly what it must have been to be with Jesus of Nazareth as He really was. This is the motive-force of critical inquiry as well as of docile receptivity. The believer, indeed, pictures himself as now having personal relation to the living and exalted Christ, but, to our sense-dimmed vision, there come moments when this belief seems to pale before the longing to see and touch the living Son of Man. And yet we are not merely creatures of sense in this longing, failing to transform the ideal of the living exalted Christ into a real presence, for the longing itself contains the profound implied truth that, if we could only go back to the immediate presence of Jesus of Nazareth, the meaning of Christianity itself would be found in personal relation with Him, and experienced in motives of conduct in harmony with such fellowship. There is also implied the hope of experiencing Christ's own mind in relation to the Father. Nothing seizes us so powerfully as our thought of Jesus' relation to the Father, for we try to repeat in ourselves what such a relation to God means. No record or tradition could fully express the inner consciousness of Jesus, which was more than even His own words could utter. How

inadequate language is to express the deep-seated thoughts and feelings, for example, of love or of religious experience !

Bergson has shown in his *Time and Free Will* that there are two orders or aspects of the self, namely, the objective and spatial, with its clearness and fixity, but impersonal; and the subjective, intensely personal, "ever changing and inexpressible because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public property. . . . Hence we need not be surprised if only those ideas which least belong to us can be adequately expressed in words" (pp. 129, 136). Applying this to the religious consciousness, particularly of Jesus, the words that undertake to express His inner life can never translate it into objective, impersonal form, for that life is free, ever changing yet enduring, and rises out of the fountain of all Being. Hence even Jesus' words, and still more the words of others about Him, leave vast regions of His living experience unrevealed, though it is the true reality of Jesus as of all personal life. Believers seem vaguely to recognize this fact, for they never cease trying to reproduce in thought and thereby create in themselves Jesus' own consciousness of personal relation to the Father, which is the principle of Christianity, because it was the controlling norm of the consciousness of Jesus. It is also the principle of redemption, which consists in return to the Father, in whose fellowship alone is a life of purity and joy possible. All things work together for this community of souls united in love to the Father and the Son in the Messianic kingdom that is to fulfil the ideal of the new humanity.

It might be objected that this view of Jesus makes Christianity unrelated to the past and entirely miraculous. Instead, it is now well recognized that no one is cut off from the community into which he is born,

and in some sense every one is the product of his race and age. Likewise Jesus came in "the fulness of time," and in Him was continued, though modified and enriched, the message of the Hebrew prophets, whose deep insight represented the choicest fruit of Israel's experience. Just how Jesus appropriated the ideals of the Hebrews and enlarged their scope need not be presented in detail. Nor is it necessary to decide the merits of the debate between Alfred Loisy in his work, *The Gospel and the Church*, and Harnack's *What is Christianity?* as to whether Christianity consists in a simple essence or sentiment that is individualistic, and may be abstracted from its objective historical form, or, as Loisy holds, is inseparably embodied in it, developing according to the changing environment with a vital relation between content and form. Possibly Loisy makes a necessary correction of Harnack's view, and is more faithful to the social aspects of the Christian consciousness. Suffice it to say that Jesus left behind Him the impression of His life. Memory and devout reflection caused that impression to be expressed in Gospels, Epistles, the Fathers, the Church, dogmas, confessions and institutions, and the believer of to-day is called upon to utter in his turn what he thinks of Christ, which, likewise, may become a means to a larger individual and social religious life.⁵

It follows from these principles that, while we necessarily conceive Christianity from our own experience of it, into this experience should enter some appreciation of its entire career throughout the past and in the present, which contains also the germs of its future. Otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish Christianity from some movement with which, at a given point, its characteristic features happened to be closely identified. Moreover, an adequate conception of Christianity would also require that it stand in some recognizable relation with the

rest of the world and with its final purpose. In my opinion, this is practically what we do when we are called upon to set forth the significance of Christianity; we think of the Christianity of the present, with its churches and missions, its benevolent institutions, its homes and schools, with their love and sweet charity. This is the Christianity for and by which we live and expect to live, and which we define chiefly out of our immediate experience. But the past is also ours, for what we possess in the present has had a long history, and we delight to trace our Christian inheritance from its beginnings. Not that we wish to exchange the present for any stage of the history of Christianity. Our Lord looked forward to a larger triumph of His cause, and, if it is our privilege to share what He foresaw, why call this present any less the "essence" of Christianity than the Christ-age itself? Our Christianity is not only conceived in the light of the present, but it is precisely and only such a Christianity as could spring up in the life of the Jewish people, spread abroad in a Jewish and Greco-Roman environment, dominate succeeding centuries, win victories in the present and be the promise of a glorious future in God's world. We want even the dark features of the past, because they enhance the worth of what is now possessed. The heterodox and orthodox are only incidents of the great movement whose majesty is best appreciated in the light of its history, and whose significance is bound up with the destiny of the universe itself. So powerful has been the ideal of life expressed in Christ to transform and redeem humanity that we may even ask, why is it not enough that the ideals called Christian have, since that early period, been the possession of the human mind? As a matter of fact, there is a school, of whom Arthur Drews in his *Die Christusmythe* (published in 1910) and Strauss in his *Leben Jesu* (1835) are representatives, holding that Christ as an idea of the divine humanity was really

the foundation of Christianity, but that Christ historically is only a myth whose origin may be traced to definite causes, and that the account of His life and works in the New Testament are mythical developments, in which faith symbolizes itself. It may be granted to this school, without further accepting its position, that the ideal of a redeemed divine humanity is powerful in its effects, and that when the race is once in possession of this idea, the only reason for putting it aside would be the proof of its falsity. In brief, meanings are, as such, timeless, and the "finality of Christianity" may well be that certain relations of God and man have been so adequately conceived that there is nothing further to be said; these relations may also be "final causes" or "ends" being realized in the natural and social order of the world.⁶ This wider view makes it possible to compare the Christian ideals with those of the intellectual and social environment of the early Christians in order to discover in what respects, if any, Christianity introduced new factors into the world's history or enriched and deepened old conceptions.

Christianity gave to the world a better conception of God and His relations to men. I hesitate, however, to say that no one had previously so thought of God and men. The conception of God as held by Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus, not to mention the Hebrews, approaches in many ways the Christian view of God and man. But there is a difference between forming a conception of the Deity as a personality and thinking of man's well-being as consisting solely in union with God, and having this conception become a vital principle of religious experience. With the Greeks before Christ, the Deity was chiefly the World-Reason, while Plotinus, who gave the best expression of speculative thought in the second and third century after Christ, exalted God above all things definite as a Being beyond any assign-

able attributes. What a relief to think of God as Father in personal relation to men ! As a consequence, the Christian faith rapidly won adherents and kept them constant and devout. But it is well to pause long enough to ask if Christianity may not be the fulfilment of the best Greek thought, as well as of the Messianic ideal of the Hebrews, thus standing in vital relation to both and completing what had already been imperfectly apprehended ?

A similar remark may be made concerning human fellowship with God, as the fulfilment of life. Here again Plato teaches many beautiful lessons about finding the fulness of life in being like God and living in harmony with God, who is the supreme Good. Likewise, Aristotle and the Stoics ; Plotinus even makes the central theme of his philosophy the return to God, in which the soul attains blissful, ecstatic intuition, merging itself into the divine Being. But how differently does the Christian religion conceive fellowship with God ! God is represented as Father and believing men as children, whose personality develops and fulfils itself in direct relation with God, which is a distinction of great significance. The Christian faith does not *lose* the human personality in the divine Being, but it is emphasized, stimulated, renewed, and put in its true element, where it grows to a fulness of being possible only in this relation. This is to be redeemed, and is a moral and spiritual experience in which individuality is preserved and emphasized, in distinction from the Neo-Platonic idea of redemption, which is to be so filled with the conscious experience of the Divine that all sense of personal reality is lost and all distinctions are transcended, though for us it is difficult to conceive how there can be any sort of experience without differentiations ; yet this seems to be what is intended ; it is really an ontological process in which man, as a passing phase of the divine drama, is merged in the Infinite.

The Christian religion also offered a new order of things, a re-creation of humanity, a kingdom of grace and love, while the Greek conception implied that it was only necessary, for the fulness of life, to correct the old. The Christian affirmation was implicitly a negation of the old as something that needed more than correction. We cannot emphasize too much this distinguishing feature of the new religion in its belief that the present order was to be replaced by a new. This new ideal required a vivid expression, which was found in the conception of the "kingdom of God," the new creation, the new humanity. It meant a fulness of life, beginning, indeed, in the present but having its full significance in another world and involving the fulfilment of all the hopes that fail here in subordination to the joy, peace, holiness, and love in fellowship with the Father and the Son. This conception is especially rich in comparison with Greek views. Plato expresses in his *Republic* a more wholesome idea of another life than that presented by Homer and other poets, for Plato rejected as untrue those conceptions of the life after death which represented it as a shadowy, undesirable existence; nor, said Plato, may the young read such obnoxious passages as, "I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor portionless man who is not well to do, than rule over all the dead who have come to naught" (*Od.* xi. 489); or again: "The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving strength and youth" (*Il.* xvi. 856); there the "souls do but flit as shadows" (*Od.* x. 495). But Plato himself is apparently convinced that the other life is more desirable than this, since the soul will there be freed from the body, which restrains the spirit; the soul may even continue its active life, but with a better knowledge; certain it is that only to those who seek virtue and justice is there reserved a life of blessing.⁷ But Socrates and Plato were unable to prevent the

following centuries from uncertainty tinged with despair concerning the present world, with no assurance of a desirable life in another. Consequently, the Christian faith in a new order of things, a new world even now being established, a kingdom of God, in which the believer acquires a new and blessed life, seized the imagination and the heart of a generation that had become exceedingly weary through unrealized hopes and longings. Whence came this assurance? Was it not due primarily to the personal experience of Jesus, who had such a deep consciousness of God and His own relation to Him that the invisible and the ideal assumed the character of the real? Did not those who knew the Master come to share His ideals with a proportionate depth of emotional experience which transformed these ideals into the most real of all that exists? Thus the ethical kingdom of God, ruled by love and grace, became the true reality and more real than the present world. Participation in that kingdom solved all problems by transcending them and changing the point of view. That there is profound truth in this conception of the ideal as the finally real is not denied. But the interesting fact is that the abstract conception of the invisible kingdom of God, a new order, a new creation, should have become such a vital, present reality as to cause the believer to regard himself as not of this world, though living in it, but of another. It is more idealistic than the idealism of the sublime Plato, who also regarded this world as transient and perishing. The remarkable thing is that, under the abiding influence of the personality of Jesus, the ideal, invisible kingdom of God, embracing all good and blessing to the believer, became so real a thing that even now to suggest its ideal nature seems sacrilegious. If I mistake not, there is a marked difference between the Christian and the Platonic ideal reality. The Platonist tended to withdraw from the present unreal world, but the

Christian's "kingdom of God" is "at hand," already present in this world to re-create and redeem and finally to be the all-embracing reality. Indeed, the Christian conception of the "new" world as a kingdom of grace and love rests upon the confidence that the world is founded in God's goodness, who wrought a perfect work in the strict sense of realizing all the demands of reason, not merely perfect in the sense of doing the best possible under given conditions and with a given material. Indeed almighty Love forms the whole world into the kingdom of God.⁸

The Christian faith was also characterized by a new and intense conviction concerning the nature of evil. Christianity did not solve the problems of sin and evil speculatively, but their actuality was intensified from the standpoint of religious experience. Jesus' consciousness of the divine love and of His fellowship with the Father was incompatible with sin. Consequently, the Christian doctrine of sin is not a speculative solution of its mystery, but is simply an expression of the deep consciousness of God, the loss of whose fellowship appears as the root of evil because in His fellowship is the only source of strength, completeness of life and goodness. The Christian believer thus reflects the consciousness of Jesus and always looks with suspicion upon any attempt to explain away sin and evil as an actual condition of human souls, because his religious experience makes the fact of sin a real occurrence in himself in the effort to fulfil the ideal of what he ought to be through his own voluntary actions. On the other hand, there was a tendency in Greek speculation, not consistent with its deeper significance and unfortunately later influencing Christian thought and life, to regard evil as due to a sort of limiting principle called *Matter*, or that which is moulded by or according to Ideal Forms, to make the material things of the sense-world. The evil is, as it were, the necessity of finiteness, while the good is

the abiding reality. The Greek as well as the Persian conception of evil is more metaphysical than ethical. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics are, however, chiefly ethical, for their doctrine of the will made man virtuous only when he willed the good habitually. Moral evil is done partly through ignorance, and partly because the senses induce choices before clear judgment can take place, but ultimately ignorance corresponds to non-being. The Christian conception is, however, predominatingly ethical, and concerns the inner life. The chief problem for man is his own inner discord, which is due to his own misdirected will and affections as he strives for his self-realization in the kingdom of God.

A careful analysis of Christian and Greek moral conceptions cannot, indeed, make a sharp distinction between them. The Greek seems to have formulated the principles of moral good and evil so completely that the Christian does not clearly add to their ideal content. The uniqueness of the Christian view of evil is due to a new depth of experience and a new conception of life in union with the Father, which sin interrupts, and, if the disturbed harmony is not restored, the very being of the spirit suffers loss. The Pagan and the Christian could both use *ἁμαρτία* to express sin, which literally means to miss the mark, but the Pagan meant by it a misuse of his own powers out of harmony with the requirements of true insight; the Christian implied as much, but for him moral evil becomes wilful rebellion against the divine Father, with consequent estrangement and loss of the divine presence. There was, therefore, more vivid reality and a more intense personal relation in the Christian conception of sin. Herein also lies the Christian hope of overcoming sin and its consequences; for, if sin is an estrangement of personalities, reconciliation through the triumph of love may so completely restore the lost harmony that all traces of sin and its effects will be

for ever obliterated. But if the ideal be simply righteousness in the sense of accord with some cosmic or divine law, the correction of transgression and the removal of its consequences are difficult to conceive ; and, if evil be due to an ontological principle such as the Greek conception of Matter seems to imply, it can never be overcome and eradicated.

Again, the Christian conception of the ultimate rationality of the world seems to be more satisfactory than that of the Greek. The term evil has both a moral and a physical significance. Disease, storm, earthquake, flood, pestilence, even death, seem to many natural evils. The Christian and the Greek solutions of these problems differ. Although the world with its suffering, sin, and death caused many of the Greek thinkers to incline towards dualism, as in the case of Plato and Aristotle, it was held that one need only press beyond the transient world of appearances to universal Reason to find that the true reality of the world is a rational whole. The Greek, however, seems never to have been able satisfactorily to relate the finite to the supreme Being, though it was often implied that the universal Reason can realize itself only through finite and particular existences. The Christian view of the world is more faithful to our life as it is. To the Christian, nothing is more unsatisfactory than to represent the world just as it is, as a kingdom of reason. If so, there is nothing rationally to be desired except what is, and to turn to a new and better world becomes superfluous. But Christianity gives full expression to the suffering and pain of existence, and is, thereby, faithful to actual experience. Indeed, the darkness and suffering of life are intensified in their realness by the exalted conception of the worth of the human soul and by the demand for love and happiness. But Christianity is as far from pessimism as it is from a superficial optimism. Without attempting to explain away the hard fact of sin

and suffering, Christianity energetically maintains the deeper rationality of the world, which the Greek did not perceive, in that present imperfections and sufferings may yet serve higher ends, such as the triumph of love and sympathy and the strengthening of human brotherhood, finally culminating in the removal of suffering and in the enjoyment of peace and blessedness. What is more inspiring than the Christian faith that the goodness and mercy of God are the ultimate principles of reality, which nothing can defeat, in the coming of the kingdom, and that what now appears to be irrational and hard to bear only works out a more profoundly rational moral order! It is, indeed, an experiential postulate rather than a theoretical demonstration, but it has its prototype in the consciousness of Jesus, who came, not to condemn the world, which was unnecessary, but to save "that which was lost," which was a vivid way of saying that the world, just as it is, could not be called rational, for a deeper rationality sought to replace the old order with a new. In this new order, imperfections and evils, resisted and overcome, enable a higher type of character to be reached. Thus the Christian consciousness identifies itself with the consciousness of Jesus in the conviction that these dark shadows, hovering over life, shall finally be removed, and life brought to a fulfilment whose blessedness will be measured only by the grace and love of the Father. But the individual person has a real work to do, a real contribution to make to the attainment of this goal. The realness of human personality and of what men will and do is not resolved into a mere process of the infinite Being. Such is the deeper rationality of the Christian view of the world.

Christianity also stands in favourable contrast with Greek thought in its conception of divine assistance, by which men are enabled to do and be what would otherwise be impossible. Here again is a

reflection of the consciousness of Jesus. So vividly did Jesus think of His relation to the Father that His consciousness was filled with the Father's grace, love, and strength. Nor can the manner in which the divine assistance is bestowed upon the believer be otherwise described. No theory of the incarnation satisfactorily expresses the religious faith in the divine assistance by which man's broken powers are restored. Do we not obtain more light by reflecting upon Jesus' vivid consciousness of the Father as the source of His power? There may indeed be much that we do not understand about the heart's awakening, but, when awakened, in what lies the believer's spiritual strength to choose and follow the good and triumph over suffering except in the vivid consciousness of the Father? Or, perhaps the believer's mind is filled with the thought of Jesus and union with Him, and through Him with the Father. But, whatever the manner of conceiving the divine assistance, certain it is that Christianity came into the world with the assurance of divine help. On the other hand, Plato, the Stoics, and others thought of the divine presence as accompanying the virtuous wise man, casting upon his life a gracious blessedness; but the idea of God assisting the weak and helpless to win moral victories and quicken the springs of spiritual life seems to be lacking. To be sure, Socrates and Plato taught that the gods are in league with the good man whose best interests are served even by the natural world. But this is more theoretical than practically efficient; the meaning is rather that he who will, through his own self-discipline, become wise and press beyond the order of sense-experiences to the World-Reason may be assured of the divine presence; this thought will indeed be a comfort, but the initiative lies in man's own efforts.

Christianity, on the other hand, is distinguished by the unique belief that the initiative is with God rather

than with man, and that it is the divine Spirit that does for man what he cannot do for himself, by enabling him to possess the strength that springs out of the vivid consciousness of union with God. Even for us, the significance of Christianity might be expressed in the confession, God helps us. The moral philosophy of the Greeks did little more than refer man to himself, but Christianity met human need with the assurance of divine love and gracious assistance without respect of persons. Indeed, the weak, and the moral and intellectual outcast were near the kingdom. The Christian conception of divine help was victorious, because it satisfied a deep need of the soul in its struggle with sin. We are glad to find in what we believe to have been Jesus' experience the key to our own relation to the Father. Nor are we prepared to admit that the Christian interpretation of man's relation to God is speculatively groundless. Rather do we believe that in Jesus' vivid consciousness of personal relation with the Father, which is reproduced in some measure in every believer, is to be found the fundamental principle of a profounder philosophy of life and the universe than had yet appeared. Nevertheless, we are not willing to mar by speculation, if that be possible, the precious consciousness of divine assistance and redemption as they exist in experience. The speculative problems involved are more complicated now than in a less complex age, but, whatever the difficulties, we are confident that "the very essence of Reality . . . in its harmonious working presents man with something quite different from a merely logical system of agreeable ideas . . . presents him, that is, with the complicated problem of a world that *is* a unity, although of no merely logical kind."⁹ Thus Christian thought makes room in its conception of the universe for divine assistance to supplement human effort in the struggle with evil.

Christianity made human brotherhood a reality.

It would, however, be untrue to say that Christianity first gave this conception to the world, for it was, at least in principle, recognized by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, because they made men as rational participate in the divine Reason. But Christianity imparted to the conception of Christian brotherhood an intense realness as a consequence of human fellowship with the Father through the Son. We obtain the most adequate conception of union among men by reflection upon the consciousness of Jesus. Because Jesus conceived the relation of men to the Father to be like His own in some degree, He became the Elder Brother in the household of faith. Jesus' consciousness of relation to the Father is reflected in the individual's experience whereby men become conscious of themselves as brethren. Certain is it that this common experience is the mighty bond between the units of Christendom. The ideal of human brotherhood is at least the fashion of the modern world, but this ideal can become fully actual in experience only when men reproduce in themselves Jesus' consciousness of fellowship with the Father; and this experience will result in the fulfilment of the command to love God, and our neighbour as ourselves.

Another feature of Christianity, distinguishing it from earlier conceptions of the universe, was the acquirement of a history. Christ's work was only the beginning. Each believer might contribute to the coming of the kingdom. Jesus founded a new ideal world which had the value of reality. It needs a moment's reflection to recognize the significance of saying that Christianity made a real history possible. Many Greek philosophers held that the world is the expression of some fundamental principle which puts forth all things, and takes them back into itself in a ceaseless repetition of the same order, in which there can never be anything new so as to make a true history possible. Such a conception is found in Thales

and his school, in Heracleitus and Plotinus and others. In modern times, Herbert Spencer showed that the evolution of all things implies also devolution, or the return of formed existences to the formless original state, whence again, by inexorable laws, the evolution is repeated. Such speculations when applied to the practical life quench ambition and hope. Nothing can be other than it is, and the thought is near at hand that what is has already been and may be again, and the profoundest effort of the spirit of man does not suffice to bring anything new into existence. Men soon feel themselves in the grip of Fate.

It may be that Christianity never made the possibility of a real history theoretically clear, but, practically, it overcame the difficulties. I believe, however, that Christianity has something valuable to say concerning the solution of these problems. Here again the consciousness of Jesus should be our guide. His fellowship with the Father, and the teaching of a new order of things in the kingdom of God, won believers, who found therein a new life and hope—indeed, a new world, which became for them the true reality. The disciples entered into an inheritance which was both the inspiration and the goal of their efforts. Succeeding generations of believers have gained the same possession. And to-day who could persuade Christian believers that their efforts and faithfulness do not count as real factors in the progress of the divine kingdom? What has a deeper hold upon us than the confidence that what we do is a new factor in the world, which no assemblage of natural conditions could have produced? Are we not originating causes, bringing forth what is new? Can the supreme efforts of the will be simply the kaleidoscopic changes of a universe from eternity to eternity the same? The zest of life depends upon this sense of realness. It is vain to protest that this confidence has only a practical significance, for Christianity supplied the assurance of

a new order of things in which a real history is possible and to which human efforts are a real contribution. We may therefore boldly say that this world, as it is, is not the true reality which is to be when the glorious work of Christ has been accomplished and men redeemed. Are not the final realities ends and values in experiencing subjects which make a continuous progress in life's experiences possible? Let it be sufficient to say, for the present, that this view does make a history possible, because it will then be a history of experience which cannot be eternally completed; and because Christianity set up new ends to be accomplished in such an experience, it makes a real history possible. Consequently, the universe is not finished without us and without our struggle to realize ideals.¹⁰

Finally, I have endeavoured to present some of the distinguishing features of Christianity, assuming that in the consciousness of Jesus Himself the reality of Christianity is to be found. I have sought to do so with the least possible use of the classic dogmas, which are in some sense products of the very thing to be understood. Relying upon the simplest forms of expression, I have tried to state the distinguishing features of Christianity as they appear in Jesus' own consciousness and in the believer's experience in contrast with the Greco-Roman life in which Christianity arose. Let it be remembered, however, that every meaning is necessarily the personal interpretation of some thinker reflecting upon what is given for constructive thought. At best, the meaning can only be less than the whole reality, which is the living experience, in which the ideal content finds realization. The consciousness of Jesus and the experience of believers who have responded to the impression of the life and work of Jesus are the primary facts given for interpretation. In the nature of the case, Christianity as a system of objective judgments called Theology is

man's product ; it is even a personal construction serving as a guide, primarily of the individual, but also of the religious community, and valuable only as it succeeds in interpreting the Way, the Truth, and the Life revealed in the consciousness of Jesus in such a manner as to promote the reproduction in us of like motives and deeds.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

THE believer bows in reverence before the thought of Jesus and lovingly follows Him, in meditation, as He went about doing good. Conscious participation in the mind of Jesus and in a like fellowship with the Father satisfies the soul that seeks to be saved. Thus the historical and the experimental stand forth as the chief reality. But religious experience soon strives to answer Augustine's question :¹ " Quid est, quod amo, quum te amo ? " (" What is it that I love, when I love thee ? ") The reply inevitably adopts the language of the believer's social and intellectual environment.

The New Testament writings have often been regarded as affording an objective but progressive expression of faith ; in them is the beginning of a theology, and Christianity frequently appears as a world-principle. In the Synoptic Gospels the historical and biographical predominate : it is Jesus of Nazareth. In the Apostolic Epistles " we have a doctrine of the Person, but no history of His life " ; this Person is " regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*, interpreted according to His place and function in universal history and as the central term in a theology or system of religious thought. In other words, the (historical) Jesus is a symbol which the Epistles explicate for human belief and apply to human experience, individual and collective." ² But, as is well known, the

New Testament Canon did not exist for the early Christians. It developed with the growth of the Church and in response to the need of a definite standard of faith by which believers might distinguish themselves from others. Nor was it till late in the second century that more strictly theological discussions began to appear, nor does Christian theology become relatively complete till well on in the fifth century. Only a brief outline of this development will now be undertaken.

In the discussion of the meaning of Christianity in the preceding chapter, it was shown that the Logia or collection of the words of Jesus, which were taken up and absorbed by the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, and Mark as the interpreter of the preaching of Peter concerning the teachings and deeds of Jesus, afford the most reliable information concerning the historical personality. It was also found that each author in his Gospel had an interpretative apologetic element, in part peculiar to himself. The Gospel of John was said to mediate between the Synoptics and St. Paul's teachings. I shall only indicate the task that is before one who would adequately present the beginnings of our Christian theology. That task is to show in detail the progressive development of this interpretative apologetic element in the New Testament writings as they undertake to explicate the content of the faith in the historical Jesus of Nazareth.³

Early Christianity was exposed to two dangers : first, a return to Jewish customs, making Christianity simply a form of Judaism ; secondly, the loss of the specific historical character of Christianity and of its wholesome truths in vague abstractions, under the influence of speculative ideas prevalent at the time and appearing particularly in Gnosticism. It must also be remembered that there were the Jews of Palestine and of the Dispersion, who felt the influence of Greek thought which was everywhere. St. Paul's

mission resulted in the formation of many Greek churches, to whom Jewish conceptions were foreign. All these diverse elements combined to modify each other and to influence the authors of the New Testament, and are reflected in their writings. On the one hand, it was necessary to present the new faith so as to commend it to the Jewish mind by showing its relation to the Old Testament, yet make it clear that Christianity was a real advance; and on the other, to convince the Greek that Christianity was the true philosophy of life, which fulfilled but transcended the best that was in the Greek thinkers.

The first Christians were, for the most part, Jewish laymen unrestrained by the logical precision felt by the Scribes, and, consequently, fancy and enthusiastic feeling had a large part in the interpretations of their faith. Two motives were at work in the formation of this earliest theology: first, the need of interpreting the personality of Jesus, both because of what was already known of Him and particularly because of what seemed to depend upon Him in the future; secondly, it was necessary to present the claims of Jesus so as to win the Jews and to defend Him against them. For both reasons, the oldest Christian theology partakes largely of Jewish conceptions. "Jesus is the Messiah" was the first confession. If this is denied by the Jews because Jesus died, the Christians reply that He shall come again, which could only be finally proved by the future. But, by applying the word "Messiah" to Jesus, the Jewish conception of things to come was transferred to Him. The prophecies of Daniel are appropriated, and the conception "Son of Man" is applied to Jesus as His own self-designation. "Soon all the Jewish apocalyptic theories, with their richness of fantasy, claim the person of Jesus for their own." But Jesus died and was buried; how then can He return as Messiah? The resurrection, with many proofs, was the answer

to this objection. But the greatest stumbling-block to the Jewish mind was the death of Jesus ; how could the fact of His death be united with faith in Him as the Messiah, whatever new meaning Jesus may have put into the conception ? This question led to the theology of the Cross. Emphasis was laid upon the forebodings and prophecies of Jesus. It began to be held that His death would have a saving influence upon His people. But the conception of suffering as having a vicarious power and as enlisting God's mercy for His people was already a part of the Jewish faith, as shown by the fourth book of the Maccabees. Then juridical and ceremonial conceptions were applied to the death of Jesus, so that St. Paul, when he became a Christian, found the formula, "died for our sins," already on the lips of the early Church. The next step was to explain the death of Jesus by the Old Testament, with the result that His birth, death, and resurrection are shown to be according to the Scriptures. Thus the Old Testament with its treasures was appropriated by the new faith ; Jesus was still further exalted by the Spirit descending upon Him at the Baptism and becoming the source of His miracles. He is the Messiah and David's Son. Then later the mystery of Jesus was explained by the story of His birth and the conception by the Holy Spirit. Very early the idea of pre-existence was also brought into connection with Jesus, and it was inferred that Jesus Himself lay hidden with God from eternity. Such were the first attempts by the use of Jewish conceptions to explain the personality of Jesus of Nazareth, with the result that His simplicity, love, and human kindness were in danger of being forgotten. Had the Jewish Christian Church remained the only representative of Christianity, it never could have claimed the world for its own. It was St. Paul who took the enthusiasm and fruitful germs of Jewish Christianity to his Gentile churches, and thus introduced Christianity

into the Greek and Roman world. St. Paul universalized Christianity. To St. Paul, Christianity was entirely a religion of redemption, Jesus was the Redeemer through God's grace. Thus he preached to the Gentiles, freeing them from obligation to keep the Jewish law, and substituting the freedom of the Spirit in Christ. Jesus, the Son of God, died on the Cross, manifesting God's love, grace, and forgiveness; rose again from the dead and ascended to heaven. These conceptions of "Son of God" and "descent from heaven" were congenial to the Greeks, who were reminded of their own mythology, but the death of Jesus still appeared difficult to reconcile with divinity. The difficulty, however, was in part removed by the conception of the resurrection and ascension.

Another important factor contributing to St. Paul's conception of Jesus was his doctrine of salvation. His view of the world and of man was radically pessimistic. Sin rules man; the flesh wars against the spirit; human powers are of no avail. St. Paul put out every other light and thought of the world as in utter darkness that he might enhance the supremacy of Jesus, whose death on the Cross as Son of God, resurrection, and ascension make Him the only Lord and Saviour of men. At that time the titles Lord and Saviour were universally applied to gods and kings, and their use by St. Paul had the effect of bringing Jesus nearer to the dignity of the Godhead. The title "Son of God" also underwent a change from its significance in the earliest Christian community, for St. Paul now thought of the "Son of God" as a heavenly being eternally with God, "the image of God," after which God created man. These conceptions were congenial to the Greek mind and had much to do with the spread of Christianity in the Greek and Roman world. This "Son of God" became man for our sakes, that we also might be sons of God. Thus Paul became the creator of a new Christology, and

furnished the theme for the subsequent speculations concerning the person of Christ. St. Paul did not, however, mean that the supreme Deity but the Son of God descends into this world and becomes flesh in order to reveal the love of God. A similar change took place in the conception of the Spirit of God or of Christ, called also the Holy Spirit, given to all believers in the Christian Church. As yet the conception of the Spirit had not become prominent. But St. Paul already uses the formula, Father, Son, and Spirit, thus anticipating the Trinitarian doctrine.

St. Paul also had an anti-Jewish apologetic, in which Christ was made the end of the law, and justification by faith and freedom in the Spirit were substituted for salvation by works. The Jewish doctrine of justification implied that God is the judge who punishes or rewards, for whom Paul substitutes the God of mercy who forgives sinners on the ground of their faith, and in support of this view he appeals to the Old Testament. Abraham "believed in Jehovah, and He reckoned it to him for righteousness" (Gen. xv. 6). "The righteous shall live by his faith" (Hab. ii. 4). Thus Paul brought the Old Testament into line with his doctrine of justification by faith, and the God of Jesus Christ was shown to be the God of Abraham. In a similar manner, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews transformed Jesus into a High Priest after the order of Melchisedec, thus making Him superior to Levi and Aaron, and even to Abraham.

The conception of Jesus as High Priest after the order of Melchisedec, and as Son of God with the new meaning given to the term, removed Jesus from men and gave rise to the question as to His relation to God. As reflection dwelt upon this problem, the supreme God recedes from contact with men and the world, and mediatorial agencies are introduced. Here we may refer to the prologue of the Gospel of John, where God is said to have created the world through His Son,

who is the Logos become flesh and dwelling among us. It is not necessary for us to enter upon the discussion of the source of this Logos doctrine. It may have been Philo's writings, although the conception was already widely prevalent and can be traced in earlier Greek philosophy. Its ontological character is evident. So also is the utility of the conception as the basis of an apologetic to the Greeks and those familiar with Greek thought.

This brief outline of the complex movements explaining and interpreting the life and work of Jesus cannot now be made more complete. I have presented some of the results attained by those who have made a critical study of New Testament writings regarded as the natural products of the early Church. None of these writings are strictly biographies although based upon historical material. "And since the evangelists in any case are not chroniclers but preachers, the effort to disentangle 'the historical Jesus' from their account must be fruitless, because perverted by illegitimate dogmatic considerations. It was by the apostles' preaching of Christ that the Church came into existence; their preaching, accordingly, must remain the vital soil of her life and the final court of appeal by which the truth of her message is sanctioned" (summary of Kähler's position, by Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, p. 313). It seems to follow from such a statement that it would be highly important analytically to determine the elements in the New Testament writings that do definitely show who and what Jesus was, freed from extraneous considerations; that it ought to be possible to follow the logical development of the interpretative apologetic element which, it is frankly admitted, is in the New Testament writings, even in the Synoptics; and that, finally, the apostolic "preachers" and New Testament writers in general should form "the final court of appeal" for the Church and the believer. Many are

always found who are unwilling to assent to the latter statement, for the mind of all ages has been disturbed by the controversies that deal, not with the real Jesus, but with the titles, Messiah, Son of Man, Son of God, High Priest after the order of Melchisedec. Nevertheless, the obligation has always rested heavily upon many to receive as finally authoritative the "illegitimate dogmatic considerations" which render "fruitless the effort to disentangle the historical Jesus." But how sharp is the contrast with the simplicity, nearness, human love, and kindliness of Jesus of Nazareth portrayed by the Logia, indeed, by the Synoptics, if we may trust the results of the critical study of the Gospels that there are such sayings of Jesus distinguishable from the interpretative, apologetic element! If so, how can this other element be equally authoritative for those differently conditioned?

It is, of course, true that the application of these titles to Jesus served the purpose of preserving the precious truths of the real Jesus, whom they in a measure helped to conceal. It was because St. Paul and others succeeded in conveying to their readers Jesus' own consciousness of the Father's love and mercy, His readiness to forgive and save unto the uttermost, that the Christ of whom they speak still inspired the believer with hope, courage, and joy, and for this reason a certain sanctity attaches to the symbols of faith employed. The Gnostics, however, were not so successful, for they lost this familiar, human Jesus in their subtle abstractions and fanciful interpretation of the relations of God, the Son, and the Spirit to the world and to men. To these we now turn.³

The Gnostics were believers who sought to justify to reason what faith accepts, and to show the relation of Christianity to Paganism and to Judaism.⁴ Although Irenaeus speaks of the Gnostics as "a body

of men who set aside the truth, putting in its place fables and vain genealogies,—wickedly perverting the good words of Scripture, which they handle deceitfully—and destroy the faith of many,”⁵ a more generous judgment would regard them as conscientious thinkers endeavouring to adjust the claims of the Christian religion to the scientific reason. The Gnostic doctrines appear in the Apostolic age, as, for example, the teachings of Simon Magus and his followers, “as well as the false doctrines which Paul combats in Corinth, Thessalonica, Ephesus, and Colossae.” But it is only in the second century, under the influence of the Hellenic philosophy of Alexandria, that Gnosticism assumes a formidable speculative character. It appeared in a threefold form: the first regarded Christianity as only a purified and expanded Judaism; the second was animated by hatred of Judaism, and sought to substitute purely heathen ideas for Christian doctrines, ascribing a dignity equal to that of Jesus to Pythagoras and Plato, and in general making Christianity approach as nearly as possible to Paganism; and the third, of which Marcion was a representative, sought a pure Christianity freed from Pagan and Jewish ideas.⁶

It was about A.D. 130 that the flood of Gnostic theories began to appear, pretending to give the deeper and truer view of Christianity. Being put forth by able Christian men and appealing particularly to the cultured, these views had much influence. The factors entering into Gnosticism often reflect the prevailing thought of the age, such as the distinction between spirit and matter, which was viewed as the source of evil, while spirit was the sum of light, truth, and reality; the present world including man is due to the union of the two elements, the material imprisoning and hindering the spiritual. The Gnostic believed in a higher world, where spirit exists in purity and power; in this higher world are hierarchies of beings

(aeons), all divine and all manifesting the central source called God. The world gives evidence of being pervaded by a certain wisdom setting it in order, indicating some intelligent agent as its artificer, who is the Demiurge, the God of the Old Testament, but subordinate to the supreme God. Christ is a wonderful concentration of the light and virtue of the spiritual world, and appears at the proper time to deliver those who are in the power of evil so far as they are susceptible to salvation, and they are saved according as they apprehend the significance of Christ's coming and acquire the true view, the true *gnosis* of things. "The hope of the Gnostics was to rise clear of all material entanglement into the realm of light, knowledge, and incorruption. What this would prove to be remained very vague; no details could be given" (Rainy).⁷

It may be noted in passing that the term Matter was used by the Greek philosophers, the Persians, Philo, Plotinus and others, and so was differently conceived, but never refers to matter as it appears in sense objects of our material world, though it is necessary to its formation. What is it but a recognition of the privation and limitation that must be the fate of finite existences if there is to be a world at all? Or is it the logical concept of pure being abstracted from all attributes?

It is important, however, to note that, while Gnosticism like Christianity emphasized the redemption from the evil, it extends the conception of evil to the world as a whole, which for the Christian is good; that the tendency of Gnosticism is towards fatalism, while Christianity affirms personal freedom and responsibility, and creation in the image of the supreme God, who is the God of the Old Testament and not a Demiurge; that the Gnostic doctrine of the Redeemer's personality was Docetic in tendency, for their conception of matter as evil did not allow a real incarnation; that the Saviour—the pure spiritual

principle—descends upon the Messiah, prepared by the Demiurge, who dies on Calvary, while the Saviour is viewed as previously departing from the Messiah of the Demiurge—the God of the Old Testament. The Church, of course, believed otherwise, but as yet the doctrine of the person of Christ had not been formulated, and the need of doing so began to be felt. The Gnostic method of salvation was by mental and spiritual illumination, while, for the Christian, salvation was by grace and the surrender of the will, which were within reach of all ; the Gnostic instead divided men generally into two classes, the spiritual and the carnal or material. Even ordinary Christians as men of mere faith take Christianity literally and have only a relative blessedness suited to them, but the truly spiritual, the Gnostic proper, by their own enlightened, illumined nature respond to the revelation of Christ and experience its power. Only a few can attain to this state, but they form the true Church.

At this point, reference may be made to the relation of Gnosticism to Christianity. The New Testament writings have some features in common with Gnosticism, which doubtless furnished a starting-point from which even a conscientious thinker might be led into this heresy. For example, Jesus spoke in parables, which to many were dark and mysterious sayings. Mark's Gospel shows also that certain disciples, as, for example, Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, were the recipients of Jesus' special love and confidence. Then there was the promise of the Spirit after His death, which was thought to mean a substitute for Jesus and a continuance of His work. The Gospel of John, too, speaks of a unique knowledge of God and of the Son. St. Paul, however, contributed most. He thinks of the world as corrupt ; and it would be easy to infer from Paul that Matter itself is the abode of evil. Paul's Christology also contains the elements of the Gnostic doctrines concerning Christ, for Paul regarded

Christ's nature as heavenly in its origin. This heavenly Being humbled Himself to become man, yet His humanity was only after the "fashion" or "similitude" of the body of sin. How easy it would be to draw the Docetic conclusion which the Gnostics held ! After a short time He ascends to heaven, triumphing over principalities and powers. St. Paul, too, frequently refers to those that are of the flesh and those that are of the Spirit. Likewise the Christian teachers were skilful in distinguishing the double meaning in the Old Testament. Faith takes only the immediately given copy of the eternal truth which the Spirit of Wisdom reveals, suggesting Plato's distinction between opinion and knowledge. The Gnostics, likewise, sought a higher spiritual knowledge surpassing the symbolic concreteness which faith apprehends, and this higher knowledge is attainable only by a few. But Gnosticism, although having these points in common with the New Testament writings, especially those of St. Paul, did not succeed in making its abstractions and fanciful constructions the medium of preserving the wholesome content of the Christian faith in the historical Jesus, and in this chiefly lies the heresy. The best representatives of the more dangerous speculative Gnosticism were Basilides (about A.D. 120) and Valentinus (d. about A.D. 160). Marcion, though less speculative, caused much disturbance in the Christian community, for he endeavoured to free Christianity from Pagan and Jewish ideas. For him there was an antithesis between the Law and the Gospel. Nature reveals to the Pagan at most the Almighty ; the Law reveals to the Jew the righteous God ; but Christianity is absolutely new and, therefore, sudden, because it reveals the good and compassionate One. Christ was not born at all, but came directly from heaven into Capernaum in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius as revealer of the good God, in contrast with the righteous world-maker, the

angry Jehovah of the Jews. Jesus has no connection with the Messiah of the Old Testament, although He by accommodation applied the term to Himself. His body was an appearance, His death an illusion, with, however, a real meaning. Hippolytus relates Marcion to Empedocles, whose doctrine of Love and Strife he appropriated as the good principle of the universe or God, and as the bad principle or Matter, over which the devil rules and to which the heathen belong.⁶

Enough has been said to show that the Gnostics, applying the allegorical method to the Scriptures, particularly the New Testament, and dominated by the Hellenic thought of Alexandria, attempted to transform Christianity into a world-principle having ontological significance, dissolving the distinctive Christian principle of salvation into a transcendental metaphysics of the world's beginning and course of development. It was only through the formation of dogma under the dominance of the Roman Church that the distinctive Christian ideas of salvation could enter upon a course of historical development. However cumbersome the ecclesiastical and dogmatic structure became in later centuries, the core of meaning, the precious Christian teachings of salvation, were conserved and made the possession of the later generations, and even of the present.

At first, Christianity, arising among the humbler classes and marked by religious fervour, felt no need of theological speculation. But, when it came into contact with that peculiar fusion of Greek and Oriental thought and religion which appeared in Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism, there arose the problem of differentiating Christianity so as to interpret and conserve the Christian ideas of salvation, and not only to defend but commend them to all. The Roman Church, upon which fell in no small degree the prestige of Rome itself as the chief city of the world, contributed much to the undertaking. Nor are the political changes, due

to the decline of the Roman Empire and the barbarian incursions, to be neglected. All these things contributed to the formation of Christian dogmas and to their acceptance as the final truth of Christianity. The dogmas themselves had an important function to perform in adjusting the Christian community to its environment.

The first marks differentiating Christianity from its rivals were found in the Rule of Faith and in the formation of the New Testament. Then came the work of the Apologists and the beginnings of Christian theology, which served as a vehicle for the faith and as a powerful instrument for its defence and promotion in the individual and social religious life.

Very early it was believed that there was an identity between what the churches possessed as Christian communities and the doctrines or regulations of the Twelve Apostles, through whom there was a direct connection with the Master. "Before the violent conflict with Gnosticism, short formulated summaries of the faith had grown out of the missionary practice of the Church (catechising). The shortest formula was that which defined the Christian faith as belief in the Father, Son, and Spirit. It appears to have been universally current in Christendom about the year 150. In the solemn transactions of the Church, therefore, especially in baptism, in the great prayer of the Lord's Supper, as well as in the exorcism of demons, fixed formulae were used." "They embraced also such articles as contained the most important facts in the history of Christ." ⁷ As early as A.D. 140 the Roman Church possessed a fixed creed which every candidate for baptism had to profess, but it is not probable that all the Christian communities had such creeds. These formulations expressed the facts upon which Christians based their faith, and were rules of faith rather than of conduct; for there was no objection to the Christian interpretation of the

moral aspects of life, but to the adoration of Christ, and to the worship of God as the Christians conceived Him. Consequently, these formulae served as a distinguishing mark of the Christian community as well as a bond of unity.

There is a somewhat precise statement of this *regula fidei* in 1 Cor. xi. 1 and 1 Tim. iii. 16 ; another in Hermas, Bk. ii. Commandment 1. Irenaeus (A.D. 120 to A.D. 202) gives a short summary of the faith : " The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from the Apostles and their disciples this faith ; in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them ; and in Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who became incarnate for our salvation ; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of God, and the advents, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and this future manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father ' to gather all things in one,' and to raise up anew all flesh of the whole human race." ⁸ Tertullian's summary of the faith is more extended.⁹

The appeal to an objective standard, like the *regula fidei*, was accompanied by the growing importance of certain writings which it was the custom to read in the churches, and which were finally declared to be the New Testament, as a collection of Apostolic writings ranking with the Old Testament. There is no definite history of this process, for the Canon emerges quite suddenly ; as early as " 150, the main body of Christendom had still no collection of Gospels and Epistles possessing equal authority with the Old Testament." The Canon first appears in the same ecclesiastical district where there are the best evidences of the existence of the Apostolic *regula fidei*. The conflict

of the Church with Marcion and other Gnostics promoted this movement to form an authoritative collection of Apostolic writings as a weapon against the enemy, and the next step was to declare that the Church alone possessed the true writings, *i.e.* everything apostolic, consequently, authoritative. The gradual formation of the conception of the Church also accompanies the development of the New Testament Canon. Omitting the complex details of these movements and their relations, we pass to the Apologists and their attitude towards these standards of belief.¹⁰

The Apologists regarded the *regula fidei* and the New Testament as affording the means of defending Christianity and differentiating it from other forms of faith and knowledge, but their attitude towards these standards of belief varies. Justin Martyr, for example, insisted upon the recognition of certain definite traditional facts as the standard of orthodoxy, but he was such a thorough student of Greek philosophy that he found in it a strong support and preparation for Christian faith. Tatian, Irenaeus, and Tertullian recognize nothing but the traditions and the Scriptures. Tatian ridicules philosophers.¹¹ Tertullian would confine all investigation to the limits of faith: "Let our 'seeking,' therefore, be in that which is our own, and from those who are our own, and concerning that which is our own,—that, and only that, which can become an object of inquiry without impairing the rule of faith." "All doctrine must be prejudged as false which savours of contrariety to the truth of the churches and Apostles of Christ and God. . . . We hold communion with the Apostolic Church because our doctrine is in no respect different *from theirs*. This is *our* witness of truth." The Scriptures, moreover, belong only to Christians, and heretics are not to be recognized as having a right to base arguments upon them.¹² How different

is the attitude of Clement of Alexandria (d. 217), who, with Origen his pupil and successor, may be said to have founded Christian theology! Clement regards human knowledge as necessary for the understanding of the Scriptures, and says that "it is necessary for him who desires to be partaker of the power of God, to treat of intellectual subjects by philosophizing."¹³ It is even desirable to know and use philosophy as a help to the truth, for "philosophy has come down from God to men, not with a definite direction, but in the way in which showers fall down on the good land, and on the dunghill, and on the houses."¹⁴ For, "perchance philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily, till the Lord should call the Greeks. For this was a schoolmaster to lead the 'Hellenic mind,' as the Law, the Hebrews, 'to Christ.' Philosophy, therefore, was a preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ."¹⁵ Thus the difference in the attitude of the defenders of Christianity towards the standards of belief was reflected in their treatment.

The peace of the Christian communities was, however, frequently disturbed by the violence of persecutions and the bitterness of controversy and ridicule. The persecutions began with the Jews and spread to the Gentiles. It is said that there were ten great persecutions, extending from Claudius in A.D. 53 and Nero in A.D. 64 to A.D. 311, when edicts of toleration were issued by Galenius, one of the subordinates of Diocletian.¹⁶ The controversial attack was directed against Christ, who was said to be of illegitimate birth, of humble life and lowly associates, finally suffering an ignominious death, whereby He could not be the Messiah.¹⁷ Celsus regarded Jesus as an impostor, but the Syncretists and Neo-Platonists viewed Him as at least a distinguished sage. A second charge was aimed at Christianity itself as a new religion of barbarian origin which affirmed absurd facts and doctrines,

such as regeneration and resurrection.¹⁸ Also objections were made on the ground of contradictions between the Old and New Testaments, among the Gospels, and between Peter and Paul. The Christians were also attacked because of their blind faith and their denial of the gods ; their lack of patriotism and their superstition ; even the charge of unnatural crimes was made. Thus the age of persecution expressed itself against what was really purest and best in it.¹⁹

The Apologists addressed, sometimes, the emperors, for example, Hadrian (A.D. 117-183), Antoninus Pius (A.D. 137-161), and Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-180) ; sometimes the governors of provinces, and sometimes the intelligent public in general. It is doubtful whether the apologetic writings ever reached the emperors themselves. We might expect that Marcus Aurelius, himself a Stoic philosopher and moralist, would have listened to the apologies of Melito, Miltiades, and Athenagoras in behalf of the persecuted Christians. The persecution was, however, political rather than religious, and the real teaching and practice of the Christians was probably unknown to the emperor, who mentions them in his *Meditations* (xi. 3), only once, as dying through sheer obstinacy.

The Apologists sought primarily to lead the authorities and the people generally to be more tolerant towards the Christians by refuting the charges against them, and, secondly, by showing the reasonableness of Christianity and by defending it against the Gnostics. Their argument was both popular and theoretical. Popularly, they defended Christianity against the charge of being an apostasy from the Jewish religion, that the servant-form of Jesus was inconsistent with the conception of the Messiah, and that the divinity of Jesus contradicts the unity of God. The slanderous accusations of immoral conduct, secret vice, and superstitious fanaticism were refuted.

A positive argument was made in support of miracles and the resurrection of the body, both of which were offensive to the Greeks.²⁰

Our interest, however, centres in the more theoretical arguments of the Apologists which form a transition between Gnosticism and the more scientific theology of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, and Augustine. A simple statement of their main position may be made as follows : The Apologists assumed as finally true what was believed by the religious communities, namely, the *regula fidei*, or formula of belief in Father, Son, and Spirit, together with certain sayings and events connected through the Apostles with Jesus ; the Old Testament and, after about A.D. 150, the New Testament were accepted as the Scriptures. The contents of these objective expressions of faith were regarded as the revelation of the Logos in the race as a whole and particularly in Christ. This objective revelation in Christianity was perhaps not anything new in content, but it was new in its function of completing and confirming as true what the Logos in a Pythagoras, a Socrates, and a Plato had already vouchsafed unto men. For centuries Greek philosophy had been developing into a religion. After Aristotle, the ethical and religious features of thought predominated until, at the beginning of the Christian era, there was a distinct longing for a revelation which should confirm as true, as well as complete, the moral and religious thought of the best of Platonic and Stoic teaching. The Apologists found in Christianity real revelation, and had no doubt as to what is revealed. Thus, through the aid of Christianity, the noblest features of Greek philosophy, as a theory of the world and a system of morality, attained to victory over the polytheistic past and descended from the circle of the learned to the common people. The Apologists proclaimed Christianity as the realization of an absolutely moral theism, which they declared

to be the true meaning of Greek philosophy when freed from the perversions due to the later forms of Alexandrian Syncretism and Gnosticism. This real kinship of ideas between Christianity and Greek philosophy in its purity constituted the fitting refutation of critics like Celsus, and commended it to thoughtful Greeks, who in large numbers became Christians.²¹ Such a position was also acceptable to the Church, for it made its beliefs appear reasonable without the sacrifice of the historical form of the revelation. It is not altogether clear why the arguments of the Apologists were accepted while similar efforts of the Gnostics to explain Christianity to the cultured world, as the highest wisdom, were rejected. The churches, however, regarded the work of the Apologists favourably for many reasons: first, there was by this time an intense longing in many quarters for religious revelation of the way of life; ideals had already been conceived that were unattainable by mere human strength; the need of divine help was keenly felt; secondly, the representation of Christianity as the *reasonable* religion, which fulfilled the moral and spiritual ideals of the past, appealed to the good sense of the intelligent man of the age; and, thirdly, the Apologists contrived to make room for "tradition including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain." As a matter of fact, however, no special use was made of the historical. Nor was the person of Christ of so much importance in the scheme of salvation as it appeared to be later. The confession of Christ was involved in the acknowledgment of the wisdom of the prophets, but no new content of truth was received through Christ, who, as a great Teacher, made it acceptable to the world and strengthened it. Nor was the method of the Apologists new, for they only adopted the methods and

results of the labours of the Jews of three centuries previous, who, having received a Hellenic training, set forth the religion of Jehovah to the Greeks in a spiritualized form as the absolute philosophy, whereby the positive and historic elements of the national religion were transformed into proofs of the truth of that theism. Likewise, the Christian Apologists, leaning upon the Stoic and Platonic philosophy, found in the historical features of Christianity a revelation and confirmation of the spiritual and moral theism which formed the content of their teachings. Besides, the Apologists did not question authorities or introduce foreign elements. All these conditions led to the favourable acceptance of "the marvellous attempt to present Christianity to the world as the religion which is the true philosophy and as the philosophy which is the true religion." The foundation of this position was the conviction that the creating and revealing Logos or Reason of God was perfectly manifested in Christ, as a consequence of which the reasonable account of all things, *i.e.* philosophy or theology, and the Christian revelation are identical. In this manner "the philosophical doctrines of God, virtue, and immortality became through the Apologists the certain content of a world-wide religion, which is Christian because Christ guaranteed its certainty. They made Christianity a deistical religion for the whole world without abandoning, in word at least, 'the old teachings and knowledge' of the Christians. They thus marked out the task of 'dogmatic' and, so to speak, wrote the prolegomena for every future theological system in the Church." ²²

This Apologetic may be illustrated by a brief reference to Justin Martyr (A.D. 110 or 114-165). Justin was a cultured Gentile, born in Samaria, who also lived in Ephesus, and probably in Rome as a Christian teacher. His two *Apologies* were not the first to be written in behalf of the Christians, but are

the earliest extant. His other principal writing is the Dialogue with Trypho, which expounds the reasons for regarding Christ as the Messiah of the Old Testament. Both *Apologies* show a thorough acquaintance with Greek philosophy. He appeals from the scepticism of the later forms of Greek thought to the older and purer. Socrates and Plato prepare for him the way to Christ. The prevailing scientific conception of the world is made to support the Christian faith and hopes. The Word or Logos is the first birth of God, who is otherwise incomprehensible.²³ The natural world and all living creatures express this divine Logos in different degrees. The Christians are not atheists or teachers of new divinities, but worship God according to truth, yet are persecuted, like the Stoics and Socrates, for no other reason than faithfulness to the Word in which they partake. Socrates and other teachers had the Word only partially, our Teacher completely, whence it follows that we have the more reliable truth. Why, then, persecute us? Thus Justin reasons. Our Teacher foretold even the persecutions we suffer, and taught us to worship God according to truth. "And we reasonably worship Him, having learned that He is the Son of the true God Himself, and holding Him in the second place, and the prophetic Spirit in the third." "Whatever either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated by finding and contemplating some part of the Word." "For each man spake well in proportion to the share he had of the Spermatic Word. . . . Whatever things were rightly said among all men, are the property of us Christians. For, next to God, we worship and love the Word, who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God, since also He became man for our sakes, that, becoming a partaker of our suffering, He might also bring us healing."²⁴ Thus Justin emphasizes Christ also as Redeemer, while other Apologists mainly consider that man is able to redeem himself, if only his reason

is graciously stimulated so that he may know how to gain the victory over evil powers. He also endeavoured to give a positive significance to Christ's death, and spoke of the blood of Christ as cleansing from sin which through Him is forgiven. But Justin still occupies the moral and philosophical ground in the view of salvation according to which Jesus saves as a Teacher through whom men gain the knowledge of the true God, of His will and promises, and the certainty that God will always grant forgiveness to the repentant and eternal life to the righteous; this knowledge is sufficient to lead man to turn himself to God, which is life. At the same time, Justin intends to regard Jesus as Lord and Redeemer as well as divine Teacher.²⁵

The work of the Apologists strengthens the self-consciousness of the Christian community and tends to augment the importance of the objective standards of faith to which Tertullian and Irenaeus exhibit increasing devotion. Tertullian contributes to later theology the terminology, one substance, three persons, used in the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ, as well as a series of dogmatic conceptions, such as satisfaction, merit, sacrament, original sin; ²⁶ while Irenaeus makes a positive contribution to the content of dogma by his fundamental idea that the Creator of the world and the supreme God are the same, and that Christianity means a real redemption effected by the appearance of Christ. Thus the Person of Christ begins to assume theoretical importance in distinguishing Christianity from its rivals. Henceforth Christ is to be thought of, not only as the adequate expression of the divine Logos, making Him the supreme Teacher, but as Redeemer, the incarnate God. This redemptive conception of the Person of Christ becomes the theme about which the theology of the Church is to be formed.

Belief in Christ as both Teacher and Redeemer soon led to reflection concerning His ability to save, which seemed to require that He be exalted to an eternally constituent factor in the Godhead, for if He be God, surely He can save unto the uttermost. Consequently, every effort was made, not only to accept what is given in the Christian belief as true, but to formulate it *sub specie aeternitatis*. But in order to conceive the relations of God and the Person of Christ so as reasonably to satisfy the confession of faith in Father, Son, and Spirit, God must be thought of not according to the negative theology of the Gnostics and the Neo-Platonists, but as a Being in whom there are recognizable distinctions ; otherwise the confession of Father, Son, and Spirit could not have final significance. It would not, I think, be inappropriate to characterize the movement now to be outlined as the process of transforming Christianity as a religion of salvation into an ontological principle, explaining the universe as such. At that time no other course seemed possible. This movement had its source in the catechetical school of Alexandria. Here the Church enjoyed a large measure of prosperity, and the Christians themselves felt the influence of the literary activity of the city, many of the young men attending the lectures of heathen professors, who in some cases, as, for example, Celsus, began to take a critical interest in Christianity and its claims. There had already been, as early as A.D. 200, a school of ecclesiastics at Cappadocia, in Asia Minor, for scientific study in general. In Palestine, even in Carthage, there were Christian scholars who sought to appropriate the scientific knowledge of the age to the uses of the Church. In some cases, treatises of philosophical theology were written, as, for example, by Bardasenes of Edessa. At Alexandria this movement reached its height somewhat later in connection with the famous catechetical school. Here the whole of Greek

science was taught, and made to serve the purpose of Christian scientific thought. Geometry, physiology, and astronomy, as well as Greek philosophy, were studied. Plato and Aristotle were held in high esteem.

Clement was the first teacher of the catechetical school at Alexandria. He was probably an Athenian, and was born in the middle of the second century and died in A.D. 213. His spirit and method are those of a Greek philosopher who has become a Christian. On the one hand, he accepts what is given for belief by tradition and the Scriptures, but, as a thinker, it is for him the highest revelation of the Logos, through whom the human race is trained in the knowledge of God. Clement thus preserves his intellectual freedom and independence of external authority. For him "the liquid stream of Greek learning" is a preparation for and a means of setting forth the content of Christianity, which requires the fullest exercise of the reflective reason. Nevertheless, whatever conceptions cannot be harmonized with the Holy Scriptures with the aid, if necessary, of the allegorical method, are to be rejected—a fact that made the work of Clement acceptable to the churches, who were quite willing to have him show that the Greeks were but children in wisdom compared with the Hebrews.²⁷ Clement manifests a tendency to identify Christ and the Logos, and yet the Logos is sometimes regarded as the law and order in the world which appears most perfectly in Christ as the supreme Teacher. "The Logos is Christ, but the Logos is at the same time the moral and rational in all stages of development." He who responds to this training of the Logos and finds life in God, experiencing the divine goodness, is saved.²⁸

Theology, however, owes more to Origen than to Clement, who was a tranquil spirit, not impelled to undertake more than his own intellectual needs demanded. Clement's work was of the eclectic type,

and he failed to produce a system. But Origen (A.D. 185-254) was a critical scholar, a great preacher and writer. He was an Egyptian, a Copt, the son of Christian parents, and bore the name of one of his country's deities, namely, Origenes, child of Hor, the God of Light. He had an eager, fiery temperament, which was softened by tribulation, for his father perished in the persecution of Septimus Severus. At the age of eighteen, Origen succeeded Clement as the master of the catechetical school at Alexandria. Here he lived a devoted, enthusiastic life, marked by great ability and scholarship.²⁹

Like Clement, Origen sought to unite the philosophical with the traditional and historical features of Christianity. He begins his work, *De Principiis*, by a summary of the revelation which the Church possesses from the Apostles (Preface, 4-8), which includes the usual Rule of Faith and the Old and New Testaments. These constitute an absolutely reliable revelation, which is to be believed, and whose meaning it is the purpose of theology to set forth. These limitations make Origen appear at times less bold and free than Clement. Nevertheless, the modern reader feels the power of Origen's deep earnestness, and admires him for his ability to find a safe way for the Christian faith through the intricacies of his intellectual environment.

Origen's method enabled him to unite the historical and traditional with philosophical principles. This method was threefold: "The simple man may be edified by the 'flesh,' as it were, of the Scripture, for so we name the obvious sense; while he who has ascended a certain way, may be edified by the 'soul,' as it were. The perfect man, again, . . . may receive edification from the spiritual law, which has a shadow of good things to come. For as man consists of body, and soul, and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture, which has been arranged to be given by God for the

salvation of men.”³⁰ This method, sometimes called allegorical, enabled Origen to be an orthodox traditionalist and maintain “that Christianity embraces a salvation which is offered to all men and is attained by faith, that it is the doctrine of historical facts to which we must adhere, that the content of Christianity has been appropriately summarized by the Church in her Rule of Faith, and that belief is of itself sufficient for the renewal and salvation of man. But, as an idealistic philosopher, Origen transformed the whole content of ecclesiastical faith into ideas”³¹ similar to those of the best form of Neo-Platonism. Thus he conceived salvation as a spiritual enlightenment, a restoration, a contemplation of the divine Being. It may be said, however, that the historical and the Scriptural furnished the standards of belief to which, with great skill, he adjusted his philosophical system, in which he sought to appropriate the results of the labours of the Greek idealists and moralists since Socrates.

The most important part of Origen’s teaching concerns the being of God in relation to the Person of Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is worthy of remark that the confession of faith in Father, Son, and Spirit was the occasion of a clearer formulation of the problem concerning the divine nature, and was instrumental in turning thought away from the negative theology of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism towards modern Christian theism. God is, for Origen, incomprehensible, immeasurable by our understanding “when shut in by the fetters of flesh and blood . . . and rendered duller and more obtuse.” But God is a spiritual unity. Although we may not know God as He is, yet our understanding “knows the Father of the world from the beauty of His works and the comeliness of His creatures.”³² Origen here shows the influence of the negative theology of Neo-Platonism, but tries to draw near to the Christian conception of God as

Personal Will. The predicates, good, wise, and just, are not untrue of God but inadequate ; the incomprehensibleness of God is relative, and the nearer we approach to Him the more completely will the darkness that seems to envelop Him give place to light. God is passionless because unchanging and eternal. It is condescension to our infirmity that Scripture attributes to Him wrath, hatred, and repentance.³³

The creation of the world is due to the perfect goodness of God, who communicates Himself always in the world of finite existences. That this may be done, the divine Being issues, first, into an adequate organ, namely, the Logos. Of course, Origen uses the conception, Logos, for the purpose of expounding the Christian faith, which makes the Logos doctrine apparently different from what it is with Philo and Plotinus ; but the conception has practically the same meaning for each, namely, the Platonic Ideas, conceived as a unity, forming the pure Reason or Intelligence of God. This Logos, says Origen, appears in Christ, and is the perfect Image, the Wisdom of God (cf. John i. 1 ; Heb. i. 1). Hence there is nothing in the Logos corporeal, but He is essentially God. Therefore He is immutable and has not a communicated essence, but is God. Being in Christ, the Logos makes Christ the same in substance with the Father (*ὁμοούσιος*). But the Son, proceeding as the will from the spirit, was always with God ; or, God could not be without Him, because we cannot think of God without His eternal Wisdom and its expression. The relation of the Logos to God, and hence of Christ to the Father, is a ceaseless, beginningless process, and belongs to the inner necessity of the divine nature as Spirit.³⁴ Origen beautifully illustrates the *Kenosis* of the Logos in the incarnation by comparing the fulness of divinity to a statue so large as to fill the whole earth and therefore impossible to be seen ; another, in outline identical with the first, is of such limitations as to be

presentable. In like manner is the Scripture true that "he who sees me, sees the Father also," for "I and my Father are one."³⁵

Origen strives to avoid the Neo-Platonic and Gnostic conception of the Logos as the first created being, which would make Christ the Son the highest creature. He accordingly regards the only-begotten Son as God's Wisdom hypostatically (*ὑπόστασις*), just as Augustine does in the *De Trinitate*.³⁶ It is not so clear that the Holy Spirit is not a creature subordinate to the Father and Son, as with Basilides the Gnostic. Harnack holds that Origen conceived the Spirit as subordinate to the Son with a restricted sphere of action. This view does not seem to agree with Origen when he says: "Nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or less." But Origen does acknowledge that the teachings of the Apostles which the Church possesses do not make clear the relation of the Spirit in the Trinity. Origen, however, yields to the influence of the Neo-Platonic philosophy in holding that the angels of the Old Testament proceed from the Father next in order after the Spirit, and in association with the Spirit. Even subordinated to these is another "order of rational creatures . . . judged fit by God to replenish the human race, *i.e.* the souls of men, assumed in consequence of their moral progress into the order of angels."³⁷

While Origen contributes to the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity, he does so by a skilful adaptation of the Neo-Platonic philosophy to the Christian faith, at the same time giving little or no place to the actual life of Jesus of Nazareth in the doctrine. This modified Neo-Platonism, united with the Christian confession of faith in Father, Son, and Spirit, produces only a mechanical, contradictory structure. Besides, Origen thinks of Christ not so much as Redeemer as an active, creative world-principle which only barely escapes the Gnostic heresy. In Origen, the functional

relation of theology to the religious life is vividly illustrated. On the one hand, he devoutly accepted the traditions, confessions, and Scripture of the Church as objective standards of belief, to which he endeavoured to conform his thought in his effort to conceive it all from the standpoint of the science in which he had been trained. The combination of the two factors was his theology, which was little more than a theory of the world and the world-ground, the product of the Greek spirit, qualified by predicates taken from the Gospel concerning Jesus as Saviour and Redeemer. His thought was really triumphant over external standards, as it always must be, finding the criteria of truth within itself, indicating that theology is the product of thought, and as such has an important function in the co-ordination and promotion of the religious life.

The Logos conception, appropriated from Greek philosophy by Origen and other defenders of Christianity, although in itself not very definite, and apparently admitting of wide accommodation to what was conceived to be Christian truth, nevertheless contained an inner difficulty, namely, it was fundamentally the conception of the cosmic creative principle, an ontological principle, not really fitted to express the divinity of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Redeemer. At last its unsuitableness was recognized, and issued in the controversy between the Arians and Athanasians and Augustine. The ideal significance of this famous struggle is the gradual removal of the original cosmological content of the Logos conception, and the substitution of that of Christ as Redeemer of men in such a way that the divinity of Christ as Saviour was theoretically secured, at least to the satisfaction of the ecclesiastical party. The thing of chief significance about this controversy, for our purpose, is the effort to bring the theological doctrine into such a relation to the saving Christian

beliefs as to conserve them and minister to the life of the community of believers. As such, the speculative doctrine of the divinity of the Son had an important function to perform.

Only a brief review of this controversy can be undertaken. There were many stages along the way. There was much indefiniteness in the views held by the bishops and theologians of the Orient about A.D. 320. The Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean conception of subordinate gods and intermediate beings furnished the background, yet a monotheism was at the same time maintained. In seeming opposition to this conception of the Deity, was the faith of the Church in God the Father, Son, and Spirit, as expressed in the *regula fidei* and the New Testament. Paul of Samosata considered the Logos incarnate in Christ, not as the eternal Wisdom of God proper, but as the created Wisdom of God, which was to reduce Christ to a creature and a cosmic principle.

Lucian, a disciple of Paul of Samosata, founded a school at Antioch, from which proceeded the Arian doctrine. Lucian was greatly revered, and finally martyred in A.D. 311 or 312. His pupils came to Alexandria, which was more tranquil. On their arrival they found the Church there seeking for a tenable, formal expression of its faith which would be a union of tradition, Scripture, and philosophical speculation. The prevailing confusion gave advantage to the system of the disciples of Lucian, which appeared to be speculatively and exegetically consistent.

Lucian had a pupil by the name of Arius, a Libyan by birth, and much respected by his followers, although regarded by Athanasius as a flippant character.³⁸ There had already arisen at Alexandria a suspicion of scientific theology, united with a tendency to separate Christian doctrine from Greek speculation. Arius, however, boldly advocated the teachings of Lucian.

The climax came about A.D. 320, when Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, summoned a synod of about one hundred Egyptian and Libyan bishops, who excommunicated Arius and his followers. Arius appealed to the Eastern bishops, and the appeal was favourably received. The controversy extended to the common people. Even in the theatres the sacred doctrines of the Church were held up to ridicule. Finally, the attention of the emperor, Constantine, was attracted. After his victory over his rival, Licinius, Constantine had become Roman emperor in A.D. 323. In the interest of social and political peace, Constantine counselled union between the two parties, declaring the quarrel to be about non-essentials, all being agreed as to the main point. The emperor soon discovered that such a reconciliation was impossible—indeed, he himself was won over to the Western party, that of Bishop Alexander, by Hosius of Cordova, upon whose advice, apparently, the emperor summoned the Council of Nicaea in the summer of A.D. 325, which finally decided against the Arian party. Harnack says we do not know who presided, but Gibbon says it was Hosius.

Arius held that there are two Wisdoms: "First is the attribute coexistent with God, and next, that in this Wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it. 'For Wisdom, saith Arius, by the Will of the wise God, had its existence in Wisdom.' Hence this Word (in Christ) is not eternal. 'God was alone, and not yet a Father, but afterwards He became a Father.' 'Then wishing to form us, thereupon He made a certain One, and named Him Word and Wisdom and Son that He might form us by means of Him.' 'And by nature, as all others, so the Word Himself is alterable, and remains good by His own free will, while He chooseth; when, however, He wills, He can alter as we can, as being of an alterable nature.' 'The Word is not very

God, (but) only in name.' 'Even to the Son, the Father is invisible and the Word cannot perfectly and exactly either see or know His own Father' 'except in proportion to His own measure,' as we also know according to our own power. 'He (the Son) knows not even His own essence.' The essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are separate in nature, and estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other—utterly unlike from each other in essence and glory, unto infinity" (Quotations by Athanasius from Arius, Oration 1, chap. ii. sec. 6).

On the other hand, the Alexander-Athanasius party sought to rescue the faith that God had come in Christ into humanity, whereby Christ, being of the same essence with God, is able to redeem men. Athanasius replies to the Arians that he bases his view upon the Scriptures, whose doctrine is: "Very Son of the Father, natural and genuine, proper to His essence, Wisdom only begotten, and very and only Word of God is He; not a creature or work, but an offspring proper to the Father's essence. Wherefore He is very God, existing one in essence with the very Father. . . . For He is the expression of the Father's Person, and Light from Light, and Power, and very Image of the Father's essence. . . . And He ever was and is and never was not. For the Father being everlasting, Word and His Wisdom must be everlasting. We believe not in a creature, God in name only. If Arius were right, God would be a monad becoming complete in a trinity. But the Trinity is not originated; but there is an eternal and one Godhead in a Trinity, and there is one glory of the Holy Trinity. The attributes of the Father must be in the Image to make it true that he 'that hath seen' the Son 'hath seen the Father.' But the Father is eternal, immortal, powerful, light, King, Sovereign, God, Lord, Creator, and Maker. Therefore He (Christ) was not

man, and then became God, but He was God, and then became man, and that to deify us.”³⁹

Nor is evil essential in nature, as Arius taught, but consists, says Athanasius, in the choice of what is lower in preference to what is higher⁴⁰—a voluntary turning away from God who is, to non-being, in consequence of which men “might look for corruption into nothing in the course of time.” But God’s goodness and faithfulness to His word could not leave men thus, nor could man who had once “shared in the being of the Word” “sink back again into destruction” without “God’s design being defeated.” Therefore the incorruptible Word, although filling “all things everywhere,” “in condescension to show loving-kindness upon us,” takes a human body, suffers on the Cross, and in the resurrection triumphs over death, whereby we are redeemed.⁴¹

While the above words are taken from works written after the Nicene Council, they represent the doctrine which then prevailed over Arius. But this famous council did not end the struggle. Till his death in May A.D. 373, Athanasius was in continuous conflict with the Arian party, under whose influence he suffered five different exiles and was often in danger of his life. During this long period, Athanasius was the champion of the Christian faith, affirming that, for the sake of redemption, God must be thought of as Christ and Christ in God. He put a new content into the conception of the Logos which was foreign to the philosophy of which the Logos-conception is a prominent factor, but, in spite of reproaches, he succeeded in maintaining this new but unassimilable content, and thus appropriated the Logos-conception for Christian faith as a way of salvation. Although using the word *ὁμοούσιος*, he cared only for the faith in Christ as divine Redeemer which he was seeking to establish under cover of that formula.⁴² “Athanasius was not a systematic theologian—like Origen or

Augustine. He had no interest in theological speculation, none of the instincts of a schoolman or a philosopher. His theological greatness lies in his firm grasp of soteriological principles, in his resolute subordination of everything else, even the formula *ὁμοούσιος*, to the central fact of Redemption, and to what that fact implied as to the Person of the Redeemer." ⁴³

Comparing the two parties, it is evident that, speculatively, they had practically the same conceptions, but the aim was different. Both affirm the unity of God and distinguish between Creator and creature; both seek to base their doctrines on Scripture and believe themselves in harmony with tradition. Both hold to the pre-existent Christ, who is Logos, Wisdom. Both seem to have made the tacit assumption that redemption through Christ is possible only by a communication of the divine nature to those who believe, which is, as it were, infused into them. But the Arian party stood more for a rational principle and the scientific interpretation of the Person of Christ. But with Athanasius it was not so much a question of scientific argument as it was interest in the redemption of men through Christ, who must be thought of as divine Son, it was held, in order to communicate the redeeming life of God to the believer and bring the believer into fellowship with the Father. Herein lay the significance of Athanasius, when he maintained the *ὁμοούσιος* doctrine of the Person of Christ, who is thus one in substance with the Father, yet the eternal Son.

The doctrine of the Person of Christ in the early centuries overshadowed that of the Holy Spirit, but the *regula fidei* required confession of belief in the Spirit as well as in the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit was, however, for a long time vaguely conceived, now as gift of God, Spirit of the Father and of Christ working in world, Church, and individual; now as an

impersonal power promised by Christ to come after Him ; now as a created being, subordinate to the Son, or, again, as the highest angel. Some of the conceptions conflicted with the doctrine of the Person of Christ, for some of the functions assigned to the Spirit had been ascribed to the Logos in Christ, as, for example, that of revelation. The theological doctrine of the Spirit shows a marked line of development from Justin Martyr to Augustine. Origen, for example, seemed inclined to view the Spirit as subordinate to the Son, but did not recognize the importance of the doctrine of the Spirit, nor did it receive special attention in the Arian controversy. But between A.D. 350 and 360 Athanasius began to insist on the equal recognition and worship of the Spirit. The personality of the Spirit was presupposed somewhat indefinitely, as was the personality of the Son. Nor did Athanasius do more than accept the inner relations of the three within the Godhead. Athanasius prepared the way for the Cappadocians—Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa—who carried still further the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, which assumed a dominant place in the Church.

The doctrine of the Trinity was still further developed by Augustine (A.D. 354–430) in his work *De Trinitate*, some say, in the direction of a modalism. God, he says, has no attributes which imply change. Indeed, the very essence of God in Himself never appeared, a statement which reminds us of Neo-Platonism and Philo as well as the Gnostic theology (Bk. iii. chap. ii., Bk. v. chap. ii.). When we speak of the begotten Son of God, we speak not of the divine essence but of a relationship (Bk. v. chap. v.). Augustine, consequently, distinguishes between what is said in respect to essence and what is said relatively ; such are the terms Father, Son, and Spirit, and “ Whatsoever is said of each in respect to themselves, is to be taken of them, not in the plural in sum but

in the singular. For as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, which no one doubts to be said in respect to substance, yet we do not say that the very supreme Trinity itself is three Gods, but one God. . . . For the Father by Himself is declared by the name Father; but by the name of God, both Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God" (Bk. v. chap. viii.). That is, God is properly used only of the Trinity, which is really singular. Conversely, "Whatever, therefore, is spoken of God in respect to Himself, is both spoken singly of each Person, that is, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and together of the Trinity itself, not plurally but in the singular." The Greeks use *οὐσία* (essence) for what we Latins generally call substance. "They—the Greeks—indeed use also the word hypostasis; but they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between *οὐσία* and hypostasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language are accustomed to say *μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, or, in Latin, one essence, three substances" (Bk. v. chap. viii.). One step more is taken, in consequence of the confusion between essence and substance in Latin, whereby *persona* is used instead of *ὑπόστασις* (hypostasis). But *persona* easily assumes an independent reality, that is, three independent Persons, whereas the three Persons of the Trinity are not properly so called in a human sense, but are a unity in God, who is one God (Bk. v. chap. ix.). Augustine then searches for analogies, in nature and especially in man, of this threefoldness yet unity, which may be viewed as intended to suggest to us the real nature of God. Such are, for example, the mind, and the knowledge wherewith the mind knows itself, and the love wherewith it loves itself and its knowledge (Bk. iv. chap. ii.). Or, again, there are three things in love, "he who loves, and that which is loved, and

love " (Bk. ix. chap. iii.). But pre-eminently is man the image of the Trinity in his memory, and understanding, and will, yet is the soul of man one (Bk. x. chap. xii.).

The development of Christian theology in its earliest forms cannot be followed further. I have tried to sketch some of the chief steps in the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity, which historically stands as the distinctive Christian conception of God. Instead of mentioning in detail other features of the history of Christian doctrine, it is sufficient to state the logical issue that separates the different sects. It is Jesus' relation to the temporal and eternal. How can the eternal God be in the temporal Jesus? Is it one divine nature with apparent human form? Two natures but no true personal unity? A human nature only gradually becoming acceptable to God as the medium of His Grace? How can the Absolute have distinctions within itself? Are the persons of the Trinity simply modes of an unknown One, or of an essence that expresses itself in the modes and thus becomes known? If so, what about the relation of this eternal inner nature of God to the historical Jesus? Each of these shades of opinion formed the basis of sects whose disputations constitute a large part of the history of doctrine. There is also in the midst of this battle of words an effort to interpret Jesus in relation to God as Saviour, without whom there can be no redemption. The Church, too, gradually becomes the medium of the grace of God in Christ.

It is commonly held that, with the establishment of the Trinitarian doctrine, Christianity differentiated itself from the Neo-Platonic philosophy and the Gnostic and other heresies. Emphasis should be placed upon that which constitutes this differentiation. The natural supposition is that, of course, the Trinitarian doctrine itself was such a unique product that it

clearly differentiated Christianity from its rivals. Formally, this is true ; and the doctrine of the Trinity, as the issue of such a violent controversy as we have reviewed, is a great monument in the history of Christian thought. But is it too much to say that the victory of Christianity over other views was not really due to the merit and logical value of the arguments in the establishment of the doctrine of the Trinity, be their validity what it may ? All parties had the same speculative environment and used the same Neo-Platonic and Gnostic conceptions, often appealing to the great philosophers of ancient Greece. It would be no easy task to estimate critically the merits of the debate and reach a fair decision in behalf of either of the debaters. We must then look in another direction for the real source of the victory of which the doctrine of the Trinity was the formal expression, and this is found in the different motive of the two parties. Arius seems to have sought a logically correct theory of God in relation to Christ and the Holy Spirit formed in the light of the speculative science with which he was acquainted ; and, judged by that science, he was eminently successful. But consider Athanasius—a man of deep piety, to whom belief in Jesus of Nazareth as Saviour was precious—troubled because the other party was in danger of explaining away the significance of Christianity as a religion of redemption. Athanasius entered upon the debate to save something which he had experienced and which ought to be kept for the world's need ; like others, he gives himself to the speculative argument with great skill, but substitutes for the cosmological content of the conception of the Logos a content which meant that Jesus Christ is to be thought of as Redeemer. But the motive of Athanasius went farther than his thought, namely, to the Saviour of the historical revelation and the Redeemer of religious experience, through whom the

believer has fellowship with the Father. Athanasius was moved to go back to the Christ, even to the consciousness of Jesus; and he succeeded, not because of his power and consistency as a speculative theologian, but because he seized upon the distinctive feature of Christianity, which was faith in the divine-human Redeemer, through whom men are saved and brought into fellowship with God. But the implication is that the garment woven from the fibre of Greek speculation did not fit the new content; for the conception of the Logos is thoroughly Greek, with a history extending from the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, the rational world-order of change according to Heraclitus, Plato's Ideas, and Aristotle's and the Stoic's World-Reason, to the first stage of the emanation of the Absolute according to Plotinus. That is, the moving principle of Athanasius was of far more significance than the foreign conception of the Logos, which gave it form and was incorporated in Christian theology as a vehicle of the doctrine of revelation and redemption. But the conception of the Logos was the only means of getting a hearing and winning the victory; the end itself, however, was the conservation and promotion of faith in Jesus as Saviour. The Athanasian party also aimed to make the theological doctrine embody the facts of the Christian revelation of redemption, and save them from being lost in the complexity of the Hellenic speculation. This motive, however, was only imperfectly realized by Athanasius and Augustine, who made little use of the historical in the doctrine of the Trinity. But the life of Christ on earth, sharing our humanity, touched with the feeling of our infirmities, yet bringing the assurance of its exaltation, is just what appeals to the heart most forcefully; and both leaders eloquently defended the faith in Jesus Christ as revealer of the Father and as Redeemer, through whom the believer has fellowship with the Father. This

is the vital element which gives real significance to the Trinitarian controversy and which won the victory in a form which was probably the only form in which Christianity could enter upon its historical career.

This motive to go back to the historical Jesus of Nazareth, not as a theological doctrine but as a living Person, in whose consciousness is the very mind of God concerning men, seems to have been the real purpose of the Trinitarians in their controversy, as it is of any believer who may accept the Trinitarian doctrine without a thought of the peculiar Greek philosophy that formed its background, and with no knowledge of the intricate argument of Athanasius, or of Augustine in his work, *De Trinitate*, which he himself regarded too difficult for general acceptance. *What is really believed is Jesus Christ.* To-day the Christian community cares supremely for the historical Christ and is deeply anxious to know that life in detail, and welcomes eagerly any new discovery that may throw light upon even the land that He traversed or illumine the Scripture account of Him. It is not these primarily that is sought, but, through these, Jesus' own consciousness; and the motive of the search is that, if we could only find out the real mind of Christ, we should then know the significance of Christianity and possess the Way of Life. It is not too much to say that such was the motive of the Athanasian party, which finds its still imperfect realization in the present movement of theological science to embody and faithfully represent the life and work of the historical Christ as Saviour and Redeemer.

In conclusion, it may be noted that the Trinitarian controversy illustrates a twofold relation of theology to the religious life. To one party, theological science, as such, was predominant, incurring the danger of completely Hellenizing the Gospel message of redemption. Justin Martyr, Origen, Lucian, and Arius saw the danger, strove to avoid it, but failed, at least

in the judgment of the councils. On the other hand, the Athanasian-Augustinian party compelled, rightly, theological doctrine to fulfil the important function of rescuing the distinctive feature of Christianity as a religion of redemption in which human need finds satisfaction, thus showing, perhaps in spite of themselves, that theology or science has not precedence over religious experience, but interprets and serves it.

Another lesson is taught by this famous controversy, namely, however subservient theological science may be to the religious life, the theologian cannot avoid the formulation of his beliefs in the conceptions of the science and philosophy of his time, nor need he regard these conceptions as essentially foreign to Christian truth, for, if they were, they could not so fittingly serve the purposes of Christian theology. So far as trustworthy, all thinking ends in truths which are only different ways to the Deity, and the knowledge and use of these truths promote the religious life.

On the other hand, the founders of Christian theology scarcely avoid conceiving the divine Being, like Philo and the Neo-Platonist, as so far removed from this evil world as to require subordinate, mediating agencies of which the Logos, the Word, the Son is supreme, and possibly the only Mediator. Nor did they succeed in making clear the relation of God as "essence" to the Father, Son, and Spirit. Certainly the historical is unessential in the speculative doctrine of the Trinity as it was finally formulated. Nor were they unresponsive to the dualistic element in contemporary thought; for the "carnal" nature was still conceived to war against the spirit, giving rise to a mystic tendency to escape from the natural to find rest, as the great Augustine said, in the changeless God. It will be shown later that the philosophical basis on which the early theologians reared the doc-

trines of the Christian faith is far inferior to the constructive basis for theology provided by modern philosophical thought, in the light of which the Trinitarian controversy appears as a struggle to reach the conception of God as a self-conscious personal Spirit manifesting Himself in the world of finite existences, and having His life in and through the lives of persons who thus have their being as children in their heavenly Father. This conception of God and men is more faithful to the consciousness of Jesus, who is the Elder Brother in the household of faith. Nor is the sin of men due to an eternal matter to which unfortunately they have relation in this life. Were human sins due to anything else than the voluntary action of self-determining persons in their effort to fulfil their divinely appointed end, were reality anything else than finally spiritual, sin could not be removed by forgiveness and swallowed up in the loving Saviourhood of God. The founders of Christian theology vaguely saw this, but it is only modern thought that provides a satisfactory constructive basis for a theology that shall more adequately embody this deeper content of our faith.

CHAPTER V

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION¹

AFTER the doctrine of the Person of Christ had been formulated, the Church entered upon a long period of development, and rose under the leadership of Rome to a commanding position. Religious thought became largely occupied with the interpretation of the doctrines already formulated and their application to social, political, and religious life. The period between the death of Augustine and the Reformation was characterized by the increasing power of the ecclesiastical system and the subjection of the individual to some form of external authority. There were several attempts within the Church to reform its life, which had become worldly and corrupt, but the Church readily absorbed these reforms without greatly modifying its course. Then came the Lutheran Reformation, for which previous events had prepared the way. The Reformation was individualistic, emphasizing subjective freedom and independence of all forms of authority. After the Reformation, there was both a Roman Catholic and a Protestant reaction: for the Catholic, it was the Roman Church and its teachings which were reaffirmed; for the Protestant, this authority was variously conceived as found in the State Church, in the Bible, and in the creeds. This was followed by a second reaction on the part of both Roman Catholics and Protestants, but in the

¹ For Literature see p. 385.

opposite direction, expressing itself in a tendency to return to the subjective individualistic position, in which creeds of all kinds become symbols of faith, which have the function of serving the religious life of the community of believers. This reaction is known, on the one hand, as the "Old Catholic Movement" and Modernism, so prominent at the present time in the Roman Church; and on the other hand, the new theological movement, represented by Schleiermacher and the Ritschlian school, and also by the multiplication of Protestant sects and denominations, in which creeds become of little more importance than convenient forms of unity of the particular group of believers who choose to formulate and adopt them. I shall now briefly outline the doctrinal basis of these movements and indicate the theological problem that is involved, requesting the reader to supply the historical details, which might well be given in full if my present purpose permitted.

I

Nothing could be more natural than what actually took place as the early Christians formed churches, preached Jesus, drew attention to themselves, met opposition from skilful, often slanderous critics, and finally suffered deadly persecution,—namely, objective bonds of social union and differentiation from the life about them, supplied by traditions, confessions, and sacred writings, were regarded as a necessary means of self-preservation and advancement. It was inevitable that these objective standards should come to assume an ever greater function with the increasing complexity of the relations of the Christian communities, until at last, under the dominance of Rome as the chief city of the world, the Roman Church became supreme, with the Church of Constantinople a troublesome rival. The emperors themselves made

Christianity the national religion, chiefly from the political motive that a united empire required a united Church and a common belief. Hence the necessity of force against heretics and the transformation of the dogmas of councils into commands, with penalties attached. It was also held that the General Council, composed of the bishops of all the churches, each guided by the Holy Spirit, could not fail to reach conclusions embodying the mind of Christ. Consequently, the products of the General Councils were the absolute truth, to which perfect submission was not only fitting for the believer but required. Here political and ecclesiastical coercion and the free spirit of religious devotion curiously mingled to create a mighty instrument of the Church, so effectively used in the later centuries.

It was Augustine who had most to do with the doctrinal foundation of the authority of the Church and of its relation to the State. In the *Civitas Dei* he sets forth his conception of the glorious society and celestial city, partly on earth, partly in heaven (Bk. i. chap. i.). This city of God is mingled with the temporal city for whose peace it prays (Bk. xv. chap. xxvi.). The earthly and the heavenly city are based upon two different loves: the earthly upon self-love in contempt of God; the heavenly upon love of God in contempt of self (Bk. xii. chap. xvi.). It was just such a doctrinal basis of the relation of the Church, as the visible Kingdom and City of God, to the State that gave the Church its mystical power and kindled the devotion of the faithful. There was, however, a darker side to this doctrine of the supremacy of the Church as the sole representative and embodiment of the spiritual order, for individual freedom was rendered impossible except by rebellion; there could be no new truth arising with compelling force out of the depths of the soul. Morality also lost its free existence and became coincident with the arrangements of the Church.

Deeds of mercy, love, and sacrifice out of the Church could not be good actions, and availed the doer nothing. Such virtues were, rather, "splendid vices." These doctrines, supported by a belief akin to superstition, made the Church predominant in the world's history during the Middle Ages and well on into the modern period. Authority in religion had become supreme.

With the increasing power of the Church and with the rapid development of outward forms of worship, abuses arose. There were several efforts to reform the Church from within, led by such men as St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), St. Dominic (b. 1170), and St. Francis of Assisi (b. 1182), issuing in the establishment of monastic orders. The Church at this time, however inconsistently, allowed within itself opposed views and modes of life in the greatest variety, for example, the profession of absolute poverty for Christ's sake on the part of the mendicant orders co-existing with the splendour of the papacy and of the hierarchy. As a matter of fact, these mendicant orders became very powerful instruments of the Church in extending and enforcing its claims, and were not opposed to the use of violence, as, for example, in the arrest and execution of Savonarola. Even persecutions were theologically defended on principles long since laid down by Augustine, and "the systematic theologians of the thirteenth century needed only to build further on the same foundation."

While the motive of this conception of the authority of the Church was often mingled with worldly ambition, it was in principle loyalty to Christ as the Head of the Church in which His gift of the Holy Spirit is embodied. As Christ is to rule over all, subjecting all things unto Himself, so all things must be subjected unto the Church as the custodian of the truth and the way of salvation. Thus the Church as an objective authority and teacher of the truth was supreme over thought

and conscience, because it alone is the dispenser of salvation and spiritual well-being.

II

Some of the movements leading to the renunciation of this external authority and the affirmation of personal faith and direct relation to the Father through Christ will now be mentioned. Before doing so, it is important to remember that the real causes of both the assertion of authority and its antithesis of individual freedom are psychological. We have seen how external authority became supreme; this was in harmony with the laws governing the growth of customs and other bonds of social unity. Now the individual is thrown back upon himself, and begins to act as though he would become free from every external coercion. The problem is suggested as to whether the two apparent contradictions, namely, individual freedom and external coercive authority, may not be united so that the individual may have his personal faith and yet common beliefs may coexist with personal freedom of initiative; it will be shown in another place that social psychology provides for exactly this relation between the individual and the community, particularly the religious community. Then it will become clear that the formulated expressions of the religious faith, such as confessions and creeds, have a functional significance in the preservation and promotion of the spiritual welfare of the community and of the individual, in which both mutually participate.

It is said that Augustine, as the churchman, supplied the doctrinal foundation for the authority and supremacy of the Church. There is also Augustine the philosopher and the free seeker after God without any mediation whatever, either of Church or priest or sacrament. In the following centuries, these

apparently contradictory elements in Augustine often stood in opposition to each other. The Lutheran Reformation was the final outworking of the real Augustinianism, putting aside the mass of externals that had accumulated to the injury of the inner life of piety. But many earlier reform movements in different countries prepared the way for Luther, but they all owed much to the purer Augustinianism. I shall not now mention the many causes co-operating with a deepening religious experience to liberate mind and conscience from bondage to the authoritative doctrine and practices of the ecclesiastical system. Among the reform movements more directly tending towards separation from the Church may be mentioned the work of Pierre de Bruys (1106) in southern France; also the sect of the Waldenses gave a sane and rational expression of the purified Christian consciousness in its reaction against abuses and corruptions. Likewise the true Protestant principle is anticipated by John Wycliffe in England, when he ascribed the whole work of salvation to Christ and sought to put the Bible within the reach of all, with the privilege of freely reading and interpreting it. John Huss was burned at the stake in Constance, July 6, 1415, for preaching the purification of the Church and the clergy in behalf of spiritual religion and the immediate relation of the believer to Christ, as well as the sufficiency of the Scriptures as the source of the knowledge of the method of salvation which the reader was free to interpret for himself, yet in subordination to faith in Christ and the Gospel. Many others, such as Savonarola in Italy and the Oxford Reformers, advocated the same principles.

Only a few words need be given to the well-known work of Luther, whose vitality, force of conviction, and perhaps even his violence, were just what was needed to carry the reform movement to a successful issue. Luther, an Augustinian monk, first learned of the

purser Augustinianism from Johann von Staupitz, who was a profound student of the Scriptures and of the writings of Augustine. Religion was for him an immediate relation of the soul to God, and salvation consists not in mere works but in a transformation of character. Justification is by faith, involving a complete surrender to God and an appropriation of Christ, with fellowship in His sufferings. To Luther, in the monastery at Erfurt, the spiritual words of Staupitz were "as a voice from heaven," leading him to adopt Staupitz's Augustinianism, which constitutes the principle of Luther's reform, but to which Luther was later in some ways unfaithful. Luther boldly proclaimed that immediate faith in God was the only way to gain salvation, which made the intervention of Church or priest or sacrament unnecessary. Man and his God are face to face and must deal with each other, salvation being an experience of fellowship with God through faith in Jesus Christ. Like principles were also advocated by Zwingli and Calvin, whose work in detail need not at present be reviewed.

To an indefinite group, known as Anabaptists, belongs the honour of giving perhaps the most consistent expression in words and conduct of freedom of thought and conscience, with appeal to the Scriptures as the believer's guide. They recognized no universal Church, but only local congregations interdependent in their relations. The Anabaptists were contemporary with Luther, who bitterly opposed them, though he, like them, was really struggling for religious liberty. Suppressed in Germany, the Anabaptists went to Holland and from there to England, where they contributed greatly to the final victory of religious freedom and to the formation of nonconformist congregations, especially local groups of baptized believers, guiding themselves according to their unrestrained interpretation of the Scriptures.

It is important that the principle of the religious

Reformation should not escape us. It was the return to the consciousness of Jesus in relation to the Father, and the assertion of true spiritual freedom on the part of the individual and the religious community. But this does not mean that Luther and the Protestants never again sought to compel thought and practice in themselves and in others to conform to external authority. But the principle on which Luther based everything was faith, the personal and continuous surrender to God the Father, which renews the whole man and gives the certainty of forgiveness of sins,—a living, active, joyous faith, bearing good fruit, because thereby the life of the Christian is in God, in whom there is perfect freedom and dominion over all things. The believer thus achieves the emancipation of thought and conscience in religious experience, while creeds and theological formulations are brought into the service of the life of faith.

It remains to consider the attitude of the Roman Church towards the Reformation, and to show how the Protestants adjusted themselves to their own principle, and what significance attaches to the Protestant creeds which displaced the authoritative dogma of the mediaeval Church, or appropriated that dogma and put it to a new use.

III

The attacks made by the Reformers upon the Roman ecclesiastical system at last led to a threefold reaction, consisting of attempts to reform the Church from within, to define more precisely its doctrines, and to crush out Protestantism. Reform was necessary in order to remove the occasion for Protestantism and perhaps make possible a reunion with the mother Church, while the definition of doctrine was required in order to have a standard to appeal to in declaring

Protestants heretics. But the motive of these counter-reforms within the Church was closely identified with the effort to preserve and exalt the ecclesiastical system as the embodiment of authority over thought and conscience. It had still the despotic absoluteness of the thirteenth century.

Many on both sides hoped for a reconciliation, and at last the two parties, represented by Cardinal Contarini and Melanchthon, met at the Diet of Ratisbon (1541) to determine whether a reconciliation were possible. The doctrine of justification by faith was agreed upon as the basis of a union which now seemed possible. But other motives entered and determined the Pope (Paul III.) to withdraw; so everything was left over to the Council of Trent, which finally opened in 1545 and closed in 1546. To this council the Protestants were invited, but, recognizing the futility of any further attempts at reconciliation, would have nothing to do with a council presided over by the Pope. There were conflicting aims among the members of the council when they came together. The mediating party, under the leadership of Cardinals Contarini and Pole, took up the same line as at Ratisbon, and urged the doctrine of justification by faith as the common Christian ground on which a reconciliation with the Protestants might be possible. But the Jesuits opposed it and finally dominated the council, which, as a consequence, was reactionary. The Protestants were condemned without a hearing. Some provision was made for the correction of clerical abuses, but there was reaction instead of concession in doctrine. The divine authority of the Pope was maintained. The creed of the Church was definitely stated and acceptance required. The Inquisition, imported from Spain, was extended to other countries. Thus the ecclesiastical empire was strengthened and the scholastic system reaffirmed for those countries which still acknowledged the supremacy of Rome. Hence-

forth, Western Christendom was divided into Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.

Next in importance to the decrees of the Council of Trent is the creed of Pius IV. (1564), which, though briefer than the decrees of the council, is quite the most important summary of the doctrinal system of Rome. Only a reference need be made to the two additional dogmas of the Immaculate Conception (1845) and of Papal Infallibility (1870), which complete the present standard of Roman orthodoxy.

It should be remembered that the underlying principle of these remarkable dogmas, particularly that of Infallibility, was set forth by Augustine, namely, that there is an invisible spiritual order of which the Church is the visible representative; or better, the Church has immanent within itself this spiritual order, which is the true kingdom of God. It follows that the Holy Spirit is never absent from the Church. How then can the voice of the Head of the Church on earth be other than the voice of the Holy Spirit, to be believed, for it follows that unbelief would be sin against the Spirit? Consequently, the Vatican Council of 1870 was not without strong ground for its action in proclaiming the dogma of Infallibility, which may easily be regarded as the only logical consequence of the principles which Augustine set forth as the basis of the Church.

A word may now be said concerning those who opposed the dogma of Infallibility. Some of the ablest men present at the council of 1870 offered futile resistance, recognizing it to be against the more liberal spirit of the age. The opposition to the Vatican decrees extended beyond the council, and became so important as to be called the "Old Catholic Movement," which was organized into a distinct Church at Constance in 1873. This movement has had its chief centres in Munich and Bonn in Germany, and in Geneva and Soleure in Switzerland. In

doctrine, the Old Catholics at first returned to the decrees of the Council of Trent and the creed of Pius IV. as against those of the Vatican. There is, however, a still more liberal spirit among the Old Catholics, who tend to recognize only the Scriptures and approach the Protestant position. This party forms an important mediating link between Romanism and Protestantism. It scarcely needs to be said that these "New Protestants," in particular Döllinger, the leader, and his sympathizers, were excommunicated. "Modernism" still continues the struggle for a more liberal Roman Catholicism.

It is evident that the principle of objective authority inherent in Roman Catholicism tends to dominate religious thought and conduct in reaction against the principle of the Reformation, which implies freedom of thought and conscience, a direct relation to God through faith in Christ, and a personal ethical union and fellowship with the Father, which is salvation. The failure thus far of all attempts to establish a union between Protestants and Romanists should not conceal the fact that the Romanist has simply carried out the logical implications of a universal doctrine and of uniformity in practice—indeed, of theology itself as the science of universal doctrines of Christian faith. The Protestant position remains vulnerable until it is shown how to unite the universal and objective in doctrine and practice with free individuality of faith and direct relation to God without crushing the individual into abject submission to an external authoritative standard of belief and practice. Until this is done, some form of submission to external authority more or less absolute must prevail in true Roman Catholic fashion, even among Protestants themselves, however inconsistent with their fundamental principle of freedom of thought and belief it may be.

IV

How did the Protestants adjust themselves to their own principle? Three factors entered into this principle: first, the Scriptures as the objective basis of the Reformation were put in the place of the Roman ecclesiastical system with its authority, which was a great gain for freedom, and meant that the individual might interpret the Bible for himself in direct relation to God, perfectly free from obligation to submit to any form of ecclesiastical or doctrinal authority; a second factor was justification—not very clearly understood—through faith in Christ, in whom the saving grace of God was revealed and given to men; the third factor was the universal priesthood of believers, or the practical assurance of the sufficiency of faith to bring the believer into fellowship with the Father, which is to possess salvation. It was, in short, universal religious liberty with a tendency towards individualism.

The Reformers in these principles had, however, risen to too lofty a height to remain there long. Not so easily could this generation put aside the bondage to external authority to which they and their fathers had long submitted. Like the great Augustine, at one moment rising up to the principle of individual freedom of thought and belief, and at the next falling in lowliest submission to the Church and its dogmas, so the leaders of Protestantism fell back into the bondage from which they had striven to be free.

External authority among the Protestants now assumed at least three forms: first, in the place of the Roman Church and the Pope was erected the national or State Church, and it required a long struggle before the local church as an independent body of believers was tolerated; secondly, the Bible itself was transformed into an external authority

and the letter of the Scripture was enforced ; thirdly, symbols and confessions acquired the force of objective standards of belief, to which all must conform who would be called faithful and orthodox ; to the reproach of Protestantism these standards of faith were sometimes upheld with persecution and revolting violence. Thus the old ecclesiasticism survived in the new setting. The succeeding centuries of Protestantism have been a slow but continuous loosening of the bonds to objective authority, until now it may be said that the principle of the Reformation is working out its logical consequences in repeated attempts to state afresh the significance of Christianity in the believer's experience. The climax of this movement can only be that doctrinal statements shall be regarded as expressing the experience of the age in which they are formed, and shall not be viewed as authoritatively binding, but only as convenient and reasonable expressions of the content of faith, useful in the intellectual and religious development of believers and in the public ministry of the Gospel, and forming the bond of the social religious life. They are, in brief, functional in their significance and entirely subordinated to and in the service of religious experience, which is the primary factor. The detailed examination of these movements among the Protestants cannot be undertaken. Suffice it to say that Luther and Calvin, the great apostles of freedom and justification by faith, both became persecutors in the endeavour to enforce a uniformity of belief and practice. The Lutherans in Germany and the Calvinists in Holland and in Great Britain did likewise—for example, the action of the Calvinists at the Synod of Dort against the Arminian *Remonstrants* ; while in England Calvinistic Presbyterians were, as members of Parliament, the real authors of the " Ordinance for the Suppression of Blasphemies and Heresies " (1648), which made it a law that " any man

denying the doctrine of the Trinity or of the Divinity of Christ, or that the books of Scripture are the 'Word of God,' or the resurrection of the body, or a future day of judgment, and refusing on trial to abjure his heresy, 'shall suffer the pain of death.' Any man declaring 'that man by nature hath free will to turn to God,' that there is a purgatory, that images are lawful, that infant baptism is unlawful; any one denying the obligation of observing the Lord's Day, or asserting 'the Church government by Presbytery is anti-Christian or unlawful,' shall on a refusal to renounce his errors 'be commanded to prison'" (Green, *History of England*, iii. 257). Accompanying this religious spirit was the ideal of doctrinal and ceremonial uniformity, whose enforcement was yet to cause much suffering and even bloodshed. But at last the good sense of England revolted against these coercive measures, as it had already revolted against the Roman hierarchy and the Established Church; for the principle of coercion in the enforcement of doctrinal and ceremonial uniformity was the same in each.

It would now be desirable to trace the rise of the different denominations and to examine their distinctive principles in order to determine precisely the significance of creeds in their life and work, but this cannot now be done. Such an examination would show that the logical issue of Protestantism is the functional, instrumental significance of creeds as the proper relation of the formulations of thought to religious experience. In proof of this, appeal might be made to the multiplicity of denominations and sects for which there exists no bond of unity except the Scriptures, freely interpreted by everybody, and the needs of the heart. Uniformity here is not a fact, and it is undesirable.

It must, then, be granted that the historical differences between the Protestant denominations have been gradually merged into a general disregard

of creeds as authoritative. Where subscription is still required, it is more or less formal. Creeds are rather for practical use, and "mark a return to the brevity and simplicity of the primitive baptismal creeds and rules of faith" (Schaff). The multiplicity and yet distinct individuality of the denominations is possible only on the assumption that the Bible is given to every one to interpret freely, as the Spirit gives insight, which can only mean that creeds are functional, local, and individual, to which as authoritative subscription cannot be required; for who is there to require it? While brotherly love and co-operation are desirable, and should be promoted by the recognition of a common Christian purpose and life, the frequent attempts to unite the denominations in some larger ecclesiastical unity should be cautiously made, lest they prove to be steps backward on to the old ecclesiastical basis, with authoritative dogma as the bond of unity, which is exactly the ideal of the Roman Church. But the significance of historical development is the negation of every form of external authority in religion, whether it be of creed or of the letter of the Bible, as contradictory to the inherent right of every thinking man, with the Bible in his hands, to discover his own true relation to God and the way to worship the Father. Moreover, the multiplicity of sects and views is itself in harmony with modern psychological interpretations of individual and social development, as will be more fully shown later (Chaps. X. and XIII.), and is significant of an active religious life, on the whole, probably exceeding in its efficiency that of former generations. Should we not therefore rejoice in and strive to maintain the principles that have made these things possible?

Thus is restored the original, personal, and individual character of dogma, which, once lost, makes dogma or doctrine appear as something of universal

validity, instead of being the subjective and temporary conviction of individual thinkers concerning their beliefs as they endeavour to live with their brethren and realize their ideals of life. What then is left to constitute the unity of Christendom? Only the common reasonableness of Christian faith and thought, whose free formulations of belief are related to religious experience as other products of reason are related to life's activities; and this relation, as will be shown more fully later, is functional and purposeful, and finds its realization in the activities of free, self-conscious agents, who grow into a larger life in a developing moral and religious community.

The problem that grows out of this transition period is how to unite the individuality of faith with the objectivity of belief, which seems to imply a common standard of reference by which every believer must judge himself and be judged by others. Certainly the time has gone by when this union can be attained through any form of coercion; if it is ever to be at all, it must be the normal product of religious freedom. As already intimated, there may be a relative uniformity of individual experience which expresses itself in different individuals in a manner sufficiently like to afford the hope of constructing the content of the belief in a form that will be acceptable to all.

It may be said that all that is required is just to restate the doctrines formed in the early centuries in such strenuous circumstances and present them in the garb of modern thought. It all depends upon what is meant by this restatement that is proposed. It has been said that the significance of Christ was "barely conceived" by the Apologists and representatives of Christianity in the early centuries, for they adopted the conceptions of the Greek philosophy, the Logos doctrine, and the general scheme of interpreting the world as it was then viewed. But the attitude of the Apologists and the early theologians meant far

more than their words ; they believed in something new set for them by Christ's religion. They were rather seeking confirmation of a faith and an ethical view already possessed. But, while claiming the attention of the world by identifying the content of Christianity with the better forms of pre-existing theories, they did so at the cost of neutralizing the specific features of Christianity, such as forgiveness, the new birth, and the new order introduced by Christianity (Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church*, p. 90 ; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, i.). Nevertheless, the product of these early theological speculations laid the basis in a large measure of that theology which continues to have much influence even in the present time. But if it is true that by adopting the prevailing thought of the age in order to express the content of the Christian faith, the early Christians did not do full justice to that faith but "barely conceived" it "at the cost of neutralizing the significance of all the specific features of the religion they defended," may it not be that a new philosophy with its new conception of the world and of life may afford the means of constructing the content of the Christian faith more adequately than was done in the early centuries ? Ought not the relation of Jesus to the Father, and His consciousness of the supreme worth of Personality and its destiny to find completion in fellowship with God, who is a personal Being, to have led to a new philosophy more in harmony with its own essential content, instead of losing itself in the mazes of a philosophical speculation which was not even the best of ancient thought ? "That the Absolute is affectional and volitional ; that God is love ; that access to the supremely real is by faith, a personal attitude ; that belief, surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own operations its own fulfilling evidence ; such was the metaphysic of Christianity" (Dewey, *Phil. Review*, March

1906). Even modern Christian theism has not as yet produced the perfect fruit of these fundamental Christian conceptions.

It is, indeed, true, and in accordance with the relation of all thought-products to life, that the theology which developed in reliance upon an ancient philosophy in a measure unsuitable to Christianity, performed the important function of providing a vehicle in which to convey the content of the Christian faith to later generations. Was it not, however, necessary that a new philosophy leading to a new theology should arise, and prove itself a more suitable medium of expressing the Christian faith and its implicit metaphysic than the theology that was developed on the basis of Greek thought? It is a fact that such a new philosophy and theology arose in the attempt to appropriate the principle of the Reformation. It may even be that this new theology cannot in all respects be the theology of the twentieth century, for it may well be that the science and philosophy of the present afford a more adequate speculative basis for a theology yet to be produced than either the classic philosophy of the early Christian period or the philosophy that arose after the Reformation. On the other hand, no philosophy or theology is wholly new, for each builds upon the past and gathers the significance of what has preceded up into itself, that it may more surely keep in touch with experience, yet enlarge and deepen the conceptions of knowledge and belief. These problems will occupy our attention in the remaining chapters.

PART II

A NEW PHILOSOPHY AS THE CONSTRUCTIVE
BASIS OF A NEW THEOLOGY

CHAPTER VI

A NEW PHILOSOPHY : THROUGH SELF TO WORLD AND GOD

THE adoption of the principle of the Reformation by philosophy is a part of the movement which forms the basis of the present relation of theology to religious experience. Augustine anticipated this relation when he showed that God is the presupposition of our being, knowing, and willing, which are the image of the divine Trinity, and which indicate that our highest good is to know and do and love the will of God in complete dependence upon Him. This derivation of the consciousness of God from the Christian self-consciousness was of deep significance for later thought and became the moving force in the Reformation, and modern philosophy still strives to work out its meaning.¹ "The Reformation was in principle the negation of the claim of any doctrine to be accepted by the individual which could not find its evidence in the movement of his own reason ; of any law to be obeyed by him which could not be shown to spring from his own will. It was the return of man's spirit to itself and a rejection of all that is merely external and foreign."² It was the substitution of individual personalities as centres of value and experience in place of an absolute external authority of any sort.³ But herein is involved the danger that the issue be dissolution rather than unity and growth. The problem is to overcome mere individualism and find

in the principle of personal self-conscious experience the way to spiritual unity which shall embrace the realm of selves divine and human and a knowledge of the world. Already has there been some progress along this path, but the principle of individual personality as a centre of value and experience promises richer results still.⁴

Although Descartes (1596–1650) was not the first philosopher to respond to the new movement, he was its first prominent representative, at least in France. As there is a close connection between his axiomatic principle of self-certainty and that of Augustine,⁵ we may begin with him. Trained in the scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit school of La Fleche till his sixteenth year, Descartes became dissatisfied with that philosophy because of its lack of certainty; but he was attracted by the clearness, distinctness, and necessity of the truths of mathematics, and wondered why such firm foundations had so meagre a superstructure. Descartes therefore set himself the task of giving a like secure basis to philosophy, thus doing for it what somebody had in the past done for mathematics. To this end he resolved to admit nothing as true which could be doubted, requiring that everything be as “clear” and “distinct” as the axioms of mathematics. His *cogito ergo sum* was the result of his self-examination, and became the axiomatic truth, clear and distinct, which forms the basis of his philosophy.⁶ Although this proposition is not properly the conclusion of an argument, as Descartes was careful to point out, its real significance is that there is a necessary interdependence for thought between the idea of self as conscious and the existence of self. “The act and the ego are the two inseparable factors of the same fact or experience in a definite time.”⁷ To this axiomatic truth all the other truths of philosophy are related.

Descartes now proceeds to examine the ideas of

consciousness, and discovers there the idea of a perfect Being. Assuming "that the objective reality of our ideas requires a cause in which this same reality is contained, not simply objectively but formally or eminently,"⁸ the idea of a perfect Being can only be caused in us by God, for we ourselves are not adequate to produce it, being imperfect, since we are subject to doubt. Descartes also adopts the ontological argument, finding "that the existence of the Being is comprised in the idea (of a perfect Being) in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle."⁹ A third proof of God's existence seems to be implied when Descartes says that doubt is possible only for an intelligence that already possesses the idea of a Being not capable of doubt, and therefore perfect.

Having established the existence of God, Descartes thinks that he finds a way of escape from scepticism concerning the presentations of sense. The divine Perfection forbids that He should endow His creatures with senses whose use, under the guidance of reason,¹⁰ deceives. Consequently, the ideas gained through the senses and found by reason to be clear and distinct may be taken as giving certain knowledge of a world of things external to consciousness.¹¹

Our interest concerns chiefly Descartes' attempt to deduce from his own subjective experience the knowledge of world, soul, and God; the world and God were for him represented in consciousness by ideas whose objective reality was either "formally" or "eminently" in their causes; this can only mean that all we know is the idea, and that the external object and subject are interrelated aspects of experience, and both embraced in a divine unity. These implications of the Cartesian philosophy entered into the system of Spinoza, who showed that subject and object cannot be abstracted from each other, but are interrelated and in direct relation to the one Being.

"We do not know ourselves first and the world through ourselves; but we know ourselves only in relation to, and in distinction from, the world: and we know both through their relation to the one principle of unity which underlies all knowledge."¹² The strictly subjective standpoint of Descartes needs supplementing by showing that the consciousness of the not-self is from the first bound up with the consciousness of the self, and that within this individual experience there may be objective and universal judgments which are the truth about self, world, and God; knowledge and faith must escape, if possible, mere individualism, lest it end in scepticism. This problem dominated speculation from Descartes to Kant, who laid the foundation for its solution.

The pendulum swings to and fro between the individual and the absolute standpoint, unable to reach a satisfactory synthesis. Spinoza resolved the individual into such dependence upon the one substance that the individual was merged in the Infinite. On the other hand, Leibnitz laid the emphasis upon the individual in his theory of the independent "windowless" monads, at the same time endeavouring to provide for the unity of the many by his doctrine of pre-established harmony; but he provided no real unity between the principles of individuality and universality.

He puts side by side the *real* individuality of the monad and its ideal relativity to the universe; the absolute independence of each substance and the immediate relation of all substances to God; the analytic principle of identity and the synthetic principle of sufficient reason; the idea of God as the *ens realissimum*, who absorbs all positive existence into himself and the idea of Him as the self-revealing spirit, whose nature it is to create other monads different from himself and from each other and through their difference to realize the highest unity. Nor does he ever attain anything more than an external "harmony" between these different sides of his philosophy.¹³

The philosophy of Leibnitz as popularized and developed by Wolff tended to a formal individualism. Leibnitz had endeavoured to provide for the knowledge of the universal and for the connection of the monads if only in a harmony established by the supreme Monad ; but Wolff reduced the Leibnitzian principle of sufficient reason to the principle of identity, and surrendered the pre-established harmony except between soul and body, keeping also Leibnitz's idea of God as an external power holding together the individual substances, which themselves have no necessary relation. Without this harmony of soul and body, and God to hold together the scattered members of the universe, Wolff would have been left without any unity of things with each other and with the mind that knows them, and would have remained shut up in the individual self-consciousness. There would then be left only a strictly subjective individualism with its consequent scepticism.¹⁴

A similar result along empirical lines was reached by the development of thought in England. Assuming the ability of the mind to investigate the facts of nature when freed from prejudices (*Idolae*), Francis Bacon (1561–1626) sought to establish science upon inductions from the observed facts of nature, piously holding that the dogmas of religion are not objects of knowledge but of faith, which of course implied the separation of philosophy and theology.¹⁵ Confining himself to what is given in experience, Bacon is an example of those practical tendencies of the English people which have often kept them from the errors of scholastic abstractions.

In like manner, Locke (1632–1704) proposed “to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.”¹⁶ He found that the only sources of knowledge are the ideas of sensation and reflection with which the mind, an empty

cabinet, becomes furnished. By the ideas of sensation we gain real knowledge of an external world of things ; but only the primary qualities, such as form, motion, and solidity, are extra-mental, while the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and smell are subjective. The ideas of reflection the mind obtains by observing its own operations and the manner of them.¹⁷ Locke also assumed the existence of the soul, but could not define its nature.¹⁸ Berkeley (1685–1753) adopted Locke's theory of the sources of knowledge, but rejected his distinction between primary and secondary qualities, thus denying the existence of matter as Locke and the materialists understood it, affirming that God acts upon us in a kind of "Divine Visual Language" or uniform experience of sense-presentations, which for us is the external world with its laws.¹⁹ Hume (1711–1776) adopted Locke's view that the source of knowledge is sensation and, finding it impossible to interpret Locke's "reflection" as anything more than another form of sensation, said that the source of knowledge is impressions of the senses and faint impressions or ideas of former sense-impressions. Only these do we know, and these ideas are combined according to "resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect."²⁰ Instead of assuming a soul as Berkeley and others, Hume says, "Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with incredible rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations."²¹

Thus Hume, carrying out Locke by rendering him consistent with the sources of knowledge which Locke had set forth, reaches as pure an individualism as

the Leibnitzian-Wolffian philosophy with its resultant scepticism concerning the existence of anything but the fleeting ideas of any moment of consciousness. Consequently, "the history of the development of philosophy from Leibnitz to Wolff, like the history of its development from Locke to Hume, is a history of the progress of individualism to its necessary consummation in scepticism."²² Still the problem of modern, indeed of all, philosophy remains. Many of the prejudices and errors of scholasticism have been discovered and put aside. But the distinctive principle of the Reformation and the new movement that each thinker remains within his own self-conscious experience, in which he must find, if at all, his knowledge of and relation to the world and God, cannot be lost. Another attempt has to be made on this basis to provide for necessary and universal truths, and to conceive the relation of subject and object in such a way as to explain our experience of what we call self, world, and God.

It was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who opened the way, and in him the lines of thought which have been indicated meet and receive new form. From Kant flow streams of thought which powerfully influence present philosophy and theology. Kant's life and work are so important in their consequences as to deserve a more complete presentation than can now be given. His problem was similar to, though not identical with, that of Locke concerning the nature, sources, criteria, and extent of knowledge.²³ It is sufficient to say that he was first trained in the Leibnitzian-Wolffian philosophy which, under the influence of his teacher, Knutzen, Kant sought to modify so as to make room for the mechanical conception of nature represented primarily by Newton. Under the influence of Hume, Kant was attracted by the difficulty of conceiving a universal and necessary causal connection in the events of the natural world,

but soon recognized the same difficulty in all those connections of concepts, that is, judgments, whose function is to extend knowledge beyond actual sense-experience, and he undertook to find out their number in order to determine their precise and legitimate use. Kant soon sees "that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections," or judgments, supposed to give us knowledge beyond the reach of actual sense-experience. These judgments are *a priori* and synthetic, because they are underived from experience, and, in the case of metaphysics, predicate existence of objects beyond the sphere of possible perception either pure or empirical. Our highest interest is involved in determining whether such an extension of knowledge by pure acts of reason, unaided by experience, is possible; for metaphysics deals with problems concerning the soul, its freedom and immortality, God and the world. Such is Kant's problem, whose ultimate purpose is to decide whether we really have a knowledge, that can be called scientific, of God, freedom, and immortality.

That there are real extensions of our knowledge by *a priori* synthetic judgments is proved in the case of mathematics and physics in which such judgments are found, and whose success makes it useless to question the possibility of such judgments. But the success of mathematics and physics in extending knowledge beyond actual sense-experience by means of necessary and universal truths, which Kant calls *a priori* synthetic judgments, makes it appear equally possible to do so in metaphysics, whereby we seem to have knowledge of the supernatural realm, especially of the soul, its freedom and destiny, and the existence and nature of God in relation to soul and world. But there is an important difference which is overlooked, for mathematics and physics concern concepts that could be realized in perception, at least in "pure" perception, but those concerning God, soul,

and world in itself cannot be. Since, then, no concept and no unity of concepts can be called knowledge except those in some more or less direct relation to actual or possible sense-experience, the *a priori* judgments of which metaphysics consists, and which concern God, soul, and world, are impossible, for the theoretical reason, as scientific knowledge. The individual, indeed, knows the "empirical reality" of time and space and of the causal relation of objects and events which constitute the world of phenomena whose laws are imposed by the subject upon these appearances in the act of experiencing and knowing them. These phenomena are, however, assumed to have some sort of connection with the unknown things-in-themselves which we can only think of. Thus the individual, remaining within himself, has a universally valid knowledge in his empirically real world, but this knowledge does not extend to God, freedom, and immortality, and, in this sense, metaphysics is impossible.

It is evident that Kant's solution of his problem unites but transcends the empiricism of Locke and Hume and the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, neither alone being sufficient to account for knowledge. Instead, the subject conditions, through its acts of arranging sensations called the forms of space and time, the possibility of objects of experience which must conform to our mode of cognition. Knowledge, then, does not transcend what the senses give when interpreted according to the mind's own laws, which are what Kant means by the *a priori* forms of space and time, categories and principles of the understanding, and the ideas of the pure reason,—the issue of which is the natural world with its laws—indeed, "the understanding makes nature and its laws." Only through the fact that the subject conditions the possibility of the experience of an external world of things and events can there be any knowledge of

necessary and universal truths. To be sure, Kant says this knowledge is limited to phenomena; but this is a foreign factor inherited from Hume's sceptical philosophy, and was, in consequence, nothing new. His essential meaning was rather that, both in the sphere of knowledge and action, reason imposes laws upon its objects and desires, constructing the world of its experience and practice. Undoubtedly Kant also felt the influence of Spinoza's idea of a universal unity involving the unity of knowing and being. We have only to cease to be concerned about things-in-themselves simply because there are none, and to seek them would be like "looking for the wood behind the trees," to discover that the individual in constructing the objects of knowledge according to the laws of his own mind is yet experiencing reality within himself. Thus subject and object, including their relations, belong together as inseparable factors in a living unitary experience dominated by universal and necessary principles.

This statement, however, implies that we have knowledge of God, soul, and world; but Kant confines knowledge to the realm of sensuous experience. That he was intensely in earnest concerning these highest objects of our reflection, even making them the goal of his investigation, is shown when he says: "We are even willing to stake our all, and to run the risk of being completely deluded, rather than consent to forego inquiries of such moment."²⁴ The practical reason, however, requires the *postulates* of freedom, immortality, and God, whose ultimate basis is the moral law. The function and worth of these postulates, which stand for Kant in the place of knowledge, require some consideration of his moral theory.

In the *Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of the Practical Reason*,²⁵ it is shown that pure reason, applied to desires as the guide of conduct, formally declares: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou

canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (38). This does not mean, as it has often been interpreted, that any particular action is to be universalized, but it is the maxim of the volition which the practical reason requires to be so treated. This is the moral law which declares the form of every volition that can be called good; it is a categorical imperative; it is a mode of functioning on the part of the practical reason in view of desires and interests when the will is required to act, as original as the categories of substance and attribute, and cause and effect in relation to sensations. It is the same reason in two spheres of activity. The ideal is the rational will acting for the sake of the moral law and completely in accord with it. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except the good will 'which is good' simply by virtue of the volition whose motive is respect for the law" (59). We are not, however, pure rational wills only, but belong to the world of desires and interests whose satisfaction is happiness. The true end of our volition is not happiness, but rather worthiness to be happy. It is because our wills do not with certainty obey the declarations of the self-legislating reason but may sometimes choose an end of less dignity, that the sense of obligation and duty arises. Herein lies the imperativeness of the moral law. "Thou shalt" admits no questioning in behalf of interest and particular desires for pleasure and happiness.

Since reason declares the moral law as the true end and motive of the will, every personality as rational is an end, and humanity a kingdom of ends, each realizing in his measure the moral law whose full significance finds expression only in the whole (51, 52).

The postulate of the freedom of the will rests upon the absoluteness of the moral law which implies an agent free from every determining cause except his

own rational nature, which is truly free only in complete subjection to its own self-imposed laws. "A free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same" (66).

The postulates of immortality and the existence of God differ from that of freedom in relation to the moral law. They are rather the necessary conditions of the realization of the entire object of the practical reason which is the highest good. The highest good consists of virtue and happiness in perfect unity (206); of these factors, virtue is chief, and means a will in perfect accord with the moral law. This is not accomplished here. But the moral law cannot be degraded from its sacredness nor regarded as indulgent nor thought of as appointing an unattainable goal. It still holds absolute, which makes it necessary to assume that the moral law can be fulfilled "in a progress *in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance. . . . This endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being. . . . The Infinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law. . . . And the holiness which His command inexorably requires, in order to be true to His justice in the share which He assigns to each in the *summum bonum*, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings" (218 f.). Hope of sharing in the highest good is engendered by the consciousness of having stood the test of the moral law and of having proved the strength of resolution in progress from lower to higher degrees of morality.

The postulate of the existence of God is made in behalf of the perfect union of virtue and happiness as factors in the highest good. Virtue alone is within our power, while happiness, as the satisfaction of desires and interests that arise because of our relation to the

world, depends upon causes not under the dominion of our wills. The absolute nature of the moral law, however, implies the realization of perfect virtue in union with perfect happiness in personal experience. Hence it is necessary to assume that the course of the natural world, in which the effects of freedom as ultimate end, that is, morality, ought to exist as a phenomenon,²⁶ is subordinated to the moral destiny of rational beings. This "must lead to the supposition of a cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. . . . Now, a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws is an Intelligence (a rational Being), and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his Will; therefore, the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as the condition of the *summum bonum*, is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a *highest original good*, that is to say, of the existence of God." . . . "Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently, it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*; and as this is possible only on the condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God." For these reasons, it is a duty to have faith in God (221-223).²⁷

After carrying us to this lofty height, Kant disappoints us by declaring that *postulates* are not knowledge. We do not really know that we are free and immortal and that God exists. Postulates and knowledge belong to two different realms, one the

sphere of the understanding, the other, of the practical reason. He does not, however, turn away from the difficulty with indifference, but faces the problem of mediating between these spheres and of showing, if possible, that there is still a unity of experience, and deciding whether it is as a whole the experience of reality. Such is the aim of the *Critique of Judgment*, published in 1790. This work is frequently neglected by Kant's critics, but he himself regarded it as the coping-stone of his critical edifice; it also forms the starting-point for Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in the formation of their metaphysical systems.²⁸

The *Critique of Judgment* shows that morality as the effect of freedom requires that the order of nature in which it is to be realized should be purposeful with reference to itself. Now it is reflectively necessary to view the natural world as purposeful. But the only end even of nature capable of being final is the realization of the moral law which is itself absolute. Consequently, there is at least an empirical unity between the natural and the moral realm, between scientific knowledge and moral and religious faith. This argument more fully developed is as follows: The understanding, indeed, furnishes the conditions of the experience of the natural world, it "makes nature and its laws," but the detailed treatment of the particulars of nature is the work of the faculty of judgment that either brings everything in nature under some law already at hand or seeks to find its law. The latter can be accomplished only under the guidance of the principle that every particular has a law and that these laws together form a unity. Such a principle cannot be derived from the nature investigated, but must instead be entirely original with the judging mind. This principle requires that we look upon nature as purposeful, and fitted to our faculties by an Intelligence other than our own.²⁹ Feelings of pleasurable satisfaction or dissatisfaction arise in the

experience of certain objects which may be viewed as tokens of the purposefulness of the objects in relation to our faculties. For example, the pleasure experienced in contemplating a flower which we call beautiful indicates for the reflective judgment that the form is purposeful with reference to our faculties of apprehension. Such is the faculty of taste, whose judgments are disinterested, necessary, and universal. But the beauty is not in the object, but in the subject who feels and judges the object. The beautiful is therefore a necessary but original experience of the subject in the presence of certain objects, having what Kant calls an *a priori* regulative principle at its basis. The subject experiences a feeling of repose and surrender to the ideal which finds expression in the beautiful object. It is as though an intelligent creator formed nature so as to evoke in us these experiences of the beautiful. Thus it is that the beautiful lifts the experiencing subject beyond the physical into the moral and religious (178-180).

In like manner, vast forms or great power in nature evoke in the subject the experience of the sublime which has its own grounds and laws. Does Kant mean to say that the physical object of vast proportions or of mighty power is not sublime? Certainly! let nature be as vast or as mighty as it may, let it cause us momentarily to fear and shrink into ourselves, it is only for a moment; we then rise up in our spiritual might and become conscious of our rational being and of a spiritual destiny which transcend the physical. Because the objects of nature thus arouse in us these experiences, we transfer to them what we experience, and call them beautiful or sublime as the case may be; but *they* are neither,—it is the unique experience of the spirit that is beautiful or sublime (107-129). Moreover, both the beautiful and sublime “are purposive in reference to the moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love *disinterestedly* something, even

nature itself; the sublime prepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest" (134). Each tends to break our hold upon the physical and lift us into the supersensible and spiritual—indeed, to arouse the spirit to a sense of its own destiny and bring us into relation with the Divine.

The purposefulness involved in the beautiful and the sublime is found in the relation of the object to the experiencing subject; there is, however, another kind of purposefulness which concerns the relation of objects to each other. Are any natural objects ends in themselves, or is object linked with object according to some purpose beyond them? Is the whole natural world subordinated to some final purpose? Certainly we must regard organized beings as manifesting an organizing conception. But here we encounter a difficulty, for the sciences explain everything according to natural laws and do not require teleology as a principle of explanation. The very objects of nature that from one point of view appear to manifest design may be produced by natural law and explained according to the scientific method. Kant recognizes the difficulty, which he calls an antinomy (294-295), making the suggestive remark in passing that possibly the mechanical and teleological principles may be united in the supersensible ground of subject and object (295-296). Kant solves the problem by showing that the difficulty arises from the confusion of two different ways of regarding the same thing, both of which are necessary. We must, indeed, think purpose, but equally necessary is it to regard purpose as realized by natural laws. Being compelled to think of purposefulness in nature, we are led to think of a designing agency, even an intelligent creator (310-313).

Since we must think of at least some portions of nature as designed, what can be that final purpose of nature "which needs no other as condition of its

possibility" ? (359). Nothing in nature, not even man as a physical creature, satisfies this condition. But from another point of view, natural objects are good "for man" as rational (348-349). Within man himself must be found something which can be furthered by means of his connection with nature. This is not happiness, for nature has not made man her special darling, since he is as much subject to hunger and violence as other creatures. It is in man's rational life that the final purpose lies. Consequently, nature is a means of preparing man to direct his activity to ends that are spiritual. Thus natural forces, society, science and art combine to "win us in large measure from the tyranny of sense-propensions . . . summon, strengthen, and harden the powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an aptitude for higher purposes, which lies hidden in us" (358). In brief, the final purpose of creation lies in the worth that free rational beings are able to give themselves in voluntary conformity to the moral law which is itself absolute. This alone renders man "capable of being a final purpose, to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated," and without which nature would be a mere waste (361-371). If, then, man as a moral being is the final purpose of creation, we are obliged to assume a moral lawgiver who governs nature according to moral laws and is a moral Intelligence and Will. Thus moral teleology establishes a theology, not, however, as a completion of physical teleology but on its own basis (373, 388-389).

The sympathetic student of Kant feels that his meaning is larger and profounder than his words when he says we can only postulate God, freedom, and immortality, and declares that the concept of the purposefulness of the world is only a regulative principle of the reflective judgment. Kant may have limited knowledge to what can be presented in sense intuition and interpreted by the responsive mind,

because he had constantly before him the assertions of Locke and Hume regarding knowledge as derived from the senses. But Kant makes much of what he calls the *primacy* of the practical over the theoretical reason to indicate that it is the same reason functioning in two distinct spheres, and that the practical affords some sort of content to the Ideas of soul, freedom, world, and God, which for theoretical reason are only problematic conceptions.³⁰ Hence, instead of emphasizing Kant's denial of knowledge beyond the limits of sensuous intuition, it seems more in harmony with his ultimate meaning to say that the practical reason leads to another class of conceptions which may be regarded with as much assurance as those in the strictly theoretical realm. Kant apparently has the same essential meaning as his critic, T. H. Green, who shows that some concepts are capable of verification in sense intuition, but others are not, as, for example, the moral law and the objects of faith which receive verification through the will and action of self-conscious agents (*Works*, ii. 172-176).

If now we take into consideration Kant's effort to mediate between the theoretical and practical reason by the use of the *a priori* principle of purposefulness of the reflective judgment, we seem to have as a result that the mind which knows the empirical reality of nature with its necessary and universal laws, also takes satisfaction in the beauty and sublimity of the natural world, and views it as fulfilling some ultimate purpose, and at the same time sets ends to itself in free self-determination as it strives to fulfil the moral law. If we could now grasp the full significance of Kant's frequent hints that possibly in the noumenal world, the ultimate ground of both subject and object may be one Being—a thought that betrays the influence of Spinoza³¹—if we could also forget that Kant separated phenomena from noumena—a distinction foreign to his doctrine,—we should

have as the combined significance of the three critiques the view that the individual in his immediate knowledge, feeling, and volition directly experiences reality within himself, for such is the unity of the individual and Being that no one need transcend his experience in order to commune with reality, because individual experience is reality. Nor would Kant have us tamely regard the postulates of God, freedom, immortality, and the supreme end. Rather are these postulates filled so full of the vital energy of moral endeavour that they gain the trustworthiness of established truths. So inexorably does the moral law "bind every one as a command that the righteous man may say: I *will* that there be a God, that my existence in the world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes, and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly, that my duration be endless; I firmly abide by this and will not let this faith be taken from me." ³² We must act as if God were our constant companion and as familiar to us as the visible objects about us—"this is to *postulate* the existence of God. We believe in God because a man sure of his duty is sure that the right ought to win, that in the sense-world it doesn't win, and that in the universe it can win only if God is at the helm,—God as the absolute and all-powerful well-wisher of the whole visible and invisible world-order." ³³ May it not be called a highly pragmatic truth?

If now we turn to the main theme of this chapter, we discover that the solution of our problem is at hand. Luther boldly put aside every intermediate authority and stood face to face with his God, believing that his own faith and immediate experience were sufficient assurance of salvation and of the harmony of his relations with God. It was a great thought, but, so far as Luther was concerned, a thought which had no defence against the critical objection that it is a purely individual experience, not necessarily true

for another. It was Kant who first showed that, while these experiences are subjective and individual, they have also an objective, universal nature. Thus the gulf that seemed to separate the individual experience from universal truth, and from the object of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral faculties, is bridged; not, however, by passing beyond the individual to the object, but by showing that within the individual experience subject and object are two terms of a relation that can never occur separately, and that this relation is the basis of the confidence that what is thus experienced is the very significance of ultimate reality.

The Critical Philosophy, however, left many problems unsolved which became the themes of subsequent speculation. Would that Kant had told us what to do with that shadowy realm of unknown things-in-themselves which he thinks save him from idealism! ³⁴ Would that he had shown how selves are real and in real relations, and had not disappointed us with *postulates* when we crave knowledge! Then we might think of our finite spirits as in the one Spirit whose nature involves differentiation of activities in the order of physical and spiritual beings. Such is the teaching that finds a varied expression in Fichte, Schelling, the Romantic school, and Hegel, whose views we shall now briefly characterize.

"I live in a new world," said Fichte (1765-1814), "since I have read the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Things which I believed never could be proved to me, *e.g.* the idea of an absolute freedom and duty, have been proved, and I feel the happier for it. It is inconceivable what reverence for humanity, what power this philosophy gives us, what a blessing it is for an age in which the citadels of morality had been destroyed, and the idea of duty blotted out from all the dictionaries." ³⁵ Such was the enthusiasm with which Fichte became the devoted friend and defender

of the Critical Philosophy. Fichte regarded Kant as saving him from the earlier influence of Spinoza and from bondage to the outer world.³⁶ Kant's conception of the moral law as a categorical imperative involving the freedom and independence of the moral subject is the key to Fichte's system, which may be roughly described as a fusion of the doctrines of the *Critique of Pure Reason* with those of the *Critique of the Practical Reason* regarded as predominant. Kant had hinted that the ground of the phenomenal object and of the empirical ego might be the same, and Fichte defines it as the original "deed-act" in which the absolute subject is what it is (thesis). This ego is active, free reason or will prescribing its own law of duty. These duties assume for the subject a sensuous form (anti-thesis). Consequently, the objective world is the product of this self-limitation of the rational will in the effort to fulfil the duties imposed by the Practical Reason. An external world common to different selves and governed by general laws means originally common duties, and affords opportunity for co-operation in their performance. "Thus each builds his own world in part unconsciously; and therefore he seems to his ordinary thought not to have built it at all, but merely to find it. We see not only the world made by our past acts. Our world is the world of our conscious and unconscious deeds."³⁷ The rationality of the divine plan secures to us a power thus to create and to work together. Good and bad men, strong and weak, do not really see precisely the same outer world, which varies within limits according to moral perceptions. The more fully the moral reason is realized in me, the more spiritual activity I put forth, the more of a self I become, and the more of an outer world I need and affirm.

Fichte soon enlarges the point of view (synthesis). Faith in a spiritual world comes to me because my

moral volition and its law transcend the sensuous. In that spiritual realm my moral will invariably produces consequences, though there may be no outward sensuous action. This causal connection between my obedience and its results is made possible by a supreme Will working in the moral will of finite beings.³⁸ "Let me will, purely and decidedly, my duty; and He wills that, in the spiritual world at least, my will shall prosper" and "acquire an influence on the whole spiritual world which throughout is but a product of that Infinite Will." That which alone is real in me is "the voice of conscience and my free obedience," through which I apprehend and react upon the community of selves in whom the Infinite Will is manifested, "which, itself far above the level of our finite personality, uses even our conscious lives and wills as part of its own life." To know and live this truth is to know God and have eternal life, for "from our free and faithful performance of our duty in this world, there will arise to us throughout eternity a life in which our freedom and morality may still continue their development." What is called death here is only the blossoming forth of a larger eternal life.³⁹

Though Fichte says we may not speak of God as personal, and, according to Lotze, puts the moral order in place of the divine personality, his meaning evidently is that our life is a limited embodiment of God's life, and realizes as its destiny some of the significance of the moral law which is the will of God. Kant's useless, unknown things-in-themselves give place to the moral order realized in the absolute Self and in finite personalities.⁴⁰

There are many evidences of the influence of Spinoza upon Fichte: both unite with Kant in determining the formation of Schelling's Identity-system. For Schelling (b. 1775), both subject and object depend upon a more ultimate ground. Nature

and mind, object and subject, are the twofold manifestation of the one Infinite which is neither, but is the identity of subject and object, which may be called an impersonal Reason, developing in the world-process to spiritual, self-conscious life. If we call this Absolute, God, we may say, God puts forth the world as His free act, developing in it. In order to guard against determinism and the lifeless God of Spinoza, Schelling "assumes something in God which is not God himself, distinguishes between God as existent and that which is merely the ground of his existence or 'nature in God.' The actual, perfect God, who is intelligence, wisdom, goodness, is preceded by something which is merely the possibility of all this, an obscure, unconscious impulse towards self-representation. For in the last analysis, there is no being but willing; to willing alone belong the predicates of the primal being. . . . This ground of existence is an obscure longing to give birth to self, an unconscious impulse to become conscious; the goal of this longing is the 'Understanding,' the Logos, the Word, wherein God becomes revealed to self."⁴¹ The Understanding, the Logos, is the light, but the dark background of will blindly striving for manifestation accounts for the evil and the irrational in existence. In the Absolute, the two principles are not in conflict but are held in an undifferentiated unity; in man, however, the two principles, the light of reason and the darkness of self-will, are separate, and the problem of life is to make the light of reason triumphant over all.

In Schelling, the conception of the Absolute as developing in the world-process is a step towards Hegel, while the blindly striving will as a more ultimate factor than reason in the Absolute reappears in Schopenhauer's Absolute Will, and forms the basis of his metaphysical pessimism.

The principle that the self posits the world over

against itself as the embodiment of its own ends and interests becomes the principle of the Romantic school, a name originally applied to a group of men born between 1765 and 1775, chief of whom were Augustus and Friedrich Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis, Schelling, and Schleiermacher. The practical creed of the Romanticists exhibited in Schelling was : " Trust your genius : follow your noble heart ; change your doctrine whenever your heart changes, and change your heart often. The world, you see, is after all the world of the inner life. Kant cut us off from things-in-themselves ; Fichte showed us that it is the I, the Self, that makes the world. Let us . . . make it what we choose." ⁴²

In the more general sense, the Romantic school represented a group of writers who sought to translate their own lives directly into philosophy. It is the enlargement of Fichte's one-sided idealism by other equally arbitrary doctrines " which sought to interpret the whole world in terms of our spiritual interests." The Romantic movement was widespread, and later found expression in the classic literature and music of modern Germany, from Beethoven to Wagner, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, and the Schlegels.⁴³

It is evident that the Romantic school carried the principle that the self makes its objective world to an extreme, ending in a fickle arbitrariness and changeableness according to the variations of the subject's feelings. It is characterized by a " waywardness " which needs correction by a fixed and objective order of reality. At this point appears the philosophy of Hegel (1770-1831), who still keeps the standpoint of the self, but reaches through the self both world and God. It is too much to attempt to give more than a suggestion of what Hegel meant to teach. No simple statement can do justice to this vast system. Nevertheless, the following must suffice.

Hegel seems to go back to Kant, taking up the line

of thought where Kant had left it. What is my self-conscious experience and how is it to be understood? What is the self that I am, my past, my future, my deeper self? This forms the theme of the *Phenomenologie*. Giving results rather than arguments, it is shown that it belongs to my reality as spirit to strive and to win victories over contradictions that oppose me, and through these triumphs I reach my own being. But I could not have my life apart from others and the relations I sustain to them. I am in so far one with the many selves. My spirituality is just this communication and intercourse with other lives. It belongs to spirit to differentiate itself in objective tasks and win the victory and thereby go beyond the present self to a higher, deeper, more comprehensive self. Thus step by step through active self-enlargement I come to the recognition of the Absolute Spirit as the essence of my life. In this manner, the *Phenomenologie* follows man's struggles against opposing forces all the way from the sensuous to the ideal and spiritual—a sort of outline of human history—until man becomes conscious that he is in his very essence throughout the stages of his development the Absolute Spirit in manifestation. Thus God is “simply the total spiritual consciousness that expresses, embraces, unifies, and enjoys the whole wealth of our human loyalty, endurance, and passion.”⁴⁴

Hegel now applies this practical ethical understanding of the nature of spirit and its life activity as the key to unlock the mysteries of the world, making it the principle of the universal Spirit that manifests itself in nature. Just as virtue is only to be gained in the struggle with evil, and the good will, with evil tendencies, so everything that is real is a kind of triumph over contradictions and transcends them. The problems for reflection concerning nature arise in connection with the paradoxical oppositions

that seem to exist in nature and demand explanation. It is the purpose of Hegel's *Logic* to systematize the problems thus arising out of these contradictions together with their solutions. This Whole embracing in itself all these concepts and their relations is the logical *schema* of the world of reality abstracted by thought and real only when clothed upon by actual living experience. We may think of *Idea*, *Reason*, or *Notion* as existing in itself, positing itself (thesis) logically prior to manifestation but not antecedent in time to its expressions. This Reason-in-itself continuously develops in a logical order toward the goal of self-consciousness in a world-order (antithesis). After the appearance of self-conscious beings, further development takes place within the history of self-consciousness—a process of return of what has been put forth to full conscious identification and unity with the Divine which is the final stage of self-knowledge (synthesis). The assumption of the Hegelian Logic is that the categories which manifest themselves in our mental development, practical striving and winning of virtue, may be applied to the solution of the problem of being: "Logic therefore coincides with metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts,—thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things" (*Logic*, Sec. 24). Or, as it is sometimes expressed, the forms of knowledge are identical with the forms of being. To analyse and systematize these forms or categories is to produce an answer to the question concerning the nature of reality.⁴⁵ The real is the absolute Reason to which it belongs to be expressed in different things, but the Whole is the true individual, the true concrete fact; it is a unity of differences. We find in our self-consciousness the key that discovers to us the secret of being, for the self is the organic total of conscious processes which have their existence only in this total and in relation to each other, forming a unity.

Such in principle is the infinite Whole. We do not, then, need to pass beyond our experience in order to know reality, for knowledge is directly knowledge of Being, of God. As in our thinking and striving, we unite conceptions in a higher unity which otherwise conflict with each other, so the principle of the universal development is a movement toward an ever more comprehensive, "concrete" whole, driven onward, as it were, by the contradictions that appear in the less complete lower stages of the process.

In his *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel also traces the unfolding of the creative Reason in the world of things, beginning with the most abstract forms, that is, with space, matter, the inorganic, then the organic, at last culminating in the production of man's physical organism, which is the most perfect product of the physical evolution. But man is essentially mind; as he emerges from the physical, he is neither fully conscious of self nor free, but it is his destiny to become both. Hence human history means the progressive unfolding of man's life to ever more complete knowledge of self and freedom from the physical. At first man is governed by instincts and passions rather than by the clear light of reason. But as reason in him develops, informed by reason without, in nature and in his fellows,⁴⁶ he comes more and more to recognize others as his equals and to know that they also have reason, freedom, and spirituality as well as he. Thus individual freedom finds its limits in the freedom of others, and society as the objective expression of reason in the social order begins; natural instincts are rationalized, giving rise to marriage, property, contract, penalty, and the moral structure of society. The individual becomes a person. Every stage of human development has its significance; nations rise and fall according to the ideas which they embody, and each has been in its turn a "chosen people." The strife of states is a battle

of Ideas, and the triumphant state is the form of the Ideal State then and there required by the development of the Absolute Reason. "Reason is the innermost substance of history, which is a logic in action." ⁴⁷

Beyond the social stage yet involved in it is the significance of art, religion, and philosophy, which are stages in the attainment of freedom and independence of personal life. These are higher than the objective mind embodied in the structure of society. They are steps in the final return of the Reason from its self-estrangement. The goal is communion of mind with mind. Expressed in a personal way, I need to pass beyond the stage in which I recognize the constraining forces of society to the point where I am able to identify the Reason manifested in social relations with the reason that is my life. In like manner, I at first regard the natural world as other than myself, distinct and strange. But when I have sufficiently awakened I am able to recognize even in nature, and commune with, the mind there expressing itself, and know myself in union with the great Mind of Nature and of society and of history. The goal is the full, free life of persons whose highest life is the recognition of the divine Mind in all things. Art rises in due time on the soil prepared for it by the family, society, and the state. These in turn support art and are taken up by it. Hegel's theory of art shows the influence of Kant and Schelling, but is more comprehensive. Art is the triumph over the physical, a communion with the ideal, created in the mind of the artist indeed, yet serving as the point in which the human soul and the Infinite become identified. This triumph over the material is not attained immediately; the greater the dependence upon the material, the more abstract and less ideal is the art. Architecture is cruder than sculpture, with less dominance of the idea over matter. Then follow, with lessening dependence upon the sensuous

and increasing worth, painting, music, drama, and poetry, the highest of the arts, with most direct communion of mind with mind.

Art ministers to moral and religious life, for which it is a preparation. Art leads to religion, for the attempt to represent the Divine proves inadequate and awakens the consciousness of the nothingness of finite efforts in view of the Infinite. Religion brings, again, the consciousness of the estrangement of the finite and the Infinite, and a return of mind to the yoke of the external. But religion has an evolution of which Christianity is the climax, for Christianity again unites the Infinite and the finite in its conception of the God-man as represented in Jesus Christ, thus anticipating the highest development of the mind—philosophy—which is the conceptual expression of the total experience, and for which everything real is found to have its place in the unfolding, objectifying life of God.⁴⁸

Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* is so important in its bearing upon modern theology that I reserve it for later consideration, for one feels that he is in the presence of a masterful mind unfolding to the reader thoughts of majestic power and scope. For example, philosophy has for its object to know God, philosophy is theology and theology is philosophy. Religious experience is not something apart and separate—there can be no separation or conflict between knowledge and faith—for in one sense religion goes farther than philosophy; in another, philosophy goes farther than religion, because it thinks religion and develops it in conceptual form.

The Hegelian philosophy was in a very real sense an epitome of the past, the culmination of the idealistic movement beginning in the critical philosophy of Kant, and the last great metaphysical system. Hegel made a permanent contribution to the intellectual world. To be sure we turn away from his *a priori*

dialectical method ; we do not believe it possible to represent the course of the world as a logical deduction from the concept of Being. Nor can we so confidently affirm that history is a logical process. We may have to measure its development in terms of an aesthetic, ethical end or good. Still, the Hegelian thought that the universe is grounded in Reason which is likewise immanent in us, that every step in the historical development of the race has its significance, has had a powerful influence upon the study of history, and has made it possible to believe that the present is the fruit of the past, conserving its significance and even allowing the transcended forms to remain beside the more perfect, and at the same time the seed of the future. In this system, we find supreme confidence that the individual in his own subjective thought knows the universal, the Absolute, even God Himself. There is a lofty inspiration in the calm assurance that what the finite mind experiences and knows needs not to be discounted by being called phenomenal, for in the phenomenon the essence appears and there is no separation.

The purpose of this chapter is now accomplished. It was to show how philosophy responded to the protest of the intellectual and religious consciousness against determination foreign to itself. As the Reformers sought to restore Christianity out of its original sources, God, man, and the Bible, and fell back upon the sufficiency of individual faith in relation to God with present assurance of salvation, so philosophy desired to renew human knowledge out of its inexhaustible sources, independently of the traditions of the past and of all conditions which do not lie in its own faculty of knowledge.⁴⁹ The problem became that of showing how individual cognition is not merely individual and subjective, but also objective and universal. We have traced the history of this effort, in part, to Hegel, in whom it

finds its greatest success, for I believe that we must hold to what appears to be the essential truth of Hegel on this point, namely, the absolute trustworthiness of knowledge, individual and subjective though it be, as the final significance of reality which does not lie beyond our knowledge but is *in* our knowledge and of it. This does not mean that our cognitions exhaust the content of reality; perhaps this is where Hegel failed to show that the cognitive, though real, is not all. Certainly it is all of reality that can be thought. It was Schopenhauer (1788–1860) who brought out the fact that the deepest core of reality is not thought but Will; with him, indeed, Will blindly striving to be and to take form according to Ideas, that is, according to Reason. His disciple, Edward von Hartmann, united Hegel's Idea or Thought with Schopenhauer's Will in *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, but we know nothing of unconscious will and thought.⁵⁰ It was Lotze who, not unjustly regarded as completing the movement, showed that the ultimate Being is indeed Will and Thought but not unconscious—rather is the Absolute the Perfect personality of whom our personality is a pale image.⁵¹ Self-conscious Mind as the final ground of reality whom we may think of as Personality in the highest meaning of the term is, in my opinion, the conclusion which the history of philosophy forces upon us. That this personality is known in our knowing, that self and the world are in some sense immanent in Him, even modes of His Will and Thought—though the modes are different—is the verdict of the development of philosophy to the present time.

What has just been said is not intended to ignore those who are still feeding upon the husks of agnosticism, of whom Auguste Comte, J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer were great representatives. Nor are we unmindful of the views of certain natural scientists, who, forgetting their immediate task, deny the

possibility of any other knowledge than that secured by investigations in the laboratory. It is enough to remind the over-confident scientist that there are still conceptions which he has not explained, that the objects of nature with which he deals could not be objects at all without a subject from which, for scientific purposes, they have been abstracted, and that it is philosophy which endeavours to grasp in one comprehensive view the significance of the unbroken unity of experience, although it needs for its task and in a docile spirit accepts the results of the sciences for further reflective treatment. Nor do we forget the position of such an able writer on metaphysics as F. H. Bradley, who in his *Appearance and Reality* says that we may not speak of the Absolute as personal or rational but, instead, as "super-personal" and "super-rational"—terms that to the present writer are void of meaning.⁵² It is sufficient to note in reply that Professor Royce, who acknowledges his indebtedness to Bradley, devotes his able work on *The World and the Individual* to showing that the Absolute Being is Thought and Will in living experience, and the source of "a whole that is an individual system of rationally linked and determinate, but for that very reason not externally determined, ethically free individuals, who are nevertheless One in God."⁵³

Finally, as in response to the Reformation and the modern spirit a new philosophy arose in place of Scholasticism, so a new theology based in part upon this new philosophy began to be developed in the effort to appropriate the same principles of individual freedom of thought and faith that had been so fruitful in speculative thought. The result was a theology that seems in many ways to surpass that developed on the soil of Greek culture, and is now of much influence. This new theological movement has many aspects, some of which will now be presented.

CHAPTER VII

A NEW THEOLOGY: I. RELIGION AS THE GOOD WILL

THE principle of the Reformation required a reconstruction in theology which was, however, not immediately undertaken, for the Reformers continued to hold the Scholastic doctrines, with some modifications. Nor was the principle of unrestrained interpretation of the Scriptures and of the direct relation of the believer to God fully recognized. The changes that took place may be illustrated by a brief review of the modification of the conception of Christ's atoning work. It will become clear that the new philosophy beginning with Kant laid the foundation for theories of the atonement and of the mission of Christ which are both a more complete adoption of the principle of the Reformation, and at the same time a fresh and inspiring contribution to present theology.

The theories of the redemptive work of Christ range from the extreme objective to the extreme subjective view. In the objective theories, Christ is represented as doing something which removes an obstacle in the way of man's freedom and salvation; in the subjective, emphasis is laid upon the work of Christ as bringing about a changed condition in man himself, whereby he is brought into fellowship with God, for the obstacle to salvation lies solely in man's condition.

No theory of the atonement was attempted

immediately succeeding the Apostolic age. Belief manifested itself in a grateful appreciation of the life and work of Christ in its different aspects. His self-sacrificing love was always prominently before the Christian consciousness, and the idea of substitution was common in the patristic period, but the nature of the substitution was differently conceived. Christ was regarded as the sufficient representative of man before God and, as Origen says, "from Him there began the union of the divine with the human, in order that the human, by communion with the divine, might rise to the divine, not in Jesus alone, but in all those who not only believe, but enter upon the life which Jesus taught."¹ For some, the sacrificial death of Christ was the prominent feature of His redemptive work, while others emphasized His teaching function. Other conceptions were that the power of Satan and his angels was limited by the work of Christ, that a new divine life was infused into mankind by Christ, and that the moral influence of His ministry turned men to righteousness.

The first definite theory of the method in which Christ brought deliverance has been called the "military" theory of the atonement. Through sin, men had come into the power of Satan who, like a captor in war, thus acquired a right to his captives who could justly be released only upon the payment of a ransom that Satan was satisfied to accept. There is considerable difference of opinion concerning the acceptance of this theory by the Fathers. It is said that Justin Martyr was the first to propound this theory.² G. B. Stevens says that this conception of a ransom "was the dominant note in Christian thought on the subject for nearly a thousand years—from Irenaeus (d. 200) to Anselm (d. 1109)—though it was often combined with various views, penal, ethical, and mystical, which were quite incongruous with it."³ On the other hand, it is held that Irenaeus

is charged with this view but upon insufficient ground, and that it is doubtful whether the ransom-theory is to be found definitely advocated by the Fathers. Origen did, indeed, give expression to this view but, as Gieseler says, "Origen does not consider that Christ, in the proper sense, gave His soul as a ransom to the devil, but only in a figurative and qualified sense."⁴ Others, as, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, expressed the theory in an extreme form. Although it cannot be said that this view gained general acceptance either in the Greek or Latin Church, it was an attempt, on the assumption of Satan's right and dominion over men, to show how Christ became the deliverer of men from bondage by offering Himself in suffering love to Satan as an exchange for men, and how Satan, attracted by His person, accepted Him only to find that he was powerless to retain this pure soul. Others, however, held that Satan lost his claim upon men by his own act in assailing the innocent Christ. Still others, as, for example, Augustine, regard Christ's sacrifice not as effecting any essential change in the divine disposition but as so expressing the love of God as to kindle love in human hearts in return.⁵

The next theory of Christ's redemptive work in the order of development was the "commercial" or "satisfaction" theory of Anselm (d. 1109). Anselm denied that Satan had any right over men. The obstacle to salvation is the offence of sin, which is a robbing of God, to whom perfect obedience is due, in consequence of which satisfaction must be rendered before forgiveness is possible. Commercial and mathematical conceptions also appear. Somebody able to do so must make an exact payment which will balance the books and free man from the debt he owes. It is not now so much a question of guilt and punishment, for Christ is not viewed as made sin for us, and "accursed," as Luther said. Rather is His death

a meritorious work, whose reward is the men for whom Christ gave His life.

The argument of Anselm's work, *Cur Deus Homo?* endeavours to show the occasion and necessity of the incarnation and to answer the question, Why could not God save men in some other way than by the death of His Son? And how does the death of Christ avail for the salvation of men? The argument is as follows:

"(1) Every creature *owes* obedience to God; this obedience is man's debt of honour to his sovereign. (2) Sin is the non-payment of that debt; it is a *robbing* of God, a violation of His rights, and of His *honour*. (3) For this act of robbing the sinner is bound to make reparation. Justice demands that he shall render satisfaction for this affront, this violation of the rights of his rightful Lord. (4) Now the punishment of sin would be such a satisfaction; but if *punishment is to be remitted*, some *other satisfaction* must be made which shall be an *adequate substitute for punishment* and fully meet its ends. (5) This satisfaction must completely *balance the sin* for which it is to satisfy; it must be as *meritorious* and as *pleasing* to God as sin is *heinous* and *hateful* to him. (6) Man is obviously *powerless* to render any such satisfaction and to discharge his debt. (7) God himself *must make it* if it is made at all; he alone *can* make it. (8) But it is *due* from man, not from God; man *ought* to make it, but God alone *can*; hence the necessity, if it is to be made, of a God-man. (9) This God-man has given to God *his own life* as a satisfaction for sin. This he was not under obligation to do; obedience he owed, but the yielding up of his life was a *free gift*. (10) Now as the guilt of even the least sin *outweighs all worlds*—everything not God—so the *life of Christ* surpasses in value all worlds and creatures, and is more valuable than sin is heinous; hence it is an *adequate equivalent* and balances the account in man's favour. (11) Now such a gift calls for a *reward*. The saved are the reward which God makes to Christ *for his gift* of his life." Hence the necessity of the incarnation and the possibility of saving men, yet at the same time maintaining the infinite majesty and honour of God. Whether men are saved depends "on the measure in which men come to partake of so great grace." 6

While the theory of Anselm was most widely accepted during the following centuries it was modified by the Reformers. Anselm had represented Christ as doing a meritorious work which He was under no obligation to do. His sacrifice was viewed more as passive and physical than as an active obedience to the divine law through spiritual suffering. Nor did Anselm show that Christ was in any direct relation to the just punishment of sin, sharing human guilt and incurring its penalty yet making atonement through His death. The Reformers changed the basis of the argument whereby the conception of criminal law determined the view of the redemptive work of Christ. Sin is now regarded as a violation of the law of God in which the divine holiness is expressed. The consequent guilt can be removed only through satisfaction by punishment after which forgiveness may take place. Hence the problem arose of showing how Christ could take upon Himself the sinner's guilt so as justly to bear penalty and, by His active as well as passive obedience, make forgiveness possible. Luther declared that Christ became even "accursed" that He might bear the penalty. Calvin said that "Christ interposed as an intercessor; that He has taken upon Himself and suffered the punishment which by the righteous judgment of God impended over all sinners; that by His blood He has expiated those crimes which render them odious to God; that by this expiation God the Father has been satisfied and duly atoned." ⁷ The post-Reformation theologians of the seventeenth century carried out these conceptions, holding that God's Holiness is fundamental, and that God must punish sin before it can be forgiven. On the other hand, the believer knows that, despite his own unrighteousness, harmony with the law and with justice has been restored by Christ, and through faith peace of conscience comes without leaving any doubts as to

the satisfaction of the claims of God's violated law. It is justification through faith in Christ.

These theories of the redemptive work of Christ are largely transitional, and are only partially removed from a mechanical conception of the atonement. Especially important was the difficulty connected with the conception of the transference of human guilt to Christ and of His righteousness to us. This point was sharply attacked by the Socinians whose views are expressed in the Racovian Catechism (1609-1612). The Socinians claimed that the strength of the penal theory of the atonement lay in the importance given to justice, but that the satisfaction of justice is gained only by an act of injustice in that the guilty one escapes while the innocent is punished. The Socinians themselves held that God could forgive freely without requiring penalty or expiation, and no change in His relation to men was necessary ; all that was required was that men should change morally. God can freely forgive those who are in process of this self-amendment to which the knowledge of Christ's example and obedience contribute. From the standpoint of Church history, Socinianism was a movement that gathered into itself the freer thought that had been developing alongside the Church throughout the centuries, and at the same time was responsive to the influences of the Renaissance. Its confession of faith is inspiring, and marks a step in advance towards freedom of thought and belief.⁸

The Governmental Theory of the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), was in part a reply to the Socinian objections to the penal theory of the atonement. Many of the Arminians also agreed essentially with the views of Grotius. In this theory, the basis of the argument is shifted from criminal to civil law. God is conceived as the supreme moral Ruler who must maintain the dignity and authority of His government. Sin is a violation of God's public law,

a rebellion against His government which must be maintained and vindicated. Sinners can be saved only on condition that the authority of the divine government shall be fully recognized. This vindication is accomplished by Christ. Grotius tries to keep the conception of punishment and penalty, but leaves out the Anselmic scheme of equivalence and imputation. The essence of punishment is infliction, but nothing forbids that this infliction should be ordained by God as punishment for another's sin. Christ's death is not really penal, but is as effective in vindicating the divine government as our punishment would have been. Hence forgiveness is possible with the maintenance of justice.⁹

We come now to a group of theories of the atonement which are sometimes described as ethical and subjective. They are a reaction against the theories which spring from a mechanical union of Christianity with the later forms of Greek thought and from Scholasticism, for what would the commercial, penal, or governmental theory, for example, be without the tacit assumption of the validity of mediaeval Realism? According to these later theories, law and justice are no longer viewed as external and objective, nor is sin conceived quantitatively as something that can be measured and punished. But the emphasis is placed upon the experiences of the individual man whose only obstacle to salvation is his own inner life. There is no obstacle on God's part. It is sufficient that the man change, give up his sin, and be forgiven by God and received into the divine fellowship. The place of Christ is conceived differently, now as an example to be followed, again as the revelation of man's essential, ideal nature, while the general impressiveness of Christ's personality leads men into the way of salvation. All of these theories have been, in part at least, anticipated by pre-Reformation views. Whether these theories are themselves transi-

tional to a more objective view of the moral law and of the work of Christ is still in dispute.

The theology which forms the basis of these ethical and subjective theories of the atonement finds its roots, at least in part, in the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and in the theological doctrines of Schleiermacher and, more recently, of Albrecht Ritschl and his school. In this and the two following chapters we shall outline to some extent the theoretical foundation of this modern movement, endeavouring to show that in it and in its theological superstructure may be found the clearest exhibition of the principle of the Reformation, and that theological thought is properly entirely free and in the service of religious experience, which it interprets only to become in its turn a useful instrument in the promotion of the spiritual life.

As in philosophy Kant was the first to make a successful application of the principle of the Reformation, so was he the first to lay the foundations for its full adoption by theology. Kant's moral doctrine forms the essential factor in his interpretation of the Christian religion, which in his view is the only true moral religion. The moral good is the good will acting in accord with and for the sake of the moral law. Morality culminates in religion, which consists in viewing our duties as the commands of the Supreme Intelligence. Since moral duties cover the whole of rational life, religion may be said to be, in intent, coextensive with our life activity and involved in all our relations. In 1793 Kant published his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. This work consists of four parts dealing with: (1) "The Indwelling of the Bad Principle along with the Good, or, the Radical Evil of Human Nature"; (2) "The Conflict of the Good with the Bad for Dominion over Man"; (3) "The Victory of the Good over the Bad Principle and the Establishment of a Kingdom of God upon

Earth"; (4) "True and False Service under the Rule of the Good Principle." ¹⁰

Strictly, nothing is good or bad but what is our own act. Consequently, there can be no inherited sin. The source of evil lies in the free adoption of a bad instead of a good principle of action, nor can the adoption of such a principle be due to physical causes. The only sense in which evil is innate is the capacity freely to choose a good or evil rule of conduct which is good or evil accordingly. Since man often chooses the evil, he may be said to have a propensity to evil which can be, in part at least, understood when we consider that man is dependent upon his physical nature and must act in relation to it. Rules of action with reference to the desires springing from the physical nature often conflict with the moral law whose source is the practical reason, and which should dominate the whole life. Man does not rebelliously abandon the moral law or cease to respect it, for the idea of the moral law cannot properly be called a capacity belonging to personality, for it is personality itself, but a man may adopt a rule of conduct which subordinates the moral law in his personal life.

Nor can we speak of man as requiring the restoration of the original capacity for good, for he could never lose that capacity and with it the respect for the moral law; if he did lose it, it could not be restored. Man may be said to be created for good, and in this sense his original constitution is good, but whatever a man is or ought to be in a moral sense, he must be through his own free action in accordance with, and for the sake of, the moral law. Restoration can only mean restoration of the dominance of the moral law. This cannot be effected by a gradual reform as long as the principle of action remains impure and unchanged, but there is required a kind of new birth and change of heart which consists in the adoption of the maxim

of holiness, the moral law. After this come effort and growth, that is, one may hope with such a principle of action, steadily followed, that he has entered upon the constant progress from bad to better, and that in God's sight this fidelity to the moral law will make him good and well-pleasing to the Supreme Lawgiver.

At this point we enter the sphere of religion in which the duties of life are viewed as divine commands. There are two classes of religions—favour-seeking religions and the religion of the good life. In the first, man thinks God can make him eternally happy without his needing to become better, or, that God can make him better without his having to do anything except to ask for it; but in the moral religion—and only Christianity is the true moral religion—man needs only to be anxious to know what he ought to do in order to be worthy and to use his talents to the utmost (Luke xix. 12-16).

The enemy which we have constantly to guard against is the adoption of a maxim of volition which does not give supreme place to the moral law as motive, and, since it is a free act, it is impossible to explain why the evil maxim is adopted. We give expression to our difficulty by saying with the Apostle, we war with evil powers.

On the other hand, we personify the idea of the good principle. That which alone can make the world the object of the divine counsels and be the purpose of creation is humanity in moral perfection, which, as supreme condition, is accompanied by happiness as its immediate consequent, a humanity actively experiencing the Highest Good. This Ideal Man, this perfect humanity, well-pleasing to God, is eternally before the divine Mind, and is at the same time the "express image" of God—His "only begotten Son"—the Word, the Purpose through which and for the sake of which everything was

made. In this Ideal Man which is the eternal conception of God and the immanent purpose of creation, God loves the world, and only in this Ideal Man and through the adoption of His disposition can we hope to be children of God. The ceaseless duty is to conform to this Ideal of what man is in the mind of God, a duty which our own reason lays upon us as well, and imparts the strength for its fulfilment; but because we cannot understand how our reason can create such an Ideal and impose its law upon us with unconditioned authority, we again give expression to our difficulty by saying: This eternal image of the Ideal Man has come down from heaven and assumed our humanity; not understanding how we, being evil, can rise to a holy state, we reverse the true order and say the Good, the Ideal Man, the Son, lifts us up. This union with us is then conceived as the humiliation of the Son of God, who thus shares our suffering in the conflict with evil. Only through faith in this Son of God can we hope to become well-pleasing to God, though it be through trial and temptation. In other words, humanity well-pleasing to God requires that each man should not only fulfil all human duties, but at the same time, by doctrine and example, extend the good as much as possible, and be ready for its sake to suffer even death.

Nor is an example of a Life in perfect accord with the moral law required to give us the Ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God, for such an Ideal is already implicitly contained in our reason. Nevertheless such an example must be thought of as possible, for all ought to fulfil the moral law, and would bring a great moral good into the world. But such a Person perfectly realizing the moral law need not be regarded as other than a naturally produced man, although it could not be truly said that he might not be supernatural. The Ideal, however, is supernatural enough itself without it being assumed to be embodied in a

supernatural being, for it is supernatural in every man in the sense of not being the result of his physical nature but of the practical reason. It only complicates the problem to assume two supernaturals. Besides, a truly supernatural being, above the weaknesses of men, possessing a divinely steadfast will, could not be an example for men, nor would there be anything remarkable in the persistent moral goodness of such a being.

Is the Ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God realizable? If we ought to realize it, there is implied the ability to do so. While we, so far as time is concerned, are always deficient in moral attainment, yet by the adoption of the moral law as the supreme rule of our conduct, by the constant progress from a worse to a better, a series of approximations to the Ideal is produced which may, in the timeless intuition of the divine Lawgiver, be taken as the satisfaction and fulfilment of the law. Such a life may also be assured of a blessed future of peace and security. Likewise, he who lives according to the principle of evil and goes from better to worse will be able to discover no other than a miserable end. The good and pure disposition which is the basis of our assurance may be called the good Spirit ruling us, the Comforter, the Paraclete.

The chief difficulty to be overcome in the process of the soul's restoration is the evil condition from which one starts. Since it is our duty to do all the good in our power, it is not easy to see how we can make up for what has not been done or remove the consequences of evil deeds. A change of heart does not pay the old debts, nor does the debt of sin allow another to pay it, for it is not transferable, however magnanimous the innocent one may be who proposes to stand in the sinner's place. The only solution of the difficulty lies in the changed disposition. In principle, the old life is abandoned; the new dis-

position bears the suffering that arises from the old nature, and may be personified as the suffering Son of God who bears the burden of human sin and weakness. Then comes the feeling of being accepted and counted as righteous for the sake of the new life, for the sake of the suffering Servant of God. Only under the presupposition of an entire change of heart can the sin-burdened soul be set free before the heavenly Judge who views the continued living for the sake of the moral Ideal as its virtual fulfilment. Such is the significance of the religious history both of the individual and of the race.

It has been said that Kant failed to give sufficient importance to the historical significance of the religions of different peoples. This may be true, but Kant gives a large place to the development of religions finding their essential significance in the progressive manifestation of the moral Ideal in its triumph over evil. The goal towards which the movement tends is a humanity so fully in accord with the moral Ideal that it is well-pleasing to God and manifests itself in a social order—a church—which is the expression of the kingdom of God. Hence religion is a direct experience of God, who is viewed as the source of the moral law which our own Reason also prescribes to us. We are in God, and God is in us, and our self-imposed laws are the divine commands and the law of the kingdom of spirits.

Of particular interest is Kant's interpretation of the Hebrews and of Christ in the history of religions. The good principle did not come down from heaven at a certain time, but has been coming, in an invisible manner, from the beginning of the human race, and found among the Hebrews its first true dwelling-place, and, finally, in Christ its full manifestation. He is an example for all, opening the door of freedom to those who receive Him, giving them power by following His example to become children of God; by the

adoption of genuine moral principles, to be healed ; in Him we discover that the Ideal of the moral good really belongs to our original endowment (*Urbild*), and that one needs only to strive to make it dominate life in order to become convinced through its effect upon the heart that the powers of evil cannot prevail against it.

While Kant finds the moral struggles of the soul depicted in religious conceptions, he also makes room for the fact that the moral and religious life of the individual is dependent upon a society consisting of those who love virtue and make it the bond of their union. Such a society is called the people of God. Their unity may depend at first upon general laws prescribed in some manner as statute, but the development of the people is towards a morality which consists in obedience to self-imposed laws of the rational will which are at the same time regarded as the laws of God, who rules His people, His invisible Church and kingdom. The successive forms of the visible Church have as their essential significance that true religion which rises out of the practical reason. Human weakness reverses the real order and puts some Person, Book, or Dogma in the place of the simple moral religion of the spirit.

On the other hand, the Scriptures are necessary as a basis of union among believers. That which makes Scripture useful and constitutes the test of its worth as divine revelation is that it promotes the moral life. The Holy Spirit's guidance in the interpretation of the Bible is just these original principles of the moral reason. True religion does not consist in belief in a Scriptural account of what God may have done for our welfare, but in what we do and are, and must do and be, in order to be worthy of what God does for us ; but this is never anything else than what has unconditioned worth in itself, namely, the harmony of our will with the divine will in doing the

whole range of duties which, religiously interpreted, are divine commands.

Is there progress? Yes, traditions, statutes, and rites which did good service in their time are after all only leading-strings, and gradually give place to the pure religion of the moral reason. Political, social, and ecclesiastical reforms are outgrowths of this development for which previous stages are a preparation. Thus there is being formed a power and a kingdom which shall have the victory over evil and bring to the world an abiding peace.

Since religion subjectively considered is the recognition of our duties as divine commands, the fulfilment of duty in the various relations of life is the true divine service, and the requirements of this service each may discover directly in his own moral consciousness. The possibility of revelation as a means of introducing the true religion may not be denied, but revealed truth can only be an earlier statement of the true religion which the moral consciousness would have itself reached in the course of its development. Consequently, the distinction between natural and revealed religion has to do with form, not with essential content. In this sense Christianity may be regarded as a natural religion in that it founds itself upon the essential moral nature of man, as the Sermon on the Mount abundantly proves. Christ's message concerned the inner righteousness and like principles of the kingdom which are written in the human heart, indeed, but which require earnest effort on the part of every one in order to prevail in the life.

Nevertheless, Kant finds a place for the formal service of God, but always as symbolic of the inner life. But never should the symbol be put in the place of what is represented, nor mere piety in the place of virtue, although piety is useful as a means of strengthening the love of virtue. Prayer, church

attendance, and the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper are useful in promoting the true religious life. Prayer serves to awaken the attention and to establish a disposition to live according to the divine will. But prayer, church attendance, and the ordinances have their proper end in real moral attainment which alone renders us pleasing to God. The Lord's Supper especially sets forth a world-wide moral fellowship and the equality of the members of the kingdom, and tends to cultivate in the religious community the moral disposition of brotherly love.

We may now sum up Kant's view by saying that for him the core of personality is the moral will, and that there is nothing good but the good will and what is directly related to it. Nothing avails for man but deeds of will for the sake of righteousness, or, to speak the language of religion, for God's sake, who is regarded as the source of the moral law which our own reason at the same time imposes upon us in the form of duties. The gradual coming of this pure religious faith of the moral reason in the history of mankind is the coming of the kingdom of God. The historical Christ may be regarded as a perfect example of the fulfilment of the moral Ideal of man, but it is not faith in the example as such that saves, but faith in the inner significance of the example, which is just this original divine Ideal of man (*Urbild*) eternally present in the mind of God, and dwelling in and constituting the essential nature of man. To live out that inner nature alone renders us acceptable to God, and only as we do so with devoted wills can we have confidence that God in His love will forgive the deficiencies of our deeds. But man lives necessarily in relation with his fellows, and, consequently, Kant adopts as his own teaching Christ's summary of the whole duty of man to love God and his neighbour as himself.¹⁰

What I have called the principle of the Reforma-

tion, namely, the direct relation of the individual to the objects of knowledge and of faith, finds full expression in Kant. The lofty position which he occupies in his moral and religious doctrines as the expression of the pure practical reason was in wholesome contrast to the superficial views of sin and the atonement prevailing in that age of *Enlightenment*, and to the objective mechanical theories of the redemptive work of Christ advocated by theologians. There is much need even now for heeding Kant's strong plea for morality in the religious life, for which neither piety, service, nor ceremony can be a substitute. Nevertheless, the history of theology has shown that Kant's view is not so much false as insufficient, at least in two respects: in the first place, we feel that in Kant's conception of the religious life the emotional and imaginative side of our nature was not fully enough recognized; in the second place, we crave knowledge where Kant denies its possibility.

As to the first, it is true that we strive to fulfil our duties, but Kant leaves the issue so indefinite that apparently there is never to be a complete triumph, which is equivalent to saying there is never to be a complete redemption. Besides, Kant's conception of moral progress implies a rigorous self-control and subjection to Duty which are too cold and self-reliant to meet the needs and weaknesses of our ordinary humanity, although nobody can deny that we ought not to be ordinary. In our weakness and moral failure to hold ourselves by act of will to our Duty, "religion comes to our rescue and takes our fate into her hands. There is a state of mind known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and water-spouts of God. In this state of mind what we most dreaded

has become the habitation of our safety, and the hour of our moral death has turned into our spiritual birthday," with its sense of peace and perfect security.¹¹

It is not, however, just to say that Kant did not give a large place to the feelings and emotions. One cannot read his *Apostrophe to Duty*,¹² for example, or his conception of the beautiful and the sublime¹³ as having power to lift us into the ideal realm and awaken the consciousness of the spirit's destiny without a conviction that, in some respects, Kant occupies a more exalted position even in the world of feeling and emotion than many of his critics. Nor is Kant lacking in a trace of mysticism. It was Schleiermacher and Ritschl who, building in part upon Kant and to some extent upon the Romantic school, restored feeling and faith to their proper place in an understanding of religious experience. But both appropriated Kant's questionable suggestion that the conceptions of religious faith are symbols in the place of knowledge. Höffding, in his criticism of Kant, seems to me to go too far when he says that Kant conceives both natural and positive religion as the outer shell or symbol of an essential moral content, and in no sense possessing cognitive value.¹⁴

On the other hand, I do not think the above interpretation of Kant does full justice to his assertion of the primacy of the practical reason over the theoretical reason, and to the evident purpose of Kant in his entire work to render a positive service to moral and religious faith. Does not Kant intend to give us in his "postulates" and in his view of religion something more than mere symbol instead of knowledge? Is it not even a certainty that out-ranks in value mere logical reasoning on the narrow basis of knowledge as presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? However this may be, as a matter of fact an attempt was made to restore metaphysics

on the basis of criticism, in which we are no longer limited to mere feeling and symbol, but have certain knowledge of ultimate reality which affords a foundation for the conception of religion as knowledge. It was Hegel who interpreted religious experience in terms of knowledge and, at the same time, restored the objective and historical, which Kant neglected, to their proper place, and thus united the objective and subjective factors of religious experience.

To Kant the will, to Hegel, knowledge, to Schleiermacher and Ritschl, feeling, appears to be the essential element in religious experience. Each in turn regards his system as fully in accord with Christianity; indeed, the chief aim of each is to set forth the significance of Christianity, but each system lacks the feature that gives strength to the others, at least suggesting that the most satisfactory theology can only be that which gives full account of cognition, feeling, and will, basing itself upon the whole human constitution. We turn next to the conception of the Christian redemption in terms of knowledge, which is the work of Hegel and his numerous followers.

CHAPTER VIII

A NEW THEOLOGY : II. RELIGION AS KNOWLEDGE

IT has often been said that faith ultimately yields to knowledge. St. Paul seems to imply this in the words: "Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been known" (1 Cor. xiii. 12), while St. John identifies eternal life with knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ (John xvii. 3). The words faith and knowledge have had a varied significance. For the Neo-Platonist and the Gnostic the goal was an intuitive, contemplative apprehension of God. For Clement of Alexandria faith was "the compendious knowledge of essentials; knowledge (gnosis), the incontrovertible demonstration of the things received by faith, through the doctrines of our Lord, whereby faith is raised to an irrefragable scientific knowledge."¹ Both Augustine and Anselm declared that faith precedes knowledge (*credo ut intelligam*), implying that faith ends in knowledge. Jesus also suggests that knowledge is a kind of fruit of obedience when He says: "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself" (John vii. 17). There is, therefore, sufficient ground for attempts to interpret the essence of religious experience from the standpoint of knowledge. We have seen how Kant viewed the different forms of religion and religious history as having a moral content. We shall now find that it was Hegel who most clearly conceived religion and

religious experience in terms of knowledge as a system of concepts.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* has had an important influence upon recent theology. Hegel may have placed too much emphasis upon the cognitive, but he did not separate faith and knowledge. Knowledge is a more completely organized and concrete experience. What faith apprehends is brought by the thinker into its proper relations in the universal, but at the same time the concrete, whole—the truth, the divine Mind. At the beginning of his *Philosophy of Religion* stand New Testament passages, anticipating his own doctrine to the effect that the inner relation of man to God finds expression in Christ, that to know God who is spirit, to be in Him, is religion—it is also liberty. The following outline of some of the views developed by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Religion* is given partly because of their power and richness, but chiefly because Hegel shows how knowledge fulfils an important function in the religious life.²

In religion we pass beyond the finite into the infinite, beyond the time order into a region where all contradictions are overcome in eternal truth and peace. Learning, art, and all acquirement culminate for the religious consciousness in the experience and thought of God. In this act the spirit is free, for it relates itself to nothing finite. The religious consciousness varies in vividness but is always characterized by certainty of God. No one is entirely without religious feeling, although it may exist in a perverted form, for “to man as man, religion is essential and is a feeling not foreign to him” (5). Religious experience, moreover, normally develops into reflective thought, producing the philosophy of religion. There is, therefore, no conflict between faith and knowledge, religion and philosophy; indeed, they have the same interests and the same object, “God and nothing but God.” “Philosophy is not knowledge of the world,

but knowledge of the not-worldly, not knowledge of external mass, of the empirical existence and life, but knowledge of what is eternal, what is God, and what flows from His nature" (17). Philosophy, indeed, is itself service of God, worship, religion, for it is the renunciation of the self for the universal and eternal. Philosophy is, therefore, identical with religion in content, and only passes beyond religious experience in so far as it expresses this experience in the form of thought. This is really theology, for there is one Reason, one spirit of God present in the world, in man and his religion and in his thought.

Do we know God? Where Kant is negative, Hegel affirms the knowledge of God and finds a place for the significance of Christian doctrine in the development of the divine life and purpose in the world (37). There is both immediate and mediate or reflective knowledge of God, and we know not only that He is but what He is. We know that God is spirit, and that it belongs to the self-conscious nature of spirit to have its life in and through a community of spirits (40). In general, religion means an immediate experience of God, which becomes mediated by thought when it is seen in relation to the whole, and acquires an absolute value.

It is evident that religion is one of the stages in the development of the Spirit in the individual and the race to full self-consciousness. Corresponding to these different stages are the different religions of the world, each of which is a necessary step in the development, and the essential elements of each, though transcended, are preserved and completed in the higher forms. In order to determine the place of a religion, we need to ask how God is conceived and how man thinks of himself. According to this standard, Christianity is the culmination of the religious development and is the perfect religion, since it reveals what God and man really are and

contains the elements of truth found in other religions. Consequently, each religion has an element of truth and is a necessary step in the religious development of mankind (72), but all prepare for and end in Christianity.

Religious development in the individual and the race consists in the gradual awakening of the soul to consciousness of its life in God, for both nature and the soul are different forms of divine self-revelation. At first the religious consciousness has a faith and certainty of God experienced chiefly in subjective feeling; a second form is objective and expresses itself in a representative, imaginative manner. The final form is cognitive, in which the absolute truth becomes the object. There is, however, certainty of God in all these stages, for what I believe I also implicitly know, but thought seeks "the supreme point of view in which all the parts and differences, occasionally standing out as if independent, sink into their due relation and are seen in their right proportion." The first stage of immediate experience of God is not reducible to mere subjective feeling, for there is some rational content which seeks expression. Feeling and thought are mutually helpful; it is worse to be forgotten than forgiven, and consequently, the clearer the thought of God the richer and deeper does religious feeling become (110-113).

The objective expressions of religion form a progressive development from the sensuous to the conceptual. At first the ideal is embodied in some external, sensuous object as a fetish or idol. The next stage is that of the representative imagination, in which the sensuous is lifted into the universal, as, for example, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for here it is not a question of fruit or of eating but of the ideal of life that assumes a sensuous expression. In like manner, historical events, such as those in the life of Christ, have as their essence a particular

content of the divine self-revelation, but this ideal content is not yet fully distinguished from its historical form. This takes place in the final form of religious development, namely, the reflective or philosophical or theological, in which the essential content of any thing, event, or experience is assigned its place in the concrete whole. The awakened mind then strips off the particular and the sensuous and finds the absolute Truth, God. Philosophical, and equally theological, thought only appropriates the essential significance of religious experience. The early forms of religion are often spoken of as immediate knowledge, but strictly there is only mediated or related knowledge, and whatever is immediate is full of implicit relations which are rendered explicit by reflection. Thus we pass from immediate religious feeling to knowledge of God (140).

The relation of the individual to God also throws light upon the relation of immediate religious experience to knowledge. We, indeed, have the feeling of absolute dependence, as Schleiermacher later said, but in this feeling we transcend our limitations by being aware of them. This consciousness of a wider realm is unique to man, who not only strives towards the Infinite but also affirms himself as real and becomes self-centred, which is to become evil. To be reconciled with God does not mean that God needs to be reconciled, but that I should turn away from an undue affirmation of myself to God. Reconciliation is made possible by the essential relation of the individual to God. If the Infinite and the finite stood over against each other, they could never unite; the Infinite would limit the finite by being in opposition to the finite. Hence the Infinite would be what the finite is not, and would, of course, no longer be Infinite but finite (156). Instead, Infinite and finite are a real unity, a whole, in which alone are distinctions and differences possible, just as in an organic whole of knowledge there are

distinctions and differences of objects of thought. Likewise, the infinity of the divine Whole requires the distinctions and differences of the finite, which in turn can be what it is only in the embracing unity (599). In this sense God transcends the individual who is a manifestation, a spiritual process in which God is conscious of Himself. As long as I affirm myself in such a manner as not to recognize that only in God do I have my being, my freedom, and my life, I fail to have true religion. Instead, I should come to know that in my self-surrender and recognition of God I complete the process of God's own life as self-conscious spirit and gain my own salvation (167).

In our first thought of God He appears indeterminate, which is really to make God nothing. Instead, we ought to see that God removes this abstract negation by manifesting Himself in finite individuals who differ from each other and are yet factors in the divine life, thus giving definiteness and character to that life. This can only mean that God is self-conscious spirit and is social, having His life in the life of a spiritual and personal community which is yet His own life in objective manifestation (275, 561).

Our true relation to and in God is more clearly expressed in Christianity than in any other religion. For Christianity, God is not some far-off Being as the Oriental conceived Him, nor is He to be identified with the finite according to Greek and Roman thought. Rather is God as spirit both finite and infinite. It is in the Christian religion that the Divine and the human become most conscious of their identity, which seems to mean (563): God is self-conscious in man; only as man knows himself does he know God, and only as man knows God does he know himself. God is in us. As we dwell in thought upon God, we are not only knowing God but God is in us knowing Himself, for we are His self-manifestation. It is just the divine nature thus to go forth in objective manifesta-

tion and be self-conscious through the consciousness of the finite. The converse of this is that human life has no independent substantiality of its own, and to say that it has is to affirm a negation ; but human life ceases to be a negation when man avails himself of his privilege and knows himself as existent only in the divine life. When we fail to know our true relation to God and to live accordingly, we fail of our life as human, indeed, we *are not*, we fall short of our end, we fail of our redemption.

How impressive it is to review the history of religion which is the unfolding life of the Spirit ! The religious consciousness of God is seen to rise from the natural religions with their dim region of myths, scarcely different from the natural forces of wind, sea, light, and darkness, up to the thought of one supreme Being—a conception hovering over the manifold gods of the Greeks, taking higher form in the Indian, Egyptian, Persian, and Jewish religions, until finally the Oriental conception of transcendence and the Greek conception of immanence are united in the Christian ideal of the God-man which becomes the central principle of the absolute and final religion. Nor is it a matter of indifference how we think, if only there is piety. Rather does it belong to the nature of the perfect religion to have the divine Spirit rightly conceived as the object of the religious consciousness.

It would be unjust to Hegel to say that he is a pantheist, for Hegel thinks that the pantheist, indeed, sees the divine Being in nature and man, but not as Spirit. For Hegel, God is Spirit, and finite natural and spiritual existences are different factors in the unitary process of the divine life. When man in religious faith becomes conscious of his own dependence upon God, it is the affirmation of God, the true self-consciousness of God. This is the meaning of the Christian doctrine that man is created in the image

of God, that the divine grace dwells in us, and that the Holy Spirit abides in the believing community and leads it into the truth. Consequently, the distinction between this philosophy, or theology, and pantheism is that it belongs to the nature of God as spirit objectively to express Himself in the manifold forms of nature, and self-consciously to be in the social life of men, including the religious community.

From this standpoint the history of the religious community is to be understood. Poets and prophets in successive generations interpret the inner movement of the Spirit and make the gods of the time, while faith and thought gradually acquire the freedom which implicitly belongs to them. These advances require the removal of anything which, having served its purpose, now hinders the forward movement.

Personally, I am so to live that God may dwell in me and use me, which He does according as I surrender myself to Him (193). This is the meaning of sacrifice, which is the surrender of some natural object or possession, not because God needs it, but as a token that it belongs to the finite thing, even to the finite person, to be surrendered in subordination to the Divine. Sacrifice finds its full meaning in the spiritual surrender of the inner life and its identification with the life of God. In such sacrifice there is true freedom, while in the earlier stages the person is free but at the same time is bound to the natural—it is the unfreedom of freedom. Only when man puts away the sacrifice of the natural object and denies himself by identifying his life with God does he have true freedom and renounce in the fullest measure his own natural impulses, desires, and will in whose undue assertion sin and evil consist. Such renunciation does not mean the uprooting of natural impulses and desires, but their purification and exercise in subjection to the divine Spirit, and, consequently, to the moral ideal. In this manner religion has a

necessary moral aspect expressed in a moral community and in a state which is the actualization of the moral will (207). The necessity of this practical aspect is involved in the significant statement: "Principles as such are abstract, and have their truth only in development. Held in their abstraction, they are entirely untrue" (211).

The history of the development of religion from the naturalistic sensuous stage, which is immediate and unreflective, to the religion of the spirit—the spirit's knowledge of Spirit—may be illustrated by the transition of the human life from childhood to maturity. For the child there is an immediate unity of the self and the natural environment, a unity of will and nature; for the young man there is no fixed purpose but everything engages the interest; for the mature man there is a definite purpose upon which the powers of the self are concentrated; finally, there is ripe old age, in which attention is withdrawn from the self and its limited purposes and the absolute final purpose of life is sought as the very essence of Being (226). In this reflective stage man reaches his true end and freedom. So in religion. In its first forms there is no distinction between the natural and the spiritual; then come religions in which a variety of objects are fixed upon, as in polytheism; these give place to religions with one all-dominating object; finally comes the religion of the spirit, in which spirit awakes to full self-consciousness which is at the same time the consciousness of God. As has already been said, the Christian religion is the goal of the religious evolution, and is final, because it is the true religion of the spirit in which man surrenders himself only to find himself again in God, in whom, as spirit, he has freedom and life indeed.

Without attempting to present more than a meagre outline of Hegel's intricate argument, we shall now turn to his conception of important doctrines of the

Christian religion, beginning with that of the Trinity. This means a threefold, active, eternal process inherent in the nature of the divine Spirit as self-conscious life. We may think first of the absolute substance in itself (thesis) which issues in the objective form of finite physical and spiritual existences (antithesis). Finally, what has been put forth completes itself by full identification with the divine Being through self-conscious experience (synthesis). God in Himself is free spirit and expresses Himself in His image (the "other") objectively, which is only Himself, but in order to be actually determined as spirit, God "negates this other" and returns to Himself, for only when God knows Himself in the "other" is He free spirit and this "other" too knows itself as free (476). In other words, God in Himself is Father, to whom it belongs to express Himself in the Son, or the world of finite things and spirits. The two are one, yet different. The kingdom of Father, Son, and Spirit is God expressing Himself in the community of finite spirits whose destiny it is to attain full self-consciousness, which is at the same time the consciousness of God. To this end the world-process, particularly the historical life of men, is subordinated. We are, therefore, factors in the life of God, whom to know is the highest act of our reason and our moral destiny. Our moral problem is to work out the consciousness that it belongs to the mind and life of God as spirit to be in us and we in Him; the feeling accompanying this consciousness in connection with the thought of it is religion; the formulation of it is philosophy, that is, theology.

Although religion may express itself sensuously, the end is to become so conscious of self and the world as the manifestation of God that we no longer need the sensuous but behold face to face—spirit communing with Spirit. The world is thus a sphinx veiled; we lift the veil in Christianity, the perfect

religion ; we spiritualize the natural and find at the goal man united with God. We do no violence thereby to the natural but only express its worth and significance as having kinship with us. Since Christianity sets forth this truth, it is the final religion, for finality is reached when the spirit knows itself perfectly. We know that what we are, we are in God, in whom we have our freedom. God and man say of each other : This is spirit of my spirit ; man is spirit like God, having indeed finiteness and distinctness, but in religion these are transcended in the knowledge of himself in God (478).

It should not be forgotten, however, that Hegel's Trinity is a threefold eternal process in which the kingdom of the Spirit is the return of the Infinite into itself, or the synthesis of the kingdom of the Son with the kingdom of the Father. Hence in the kingdom of the Spirit the divine nature is fully expressed, that is, it is possible, as M'Taggart has shown,³ to interpret Hegel as meaning that God is not self-conscious personality but is identical with the spiritual community of finite persons whose union consists in their mutual knowledge and love. Just as a college is a spiritual unity of persons who each know the unity which they form without the college itself being a person to know its members, so are finite persons conscious of God who is the unity in which they have their being, but the individuals are not *for* the unity as a personal subject knowing and experiencing them. Whether Hegel really meant that God is a self-conscious person, although he often so speaks of God, is a question concerning which there is considerable difference of opinion. But it seems to me that Hegel's conception of the divine nature as a process of differentiation in unity cannot be satisfactorily understood except on the hypothesis of the divine personality.

The next doctrine for our consideration is that of

the Incarnation. At this point the Christian theologian is apt to think that there is not sufficient recognition of the historical Christ either in the doctrine of the Trinity or of the Incarnation in the endeavour to seize the essential thought from the absolute point of view. Hegel called the "Other," or the divine expression in the physical and spiritual world, the kingdom of the Son, which is an eternal process in the being of God. In this sense, God creates the world and is incarnate in everything that exists, and, therefore, is incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth in a unique manner since every individual is a unique expression of the divine nature. If men had understood their own nature adequately, they would have known their true relation to God; but they did not. Consequently, when Jesus, out of His own experience, revealed the metaphysical truth of the essential unity of God and man, and that it belongs to men to find their true life in union with God, His disciples regarded Him as the special incarnation and revelation of God, indeed as the very "Word," the Truth, given visible form for their sakes. But if adequately understood, all exceptional character disappears from the divine incarnation in Jesus, since all men like Jesus are to realize in themselves their union with God. Jesus as Son of God means the divine presence in Him. The Arabians name themselves sons of God, and so did Jesus (651), which only signifies an exceptionally vivid experience of the essential identity of the Divine and human.

Turning now to the Christian doctrine of original sin and grace, Hegel asserts its profound truth. Original sin can be understood to mean that, so long as man is only potentially good, he is in the state of nature superficially represented as innocence which implies absence of will. The advance from innocence to virtue can only be through sin, which has at least the merit of being an expression of will, and is to that extent in the line of progress towards the good. The

merely natural man, filled with impulses and appetites, may be said to be evil in the sense of not possessing goodness; to be evil actively is to attribute to the finite an importance in itself viewed as separated from the divine Spirit. Man forms his character freely only by distinguishing between good and evil in his activity. Even daily toil is necessary, for it shows that the satisfaction of needs is gained only through effort. Man's life problem is to realize in himself what he already is in the mind of God, which is to be a person, to be spirit; as such, man is immortal in the mind of God and for ever an object of divine interest. God can make these distinctions of good and evil in His world and yet overcome them in His own self-identity; as for man, the possibility of reconciliation between him and his God consists in the essential unity of the Divine and the human. To see and know this self-consciously is to experience the reconciliation (613-641).

Since Christ's life is involved in the life of God as spirit, the death of Christ for us shows the divine love and makes us conscious of our true relations to God, which we could not otherwise have known. Herein lies the necessity of Christ's sacrifice for His brethren. Because the believer saw most clearly in the death of Christ the revelation of his relation to God, the death of Christ came to assume great importance. Likewise, the belief in the resurrection and ascension means that the weakness and perishableness of the finite are really factors in the divine self-manifestation—something to be taken up and overcome in that life. In other words, it belongs to the divine Spirit to be the unity of affirmation and negation—even of good and evil, which are what they are only in the whole. To discover this indwelling of all in the process of the divine Life is to rob our finiteness of its terror and the grave of its victory, which implies that our death is the point where the merely human is stripped off

and the truly Divine in man emerges in its splendour (660-663).

Reconciliation and redemption express the same truth. God is reconciling the world unto Himself, since the world-order culminating in man and human society is the divine activity. The divine purpose is reached in a spiritual community whose members are made to realize, through the contemplation of Christ, that each individual life is an essential factor in the life of God as spirit. To know this drives away sin and accomplishes redemption and reconciliation.

The witness of the Spirit and the sense of the adoption signify the state of unity and love on the part of the finite for and in the Infinite. It is the kingdom of the Spirit. The historical Christ made possible the knowledge of the true relation of men to God, giving assurance of immortality and of divine love and requiring the love of men for one another. Thus arises the religious community whose members are, indeed, different, yet of one spirit in the bond of love. "Jene Liebe ist eben der Begriff des Geistes selbst" (669). While the visible Christ initiated the community of disciples, He must indeed go away that they may receive "the gift of the Holy Spirit," after which the disciples may go out into the world and cause it to become a universal community, the kingdom of God and of the Son.

The historical community, however, is to be understood as the form in which God has His life as spirit. The historical Christ is a necessary stage in the divine self-realization, but the mind of the community is destined to pass beyond the visible Christ by transforming Him into the Son of God, seeing in Him the essential unity of man with God. When this point is reached, it is no longer necessary to require faith in the historical Christ, for now the believer has passed into the kingdom of the universal Spirit which is to fulfil the destiny of spirit, even of our life (671-677).

The development of each member of the Christian community is a factor in the divine self-realization, so that each may say : I am self-conscious in God, and this my life is indispensable to that full self-consciousness of God as Spirit in the universal kingdom of spirits. To live according to this knowledge is for me to be redeemed from sin, to be reconciled and saved. It is also complete redemption, because sin and its consequences are overcome in this life of spirit ; what has happened is made as though it had not been by being taken up and overcome in that union of the Divine and the human which is perfect in love. Indeed, we may say, sin is a negation suffering negation that we may abide only in the affirmation of the divine Spirit (680-683).

It has now become clear that philosophy and religion, especially the Christian religion, have the same content but in different form. Religion worships, while philosophy strives to know God who is the Truth ; nothing else is worth doing. Neither does piety need philosophy in order to exist, though knowledge stimulates and promotes devotion ; nor does philosophy exalt itself above religion, for it only seeks to express the content of religion in the form of thought ; only in this sense is philosophy above faith. The content is the same. Nor does philosophy reject the emotion and sentiments that accompany faith. The only question for philosophy is whether these have true content. Philosophy thinks what the subject feels. Philosophy is theology (703).

It now remains to consider the effect of the Hegelian system upon theology. Prominent in the controversy that arose was the conception of the personality of God, of the reality and immortality of the soul, and of the value of the historical element in Christianity. Hegel left it doubtful how far the "coming to itself of the Idea" was to be interpreted as personality of God, while the perpetual Becoming and dialectical

passing over of forms into one another threatened the substantiality and immortality of the finite person. On the other hand, the identity of form and matter, of logic and metaphysic, of the development of the forms of thought as the abstract essence of the development of reality, seemed to leave little room for the historical life of religion and led to the inquiry whether the conceptions of religion were more than symbolic representations of the imagination.⁴ The Hegelian doctrines were too profound and complex to produce everywhere a uniform effect. As a consequence, there were the so-called right and left wing and middle Hegelians, or those who interpreted Hegel too literally and mechanically, those who applied his doctrines critically to the overthrow of Christian dogma, and those who occupied a mediating position.

The first group were characterized by extreme conservatism. Since there was an essential identity between religion and philosophy, it was inferred that religion must be expressed in philosophical form. These theologians adopted the view that, if this philosophy had its trinity, why should it not also have its incarnate God, its reconciliation and similar dogmas? They put the most profound significance into the doctrine of the "God-man." But the chasm between the "God-man" of philosophy and that of the Church was little realized in the theology of Marheineke or in the *Theologoumena* of Daub, both of whom make an extreme identification of the dogmas of the Church and philosophical doctrines.⁵

The second form which the influence of the Hegelian philosophy assumed is represented by Richter, Strauss, and Feuerbach, of whom Strauss is most widely known through his *Life of Jesus*. These men represent a reaction against the orthodox Hegelians. The *Life of Jesus* called forth many replies of an orthodox character which were met by Strauss in another work entitled *The Doctrines of the Christian Faith in their*

Historical Development and in their Conflict with Modern Science. This work is characterized by an acute application of the principle "that the history of dogma is its destruction and the story of its dissolution." He makes an extreme application of the intellectualism of the Hegelian school, which regards knowledge as everything and all other vital functions as nothing, and held that religion considered theoretically is bound to stand or fall with a particular theory. As a consequence, the Church is shown to be bankrupt in its dogmas in the light of science, and even the God of religion is replaced by the speculative "Idea" or spiritual principle.

Feuerbach goes even further than Strauss and calls this "Idea" which becomes conscious in man a remnant of mysticism; man alone is divine, and the gods are only objectified wishes and ideals of the heart, and religious faith is only the heart's self-assurance.⁶

A more wholesome form of the influence of the Hegelian system is found in those who occupy a mediating position and sought, by the aid of speculative thought, to gain a profounder conception of the Christian faith. They agree in seeking a speculative theism and a theistic, theological view of history, in which the facts as well as the ideals of Christianity have a place. The important works in this connection are Biedermann's *Christian Dogmatic* (1868), Weisse's *Philosophic Dogmatic*, and Rothe's *Theological Ethics* (1845, 1864).

This meagre sketch of the lines of thought developed in somewhat close dependence upon the Hegelian system does not exhaust its influences, which are many and diverse. For example, its influence, together with that of the Kantian doctrines, is evident in much that appears original and inspiring in recent theology. In the recent past some of the most helpful and stimulating expressions of the essential Hegelian thought are found in the works of T. H. Green and

John and Edward Caird, not to mention many others. They agree in viewing the Kantian philosophy as the basis of the Hegelian system. But they abandon the *a priori* dialectical method of Hegel and stand in closer touch with experience. They also reject the view that the Absolute comes to self-consciousness in man, since it belongs to the nature of spirit as such to be self-conscious in its manifold and varied activity. Nor is there any such separation in the stages of the divine actualization as Hegel maintained.⁷ The distinction between natural and revealed religion is shown to be untenable. Much of the content of the verbal revelation is a reproduction of the real revelation of nature and human life. Christian truth is only a deeper and more complete interpretation of the truth of natural morals and religion. "There is, therefore," says Dr. John Caird, "no such thing as a natural religion or religion of reason distinct from revealed religion. Christianity is more profoundly, more comprehensively rational, more accordant with the deepest principles of human nature and human thought than natural religion; or, as we may put it, Christianity is natural religion elevated and transmuted into revealed." Indeed, Christianity is the more natural because more in accord with man's nature. Nor are faith and reason separate, for it is possible to gain a rational knowledge of the content of our faith. We indeed believe, but advance to science, which is a higher point of view of the same experience, and seeks to justify and harmonize it.⁸

The Christian conception of God in relation to the world is neither pantheistic nor deistic but that of self-conscious, revealing spirit or mind to whom self-manifestation to and in a world of finite beings is essential. The divine nature involves, not the negation of the finite, but the individuality and relative independence of nature and of man. "God fulfils Himself, realizes His own nature, in the existence of the

world, and above all in the spiritual nature and life and destiny of man ; that, with reverence be it said, the very being and blessedness of God are implicated in the existence, the perfection, the salvation of finite souls." Without nature and man there would be something in God unrevealed and unrealized. If man exists only because of and in God, there is in the Infinite that which involves the existence of finite spirits. " If there be a divine element in man, there must be, so to speak, a human element in God, of which the whole spiritual life and history of the world is the manifestation." God is thus the " Father of spirits." ⁹

At this point the transition to the relation of Christ to God and men is made possible. Like all men, Christ has His life in God and is Divine and human. Nor is this a dualism of nature. " The true conception is—that the divine life is the condition of the human, the atmosphere in which alone all spiritual life can exist ; and that it is only in union with God that the individual spirit can realize itself and become possessor of the latent wealth of intelligence and goodness that pertains to it. It is true, indeed, that there is something unique in the Person of Christ, and that a participation in the being and life of God can be predicated of Him as distinguished from all other members of the human race. But, however true it be that the relation of the Divine and human in the Person of Christ transcends, in one sense, all earthly parallel, it must yet be a union of which, by its very structure and essence, humanity is capable." ¹⁰ Such is the union between man and God that the human will is both most free in the surrender of self to God and man gains at the same time his greatest individuality. This identification is not a pantheistic obliteration of the distinction between the human and the Divine but is the fulfilment of life that can come only in God.

It is impossible adequately to present the wholesome and inspiring treatment of religion by those who have felt the influence of the Hegelian thought; in their hands this noble system, much modified it is true, has shown itself capable of a fruitful theology and a practical application to the problems of life. I believe the essential Hegelian thought to be of surpassing richness and value in practical living. We know God; His life, is our life, and we are essential factors in His own self-conscious existence, without which the very life of God would be incomplete. The world-order and human life-history are a living process in the life of the Infinite. Christ uniquely embodies this essential principle, the revelation of which is what makes Christ so supremely valuable in human history. This consciousness of sonship is the source of religion and the key to salvation and redemption; to awake to it, to repeat in ourselves the consciousness of Christ as we are able, is to be in the life of God and saved. To express this principle clearly and forcefully is no less a problem than that of theology.

In our treatment of the relation of theology to the religious life it is only just to recognize the inseparable relation of religious faith and knowledge, as Hegel conceived it. It is found not necessary to "destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith." Rather is knowledge the inevitable further step in the spirit's experience, if faith is to reach its fruition. There is no "pure" experience without the implicit judgments of thought which in their explicit form render the experience more completely organized, individual, and concrete.¹¹ The conception in its turn reacts upon the religious experience to quicken, nourish, and deepen it.

It is, however, true that the predominant intellectualism of the Hegelian system produced a reaction in favour of a larger recognition of the emotional

factor in religious experience, not only accompanying but, it is supposed, affording a unique source of knowledge of God and the soul's destiny through a mystic feeling or faith which transcends the sphere of reason. To this view we now turn.

CHAPTER IX

A NEW THEOLOGY : III. RELIGION AS FEELING

AN excessive assertion of the claims of reason to know all that can be believed, sometimes united with a denial of knowledge of God's existence, has often caused an appeal to the intuition of faith or feeling as a means of apprehending what it is held lies beyond the reach of the understanding. Surely faith and the deep-seated feelings of the heart have a voice that is heard though reason is forced to keep silent. Plato left the soul free "to perceive some things of herself." Pyrrhonism encountered the Stoic's confidence in the soul's ability to know God within the human life and the Neo-Platonic intuition and ecstatic contemplation of the Deity. Rationalistic Gnosticism as well as the purer philosophy of the time was met by an Irenaeus and a Tertullian, who determined to know nothing but simple faith and repudiated as harmful all dependence upon philosophy as able to reveal God.¹ An interesting fellowship of spirits, regardless of time, is shown when Coleridge, in the preface to his *Aids to Reflection*, quotes approvingly from a sermon of St. Augustine: "So receive this, that you may deserve to understand it. For the faith ought to precede the understanding, so that the understanding may be the reward of the faith." Mediaeval mysticism sought to rise above the discursive reason and immediately apprehend the Deity, as in St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventura, and others. The

German mystics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries adopted a similar but more intellectual view of the relation to God, as, for example, Tauler, and Eckhart who said: "I have a power in my soul which enables me to perceive God; I am as certain as that I live that nothing is so near to me as God." So great was this confidence of immediate apprehension of God that these mystics had little interest in proclaiming the revelation of the Bible.²

During the *Enlightenment* of the eighteenth century, the clearness and distinctness of the mathematical conception of things threatened to limit knowledge to the sensible and the demonstrative. This movement assumed an aggressive form in England and France, opposing the supernatural and consequently rejecting the revelation of Christianity. Rousseau (1712-1778), however, became the advocate of feeling as the source of confidence in the truths of religion, holding that there is in our hearts a satisfying response to the supreme worth of Jesus as exhibiting a super-human moral excellence. We may trust this leading of the heart as giving assurance of the truth of Christianity.³

We have shown how Kant, the son of Pietistic parents and possibly influenced by Rousseau's example, attempted by means of the "postulates" of the practical reason to restore assurance of God, freedom, and immortality. But his limitation of knowledge to the sensible was too much in harmony with the prevailing rationalism and scepticism to be readily distinguished and his wholesome effort in behalf of morals and faith has often been overlooked. The poet and critic Lessing (d. 1781) had a similar purpose, and perhaps better success than Kant, in his *Education of the Human Race*, which shows that God makes revelations to men suited to their condition, that the positive religions are transitional steps in the development of the "Christianity of Reason" which is older

than the New Testament and which is to some degree in all religions but supremely in the religion of Christ, and that the individual normally traverses the same course as that by which the race attains its perfection. With this intuitive insight into the significance of religious history is united an aesthetic emotional element which appropriates the divine meaning in the life of men.⁴ Still others might be mentioned, as, for example, Schiller, who under the influence of Kant taught the doctrine of "the beautiful soul" led by aesthetic feeling to a life harmony that is joyous.

It is characteristic of the tendency to make feeling the basis of higher experiences to assign reason the subordinate function of waiting upon this immediate apprehension of the supersensible and, so far as possible, of giving it utterance. The so-called "Faith-Philosophy" in the restricted application of the term is represented chiefly by Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi. Hamann (1730-1788) puts in the place of knowledge, synonymous with the rationalistic views of the eighteenth century, the subjective certainty of faith. His special interest centres in the doctrines of Christianity, which, though mysterious, are accepted as true because apprehended by faith. It would, indeed, be foolish to attempt to demonstrate the atonement, the incarnation, and the Trinity. These are essential mysteries of Christianity and can be apprehended only by inwardly experiencing them. In place of knowledge, is faith, religion. We must believe in our own existence, in external things, and in God. Belief is not a product of our reason, but, when knowledge fails, the Divine in us comes to our aid.⁵

Herder (1744-1803) was influenced by the lectures of Kant but was also attracted by Hamann's conception of faith as an immediate experience of reality. Following a suggestion of Kant, Herder made the fundamental thought of his philosophy the conception of the unity of all things according to an order of ideas

progressively realized in the natural and social world, in science, art, religion, and history. Responding to Rousseau's view of man's development and receiving a deepened conception of nature from Goethe, Herder expresses in his *Ideas for the History of Mankind* a conception of human life in many respects similar to that of Lessing in his *Education of the Human Race*. Being in love with nature, Herder sees in the life of humanity, in its institutions, its folksongs, its customs, and its history, something natural—indeed, the manifestation of God, the World-Soul, a modified Spinozism. This conception of man in relation to the universe is not the result of a demonstration, but has rather the nature of an aesthetic apprehension of the significance of reality. Such *ought to be* the nature of reality, if we are to find satisfaction. The chasm between the natural and the ideal is overcome by this immanent teleology. It is a faith, a feeling, which reason may confirm by an examination of the facts of experience. Nor did Herder ever doubt the ultimate victory of the pure religion of Christ, whom he regarded as the Spiritual Saviour of the race who “came to raise up God-men who, whatever the laws under which they lived, would further the good of others according to the purest principles, and who themselves in all toleration, would rule as kings in the kingdom of goodness and truth.”⁶

Jacobi's *Faith-Philosophy* (1743–1819) differs from that of Hamann and Herder. It is the “faith of need.” Rousseau's view of the apprehension of God through immediate feeling also influences Jacobi, while he accepted Kant's doctrine that God cannot be known in the relations of the understanding. The Kantian criticism of the ontological argument led Jacobi to give more attention to Spinoza, whose *amor intellectualis Dei* must have determined, in a measure, his own peculiar conception of faith. It is a faith, a feeling, or, later, a sense or reason which receptively

perceives or apprehends supernatural existences as the eye or ear perceives the sensible. The knowledge of reason may, indeed, be termed a "showing" an "inspiration, to which the knowledge of the understanding is related merely as a token and sign." But this immediate apprehension of God through faith or feeling or reason is for Jacobi, as for Rousseau, not a demonstrative knowledge of the divine nature but only an assurance that God is. Consequently, all definitions of God are only anthropomorphisms. Jacobi's work on *Divine Things and their Revelation* had many sympathetic readers who had been repelled by the intellectualism of the age, and the subsequent theology of feeling, as in Schleiermacher's system, found support in Jacobi's views.⁷

The protest against the rationalism that left no room for the supersensible, against attempts to reduce mental life to elementary processes controlled by mechanical laws, against the sufficiency of science, found an able supporter in Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). During his youth he had been a disciple of Hartley and Hume, but, a "playless day-dreamer," a true Romanticist, he was more fitted to respond to the ideal and the spiritual in the philosophy of Kant, Lessing, Jacobi, and Schelling. He adopts Kant's distinction between the understanding as the faculty of categories and of knowledge, and the reason as the faculty of forming ideas of the unconditioned, of that which transcends knowledge which nevertheless is in some sense apprehended by a unique act of the intuitive reason or feeling. "Reason is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense and having their evidence in themselves."⁸

Coleridge endeavoured to reconcile between philosophy and Christianity by rationalizing the dogmas of the Church so as to surrender their scholastic form but keep the moral and religious content revealed by

the "inward beholding," "the universal light" of reason which is "the spirit of the regenerated man whereby the person is capable of a quickening inter-communion with the Divine Spirit; and herein consists the mystery of redemption, that this has been rendered possible for us." Life, hope, love, in one word, faith, "are derivations from the practical, moral and spiritual nature" (Aph. 99. 22). We have the germs of the supernatural perfect life in us which are brought to their fulfilment by Christianity, the truth of which can never contradict what is implicit in our reason. The manifestation of the Divine in the life and death of Christ effects our redemption in that we turn from the carnal and become spiritual, living out the divine life implicit in us which apprehends immediately its fulfilment in Christ (Aph. 24). "Awakened by the cock-crow (a sermon, a calamity, a sick-bed, or a providential escape), the Christian pilgrim sets out in the morning twilight, while yet the truth (the perfect law of liberty) is below the horizon." This truth rises in the pilgrim as he goes on his journey, like the sun with the increasing day (Aph. 29).⁹

Though Coleridge died in 1834 and Thomas Carlyle in 1881, Carlyle likewise takes refuge in the unique power of the spirit to apprehend the supersensible in what he calls Belief. Faith, belief, are his watch-words.¹⁰ Goethe in his *Werther*, *Faust*, and *Wilhelm Meister* strengthens this Belief and helps Carlyle to think of it as requiring that each should fulfil his own life which is to embody something of infinite value, to incarnate a divine idea. For this insight into the way and the goal of life Carlyle uses the term Belief, an immediate perception of ultimate value which cannot be fully grasped by the intellect. But Carlyle lacks Goethe's joyousness, perhaps because this Belief reveals to him so much of the spiritual realm with its absolute values that he is oppressed by the longing for still clearer vision. This only partially satisfied

longing causes Carlyle to rebel against the pretensions of science which would weigh and measure everything, as though this were all the spirit needs. I think this Belief, this immediate apprehension of the Infinite, is Carlyle's reply to the restrictions of the positive sciences, to Gibbon and Hume, and to Kant's denial of knowledge of the Divine. He is overwhelmed by the mystery of the world whose forms are for him only the garment of God. The human personality is the revelation of the Infinite. The highest truth of reason is only a symbol of a yet deeper significance. Each personality must find its own religion and its own symbol and commit the work of life to the ever-flowing stream of time.

Carlyle's spiritual struggles reflected those of the German mind of an earlier generation. As the German people saw their orthodox theology destroyed by the attacks of the understanding and reconstructed belief "from the subjective sources of man as a moral and rational being," so Carlyle sought, as he says, "to reconcile reverence with clearness, to deny and defy what is false, and yet to believe and worship what is true." As the moral consciousness in Germany found expression in the ideal world of its great thinkers and poets, so the same moral consciousness, more closely united, it may be, with religion, uttered itself in the works of Carlyle.

The forms and institutions of society, the customs and creeds of religion, are but symbols of spiritual ideas, making them acceptable in the historical life of peoples. When they grow old and lose their usefulness, they should be removed lest they hinder the truth. But while each should freely think in response to the inner experience of the ideal, each is called upon to act in the world as it is that the divine purposes may be fulfilled.

Moreover, in this active response to Belief in eternal values, Carlyle, like Fichte, finds the source

of the hope of immortality. Fichte had said : " Our faith, of which we have spoken as faith in duty, is only faith in Him, in His reason, in His truth," and permits us to accept " essential truth—nothing less than that from our free and faithful performance of our duty in this world, there will arise to us throughout eternity a life in which our freedom and morality may still continue their development " (*The Vocation of Man*, Bk. iii. ; iii. 4). Likewise Carlyle declares : " The conviction that our life continues springs for me from the conception of activity ; for if I work without ceasing to the end, nature is bound to assign me another existence when the present one no longer suffices for my spirit."

Thus Carlyle belongs to that group of thinkers, including poets and philosophers, who give a unique place to faith, to spiritual, even mystical insight and to feeling which directly commune with the supersensible world, transcend the narrow sphere of the understanding, and prevail over the external authority of dogmas and the written Word. It is a " revelation " experienced in communion with the Divine in nature, in the soul, in humanity, and supremely in Jesus of Nazareth. Thought can only form symbols of the content of this experience, suggesting that theology has as its function to minister to the religious life.

Again, the limitations of knowledge and the need of a unique source of information concerning the existence and nature of God was somewhat differently interpreted by Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable Power set forth in his *First Principles* has its historical origin in Kant's limitation of knowledge as it was presented by Hamilton in his *Philosophy of the Conditioned* and the doctrine of relativity which made knowledge of the Unconditioned, the Absolute, impossible. Hence, as Mansel the disciple of Hamilton pointed out, only revelation

and faith can make God known. To this J. S. Mill, much to the discomfiture of the good Bishop, replied : "Through this inherent impossibility of our conceiving or knowing God's essential attributes, we are disqualified from judging what is or is not consistent with them. If, then, a religion is presented to us, containing any particular doctrine respecting the Deity, our belief or rejection of the doctrine ought to depend exclusively upon the evidences which can be produced for the divine origin of the religion : and no argument grounded upon the incredibility of the doctrine, as involving an intellectual absurdity, or on its moral badness as unworthy of a good or wise being, ought to have any weight, since of these things we are incompetent to judge" (*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, chaps. vi. and vii. Compare also Hamilton, *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, chap. i. 1, vs. Cousin).

It is not necessary to review these arguments further, but, as we turn from them, it seems fair to ask, Why does not Mill's objection apply with equal force to all who deny knowledge of God in order to make room for a revelation of a unique character ? When the revelation comes, no matter what its source or its content, it will have to be received, since in the premises human knowledge is not adequate to pronounce upon the nature of God, and yet how can it be received unless the revelation commends itself as reasonable ?

Another example of the adoption of the Kantian limitation of knowledge and resort to a unique experience of the divine reality appears in Schleiermacher (1768-1834). But, while really a disciple of Kant, he did not adopt the Kantian philosophy as he found it, but rejected the external manner in which Kant united ethics and religion, showing that ethical motives cannot lead us to infer a something which lies beyond knowledge. Rather is absolute Being

immediately experienced in the feeling of dependence. In order to hold that this religious feeling of absolute dependence is in harmony with scientific thought concerning phenomena, Schleiermacher presupposes a unity of knowledge, feeling and also willing with Being, for ethical action takes place in the world that is and modifies it according to an ideal. Schleiermacher is carried lightly over the difficulty which Kant encountered in the supposition of the unity of knowledge and being by the conviction that the individual, in his subjective life, experiences reality. In this emphasis upon the value of the individual, he departs in a measure from Schelling and Spinoza, with whose monistic conception Schleiermacher deeply sympathized. The power of the soul to immediately experience reality was learned in part from the study of Plato, in part from Jacobi's "faith philosophy," from Spinoza's "God-consciousness," and from the Romantic impulse to absorb himself in existence.

Still another influence tending to add to the importance of subjective, individual experience was evangelical. Schleiermacher received his early training among the Moravians, noted for their piety and devotion to Christ. The Moravians represented in Germany the same evangelical movement that in England produced Wesley and Whitefield. This evangelical movement was based upon the belief that God could be sought and found only in the inward conviction of the soul, an apprehension of the Deity impossible to the reason, and independent of authority either of Church or Bible. These literary, philosophical, and evangelical influences, combined with his own study and meditation, led Schleiermacher to his own peculiar religious standpoint, and "he never abandoned the conviction that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this, and this alone, can bring man into immediate relation with the Highest." In an earlier age, Schleiermacher would

have been called a mystic—indeed, he says he is a mystic¹¹—for his sympathies are with their views rather than with the Scholastic conceptions of the Church, the Bible and dogmas as external authorities in religion. Whatever authority there is rests finally in the subjective experience of God. Yet he was saved from mere individualistic subjectivism in religion by his sympathy with the social conception of humanity and the struggle of the German people, which led him to give a prominent place to the social aspects of the religious life. In the spirit of Romanticism also he viewed the world-order as a beautiful harmony, a drama, with an all-embracing content, in which everything has its place and the individual life has its values to realize. In some such manner, Schleiermacher sought to bring the subjective and objective into harmony.¹²

We shall now endeavour to present Schleiermacher's conception of religion and the function of theology in the religious life. His *Discourses on Religion* (*Reden über die Religion*) met a real need of the time. The German mind, he said, was developing its activities in every direction except the religious, which seemed to be abandoned by the educated portion of the nation as self-contradictory. But incorrect views of true knowledge and religion prevailed. Rather should culture lead back to the immediate feeling of the Infinite as the source and support of all finite existences. Religion is not something external and established as a social order but a part of man's nature, and every one has religion whether he knows it or not. This immediate consciousness is to be understood in terms of feeling before it has expressed itself as thought and symbol, will and action, subject and object. It is immediate feeling of absolute dependence which becomes consciousness of God when reflection gives it expression.¹³ As Hegel made the cognitive element of experience

the dominant factor and traced its development in his system, so does Schleiermacher deal in his *Dialectic* with feeling, which Hegel subordinated. Some have held that there is a marked difference between the two works, namely, the *Discourses* (*Reden*) and the *Christian Doctrine* (*Glaubenslehre*), maintaining that the *Discourses* are pantheistic while the *Glaubenslehre* is dualistic, since it makes a definite distinction between God and the world. But in each the thought is essentially the same though the point of view differs, and suggests Spinoza's *Natura naturans*, *Natura naturata*.

In order to understand the significance of the feeling of absolute dependence in which religion consists, it is necessary to trace the development of the feeling of relative dependence. In the first, the power of initiative is absent, in the second, it is present.

The feeling-consciousness arises in connection with the vital functions, both organic and intellectual, and varies with the difficulty of the performance of these functions.¹⁴ The feelings begin with reactions upon the natural world, then upon the social, and culminate in the religious. It is in this sense that Schleiermacher at times says all feelings are religious. The office of feeling is to maintain the unity, the identity of life in all its experiences. Feeling is, therefore, a kind of immediate knowing, or conviction, of the essential oneness of our life with the world of things and persons and with God. In the lower stages of feeling there is a consciousness of self-initiative in relation to that upon which we are dependent, but in the religious feeling this ability is absent and we feel absolutely dependent. "What we designate as devotion is precisely such a finding one's self in the Infinite, with the consciousness that here any reaction whatever is completely excluded."¹⁵

Schleiermacher also supports his assurance of the existence of God by the causal relation which, as he

thinks, is implicit in feeling, especially in the religious feeling, at least suggesting, in my opinion, Descartes' view of the idea of God. In all forms of feeling, he says, as a reaction upon functions organic and intellectual there is the implication of a causal relation to things and persons, and, in a different sense, to God in the religious feeling, so that it may be said there is a unity between what takes place in consciousness and Being. Thus through the religious feeling, we know, perhaps better, we are convinced of, the existence of God.¹⁶

To feel one's self absolutely dependent and to be conscious of one's self as in relation with God are the same thing, because absolute dependence is the fundamental relation which includes all others. This expression likewise includes the consciousness of God in the self-consciousness in such a way that . . . the two cannot be separated from each other. The feeling of absolute dependence becomes a clear self-consciousness only when the consciousness of God arises. When one says God is given to us in feeling in an original way and that man has a revelation of God, we mean that there is given to man, with the absolute dependence attaching to all finite being, also the immediate self-consciousness of it which becomes the consciousness of God. The degree of individual piety is determined by the degree in which this consciousness of God becomes actual during the lifetime. But we cannot say that God is *given*, because anything given externally as an object always implies a reaction on the part of the subject, however slight. It can be only symbolically that we transfer to God the thought of Him being given as an object.¹⁷

The nature of feeling culminating in the religious may be made clearer by tracing its threefold development. We may conceive the first of these stages to be the consciousness before it is disturbed through the perceptual contact with the external world,—a state to which the consciousness of children before being able to speak may approximate. With the acquisition of speech this original feeling-consciousness, which is pre-eminently sensuous, withdraws more and

more into dreamy moments as in the transition from the waking to the sleeping condition. In the second stage, experience has fallen apart into feeling and intuition with the beginning of sensuous perception and the development of the experience of things and persons and their relations. This stage also includes the social and ethical, but is throughout marked by antitheses due to the diremption of the primitive unity of the life of feeling into the subjective and objective. In the third stage these antitheses vanish, and everything to which the subject opposed itself in the previous stages is conceived as identical with the subject. The moving principle of this development is an original tendency of the soul striving from the beginning to break through the sensuous into full self-consciousness, which is at the same time the consciousness of God. In this sense, men are from the beginning implicitly religious.¹⁸

From this point of view, it is evident that sin will be the restraint of the sensuous over the development of the God-consciousness which is to some degree in all but has to become dominant in the life. Then is redemption accomplished.¹⁹ I think the influence of Spinoza is evident in Schleiermacher's conception of the awakening of the God-consciousness in the feeling of absolute dependence. Parts iv. and v. of Spinoza's *Ethics* show how "Human Bondage" to the finite and sensuous, marked by "inadequate ideas," finally yields to the "Power of the Intellect" which through "adequate ideas" triumphs over the sensuous finite, and not only knows but loves God.

This feeling of absolute dependence forms the essential principle of all religions which are related to one another according to the degree of completeness in the development of the God-consciousness, and according to the way of thinking of the Deity and expressing ideas in the religious social life. Religious fellowship may begin in the family and pass into the

religion of the tribe, nation, and state. There is, therefore, no sharp separation between the lower and higher forms of religion but a gradual transition from one to the other.²⁰

Since the feeling of absolute dependence is common to all religions, it cannot be made the distinguishing mark of Christianity which is found only in Christ as a historical person.²¹ Nor would the historical Christ differentiate the Christian religion from others if it could be shown that it might have arisen without Him. Nor is it correct to speak of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity as having the conception of God in common and differing only in the object of faith, in one case, faith in the prophets, in the other, in Christ, which would make Christ only one of the influences tending to arouse the God-consciousness. Rather is the Christian consciousness made entirely unique because of its definite relation to the historical person of Christ.²²

At this point, Schleiermacher strives to pass from the nature of religion and reality in general to the historical, not, it is to be feared, with entire success. The state needing redemption is the consciousness in which the sensuous is in the ascendancy; but this cannot mean complete inability to conceive God, for, if so, there could be no lack of God felt and a creative act would be required to remove this deficiency. Rather is redemption needed because the God-consciousness fails to dominate the life as it should.²³ How Christ redeems by causing the God-consciousness to prevail may be briefly summarized by saying that it is due to the general impression of His personality upon those who relate themselves to Him and are thus properly called Christians. The Church is an essential factor in the religious life, ministering to its growth, and has historical continuity because the members of the spiritual community relate themselves in faith to the personality of Christ, who is for Chris-

tianity final. If the Church were ever to pass beyond Christ, He would be reduced to only a distinguishing point in its development, and there would then be required not only a redemption through Him, but from Him, in order that religious development might not be hindered. Likewise, any attempt to rationalize Christianity by finding in it an essential rational element in common with that of other religions, not only neglects the importance of the historical Christ and the religious community continuing His living influence, but it tends to remove finally the distinction between Christianity and other religions, leaving only the difference in the time and condition of their founders. Consequently, the distinguishing mark of Christianity is the historical Christ and the community whose members refer their experiences to Him. But this is entirely consistent with a development of both the individual and the Christian community, but never to the point of rejecting direct relation to Jesus of Nazareth as Redeemer. Only through faith in Jesus as Redeemer can one enter into the Christian fellowship. This faith arises through the impression of Christ's personality as cause, just as in the case of faith in God faith is produced by God as cause.²⁴

What, now, is theology and its relation to religious experience? It is the product of reflection upon the feeling of absolute dependence upon God as it is experienced in relation to Christ and the Christian community. The primary expressions of religious experience are physical signs, speech, poetry, preaching, and dogmas. Poetry and preaching aim to produce immediate effects. But these primary utterances of the religious mind and heart find another more dialectical form, namely, theology or dogmatics, which is secondary.²⁵

Since theology implies a series of propositions which presuppose a definite religious experience as the starting-point, it is distinguished from philosophical

speculations concerning the highest Being, which arise in connection with investigations of nature and of knowledge. Theology must indeed use philosophical terms, being careful to choose those conceptions only which distinguish God and the world, good and evil, and the spiritual and the sensuous in man.²⁶ But there is no need of knowing the systems from which the conceptions are borrowed, provided they are suitable for the purpose in view, nor should the theologian ever hope for a philosophy capable of reconciling different theological views, nor is he ever called upon to defend his theology against a hostile philosophy, for theology simply expresses the Christian religious consciousness. Philosophy and theology stand each in its own sphere. Nor is it necessary to appeal to other theologians, past or present, although to do so may have a value of another sort.

What, then, are the criteria which the theologian recognizes? The true standard is the life of Christ embodied in the Christian community, and what agrees with and tends to promote this individual and social life in Christ is accepted as true. This essential life springing from Christ has found expression in evangelical confessions that go back to the New Testament, which forms the ultimate standard for the theologian. Hence appeal to confessions is allowable only on the assumption that they embody the New Testament Scriptures. The Old Testament appears as only a superfluous authority for the Christian theologian, because of the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and because a doctrine finding confirmation in the Old Testament only could not be accepted as Christian. But, within the limits assigned by the Christian religious consciousness, the doctrines of theology should be set forth in an orderly manner and presented with a due recognition of historical and ecclesiastical relations.²⁷

If it is objected that theology thus understood has

to do only with ecclesiastical opinions, and that there must be another and higher theology of the essential truths of religion, the distinction between ecclesiastical doctrines and the proper truths of religion implies that these truths have another source ; instead, both have the same source and are the same in kind, for they rise out of the Christian consciousness, which rests finally upon the experience of Christ, whose personality so profoundly impresses mind and heart and works in the religious community. Nor should theology be confused with other sciences, such as exegesis and Church history, which, though useful in theology, have their own distinct function in the organized life of Christianity.²⁸

If one still asks, in what sense is theology true, Schleiermacher's reply is that reflection upon immediate religious experience forms symbols or figurative representations of these experiences and that theology gathers them together in definite order, and is true in the sense that symbolic expressions are true, but not in the sense of knowledge of the nature of God. Such, for example, are the conceptions, God as person, creation, the first man, the origin of sin, which are our best attempts to represent the religious consciousness. Nor are these symbols to be derived from others more ultimate, for each is established, not by logical standards, but by its worth as a symbol of some phase of religious experience, and can have no proof except that others have experiences similar to those of the propounder. The symbols, however, have value as they express the inner life and make spiritual communication possible.²⁹ Thus Schleiermacher compels us to say, with Erdmann, that "there can be no talk of a *Theology* in the proper sense of the word. What he calls such should, properly, be called *Pisteeology* ; it consists, that is to say, in scientific reflections on pious emotions,—is the theory of piety, or has religion as its object."³⁰

This negative conception of the ultimate significance of theology as knowledge of the divine nature is due, in part, to Kant's limitation of knowledge which Schleiermacher adopts, and also to the influence of Spinoza's and Schelling's conception of God as simple and undifferentiated Being, in consequence of which the attributes which we conceive of God are only our way of thinking about our religious experiences and are not to be understood as having ultimate significance. Attributes are *our* attributions only. But such passages in Spinoza's *Ethics* as i. Def. 4 ; Props. ix. and xi. may easily be understood to mean that our thought not only attributes predicates to God, but that God really has them. Possibly Schleiermacher's conception of the symbolic significance of theology may be due to the influence of the ancient Neo-Platonic conception of the undifferentiated Absolute, for he does not hesitate to speak of his own "inborn mysticism."³¹

There are, I think, still greater difficulties connected with Schleiermacher's view of theology. This feeling of absolute dependence is assumed to transcend knowledge and in some way lay hold of God, who is not otherwise accessible, in a simple undifferentiated state of feeling in which every initiative of the subject is absent. If so, how can this feeling of absolute dependence be differentiated by symbols produced by *active* reflection ? Besides, if these symbols have any value even as symbols, there must be some ground of distinction in the primary immediate feeling. In other words, Schleiermacher fails, even more emphatically than Kant, to show the connection of the theoretical or cognitive realm with that of the religious ; yet he seems to rely upon knowledge as in unity with being, and in moral and religious action to commit himself to symbols as safe guides because of an assumed unity of willing and being. Then, again, from a state of pure feeling, how can he conclude to the exciting

cause, as he does when he infers the existence of God from the feeling of absolute dependence and the reality of Christ from the feeling experienced in Redemption? This he cannot do without the help of other experiences which by hypothesis are transcended. It is also to make a questionable use of the principle of causation, whose proper sphere is objective experience.

But if this "feeling of absolute dependence" gives assurance of God as its cause, this "feeling" makes room for only a simple quantitative relation to God, a more or less of this feeling of dependence. The Christian consciousness is, however, richer in content, and includes a feeling of reverence and moral obligation as well as definite thought of God which cannot fall short of truth unless the heart of religion is to be destroyed.³²

It also seems to me impossible to use the conceptions of philosophy in theology without bringing theology into some sort of harmony with philosophy. The nature of knowledge as such does not permit the use of conceptions in one realm with indifference as to what they may mean in another. That theology depends upon philosophy for conceptions with which to form symbols, and that the systems from which such conceptions are taken must not be materialistic, sensualistic, or atheistic, Schleiermacher grants.³³ But why not?—if these borrowed conceptions are to serve as symbols which may be anything that the subject can use, for the fitness of a symbol is its ability to symbolize; a gesture is sometimes more significant than many words. To require that the conceptions used by theology should be rationally fit is to imply the final unity of theological and speculative doctrines. It is a tacit recognition of the fact that there is a profound unity between religious experience, truth, and reality, and that theology's noblest task is at least in part to show how what is

believed in the Christian religion is not merely a subjective experience and tenable within this narrow sphere, but has also a place in the final meaning of reality. Then theology becomes more than a skilful co-ordination of religious fancies, however useful this may be in the "conduct" of a Church.³⁴ Theology ceases to deal with illusions and becomes the truth. Schleiermacher himself as an ecclesiastical theologian and pastor is forced to be inconsistent with his philosophy. "His theory of knowledge declares the concept of an absolute being to be untenable, while his theology obliges him to posit such a concept" and to affirm a divine cause of the feeling of absolute dependence. Thus theology becomes for him reliable truth.

Schleiermacher's conception of theology, however, has many excellencies. In the first place, theology is made the free interpretation of individual experience. In the *Monologen* Schleiermacher emphasizes the positive significance of individuality. "It is this which places him in an attitude of opposition, not only towards Spinoza and Schelling but also towards Kant and Fichte, who assumed a general moral law valid for all." Rather is each individual to develop and express himself in his own way in all forms of activity which requires theology to be primarily an individual view of personal religious experience, finding its limits only in the God-consciousness which relates itself to Christ. Even the New Testament sets forth the conception held by the first generation only, though it has the highest worth because of the direct relation to the historical Christ. It is, however, difficult for Schleiermacher to give objectivity and universality to his theology.

Secondly, I think the relation of theology to religious experience is rightly conceived. The starting-point is the personal feeling of absolute dependence, and, the more intense it is, the more vivid symbols

it tends to form of its object. These popular utterances of faith, theology endeavours to translate into orderly propositions which cannot, however, formulate all the content of religious experience. That is, faith is always in the lead, and there will be at best something left over which theology fails to express completely. A God fully known, or even symbolized, would be no God.

Thirdly, theological construction is always in the service of present religious life, not only of the individual but of the religious community itself which is a form of association essential to the religious life. Thus theology serves to clear up confusions of thought about what is believed and is a means of union and instruction. Here Schleiermacher restores to theology one of its much-neglected functions.

Fourthly and lastly, while Schleiermacher in assigning to theology the task of exhibiting the religious consciousness scarcely escapes pure individualism, which would of itself make theology as science impossible, he is really giving an important place to the psychology of religion.³⁵ Had he lived in the present day, Schleiermacher might have called himself a religious psychologist chiefly interested in the discovery, in the feeling of absolute dependence, of "the psychic principle that struggles to expression in all myths, ceremonials, and doctrines, that made not only natural religion but Christianity natural, and was the only possible basis of complete and world-wide religious unity. He cared little to prove the facts of religion but only the legitimacy of the psychic states they represent. . . . Even theology to him was not constitutive but regulative, and dogmas were the ancient shore-lines left by the tides of the many sounding seas of human instinct and feeling." Or we may find in the "feeling of absolute dependence" an expression of the relation between conscious and subconscious states which is so important for the psychologist.

The subconscious is indispensable to the adequate functioning of consciousness and affords a larger meaning of experience, of which the religious consciousness is a phase, and which we feel but cannot state except in vague symbols. This statement may be applied generally to those who give priority to feeling for the great mystery of being as the essential factor in religion. Of course, it is still possible that the subconscious may be the special sphere of the effects of some divine cause.³⁶

The theology of Albrecht Ritschl also makes feeling as an essential factor in religion the chief means of the apprehension of supersensible realities. Ritschl depends largely upon Kant, Schleiermacher, and Lotze. The Kantian limitations of knowledge are in the main accepted, science is restricted to the relations of phenomena and is fragmentary, and it is shown that, though metaphysics attempts to pronounce upon the nature of the Whole, it is really incapable of affording knowledge of ultimate Being and must be excluded from theology. Consequently, if there is to be any knowledge of a personal God, it must come through the revelation which has been made in Christ, as we know Him in the New Testament and in the religious community which continues His life. Lotze's theory of knowledge, and "value-judgments" which depend upon qualities of feeling in relation to different experiences, unite to establish the knowledge of things and of God so far as manifested to us. Theology is not, for Ritschl, the description of an existing fact of piety as with Schleiermacher, but develops the content of the revelation of God in Christ and points out by means of the New Testament scriptures the norm according to which the individual has to judge and govern himself in order to be a Christian. In this manner Ritschl obtains an objective, regulative norm of the Christian consciousness and seems to avoid the dangers of subjective individualism that attach to the

method of Schleiermacher and those having tendencies towards Romanticism wherever the object of consideration is the religious consciousness. We now briefly outline the argument.³⁷

After recognizing, entirely in the spirit of Kant, that the sciences have a restricted sphere and that metaphysics cannot afford knowledge of ultimate Being, Ritschl shows that nevertheless Christian theology, formed originally by means of the conceptions of Greek philosophy, has a metaphysical element which is really foreign and must be rejected. Revelation alone can give that knowledge of God which religion requires, and it is the sole function of theology to exhibit the content of what has been revealed. Therefore theology and metaphysics are mutually exclusive. By metaphysics Ritschl understands such a science as Aristotle's "First Philosophy" or "Theology," which investigates the general principles of being without reference to the differences between natural and spiritual existences for which it offers no solution. When Aristotle calls the "highest end" or "pure form" God, he uses a religious term which has no place in metaphysics, for God here is really a Fate ruling over all; indeed it is the cosmic Whole and does not allow the religious conception of a Being who cares for men and maintains justice. Nor do the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments have any place in theology, for the first two do not get beyond the world as a series of causes and effects, while the ontological is due to a doubt which the advocates of Platonic idealism feel concerning their own position.

The Christian doctrines of God and of Christ have nevertheless been formed largely by a union of Greek speculation and religious faith in the divine revelation, as, for example, the doctrines of the pre-existent Logos, the incarnation, the Trinity, redemption, and mystical union with Christ. At this point the argu-

ment turns for Ritschl upon the theory of knowledge adopted by the theologian. An incorrect view of the nature of knowledge leads to a false metaphysic, which finds its way into theology and is to be excluded, while a correct view involving a metaphysic is necessary to the theologian, and, to this extent, Ritschl claims that he has a metaphysic.

For example, what we really know of things is given us through the senses. But a memory image of our perceptions is formed, which Plato abstracts and substantiates in his doctrine of the Ideas, of which the world of things is now only the copy, the shadow of the true realities behind the appearances. This is the origin of the conception of the undifferentiated infinite Being which Philo and the Neo-Platonists put in the place of God, and, when the Christian theologian uses the conception of the Absolute and the Logos in the formation of the doctrines of God and of Christ, he is adopting what turns out to be a misuse of the memory images of actual experience. Likewise all conceptions of God as inactive, the subordination of Christ to a general conception of pre-existence, and the vain effort to render the incarnation intelligible by uniting such conceptions with that of the temporal existence of Christ, are examples of the evils of metaphysics in theology based upon a false theory of knowledge. The same is true of the doctrine of the mystical union of the believer with Christ, which is supposed to take place in the soul in itself beneath the active processes of clear self-conscious experience which is all we know of the soul.

Turning now to the positive side of the argument, Ritschl supplements and completes the Kantian theory of knowledge by that of Lotze, who "holds that in the phenomena which in a definite space exhibit changes to a limited extent and in a determinate order, we cognize the thing as the cause of its qualities operating upon us, as the end which these serve as

means, as the law of their constant changes." This is to say, there is no separation between the cause and the effect which we experience in our response to that which operates upon us, but our response is not the cause nor is it necessarily like the cause. This means that only to the extent that it is directly experienced in our conscious states do we know the nature and being of whatever acts on us, be it things, persons, or God. (Here it is to be noted that Ritschl does not adequately interpret Lotze's view of the relation of knowledge to its object, which is a special case of causal interaction which is the central principle of his system. Lotze, *Metaphysic*, Sec. 60.) The sum-total of conscious states that are capable of being objectified is now differentiated into the natural and spiritual worlds, with their variety of activities and interests, by means of the principle of "value-judgments," which consist of unique pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings accompanying objective sensational or ideal factors. That is, a "value-judgment" is the soul's response to the objects of knowledge in pleasurable or unpleasurable feeling according as the experience of these objects tends to promote or hinder the life of the subject. Judgments of value are of two kinds, "concomitant" and "independent." The "concomitant" mean that all attention to objects of knowledge is guided by some feeling of the object's worth in promoting or hindering the well-being of the subject of which the pleasurable or unpleasurable feeling is the token. On the other hand, "independent value-judgments are all perceptions of moral ends or moral hindrances, in so far as they excite pleasure or pain, or, it may be, set in motion the will to appropriate what is good or repel the opposite." Religious knowledge also consists of independent value-judgments. In this manner our conscious experience falls apart into the world that is and the world that ought to be, the world of fact and the world

of aesthetic, moral, and religious ideals, upon which we place different values, and toward which we assume different attitudes according to the pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings evoked by them.

But there seems to be no rationally discoverable principle of unity between these two orders of experience, the world of fact and of the ideal, of what is and what ought to be, of nature and of spirit, of man as a part of nature and of man as a rational and spiritual being who transcends nature and should have dominion over it. What is the supreme law, or principle, or end "from which, as a starting-point, the differentiated orders of nature and spiritual life, each in its own kind, may be explained and understood as forming one whole?" Science, compelled to relate fact with fact in the world that is, cannot reach the law or principle of the universe as a whole. Nor can metaphysics solve the problem, for it seeks only the most general principles of things without distinguishing them as natural and spiritual. The consequence of this is that metaphysic cannot show how the idea of a personal God which arises in connection with moral and religious ideals and ends is to be combined with a theory of things in general. But man still feels compelled to strive for the realization of the aesthetic, moral, and religious ideals in which his destiny as a personal being seems to be involved. Lacking the ability to discover, through his own reflections in science or metaphysics, what the all-embracing principle or end is which makes the world a unity, if it is ever to be known, it can be only by a revelation which transcends knowledge, though it does not contradict knowledge. At this point, religion enters to solve the problem due to man's distinction of himself in worth as spirit from the natural world. Throughout the course of human history, religion has consisted in man's appeal to Supreme Powers, or Gods, or God "to assure to the personal spirit its worth and inde-

pendence as opposed to the restraints of nature and the natural effects of human society," to reveal the end of life that shall be at the same time the unitary principle and end of the universe and of God, and to supplement efforts to realize the highest good and win blessedness. "The idea of Gods, or divine Powers, everywhere includes belief in their spiritual personality, for the support to be received from above can only be reckoned on in virtue of an affinity between God and men." Thus it is only religion that gives a view of the world as a whole, and overcomes the dualism which man creates by his distinction of himself as spirit in worth from nature and even from society in which he suffers restraints and defeats.

Christianity participates in the nature of religion in general, as just explained, but it is the highest form of religion in that it assures believers "that they shall be preserved unto eternal life in the kingdom of God, which is God's revealed end in the world,—and that, too, in the full sense that man is thus in the kingdom of God set over the world as a whole in his own order." The distinguishing "specialty" of Christianity, marking it off from other religions, is the Person of its Founder and the revelation of God through Him which forms the basis of religious knowledge and conduct. The pre-eminent excellence of Christianity is the completely rounded view of the world which sets, as the goal of life, that man should become a whole, a spiritual character supreme over the world in the personal kingdom of God. Hence we may say with Luther: "All knowledge of God rests upon revelation. This revelation is in the first place a universal self-manifestation of God the Creator in the inner life of man and in the world. The consciousness of God thus gained finds confirmation of its truth in the history of salvation." This special revelation of God in Christ is responded to with such a unique feeling of its worth for us, in the effort to

realize the highest ends of life, that we are assured of its ultimate truth.

What, now, is Christian theology and its function ? Negatively, it is neither science in the restricted sense, nor metaphysic, nor is it necessary to harmonize theology with either, for both fail to reach the principle, or end, which overcomes the dualism between the natural and spiritual world. This principle is known only through revelation, and is embodied in the divine end of the kingdom of God. Ritschl here thinks that he supplements and goes beyond Schleiermacher by showing that the redemption through Christ, revealed in the New Testament, is vitally related to the divine end of the kingdom of God, and overcomes the dualism arising from man's distinction of himself in worth as spirit from the natural world, whereas Schleiermacher only vaguely refers everything to the general impression of Christ's personality. The revelation of God through Christ "is that of a loving Will which assures to believers spiritual dominion over the world and perfect moral fellowship in the kingdom of God as the *Summum Bonum*. This final end of God in the world is the ground from which it is possible to explain the creation and government of the world in general, and the interrelations between nature and created spirits." This revelation so satisfies man's spirit that he, in a value-judgment, accepts it as true.

Christian theology, therefore, has solely the task of reproducing the thought of Christ and the Apostles, and confirming it by comparison with other stages and species of religion, keeping constantly in view the peculiar nature of Christianity as "the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical religion, which, based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and as Founder of the kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, aims at the moral organization of mankind and grounds blessedness on

the relation of Sonship to God, as well as on the kingdom of God." As a consequence, only the New Testament scriptures can serve a truly Christian theology which "has performed its task when, guided by the Christian idea of God and the conception of men's blessedness in the kingdom of God, it exhibits completely and clearly, both as a whole and in particular, the Christian view of the world and of human life, together with the necessity which belongs to the interdependent relations between its component elements. . . . The theological exposition of Christianity, therefore, is complete when it has been demonstrated that the Christian ideal of life, and no other, satisfies the claims of the human spirit to knowledge of things universal." To do this to the best advantage the theologian must himself have experienced the worth of the New Testament revelation and be a member of the Christian community which affords a means of knowing, through the practice of believers, what Christ and the Apostles taught.

Our final question concerning Ritschl's theology shall be whether he intends to predicate of the divine nature the Christian conceptions of God, thus differing from the subjective symbolism of Schleiermacher. An unprejudiced interpreter must, I think, reply in the affirmative, but not in the sense that his theology accords with the speculative systems of the Platonic or the Neo-Platonic or even Hegelian type. At this point everything depends upon how Ritschl's restriction of the conception of God to the sphere of value-judgments and their intended significance is to be understood. Pfeiderer says that, by making the idea of God "the ideal bond between the particular view of the world and the vocation of man to attain goods or the highest good, happiness," Ritschl is doing just what Feuerbach did when he called the Gods "Wünschwesen" invented by man in his practical need to supplement his own powerlessness over

nature.³⁸ But it seems to me that Ritschl, in a spirit entirely different from that of Feuerbach, is following the example of Kant in his *postulate* of God as a necessary condition of the realization of the highest good, and that it is going too far to say that this "postulate" has no more significance than a mere being created by our wishes. Pfeiderer also denies "that the emotional value of the conception of God for the preservation of man's sense of dignity" in relation to the world about him is sufficient warrant for its truth, nor can it ensure to theology a knowledge of speculative truth and the character of a science. But I think Pfeiderer does not give sufficient weight to what seems to be Ritschl's meaning, namely, that value-judgments are sufficient warrant for subjective truth, as the following considerations show :

First, Ritschl shows that Kant made it clear that the moral argument for the existence of God recognizes man's self-distinction from nature as the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments do not. But Kant is wrong in holding that the idea of God is solely related to the practical reason and to the conviction of personal faith in God as the necessary condition of the realization of the Highest Good, which is to give to the idea of God only subjective practical reality, whereas it must have theoretical as well as practical reality, for Kant's distinction between the theoretical and practical reason is untenable.³⁹

Secondly, we must, he says, either abandon the attempt "to comprehend the law and ground of the co-existence of nature and spiritual life . . . or accept the Christian idea of God, and that, too, as an indispensable truth, in order that we may find both the ground and the law of the real world in that creative Will which includes, as the final end of the world, the destination of mankind for the kingdom of God." Thus Ritschl intends to attribute objective reality to the idea of God and give ontological significance to theology.⁴⁰

Thirdly, in the same connection it should be noted that value-judgments are both *concomitant* and *independent*, which can only mean that difference in kind does not render moral and religious value-judgments in their sphere any less trustworthy as truth than the "value-judgments" from which science and philosophy are developed.⁴¹

Fourthly, value-judgments have two elements, cognition and feeling; the latter is the variable rising and falling between pleasurable or unpleasurable extremes according as the experience promotes or hinders the life. The cognitive element is invariable, being simply cognition. Hence differences of feeling do not affect the truth of the cognitive element of value-judgments, wherever they occur. Consequently, religious knowledge is as reliable as any other knowledge, though Ritschl has not anywhere, so far as I know, clearly expressed this point, which, I believe, is implicitly contained in his theory.⁴² On the other hand, the objects of religious knowledge must be, at least, as real as any other objects of experience, for the element of feeling and its quality determine, in a thoroughly pragmatic manner, what shall receive attention and what shall become for the subject a reality to which voluntary action must be adjusted.

Fifthly, the entire significance of Ritschl's use of Lotze's theory of knowledge is that whatever natural or spiritual causes operate upon the soul produce effects which are to that extent significant of reality. Applying this principle to the divine operation upon our spirits through the revelation in Christ which we possess in the New Testament and manifested in the Christian community, we may be assured of as direct and trustworthy knowledge of the Author of that revelation, so far as we experience it, as we are of the nature of the world of things which impress themselves upon us.⁴³

Sixthly, that Ritschl is not indifferent to specula-

tion, and recognizes the unity of the cognitive elements of value-judgments of every sphere of life, is shown by the fact that, after having gained the Christian idea of God which he desires to use scientifically as "the fundamental principle which explains the coexistence of nature and morality, we have yet to justify the claim of theology to be a science by proving that the conception of *personality* can, without contradiction, be applied to God." This Ritschl does by adopting the theory of Lotze that only in God do we find Personality in its perfection, while *we* are made *for* personality, the attainment of which in ever more complete realization is our life task.⁴⁴

Finally, our purpose does not require a critical estimate of the systems of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, nor of their modifications by Kaftan, Herrmann, and Harnack, and others. We have attempted to show the relation of theology to religious experience when religion is regarded as consisting chiefly in faith or feeling which transcends knowledge and apprehends God in an immediate experience. We have used the terms faith and feeling loosely, to mean that revolt against external authority, on the one hand, and an over-confident reliance upon reason, on the other, which threatened to make the certainty of God's existence and nature impossible. It has been shown, by a sketch of a few of its representatives, that this revolt has assumed many forms, not all of them, indeed, theological, but the movement itself may be said to have culminated in theological systems whose influence is still powerful. The principle of this movement is that God is accessible through the soul's immediate experience, best described in terms of faith and feeling. Somehow God reveals Himself in the spirits of men, but supremely in Christ, and through Him in the Christian community. The theologian is only the conscientious thinker reflecting freely upon his own religious experience of God in Christ and the

community of believers, unable to do otherwise than take the objects of these most intense experiences as both true and real. Reflection upon this religious experience results in a doctrine, a theology, which is, indeed, secondary but is also a useful instrument for the promotion of individual and social religious life.

Such is the message of this aspiration of the human spirit to God, and it is proving itself a wholesome influence upon the present age, which turns away from expressions of faith which do not serve so effectively now as they did in the past.

PART III

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

SOME of the chief types of theological thought have been reviewed. It has been shown how Christian theology arose under the influence of the philosophy of Greece and Rome, which tended to make the universal the true reality and the highest universal the most real Being ; likewise, the theology formed under this influence emphasized the absolute sovereignty of God. This theology extended far on towards the modern era. In this period, external authority, whether political, ecclesiastical, or Biblical, was supreme. Human individuality was resolved into a transient phase of the divine operation. Then came revolutions, political, literary, and religious, challenging authority in its various forms, followed by the return of the individual to his place in the world of reality. Individualism prevailed in the new philosophy that arose after these upheavals, and in the new theology. It has been shown how Kant represents many who would find in religion and religious dogmas chiefly a moral content ; Hegel was considered as a representative of those who would transform religion and religious experience into knowledge, while Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others think of religion as a mystical feeling of the Divine. These modern types of theology elevate the will, knowledge, or feeling into the chief place in the complex unity of religious experience, upon the whole of which theology ought to be based. In these systems the historical tends to

be only a figurative representation of an ideal content, and the yoke of ecclesiastical and Biblical authority is light. It is to be noted that these thinkers regard their theological conceptions as having some kind of functional and ontological significance, for they may be relied upon in the conduct of life in the real world. Schleiermacher, for example, believed that the "feeling of absolute dependence" tends to express itself in symbols trustworthy in action, for there is an assumed unity of knowledge and willing with being. None of these later systems seems to have become the theology of the present day, though their influence is still powerful. Instead, the search continues for a more satisfactory way of expressing the Christian faith than has yet been found.

Though no system of the remote or recent past can be said to be the theology of the present, no successful rival exists that I can find. Indifference prevails, for only a few seem to care for systematic theology. Much attention is given to the critical investigation of the Scriptures, to the public ministry of the Church at home and abroad, and to scientific and philosophical teachings. If there is any mental energy left, it busies itself with various organizations for moral and social reform. The age is not one in which theology thrives as an expression of the religious life. Its fate is similar to that which Kant once said came upon metaphysics; it is "the battlefield of endless conflicts," and "at the present it is the fashion to despise" it. Many voices are lifted against the Old Theology, but few attempts are made to tell what is to take its place. Negations and destructive criticism are comparatively easy, but what is being done towards a really new theological construction of a systematic character? Shall we simply continue to pull down the old house without being sure that we are able to build a better? Or shall we make not too radical changes and live in the old house still?

It seems as though the most one may reasonably hope to do is to form some temporary abode, using whatever material is at hand. In the present condition of things, it is to be expected that a good working hypothesis serviceable in the conduct of the individual and social religious life is about all that can be attained without becoming dogmatic. Whether theology can ever be more than such an hypothesis is itself a problem. There is also good ground for expecting that the present affords much that is favourable to the construction of a theological view that will serve the religious life of the present, for the theology of each generation springs out of its complex life, and that life itself is largely the fruit of what has gone before. As Greek philosophy contributed to the development of Christian doctrine in the beginning, and as the new philosophy after the Reformation led to a new theology, so the science and philosophy of the present have a contribution to make to theology.

It would be too much to attempt to examine the entire range of science and philosophy, but an effort will be made in what follows to direct attention to some phases of the intellectual life of the present that seem to make it possible to construct a Christian theology that will meet some of our needs, though the formulation of such a theology itself is not here undertaken. It is enough to indicate the way, and, if successful, it will be no small achievement to do this. Four thoughts have been helpful guides in the discussion, namely: unity amidst the complexity of intellectual and spiritual life both individual and social, indeed, of reality as a whole; development with progress in some sense, at least within the whole if not of the whole; an end of some sort that, lacking better terms, may be called the kingdom of God, which, according to Ritschl's impressive thought, is the only conception capable of unifying the natural

and spiritual worlds ; lastly, the idea of knowledge as functional and teleological, not as an end in itself but as a part of the whole self-conscious experience to which it ministers, and, as such, a factor in the end.

CHAPTER X

THE RELIGIOUS SELF AND THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

THE effort to evoke and cultivate the religious life assumes many forms. Some believe chiefly in the training of the young till they pass easily and naturally into the full religious life. Others pursue individualistic methods, and regard no one as saved unless a marked and often sudden change or conversion occurs. It is a common belief that otherwise the individual is "without religion." Conversion is also usually held to be conditioned by the direct working of the Holy Spirit upon the heart. Indeed, conversion is said to be the human side of that change in the life of which regeneration is the Divine.

Religious experience has of late been subjected to psychological investigation, and perhaps the time has come when the psychology of religion has made good its claim to a place among the sciences, though it is not clear that general psychology does not do all that can be done with religious facts, which certainly fall within its province. However this may be, the psychological study of religious life has made some contribution to a better understanding of the conditions of religious experience. A few of its results and their bearing upon religious thought and practice will now be presented.

In the first place, the general psychological method is applied to facts of religious experience which are

assumed as given for descriptive analysis and explanation. It is assumed that the feelings, impulses, thoughts, and volitions which constitute religious experience are as much subject to psychic laws as other mental phenomena, and consequently explicable. They are also not separable from other forms of conscious life, but constitute with them a unity of experience. This assumption that religious phenomena are subject to an orderly development whose law it is the purpose of religious psychology to discover is a wholesome corrective of the view that religion comes from some foreign source instead of arising in the normal evolution of human life, and, like other events in the universe, subject to laws that may be discovered. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that laws are formulations of processes to which they are relative, and, as Bergson says, the intellect that formulates these laws misses the free inner life itself. There is, then, a background of life that escapes the static, spatialized formulations of thought. Consequently, while the assumption that religious phenomena are subject to laws is useful, it should not be so interpreted as to exclude the free upspringing of the life itself.¹

Secondly, although to say religion is an instinctive possession of man may emphasize its importance in human life, it is more useful to follow the development of the child from its primary non-religious, non-moral, even non-personal, state to its self-conscious life in which the moral and religious appear. The principle of the maturing of instincts would, however, permit the retention of the conception of the instinctive nature of religion, if it seems advisable. But the fact is that early childhood is characterized by impulsive, sensuous reactions with absorption in immediate details and fragmentary interests which do not pass much beyond the non-religious, non-moral attitude. The length of this early period doubtless varies,

although Dr. Ames says it is nine years, "but that in later childhood up to thirteen years of age the child responds to more interests of a social and ideal character and thus manifests tendencies and attitudes which are religious in character" (p. 209). This development of the religious consciousness may be freely admitted, if the facts require it, without impugning the worth of religion, for moral and religious phenomena are still phases of the universe and have to be considered in any ultimate theory of reality.

What, now, are the factors entering into this development of the religious consciousness? It is a highly complex process involving both the physical and social life. Heredity also is important. Our bodies, for example, belong to the natural world, and the nervous system within the body furnishes the medium of communication with the world about us. As a part of nature, the physical organism develops according to natural laws. The consequence is that our nervous system in some sense treasures up and "recapitulates" preceding life in inherited tendencies to action and feeling which manifest themselves, under appropriate conditions, as reflexes, impulses, instincts, emotions, temperaments, giving to consciousness a vague background upon which the more specific sensations and feelings are thrown. This vague background of our conscious life, incapable of expression in clear ideas, is the source of unique experiences surrounded by mystery, for example, the sense of a deeper self than we know, the "subliminal self," the "fringe," of our conscious life, whence come those impulses and feelings that sometimes lift us up to new achievements, at others, drag us down to base deeds. These facts are the basis of doctrines that have been the source of much theological controversy. It may be that the mystery of religion can be best understood from this vague background of conscious life which thought fails to transform into definite conceptions.

But all the more confidently may we rely upon the religious feelings and impulses to indicate the direction in which our well-being is to be found, for they may be regarded as the results in us of ages of strivings for larger life that have to some extent proved successful.

Some of the most fruitful results of the psychological investigation of religious experience have been gained by considering the development of religious feelings and ideas in connection with physical changes. It is found that, as the body passes through its crises, the mental life also experiences crises. The adolescent period extends from about ten or eleven to twenty-four or -five years of age in boys and in girls to twenty-one.² During this period there is found a remarkable parallelism between the physical and spiritual development. For example, the average age of puberty in girls is 13·8 and in boys 15·6, while the average age of conversion in girls is 14·8 and in boys 16·4. The child is self-centred, but with the birth of the reproductive life tends to find life in that of another. The consciousness of self expands ; then comes the surrender of the personal will to the guidance of the larger forces of which it is a part, even to God. The self becomes an organ of the life of the universe and of God, a life of affection for and oneness with this larger life beyond. "Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith" (James, *The Will to Believe*, 213).

There is also a remarkable change in the structure of the brain in the adolescent period, either the appearance of a crop of new nerve branches, or those which have already matured come suddenly to activity. Conversion as a religious experience would be, from this point of view, the sudden functioning of these nerve centres. The sense of sin with its anguish is the mental correlate of nervous energy springing from these newly developed centres. The harmony

and peace that follow is the correlate of these nervous forces working harmoniously.³ Since the intensest religious experiences involved in conversion are so closely linked with the changes in the organic life, there is room for the inference that natural and spiritual life lead in their normal development directly to God. Beginning as self-centred, the life soon puts forth faith and love which view everything as from God and leading to Him. It is a normal human experience which, if lacking, leaves life undeveloped and its needs unsatisfied. Consequently, the evangelist has a powerful ally in the normal course of development; indeed, the new birth is not directly dependent upon external causes. These may assist, but the fact of spontaneous religious awakenings shows that the most essential part consists in the life-processes themselves. There is often a storm and stress period, but, certainly in their intense form, they are not necessary. If the conditions were always favourable, the life would unfold and find God—a most impressive evidence that God has indeed made us for Himself and has not left us ignorant of the way to find Him. What has just been said may be regarded as a partial reply to an objection sometimes made, that, since these deep religious experiences are organically conditioned, they have no spiritual value. This objection neglects the fact that this relation of religious experience to the physical system is only a special case of psycho-physical parallelism which much of modern psychology assumes, and which would apply to scientific, even atheistic reasoning, as well as to religious thought and experience; and, if one is invalidated, so is the other. Nor is psycho-physical parallelism more than a good working hypothesis, and to extend it absolutely to all conscious states with the implication that they are determined by the physical is to go beyond proof. Nor can the closely associated principle of conservation of energy be extended to conscious states on the

assumption that the psychical is absolutely determined by the physical or that the psychical is only a modified form of physical energy. To affirm this is to settle *a priori* the problem of freedom itself.⁴

There is also a well-defined course through which religious belief passes. Pratt gives three distinct types of belief in general, namely, primitive credulity, intellectual and emotional belief. In the first, whatever is presented to the consciousness of the child is accepted as real without question. Primitive peoples also, like children, are extremely credulous and tend to accept whatever is presented to them by the authority of tradition. Another illustration is afforded by the popular unthinking acceptance of the doctrines of the mediaeval Church, indeed, of the Church of any period. But soon the intellectual life awakens, doubt arises, issuing in intellectual belief. Things may still be accepted on authority, but it is now authority supported by reasons. This form of belief characterizes the mature life of the individual and of the race. It appears in the more highly developed religions; it showed itself in the revolt of reason against the authority of the mediaeval Church and is found especially in modern thought. Other beliefs "draw their strength from the field of vital feeling." Their objects *must be* real because the life needs them so much. This form of belief is found in all stages of development, from the ecstasy induced by the sacred dance, in which the soul becomes united with the god, to the Christian mystic's emotional intuition of the Deity. Undoubtedly also the present belief in God rests largely upon an emotional basis, and in this feeling our need finds expression. But while these three types of belief may be granted, I think it should be recognized that they are not entirely exclusive, for even the religious belief that rests upon a rational basis may be accompanied by credulity in some respects and by intense emotion.

In view of what has been said, it is evident that there is a period of doubt and reconstruction in the normal development of religious experience. The converse of this fact is that to force theological doctrines unduly upon other periods in the spiritual development is useless because unnecessary, and may be disastrous. Especially should children and the inexperienced not be subjected to doctrinal tests which they are incapable of understanding. The age at which theological reconstruction most normally occurs is between twenty and thirty. The line of development is from childhood faith, through doubt, reaction, and estrangement into a positive hold on religion through individual reconstruction of belief. It has several phases, but, on the whole, the reconstruction is a broader interpretation of earlier conceptions. A reason for this may be found in the relatively more persistent impressions upon the nervous system made by the earlier experiences, and "on the other hand it is doubtless equally true that one cannot attain a deep revelation without approaching it from these central channels of one's nature; 'except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.'" These reconstructions also present relatively constant central beliefs, such as God, Christ, immortality, which seem to indicate an undercurrent of religious life which has a constant character and direction. The great essentials of religion are confirmed. "The most critical tendency is toward an appreciation of religion as a life within and toward a realization of this as a part of the life of God." "The kingdom of God is within you."⁵ There is, therefore, in the normal religious development an active interest in theology which thus becomes a means of spiritual growth.

On the other hand, there is also an ethnic expression of the same lines of psychic movements that appear in the conversion and progress of the individual.

The legends, literature, and philosophy of a people gain a deeper significance, if viewed as an "allegory of adolescence," a progress in spiritual life from its beginning to its culmination in union with God. Especially is the Bible the most faithful record of this spiritual history of humanity. "It depicts the development of 'man-soul' in a way which, if it is rightly understood, leaves the best classics of the best races far behind." The Bible is conversion "writ large." The story of Jesus' life, psychologically treated, has the same import, the picture of what man passes through in his spiritual history. Because of Jesus' faithfulness to life, the Gospel story of the Cross, when re-lived and vitally participated in, is the best of all initiatives to individual and social maturity. Even if the historic data concerning Jesus could be overthrown, religious psychology would still maintain that the Gospel story of Jesus' life is the most faithful of all representations of spiritual growth to full manhood.⁶

The unity of consciousness also renders certain definitions of religion inadequate; these seek its essence in some isolated conscious element. The ultimate modes of being conscious are, however, distinguishable but inseparable aspects of a unity designated as a state of feeling, or knowledge, or will, according as one prevails over the others which are not, however, absent. Religion, consequently, has no simple essence, but claims the whole man throughout the course of his individual and social development from the sensuous to the ideal and spiritual. At the same time the limitations of individuals prevent them from being faithful to the whole of human nature, as a consequence of which there is a wide variety of religious experiences with little agreement as to the essence of religion itself. Dr. Hall received forty-two different definitions of religion, in answer to his questions, as varied as personal experience, while philo-

sophers and theologians, as we have seen, find its essence in the "feeling of absolute dependence,"⁷ or in the "feeling of piety and adoration,"⁸ or in the "feeling for the fate of values,"⁹ or in the "feeling background of consciousness,"¹⁰ or in knowledge, or in the moral will.¹¹ Religious experience is, then, too complex to be confined to any one phase of human nature but claims the whole; indeed, this variety itself bears witness to the widespread and persistent belief in God.¹²

Again, the unity of conscious experience means that subject and object require each other, and that the psychic elements found in one are not entirely absent from the other; that one's body is an objective aspect of conscious experience, like other objects, and psychologically the difference between them is that the body-percepts are a little more constant and interesting than other percepts. Likewise the mind as subject is the unity of thoughts, feelings, and volitions directed towards objects and, so far as we know, inseparable from objective experiences. Whatever dualism there is between subject and object occurs within experience of which self and world are aspects. The same principle helps us over the dualism of spirit and matter that has been so troublesome in theology. It is easy now to speak of different "worlds" which are known and felt, and in which our deeds of will are performed. The most familiar and in some respects the most real is the sensuous world, whose formation, with its rich variety of what is seen, heard, and felt, we have partially described. These sense-experiences compel attention, excite pleasure or pain, and induce action. Indeed, so strongly do they lay hold of us that we cannot avoid attributing reality to their objects.¹³

There is also the world of science, differing from that of the sense-qualities. The physicist thinks of billions of vibrations as the real nature of light and

colour, and of thousands of somewhat different vibrations as the basis of sound. The chemist deals, not with stones, plants, and animals, but with forces whose behaviours he formulates in chemical laws. So we might go through the entire realm of science conceived of in terms of matter, force, and motion, expressed in formulations called natural laws and verified within limited spheres of our experience. Likewise mathematical and metaphysical systems, together with ethical and aesthetic principles, are relations which the mind conceives to be involved in experience which, as a whole, is the true reality.

In like manner, there is the "supernatural" world filled with many and diverse objects more or less carefully joined by conceived relations. Restricting ourselves to the Christian, it is clearly as much a mental construction, whatever else it may be, as that of the chemist. It has its heaven and hell; its God and man conceived in unique relations. Think of the elaborately constructed Christian *Weltanschauung*! Psychologically considered, it is an ideal construction of the content of the Christian beliefs, consisting of the objects and relations supposed to be real in actual experience, and theology is the science of this phase of experience.

Individual personality is also an important factor in these ideal constructions of the different aspects of experience. Even the world of the senses is not free from this personal element. Besides, each mind tends to take some partial aspect of experience as the whole. The chemist thinks in terms of chemical affinities, while the theologian would cast the theological mantle over all things. The constant disputations among theologians themselves show that this personal element is a large factor in everybody's theology. It is well that it is so, for what a monotonous level of existence it would otherwise be! Indeed, the fact that each must think in his own way about

what is believed is an indispensable condition of religious growth.

On the other hand, psychology affords the most satisfactory ground of the unity of individual constructions of the different aspects of experience expressed in the various sciences and in theology. Here the conception of the unity of experience and of the social relations of the individual is important. There is no individual apart from social relations, and what one does, thinks, and is depends largely upon the social relations which embody the community life of which he is a part. Many of the doctrines of the Christian Church were formed with chief emphasis upon the individual, but now there is a larger recognition of the social aspects of life. There grows up a common consciousness in which each participates as a result of the "give-and-take between the individual and his fellows," which Professor Baldwin calls the "dialectic of personal growth."¹⁴ That is, the individual self is a social self: "My thought of self is in the main, as to its character as a personal self, filled up with my thought of others, distributed variously as individuals; and my thought of others, as persons, is mainly filled up with myself. In other words, but for certain minor distinctions in the filling, and for certain compelling distinctions between that which is immediate and that which is objective, *the ego and the altar are to our thought one and the same thing.*" For example, public opinion expresses the common social consciousness which forms and is formed by the individual. As a consequence, the members of a community are conscious of themselves as thinking alike on certain topics, which means that they have a common mind, accept and reject similar views, and act accordingly. A member who thinks and acts so that the rest of the community cannot adjust their views and acts to his becomes a heretic, a criminal, or, in lesser degree, a crank, while he may be one of

the benefactors of humanity, making his appearance a little too soon, who might have been hailed as a genius and a reformer had he come "in the fulness of time."

The best illustration of the social nature of the individual, psychologically considered, is language which requires a common thought to be expressed by a system of signs socially confirmed and accepted. Thus language is a co-operative social product. Equally so are the views of the different worlds already described, particularly the theological. There is a social Christian consciousness which varies with the different groups of believers and is shared in by each. Whatever this Christian social consciousness accepts and acts upon is, for that community, the truth which must be accepted by him who would be accounted as holding the truth "as it was once delivered to the saints." Authority in religion, at least in one of its aspects, is a form of the expression of the social consciousness; once it was the Church or Papal decrees or the confessions, and now perhaps the Scriptures, while from the point of view of the individual from Socrates to the present the only authority is the inner Voice. But the assertion that the only authority in religion is the voice of conscience and the inner light of reason is simply an attempt to separate the individual from his social relations and is only half a truth; the other half is that the Christian community has its social consciousness which is authoritative for it, expressing itself in adherence to a Person, an Ideal Man, a Creed, a Church, a sacred Book. The other pole of the personal relation is the individual, who, of course, participates in the common consciousness, but adjusts himself in his own way to these objective symbols of what is to be accepted. For example, the Bible may be accepted as authoritative, on the one hand, by the religious community, while, on the other, each member of the community cannot

fail to regard the Bible from his own standpoint and guide himself by his own interpretation of its meaning. Consequently, individual freedom of opinion and interpretation is the true counterpart of an objective expression of the social religious consciousness which, for the body of believers as a whole, is authoritative. Thus the freedom of individuality is reconciled with objective authority, and both are essential factors in individual and social religious development.

Again, the psychology of religion, particularly in its social aspects, shows that not only the authoritative but also the historical and symbolic have a legitimate place in the religious life. The content of the social mind is transmitted from generation to generation with modifications, indeed, but never with an absolute break from the past. Religious views, with other conceptions and customs, pass on and are subject to change. A social mind without a history to remember is as impossible as an individual personality with no past. For the individual the past is an ideal construction of former experiences viewed as belonging intimately to the personal self with definite relations, and the more vivid, definite, and complete these ideas and relations, the more real the past seems and the more comprehensive the self becomes. The social religious consciousness is, therefore, only a larger self with a larger and more comprehensive memory of its history, and experiences even greater satisfaction in reviewing the past. Just as with the individual, memories centre about persons and their deeds primarily, so the social religious mind dwells upon the personal character of those who have taken part in its crises, and the greater the emotional interest aroused, the more real do these characters and their deeds become.

Likewise, the psychological relation of thought to religious experience is such that the symbolical element has a legitimate place in the religious life.

The ordinance of the Lord's Supper and Baptism, ceremonies and rituals, are an embodiment in sensuous form of an ideal content whose apprehension would not otherwise be so constant and clear, although, of course, the symbolic can be misused and has a wide variability. The entire absence of the symbolic would be a religion of pure thought and inward contemplation with a strong mystical tendency, but without a community life that has a history. While individual and social development is away from the sensuous and symbolic to the ideal and spiritual, yet, in consequence of the paramount reality of the "sensuous world" above described, few ever live so completely in the realm of abstract conceptions that they are not assisted by the sensuous representation even of their highest thoughts. The recognition of this simple psychological fact would give the symbolic its rightful place in the religious life, preventing much violent controversy.

Psychological analysis shows, as has been seen, that the authoritative, historical, and symbolic have their proper place, and that the reasons therefor lie chiefly in the social religious consciousness in which the individual participates. While this is true, the individual is left not only free to adjust himself to the community life but is under obligation to appropriate his social inheritance in his own way, for through his "invention," that is, through the uniqueness of his manner of responding to his social environment, a new element may enter into the life of the whole and advance be made. These psychological principles are the real foundations of Sabatier's distinction of "Religions of Authority" from "The Religion of the Spirit," many of whose arguments against authority in religion gain their apparent strength from a failure to recognize the importance of the social as well as the individual religious consciousness. The same may be said of Harnack's conception of the history of

dogma as the accretion of a foreign element, concealing the original essence of Christianity. A similar objection may be made to Höffding's reduction of the authoritative, dogmatic, and symbolic, indeed even the entire "science" of theology, to the free play of the symbol-forming imagination which strives to give expression to the conviction of the conservation of values which he considers the essence of all religion.¹⁵ Hence it follows that he who is mindful of the psychological nature of the religious consciousness will acknowledge the rightful place in the religious life, not only of "religion within the limits of pure reason" but also of authority, dogma, and symbol.

Like principles help us to decide whether one mode of expressing the religious life is better than another. Shall the idealist be regarded as superior to him who lives and thinks in the sensuous and symbolic? To exalt one order of experience at the expense of another would be the same in principle as if the physicist were to deny the reality of red light, as seen, because from his standpoint light is a series of infinitely rapid vibrations of unique form. Is it any better or more satisfying to know about the vibrations than it is actually to see the light with its variety of colours? If we must choose between the two, let us see the light; but, if possible, let us not only see the light but know also the wonderful account physics has to give of it. Likewise, most desirable, because most complete, is it to have not only the authoritative, the historical, and symbolic elements, but also the insight that discerns the spirit expressing itself therein. There is undoubtedly a natural sequence of experience proceeding through the authoritative, sensuous, symbolic, and institutional to the ideal and spiritual, a movement from the external to the internal. One who has passed through this experience may in retrospect understand better the significance of the steps taken, both in his own life and in that of the race,

discovering therein the self coming to its own true being. Each stage of the religious history will then have its worth in the light of the whole.

The same unity of conscious experience of which we have been speaking also requires us to hold that belief, truth, reality, and action, including moral action, are most intimately related and, to some extent at least, identical. It has already been frequently intimated that the belief in the truth and the reality of any "world" of our experience depends largely on the degree in which our emotional interests are aroused and satisfied, and upon the values that the objects of our beliefs have for the promotion or hindrance of our activities, for what we believe to be true and real, we act upon, and the action in turn tends to strengthen the belief, if it encounters no obstacle. The more intense the emotional element becomes, the more the self is laid hold of and called into action, the more reality the objects of experience acquire. Whatever fails to call forth such responses, just so far approximates to the negation of reality. "The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term. And we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to with a will."¹⁶ The natural world has its reality, so far as I am concerned, in the different ways in which I respond to it. Each thing is for me a kind of end of action, and the world about me is a world of meanings so intimately connected with belief and implicit reality that I never raise the question in practice whether my thoughts apprehend reality in itself, and, if we are to take the verdict of our actual experience, such a question is not only unnecessary but grows out of a misconception of the relation of thought and being. Still further, this physical world of meanings that I know has implicit relations to my own deeds of will which fulfil ideal ends.

The physical world is to me the scene of my moral struggles ; I must carry out my ideals in the world that is, and its meanings are not complete till they are viewed in relation to the possible ends that I may set before myself as a consciously striving, willing being. These meanings are, indeed, inexhaustible, for the river is to me and to my fellows whatever our interests and purposes determine it to be—now a pleasure resort, now bearing goods to market, now irrigating our fields, or again, ministering to our sense of the beautiful. Each of us makes of the river a little different sort of reality, yet not so different as to destroy its common objective significance in our mutual experience, for we know fully enough what each means to make communication concerning this object possible, however wonderful this simple, commonplace fact may be. On the other hand, the physical world is not truly real in abstraction from ourselves ; we, as it were, complete its reality when we apply ourselves to it and it to ourselves so as to realize the ideal ends of will which we seek to fulfil. But these meanings, in which the world that we live in consists, are interrelated and embraced in a higher which takes up the partial meanings into itself, and this higher meaning can only find its completion in the living experience of the kingdom of spirits or moral selves.

The psychological relation of thought to what is believed to be real now makes it possible to show in what sense thoughts are true. Thought has a functional character because it serves the end of action. Consciousness appears at that stage in the evolution of organisms where mere reflex mechanism fails to respond effectively to the surroundings. Thought steps in to devise means and to guide the active responses to the environment, both physical and social, in such a way as to promote the well-being of the subject and render the function as a whole adequate. Thus thought

has a functional, biological, selective character, and is of value, not for its own sake primarily, but for the life which it serves. The consciousness of meaning on the perceptual level finds, in a present perception, some factor significant of what has already been experienced, which becomes the guide in the action required in order to conserve and promote the well-being of the subject in those conditions. Thinking overcomes the particular, fragmentary nature of perceptions by finding relations which may be used in activity. Thus thought, belief, reality, and action are intimately related. The subject is constantly forced to meet a varying situation. Habits of thought and action already at hand partially provide the *instrument* for dealing successfully with the present. But so far as the situation contains new features, or those that have never been fully mastered, thought is needed to produce a better way of adjusting the self to the objects believed real. There are, of course, always such features requiring new efforts to organize the experience so as to satisfy the vital needs. But it is no merely logical harmony that is sought, for thought is functional in its nature. What interest have we in uniting concept with concept abstracted from living experience? The judgment of to-day serves the real experience of the present, but there is no living interest in squaring it with a judgment held previously except so far as the experienced reality of to-day and that of yesterday are sufficiently alike to require the same instruments that were formerly useful in the identical situation. Back of logical consistency is the assumption that the living experience will be in its totality consistent which renders the ideas representing it secondary and true only in the sense that they enable us to move from point to point in this experience successfully. Thus thoughts serve the ends of life, and are true so far as they enable us to deal successfully with our environment. Failure to get on,

guided by a certain judgment, goes far towards undermining the trust in the truth of that judgment, and suspicion is awakened that the real relation between the objects of belief has not been discovered and the mind is impelled to a new solution. But conceived relations that have proved their worth in the conduct of life become trusted supports, and as they are added to and organized, advance in knowledge is gained.

In view of what has just been said concerning the psychological relation of thought and action, it follows that morality and religion accompany each other in their development. Since action takes place according to what is believed, religious beliefs must be followed by action consciously determined in view of the reality of the objects of these religious beliefs. But this is moral action in view of ends which means that, from the beginning, religion implies moral conduct of a high or low order according to the character of the object of worship. Whether there can be morality without religion being an implicate is another question, but, certainly, a morality which does not pass readily into religion, in other words, consciously directed action which fails to consider the objects of the supernatural "world" viewed as real, would seem to be incomplete, for the man who has no supernatural "world" in view of which he acts is incomplete, or, having it, is deficient in the scope of his thought, and when Kant and Hegel regard morality as a transition stage on the way to religion, they seem to have stated what follows from the relation of action and belief to reality.

It now becomes evident that the products of thought should not be abstracted from the primary unity of experience. But, if this is done, the ideal content of experience appears as the true reality, as in Platonism, while the emotional and volitional factors are neglected, though they are equally essential factors of experience. Equally false to the psychological unity of experience, as a unity of ideal, emotional,

and volitional elements, is the separation between natural and spiritual, theoretical and practical truths, for every truth is now seen to have some sort of function to fulfil in the conduct of life as a whole if it is to have any claim to be truth at all. Certainly, thought moves freely from one phase of existence to another and recognizes no absolute separation between the truths of natural science and the doctrines of religious experience, for how can there be a separation in the same unity of experience between "knowledge" and "faith"?¹⁷ Still less can theological doctrines have any truth or meaning abstracted from the living experience which is the concrete reality, and to which they minister. On the other hand, if a theological system becomes linked to the self by some intense vivid experience which it seems to embody, it is accepted as true, for the reality of the self is extended to the objects of thought that meet such a response. "Nothing which I can feel like *that* can be false," says James. But Christianity with its faith in God as love, with its passionate beliefs verified through deeds of will rather than by logical reasonings, seems to accord with the fulness of experience, and involves a conception of the world that satisfies mind and heart, and is accordingly regarded as the truth.

In like manner, the purposes which engage my attention and call forth my action constitute the psychological nature of my true selfhood that becomes organized about these ends. I am the meaning of my life which is the set of purposes that have habitually been followed, and which I am now endeavouring to fulfil and intend to pursue. A self can have no past to remember except it reviews the purposes it has sought to realize. If these purposes are indefinite and unorganized, we are nobodies, we fall back into the ceaseless flow of mental states and have no proper individuality. Personality is an achievement. Merely to be conscious, to be the channel through which the

currents of the world flow, unrestrained and unrestricted, is to stand below what we conceive man to be and approximate to the animal and plant life. There is no value in a multiplicity of successive experiences as such, and when a man allows himself to be swept along by the natural and social world about him without reacting upon it so as to accomplish some self-chosen purpose, he has nothing, we feel, to distinguish himself as a human being from non-human existence ; indeed, we venture to believe that he causes the forces of nature to fail of their implicit purpose in relation to moral agents. To be a person, then, is to be something definite, to fulfil some end which I set before myself. Of course, this end is more than the business profession that I have chosen ; it is rather *the business of living* that distinguishes me from others and makes me what I am. Personality, therefore, comes to be through self-determined activity, and is ethical and good or bad according as the conduct tends to promote or hinder the most complete realization of the self in relation to others. Each may say : I am trying to live out my ideal of life ; and to fail of doing so is to fail of being, just as he who would be a physician but fails to fulfil this ideal is no physician, indeed nothing. With what tenacity we cling to these ideals which we set before ourselves, fearing to turn from them lest we lose our distinctive reality ! Thus the permanency of the end becomes the permanency, indeed the substantiality, of the self.

This conception of the reality of the self from the psychological point of view offers an easy transition from the individual to society, and shows that the relation between persons is of a moral character. Other persons have their reality in the unique ends which they realize. Many important practical truths follow from this relation of the individual to others. One is that each personality should be permitted to live out the meaning in which its reality consists. Kant

expressed the same thing when he said that each is to be treated as an end in himself and never as a means. I may use natural objects, as a realm of meanings subordinated to my own ends, according as they are fitted to serve my life. But another person has another sort of value which obliges me to think of the reality of that person in a way that I cannot apply to the objects of the physical world. My own being is so bound up in the maintenance and promotion of the being of others that I must do all possible to preserve and develop their life. The family, community, Church, and State are simply forms of my social relations in which I give to and take from others what is for our mutual benefit.

Still another reason for finding my own life in the preservation and promotion of that of others is found in the nature of ideals themselves which imply each other in a unity of differences and distinctions. Just as each thought implies the others in a whole of thought, so it takes all of us realizing ideal ends to fulfil the kingdom of God. Thus my neighbour and I have each an aspect of the divine purpose to fulfil whose realization in deeds of will constitutes our distinctive reality. I have also a moral interest in my neighbour's conduct and participate in its goodness or badness by reason of the intimate relation between us.

It is often said that no one but myself can bear my guilt and suffer the penalty of my wrong-doing, or atone for it. But the social relations that I sustain refute this statement, in part at least. If my neighbour fails to do his duty and accomplish what he undertakes as the proper business of life, I must make good the deficiency. If he neglects his family and they come to want, my own self-protection obliges me to offer help. The member of a family who goes wrong causes the others to make good, to atone, for his sin so that the family reality shall be preserved and its

good name rescued. Likewise I myself may come short and others have to make new adjustments of their activities in order to restore the social equilibrium. At this point it is easy to pass to the ideal of One who shall so feel the imperfections and wrongdoing of His brethren that He devotes His life to the task of making all things whole again, thus making peace through atonement.

This psychological relation of each self to other selves makes it clear what moral evil is and the way in which it is to be overcome. A moral act may, for our purposes, be regarded as implying a self-legislating agent who determines his own ends and principle of action, although the consciousness of self and reflection upon courses of conduct vary much in the different stages of personal development. Such an act has a complex nature on both its subjective and objective sides. As subjective, it implies, in some degree, a consciously conceived end, viewed as able to satisfy desire, which is determined upon as the good of the self in that particular situation. Objectively the deed has its consequences which alone can be definitely known by others. A moral act is good or bad according as it tends, both subjectively and objectively, to promote the well-being not only of the doer but of society as a whole. On the other hand, physical evils have no moral quality, but are conditions and events which would hinder the development of the self-conscious life, if yielded to, but which may be the occasion of a moral triumph if overcome by reflection and will.

In view of the nature of a moral action in relation to myself and others, I must have a care as to what I do, lest my deeds restrain the spiritual growth of my neighbour as well as of myself. Sometimes my moral wrongdoing is called sin, which emphasizes this personal relation, for sin has no existence outside of personalities. The only way, therefore, to overcome

and destroy the very existence of sin is to restore the personal relation so that the interrupted harmony may be renewed. Here is one of the most encouraging truths, for it means that my sin may be entirely blotted out by what happens in the hearts of the persons whom it concerns. The father is satisfied if his erring son lives again in his affections and the father lives in the son's love. What father worthy the name demands of the repentant son, as the condition of his acceptance, that he give back the wasted hours filled with faithful service, an impossibility, for the hours have gone? Likewise, I live with the belief that all persons, even the "Great Companion," whom my sin concerns, may establish the relations of harmony and peace so necessary to our mutual well-being. Till this is done, there is mutual discord, loss, and distress.

The restoration of the soul and its recovery from the hurt of sin consist, therefore, in view of what has been said, in a radical change in the principle of action whereby I seek what I did not before, and the essential consequence of the new course and motive of action is that I am become "right with God" and man, which means that both motives and acts tend in the direction of the fulness of life of myself and others. My true ideal being now becomes realized as it was not before. I am becoming a distinct personality in the kingdom of spirits because in me one part of the divine purpose is being set forth faithfully in my motives and deeds. Because of my necessary relation to others I now minister helpfully to their spiritual development. Since each stage of advancement has a more comprehensive ideal of moral attainment, the goal is no state of passive existence but always a life more abundant, with larger scope of activity, broader duties, deeper peace and joy as we move ever more steadily and readily in the way of life.

We may not, however, be over-curious as to how

this change whereby we adopt voluntarily a new motive and principle of action is to be psychologically interpreted. Doubtless many good reasons for it are found in our natural and social relations, as well as in the depths of our own selves. It may be due to inherited tendencies of the developing organism, impelling in the direction of a larger life and furnishing the physiological basis of the mysterious feeling-background of consciousness. It may be that the natural world, with its physical and physiological laws, reveals to me the truth that certain courses of action must be avoided, if well-being is to be gained, leading to the formation of a new ideal. It is certainly a wholesome experience when we awake to the fact that we are dealing with a natural world that has inexorable laws whereby deeds harmful to ourselves and others react upon us, occasioning the conviction that there must be a change in motives and principles of action if a desirable existence is to be reached. Or, again, the natural world, with its glorious beauty and sublimity, may lead us to new conceptions of our spiritual destiny, and it is easy to believe that a divine Self therein ministers to our spiritual well-being.

Our own inner life, too, may be the fruitful source of new motives. There seems to be an inexhaustible Reason in which our rationality participates, an infinite Self of which we are the expression. Nor are we without this inner witness. To myself, I am indeed an individual having my own life, but, in rare moments, my individuality seems merged in an infinite Whole of which I am a part, and I wonder if my life may not be the unfolding of a Self that is the source of all that is or ever can be. Surely it is conceivable that there may emerge in my consciousness, from some depth of Being in me, desires and motives which are different and lead, sometimes gently, often with great power, into the new way of life in which

old things have passed away and all things have become new.¹⁸

On the other hand, probably the chief occasions for the development of new ideals are found in the social relations which we sustain. These are very complex and far-reaching, but they all have a more or less direct personal aspect. As has been shown in this psychological study, we are social selves, and live in other personalities, and they in us. We cannot avoid acting with some idea of how others regard our actions. The thought of relatives, friends, and fellow-members of Church or society has a powerful determining influence on the formations of plans and purposes. The tendency is to do as others do. Of course, this principle works both for the good and the evil, but, on the whole, men seek their highest good, and the personalities in my social environment of outstanding worth are powerful restraints from the evil, helping my otherwise too feeble desire for a "better" state of myself to prevail through their influence for good, which means that I form my ideals and ends of action in the light of their character. Naturally the person who is most worthy and who has received the most of my attention will influence me most in the formation of my purposes. At this point the personal relation becomes very complex. No one moulds my character who fails to enter into my heart in sympathy and love and calls forth in me a like attentive response. That other life must also be near to my own, for I cannot adopt the life of one removed from my sphere and beyond my capacities. I must also follow in my own way, so there is no danger of reducing us all to one monotonous type. Rather will there be an infinitely rich variety, constituting the beauty of the moral kingdom of spirits in whom the Supreme Spirit finds His life. Any personality of the past or present of such worth that I heed its characteristics leads me to modify my own ideals, and to be and do a little better,

a little more wisely than before. Thus I belong to a limitless spiritual fellowship which has its foundation in the eternal Self. I now understand better the place Jesus occupies in the Christian consciousness. From many sources I have learned of Him, although I have never seen Him. As we have previously shown, it is a psychological principle that any object of consciousness tends to become real according to the amount of interest, feeling, and volition directed to it. Even persons vary in their realness for us according as the thought of them evokes much or little of our attention and affection. Likewise, my conception of Jesus grows and deepens until it calls forth in me such interested attention, contemplation, and emotion, that He becomes a living reality, transcending the limits of time and place, a real companion. Henceforth my decisions are made in the light of the characteristics of this Ideal Man which I would make my own. Thus I commit myself to ideals formed in the light of my knowledge of Him with confidence that in Him is the Highest Life I have yet known. If I am mistaken, I know no other way that is better. But, unless values are other than they seem, I may rest all upon Christ as the Person in whom the true life is found. And what is the true life? Surely it is in harmony with the innermost principle of nature and of spirit which is the very life as it is in God, the Author and Source of all things. If in Christ I find the governing truth of all reality, it would be folly to turn from Him who alone has the words of eternal life. "This is eternal life, that they may know God and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." Thus the Christian consciousness utters itself in conformity with the psychological law that ideas which are accompanied by great emotion and interest tend to be transformed into realities. Hence the idea of Jesus, stirring the very depths of the heart, is exalted into the place of supreme reality, and to Him our destiny is committed

and we find peace. The final significance of Jesus is not, however, settled by such a psychological analysis of the Christian consciousness, although the results of this analysis contribute to the determination of our ultimate view of the Person of Christ in relation to the whole of existence, that is, to God, men, and the world.

There is also a social inheritance in which I am made to share, psychologically considered, as a consequence of my own social relations. Only two factors in this social inheritance need be mentioned, namely, the Scriptures and the history of the religious community and its dogmas. These are such constituent factors in the Christian social consciousness that they have a proper claim upon the attention of every member of the social body. Both are authoritative in that they show what the religious consciousness has experienced, in the light of which my present ideals and purposes should be formed, if I am to guide my conduct securely in the normal course of life. But how shall I use the Scriptures? Psychologically considered, I never can use anything, no matter where I find it, except in the form of my own interpretation and response to it. That is, I am to find spiritual nourishment and guidance in the Biblical writings for myself, and "whoever appreciates simplicity and truth, grandeur and sublimity, must surely find pleasure and consolation in the sacred Scriptures. The reason why many a man does not care for them, is that he is not allowed freely to appropriate from them what suits him."¹⁹ The conflict of opinions as to origins and methods does not lessen the worth of what I find written. Who cares how the poet holds the pen that writes the inspiring song that sings its way through the years and into hearts, bringing blessing everywhere? Therefore, let me, unrestrained, move up and down in the Bible, in the wonderful storehouse of the treasures of the religious

consciousness. Not all the gems are equally attractive, but none are worthless, for through them shines the life of souls who have striven to rise out of nature's darkness into the clearness of full self-consciousness in God.

In like manner should we use the social inheritance that we have in the history of the religious community and of its doctrines. Even "symbolical ceremonies, hallowed by the veneration of thousands of years, must surely seem venerable and sacred to every one who has the slightest appreciation for history" (Paulsen). To be able to follow the development of our religion from the struggles of the early Christians to the almost unlimited activity of the Christian community of the present gives a steadiness to our faith and strengthens our conviction that we have committed our spiritual destiny to something that endures and passes not away. Therefore, let me move freely through the history of the religion which I have made my own. To be sceptical towards what others have believed, to see in those great historical controversies concerning what should be held only something to be refuted with brilliant array of modern arguments, or to be zealously enforced upon unwilling minds of the present, is sadly to miss the charm that the life of the past ought to have. If prescriptions concerning what we ought or ought not to believe were to yield to perfect freedom, "the creed as an unconstrained confession that we desire to belong to the great moral community that regards Jesus as the Saviour, that we wish to live and die in it, would break forth from a thousand hearts, who now look upon it with distrust and aversion" (Paulsen).

The consideration of the practical belief in God from the psychological point of view has been reserved till now, although reference has frequently been made to the divine purposes. The particular social community to which we belong believes in God, and the

belief is far deeper and more widespread among all classes than is commonly supposed.²⁰ This belief has a history which is a large factor in our social inheritance. The Christian theologian has been at work for centuries upon the doctrine of God, and the result of his toil is at hand. But our social inheritance also presents us with a still more complicated system of science and metaphysical speculation which has often furnished the sceptic with arguments. The complexity of views for and against the belief in God is distracting, and causes the inquirer after the way of life to cling the more firmly to the conviction that there is a proper relation of all these interests of the spirit which he strives to find, and which I believe psychological analysis will help him find, as I shall now try to show.

The first problem that arises is whether religion has anything that is not found in science and philosophy. In the name of truth, what does religion add that we had not before? Concerning this question the theologian yields too much and the scientist claims more than belongs to him. The theologian often attempts to transform the content of the religious consciousness into the system of conceptions produced by scientific reflection. The universe is then conceived as a closed system of law and order and regarded as divine and spiritual, which is to reduce religion to a mere point of view or sentiment concerning the facts already present. Thus the anxious theologian supposes that he has given full significance to the popular belief in God, whereas he has left out its important elements, for there is more in the primary personal experience than a thought-content, which is at best secondary, and in the service of the religious life. Just what this additional factor is comes near to being the question as to what man in his deepest being is. As already shown, the emotions and the will are involved in our beliefs whose objects are real to us.

Thus the religious belief in God is an original, personal experience involving emotion, thought, and will and claiming the whole being. In the very nature of the case there will always be something in the religious experience of God, as there is in the experience of every form of reality, which cannot be expressed in thought simply because it is not primarily thought at all, but which is, for that reason, not the less real and trustworthy, though it has to be designated in terms of feeling and will.

On the other hand, the scientist claims more than belongs to him, for he forgets that "so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term,"²¹ which can only mean that the consciousness of God is as trustworthy as the consciousness of any other object, for both are personal experiences and reality, "in the completest sense of the term." Besides, our psychological analysis has already shown that to abstract an object from its definite place in a self-conscious experience and treat it as complete in itself, and then to use its discovered laws in an attempt to explain personal self-conscious life as a whole, is precisely what the scientist does when he tries to explain morals and religion according to the principles of natural science, which are only valid within a relative sphere. Nothing short of the whole personal experience is the primary fact, and no one phase of it can remove the unique significance of the others, which allows the personal belief in God to have its full value in the life.

It is, however, probable that the personal belief in the Deity is never the same for different persons. Each believer relates himself in his own unique way to God according to his need, just as, to use a figure of Leibnitz in the *Monadology*, no one sees precisely the same city as another, but the city seen is as it is

for him. Likewise, to one, God is holy and a consuming fire toward iniquity ; to another, God is love and mercy ; to one, He is the God of battles, to another, the forgiving Father. Nor is it true that God is all these to any one at the same time, for one of these attributes tends to assume ascendancy over the others. Consequently, there can be no universal statement of what the belief in God is, considered from the personal standpoint. And yet, unless we are to stop here, it is necessary to find some conception of what the belief in God means, although its content can never be given precisely as it is in personal experience.

In the first place, the term God is the expression of the immeasurable need of life in its fulness, the persistence of the belief in God is due to the strength of the conviction that there is such life for us, and the difficulty of explaining the nature of God is commensurate with the difficulty of telling what this need of eternal life is. Even if we were compelled to grant, as I do not think we are, that there is no room for God in our knowledge of self, things, and other selves, there is vast room in the realm of our felt needs, a fact which found expression in Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of absolute dependence." Even the fact that what knowledge we have is an acquisition and *discovery* drives us beyond itself. But we have heart as well as mind, and the heart is not satisfied with less than the divine Person, the Father who cares for us and appreciates our particular needs and struggles, and supplements and completes our life whatever happens. For this reason the message of Jesus that God is the Father who loves and cares for His children, who rescues them from themselves and brings them safely to eternal life, was glad news to the common people. Because Jesus' message promises such full satisfaction, the heart is ready to believe. Just as a fountain cannot be less than the streams that flow from it, so

the Source of our Being cannot be poorer than we who feel, suffer, and love, but must be more than any one of us, for it produces us with our varied experiences, that is, it must be mind, heart, love, will, which can only be found in the Supreme Self.

In no particular is it more necessary to keep close to what is real in our life than it is in our reflection upon the belief in God. We are not complete without God, who fills out what in us is only begun. Our life is a bridge thrust forth which must have support beyond our vision. We demand not only that this Being, who is to be our God, shall have completely what we have fragmentarily, but also that He shall see to it that we in turn have all the completeness of life conceivable for us. But we are not even willing to trust to our own thought of what can be ours, but cast ourselves upon the perfect Reason as alone able to know what is possible for us. The mighty impulse of religion is for life. We want to be saved, not merely from sin but from the defeat of struggle, from the lurking disappointment that our victories are not more complete. The thirst of spirit requires the Fountain of Life.

It is remarkable that our contradictions and weaknesses are not sufficient to prevent our belief in God. Faith is even confident that these dark shadows have a final meaning. Religion refuses to be robbed of its object, come what will. Nor are we satisfied to believe that the contradictions which are such a burden to us lose themselves by being "transmuted" in an undifferentiated state of the Absolute, as Bradley says, though we do believe with him that all is reconciled and made whole.²² Rather do we believe that they appear from the standpoint of the divine purposes as incidentals, however painful they may be, along the way of spiritual development, but utterly overcome in the higher enjoyment of the soul that has attained unto the life that is eternal in God.

What is God ? As a term God is the supreme symbol of what the soul seeks, though it be but a stammering, broken utterance. The great seeking is only exceeded by the assurance, akin to knowledge, of completeness and peace in God.

Since there is this constant reaching out beyond what can be at a given time brought into actual being, which may be briefly expressed as the original need of life that seeks its satisfaction in various forms, the idea of God as the supreme satisfaction develops for the individual as he responds to what the community accepts as embodying its highest values. Here the principles of psychological development are instructive. "The whole problem of the gradual unfolding of the character of a supreme and all-wise God in human consciousness becomes the problem of the development of human character through struggle with nature, through social intercourse, and especially through reflection upon the conflicts which thus arise."²³

Beginning with the idea of some mysterious Power over men, vaguely conceived in symbols of various kinds, there is finally developed through many intermediate stages the idea of a personal deity, and the idea of the character of this deity becomes gradually purified and elevated in response to the character of the people. In the earlier forms of religious belief God is less ethically conceived than later. He is thought of rather as the Power able to deliver, avenge, protect, and save. "The individual could not believe in a good deity until he had conceived the good person and become aware of the obligation in his own breast impelling to the achievement of like good personality. Before this, the thought of deity is without the attribute goodness because the self-thought is without it. There is then a continuous upward progress in the religious life, keeping pace with the progress of the ethical life."²⁴ This statement is true, so far as it affirms the development of ethical conceptions in

relation to religion, but it assumes that there was a time when man had no conception of the good person, and, consequently, could not think of the goodness of his God, who requires goodness in man, thus making religion without ethical content. But this is to confuse the development of the conception of the good person with the origin of the idea of goodness. Rather has man always been capable of conceiving the good person and of recognizing obligation, but there has been a gradual change in the conception of what it is to be good.²⁵ If this be so, religion can scarcely have ever been without ethical content of some sort.

The conception of God has also been determined from the beginning by social relations on which ethical conceptions largely depend. Everybody forms purposes and acts with a view to the opinion of others and strives to attain that kind of ideal self that can be approved, if not by others, yet by a higher impartial Self or Judge. We seek our true ideal self that shall be worthy of approving recognition by the highest and most perfect Person.²⁶ It is inevitable that the best and the highest that we know should be identified with the Divine. The disciples being in the immediate presence of that perfect Life could not do otherwise than confess: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." The same is true of us; when we really know of Jesus of Nazareth, we measure our life by this best and highest of humanity and utter the confession: "My Lord and my God." So great is the interest, attention, and emotion evoked in us by this perfect Personality that Jesus becomes a present reality in whom and through whom we see God, and would "attain unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. iv. 13). The practical Christian belief in God is, then, belief in a Supreme Being who cares for us, to whom we may commit ourselves with complete confidence. In prayer, the purest expression of our religion, we use

the words, God, Father, Christ, and Holy Spirit, striving to give utterance to our trust in that other Self, that supreme Person whose self-revealing nature requires manifestation in different ways, each of which meets some special human need and deepens our insight into the Source of our life.

It would be of interest to consider at this point the psychological nature of belief in prayer, freedom, and immortality which seems to follow directly upon the belief in God, especially if the Deity is thought of as our Heavenly Father. These beliefs are, I think, also largely social in their origin and significance. But since the belief in God as in personal relations with us needs confirmation from the theoretical or philosophical point of view before considering beliefs that are closely joined with the belief in a divine Personality, an attempt will be made in the following chapter to relate this belief in God to some of the more important philosophical conceptions of the present day, in such a manner as to confirm and support this faith. Only a candid examination is needed to discover that modern thought is even more faithful to the deepest needs of the whole of life than the speculative thought of earlier generations, especially of the early Christian centuries. When has there been so much emphasis placed upon the practical and the empirical in science, politics, morals, philosophy, and theology? All are learning the lesson that the problems of "Knowledge, Life, and Reality" must be treated empirically and results must accord with the whole of experience.²⁷ Such has been the motive of this sketch of some of the psychological aspects of the religious self and the social consciousness. We now turn to some of the metaphysical problems concerning the belief in God as a personal Spirit.

CHAPTER XI

THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD

IN the preceding chapter it was shown that the rise of moral and religious ideas is socially conditioned, and that the idea of God develops through many stages until it reaches its highest form in the belief in God as a personal Spirit who is thought of as in direct relations with men. Thus the religion of our natural faith seems to require a personal God. Also, "according to the Christian conception, God is a personal spirit; that is, he exists, and possesses the necessary powers of a personal spirit."¹ This presents us with the problem whether or not the World-Ground can be speculatively conceived as self-conscious mind. If we should be able to establish this, it would be much. Whether we succeed or not, belief is confident that its God is self-conscious personality, Father. The certainty of belief shows at the start that it is not dependent upon previous reflection to prove the existence of God. As Kant long ago said, philosophical speculation may confirm the belief already present, but attempts to compel belief through logical reasoning are misdirected. But if religious faith, which often wavers in its hold upon its object, finds that the results of philosophical reflection are in essential agreement with the nature of its object, faith acquires a new strength. Does philosophy, then, as it is at present, tend to confirm the Christian belief in God, the supreme Mind, the personal Father?

It is necessary only to mention certain speculative views which were once more formidable than now. Materialism, for example, either monistic or pluralistic, affords no basis for the belief in God, but applies the term God to a phase of conscious experience, and regards consciousness itself as a form of matter. Indeed, any view which makes the ultimately real to be independent, individual existences of any sort, renders the search for a God still more real a contradiction. For a like reason there cannot be two ultimate principles, spirit and matter, for then there would be no infinite God, indeed no place for God at all. Nor is it satisfactory to consider matter and spirit as only expressions of some Unknown that is neither, for, "according to the Christian conception, God is a personal spirit."

The history of philosophy shows that the views just mentioned have been frequently met by the famous proofs for the existence of God, the most familiar being the teleological and moral arguments, while the cosmological and ontological had an honourable place, particularly in the schools. It has already been shown that Kant rejected the teleological argument as able to prove at best only an architect of the universe sufficiently wise and great to fashion material at hand into the existing forms of things; that it did not prove an infinitely wise Creator, but reached the perfect Being only by falling back upon the ontological argument, which attempts to establish the existence of God from the idea of a perfect Being, which, in order to be perfect, cannot lack existence; but the ontological argument does not get beyond the conception, and is only an identical or analytical judgment. The cosmological argument from a dependent being to the existence of a necessary Being likewise finally resorts to the conception of the most perfect Being as alone necessary, but this is to rest all upon the ontological proof which has been found inadequate.

The change in the status of these arguments since Kant is favourably shown by Lotze, who regards them as expressions of the belief in the reality of values which leads to the attempt to unite the ultimately worthy and the existent in the nature of God. Hegel also speaks of these arguments, not as proofs but as an expression of "that upward spring of the mind" from the sensuous and phenomenal to the apprehension of the Truth, and this signifies "that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth, and that beyond and above that appearance, truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God." As giving expression to this exaltation of spirit, these so-called proofs are but "the necessary and native channel in which the movement of mind runs."² The moral argument is usually given in connection with the other three, and may be in many respects treated in like manner. The real question at issue in it concerns the significance of moral facts in a general view of the universe involving the metaphysics of ethics, upon which we shall not enter.

Although these famous arguments were shown by Kant to be insufficient to establish the existence of God, let it suffice here to say that the Kantian philosophy itself "cut off the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking unbelief, fanaticism, and superstition," and introduced a method which in the form of modern idealism affords a constructive basis for the belief in God.³ This method consists in ascertaining the fundamental categories by which our experience of ourselves and the world is rendered possible. It is probable that Kant hoped to use the forms, categories, and principles of knowledge discovered in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the means of solving the problem of reality, but this task he never accomplished. Fichte, and especially Hegel, adopted from Kant this method according to which their

idealistic systems are formed. This method Hegel elaborates in his *Logic*, which he says "coincides with metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts,—thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things" (Sec. 24). Many others practically follow this method, as, for example, Lotze when he says the conception of the ultimate nature of reality has "merely to show what the universal conditions are which must be satisfied by anything of which we can say without contradicting ourselves that it is or that it happens." Professor Ladd, too, would study the universal forms of knowledge in order "to frame, if possible, a consistent and satisfying theory of reality." These and many other examples that might be given may be taken as a reply to Riehl, who says that we are not able to know God or to pronounce upon the nature of the ultimate ground of reality, and that philosophy must limit itself to the problem of knowledge.⁴ Our reply is that a thorough analysis of the nature of knowledge in its relation to its object is the only means of throwing any light upon the ultimate nature of existence, and that this method results in the following views, which seem to me to make the strongest claims upon our attention at the present time, although it is not altogether easy sharply to distinguish them. The first is idealism of an absolute character, which in somewhat different forms maintains that reality is a rational principle or Mind whose nature is to be self-revealing and self-differentiating in the world of things and persons, both of which are its qualitatively different manifestations. For this view the realm of existence is to be understood as a spiritual unity actively realizing the ends of perfect reason and will. The second view is pluralism, which does not undertake to pronounce upon the nature of the whole and has difficulty in showing the relations of the individuals to each other. The many reals may be spiritual in their nature, which

would afford a better prospect of attaining the unity of the many than would otherwise be possible. A third view undertakes to make a synthesis of the other two, and may be designated as theism. To these may be added a fourth, which is an old negation in modern form, limiting knowledge to phenomena and putting in the place of knowledge of God symbols of values which arise from reflection upon feeling, while thought continually strives to formulate these symbols of values that shall be the most useful and effective in the conduct of life. The representative of each of the above conceptions does not hesitate to say that his view expresses the essential truth of Christianity. These theories are rivals rather than victor and vanquished. Perhaps this indicates that the Christian theologian may find in them all elements that will enable him to form a constructive basis for theology.

To Hegel we owe the most elaborate working out of the idealistic conception of reality, which has already been reviewed (Chaps. VI., VIII.). We shall now consider only two different interpretations of the nature of the Absolute by representatives of modern idealism, one affirming that the Absolute is a self-conscious Being, a Self to whom it belongs to be manifested in a spiritual community of finite individuals, while the other interpretation maintains that the Absolute is not a self-conscious being but is identical with the community of finite persons, but is not itself a Person. This second view is pluralistic in character and affords a transition from the idealistic to the empirical pluralism of the pragmatic school. That the Absolute is self-conscious Spirit, to whom it belongs to be revealed in the unity of differences, that is, in the world of finite things, events, and persons, is the message of T. H. Green, the Cairds, John Watson and many others. They themselves intend their philosophy to serve as a satisfactory basis for the constructive interpretation of Christianity. Nor is the Christian

theologian often disappointed in his appeal to their writings. It is not necessary to review their arguments in detail. Green, for example, shows that the world-process is itself a mode of the expression of the Divine Spirit; our own spirits are even the self-communication of God in connection with and under the limitations of a physical organism. Thus our conscious individuality is a communication and impartation of the mind of God under the limitations of finiteness. Our rational principle is identical with the eternal Reason and our knowledge is true in and through its identity with the divine Mind. But our knowledge cannot be finally separated from the good which is the living harmony between the reason and the will in self-conscious experience. We may not now fully realize this, but we are conscious of a better state than we are now in, which means that there must be a "best" in some Self that experiences it perfectly. So the good of our life is to repeat in ourselves according to our measure this Highest Good which is already the experience of the Divine Self. Thus both in our knowledge and in our moral striving for the good we are the impartation and self-communication of—shall we not say?—the mind and heart of God under the limitations of finiteness. Thus truth and good are inseparable in being, a union of reason and will in the living experience both of the human and Divine Self.

In like manner Professor Watson declares that the nature of our knowledge forces upon us the conception of the divine Intelligence which "contains within itself the principle of its own differentiation, and must therefore be a free, self-determinant rational whole which expresses itself in every part, or employs every part as the means of its own self-realization. Knowledge, in any proper sense of the term, must include all that the total nature of our experience compels us to affirm, and the total nature of our experience is incom-

prehensible unless there is presupposed in it the all-pervasive activity of an infinite Spirit." This means that "there is no reality which can be called finite in the sense of that which is separated from the Infinite and exclusive of it. What we call the finite is a particular phase of the whole viewed in its isolation, as if it could be without the whole. The finite in other words exists only for a knowing subject that has not yet learned what is involved in its own experience." Nor is constructive idealism a pantheism since the divine principle as self-determined manifests itself differently in the different realms of existence, and in self-determining persons.⁵

In like manner Bosanquet expresses an idealism which represents the Absolute as an inclusive Self, the truly concrete universal, the unity of many individual selves. This view gives special importance to the logical conception of reality. The world order in which the absolute Self is revealed is a logic made actual. Every factor in the whole is what it is according to the logical requirement of the entire realm of conditions. For example, the human self arises when its world is ready, preceded by an immense evolution "which is practically and relatively from unconsciousness to consciousness." The soul, to adopt a phrase of Lotze, is "a perfection granted by the Absolute according to general laws, upon certain complex occasions and arrangements of externality." This soul-centre of experience gathers its content in response to its physical and social environment and has for its life-task to unify itself, to organize itself about some definite end by which it becomes a concrete universal, a unity of many modes of activity, and the more unity it has, the higher is its degree of being. The divine unity is the soul's true goal of striving. But there is nothing contingent about the finite or infinite Self or the world-order, for all is logical. The evil as well as the good will-act is the logical issue of the self one

is. Nor is this fatalism, for it is the only view that makes freedom possible, for the act is the expression of the real self, which is to be self-determined and thus free. Nor is there any separation between being and value, nor between means and end. Value belongs to the whole, and so equally to the parts, for they are both means and end. Expressing the same thing in a more practical form, our human selves are embraced in the divine Self-hood revealed in us and the world-order, all of which forms a logical, rational whole in which the highest good is realized. We individually have our unique place and value in the whole, for we have our life in and through each other in the Divine Self. Time and space relations, nature and ourselves are all different aspects of the divine experience, just as, for example, the poet Dante is related to his *Divine Comedy*, in which the scenes of Italy, time and space relations, and the emotions of real individuals are embraced, but the whole, with its parts, is in the unity of the author's experience. All of these factors are, to use a phrase of Bradley's, "transmuted" in the divine experience, and each is known in the light of its value in the whole. This particular value constitutes its individuality. Practically this would mean that our little lives, of which we see at any instant only a fragment, are "transmuted" in the divine experience in the sense of being lifted up and understood in their relations to the significance and value of reality as a whole. Practically our individuality is known and experienced by God in an adequate manner to which our self-knowledge never attains.⁶

The same method of analysing our experience to discover its fundamental categories as a means of solving the problem of Being is adopted by Professor Royce in his effort to answer the question, What is reality? which transforms itself into the question, What is Truth? The key to the solution of this

problem concerns the relation of ideas to their objects, of truth to being. Some of the more important points in the argument follow.

The idea and its object cannot be finally independent of each other. If the object were a real existence independent of the idea, the idea would fulfil its purpose, even if the object vanished. We may say that in order to be true, an idea must correspond to its object, but this requires us to make clear what we mean by the correspondence of an idea to an object and what is to be understood by the object. Consequently, having an object and corresponding to it are different relations. We consider first the relation of correspondence. This does not mean similarity or likeness of idea and object. Mathematical symbols are not like the objects denoted by them; a map is not a copy of the country; the idea of a dog does not bark. And yet "the idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess. . . . The identity that suffices to establish a sufficient correspondence must, then, be like the identity found . . . when you compare the map with the region to which the map corresponds,—an identity serving some conscious end, fulfilling and intent, possessing a value for your will." The intent may vary, but the test of the truth of the idea is always the same, namely, "Is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended? If it is, the idea is true. If it is not, the idea is in so far false." The object of an idea is thus of the nature of a purpose or end for the will to fulfil, for "every idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellectual process." This selective intent predetermines what the object of the idea is to be and is the "internal meaning of the idea." "Hamlet is what Shakespeare's idea intends him to be." "The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object

of which the idea can ever take note. This alone is the Other that is sought." This Other is the "external meaning of the idea," but if the idea ever perfectly embodies its intended meaning, then the internal and external meanings of an idea would be identical in an actual experience.

As a matter of fact, however, our ideas are inadequate representations of what we intend by them, and so lack something which we seek to give them. The idea of our life, for example, is vague, and we seek a more definite understanding of it. All our ideas are thus confronted by an Other, that is, a possible, more complete embodiment of what we intend by the ideas we have ; we would move on into those complete ideas which have no Other than what they are. But " this instant's idea is true if, in its own measure, and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression. Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it were, to express. It is with any finite idea as it is with any form of will. Any of its transient expressions may be at any instant more or less abortive. But no finite idea is wholly out of correspondence to its object, as no will is wholly false to itself."

If now our finite ideas are inadequate and fragmentary, we are able to say that the finally true and real form a unity in a living experience, or, otherwise expressed, idea and object are identical in the divine life. " This life is at once a system of facts and the fulfilment of whatever purpose any finite idea, in so far as it is true to its own meaning, already fragmentarily embodies. This life is the completed will, as well as the completed experience, corresponding to the will and experience of any one finite idea. In its wholeness, the world of Being is the world of individually expressed meanings,—an individual life consisting of the individual embodiments of the wills

represented by all finite ideas. Now *to be*, in the final sense, means to be just such a life, complete, present to experience, and conclusive of the search for perfection which every finite idea in its own measure undertakes whenever it seeks for any object." In other words, our knowledge and purposes are fragmentary. "We wait, wonder, pass from fact to fact, from fragment to fragment. What a study of the concept of Being reveals to us is precisely that the whole has a meaning, and is real only as a Meaning Embodied." The ideas awakened in us far transcend what we are now able to verify, and look forward to an experience that is not now ours. But in the divine life, experience and idea harmonize; absolute experience and absolute thought are united. Thus our fragmentary experiences, our incomplete ideas and imperfect purposes, with the sorrow, hopes, and fears inseparable from them, are factors in the Inclusive Self, the self-conscious personal Life beyond whose experience there is nothing possible. The definite meaning of our life constitutes our individuality as it is known to the Divine Self, gives us our place in being, appoints to us the moral and religious task of bringing ourselves into conscious union with the Divine Person, an ethical union in which the distinct reality of the human and divine personality is maintained and not lost in the undifferentiated One of the mystic.⁷

A few words must suffice concerning Lotze's method of reaching a somewhat similar conclusion concerning the divine nature in relation to finite persons. By an analysis of our experience of things, relations, and change, Lotze shows that things, taken generically, are what they are in mutual relations in a system. But the interaction of things, including the cognitive processes of the soul in relation to objects (*Met.* Sec. 60), cannot be understood except after the analogy of a personal subject present in and unifying its objective states and yet being a true

individual in the midst of their succession and change. If, therefore, we are to think of the unity, permanence, and change of the world of things at all adequately, it must be thought of as the realization of an immanent self-conscious Mind who is the supremely real because He has "being-for-self" most completely. Thus the world is the progressive realization of an immanent Intelligence and Will. Is God also transcendent as well as immanent in the world? Yes, by the act of personality which distinguishes itself from its objects yet is immanent in them. Consequently, this is not pantheism, as Höffding says it is, but theism, as Lotze maintains, for we hold to the distinction of God from His world due to His existence-for-self. If it is objected that God cannot be personality since this implies distinction of self from not-self and there is nothing which is not a dependent expression of the Absolute, then we may say that there is no not-self except for a subject, that it is not a spatial separation but an act of the subject distinguishing itself from its objective states. Nor is there anything in self-consciousness as such which essentially requires another existence to arouse this consciousness of self, though in us it is thus conditioned. We may therefore confidently say, not only that God is a Person but that "Perfect Personality is in God only, to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof."

Of vital interest is our relation to God. We have no special hesitation in admitting that material existences are the immanent activities of the Divine Self which to our cognitive powers give the appearance of substantiality, but we are different; we claim individuality of our own for we feel and know it. Are we, then, resolved into the all-embracing unity of the divine activity? Here spatial terms are entirely inapplicable. Nothing, not even ourselves, is "outside" the Whole, and God is all in all. But we receive some help at this point by recognizing that God's

activities in His world are qualitatively different. So at least our relation to God differs from that of material existences, for we have, as material existences have not, self-consciousness and memory; we exist for self and experience suffering and enjoyment. We are other than the Divine Self just by this mutual excluding act of personality. He is in us but, by the ceaseless act constituting personality, He is other than we are, and we being an object to ourselves and distinguishing ourselves from what is other, are other than God, yet have our existence in Him. "A mind which continues immanent in the Infinite, as a state, activity, or modification of it, directly that (notwithstanding this immanence) it exists for self, has in this very existence the fullest reality."

Our conclusion must then be, according to Lotze, that the universe is spiritual and rational and that in knowing Being we know God. But even this is too poor a conception, for what does existence after all mean? To this question Lotze replies that, while a pre-established deterministic system of logical successions in which there are no repetitions may be conceivable, the final rationality of the world can only be found in the living satisfaction of God and finite spirits who experience the good in and through the world process, but not passively. It is an attainment made possible by the application of general laws, learned from repetitions of like events, to new situations requiring intelligent direction of activity which brings peculiar satisfaction to the subject, and yet in all these changes the identity of the universe remains the same through the constancy of its meaning or purpose which is the Highest Good of self-conscious spirits. "Genuine reality in the world . . . consists alone in this Highest Good personal, which is at the same time the highest good Thing. But since all the *value* of what is valuable has existence only in the spirit that enjoys it, therefore all apparent actuality is

only a system of contrivances, by means of which this determinate world of phenomena . . . is called forth, in order that the aforesaid Highest Good may become for the spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it." Since the coherency of the world is thus "ordered in pursuance of the injunction of the Sole Reality, in the world,—to wit,—of the Good, our cognition possesses more of truth than if it copied exactly a world of objects that has no *value* in itself," a statement that reminds us of Plato's Idea of the Good in relation to the object and the subject. Thus the confidence that knowledge is a trustworthy guide in our intercourse with Being is a necessary implicate of our conviction that the final meaning of the world can only be found in the Highest Good of personal life, and this conviction seems to be confirmed by reflective thought.⁸

Before we can regard the conception of God's personality as finally established, it is necessary to consider the view that God is not a person or self but is identical with the community of selves in which the Divine Spirit is wholly expressed, just as, for example, a college is a spiritual community of persons, each of whom knows the unity that the members form, but the members are not *for* the spiritual unity which would have to be the case if God were a personal self. This view of God assumes that it is not necessary that Spirit be personal, hence God may be spirit without being personal. This conception of the Absolute, M'Taggart, as we saw in Chapter VIII., believes to be the true interpretation of Hegel's idea of God, thus differing from the line of thought developed in dependence upon Hegel by Green, the Cairds, Royce, Lotze and others, who reach the conclusion, as we have found, that God is the Absolute yet also self-conscious personality. Two categories of the Hegelian logic are of chief importance in support of the view that the Absolute as spirit is totally revealed

in the community of persons and yet is not a Self, namely, the Category of Life and that of Cognition. The Category of Life requires that reality be a unity manifested in a plurality so that the whole meaning of the unity "lies in its being differentiated into that particular plurality, and that the whole meaning and significance of the parts of the plurality lies in their being combined into that particular unity." Our next resort is the Category of Cognition by which the parts, knowing each other, also know their unity, thus providing through this mutual knowledge for the unity of the plurality. In this manner the Category of Cognition renders it not only possible but actual that the whole should be in the parts and yet be the whole of which they are the parts. A still higher bond of unity is the mutual love of persons. Since this mutual knowledge and love involving the consciousness of unity are possible only in persons, and since this community of persons is God, these persons cannot cease to be or be replaced by another without a break in the continuity of manifestations ; since, then, they are essential, fundamental differentiations of the spiritual unity or God, finite persons are as eternal as God and immortality is assured.

This view seems to get rid of certain difficulties attaching to the conception of the personality of God, such as the self opposed to a not-self, which M'Taggart thinks Lotze does not overcome ; also the difficulty of showing how God can be more than His world as well as the difficulties connected with time and space relations. It is a movement, I think, in the direction of pluralism, and might be interpreted as meaning that reality consists only of a multitude of individuals whose unity is in some inexplicable way provided for, and that there really is no supreme being to whom the term God is applicable. But shall we pay this price for relief from the difficulties involved in the conception of the divine Personality ? 9

It is not easy to avoid the feeling that no form of idealism so far considered adequately takes account of the hard facts of daily life with its sin and suffering. The pragmatist attacks the idealist for gliding over the problem of sin and evil by affirming that they are "in the temporal order the very condition of the perfection of the eternal order," and that nothing really new ever takes place through personal initiative in the perfect monistic system eternally present to the Absolute Intelligence. Although pragmatism claims to be only a method and theory of truth with no specific metaphysical results to defend, it is a good working hypothesis to think of ourselves as real persons with free initiative capable of and actually producing new factors in reality. Indeed, why not say reality itself develops and the really new comes to be? Practically we are limited to the real which, as Professor James seems to say, is what is immediately given in the percepts to which our conceptions or ideas refer. Our working truths are only tentative and do not permit us to pronounce upon the nature of the whole, reminding us of Kant's solution of the first and second "antinomies." On the other hand, these working truths offer no obstacle to the entirely new and unique. Consequently, we cannot say with the idealist that the world is already perfect and therefore saved. It works better to believe that the world may be saved or lost according to what individuals constituting it do. It is neither pessimism, optimism, nor, strictly, meliorism, for it might be devolution to the bad and chaotic. Whatever view most fully satisfies our needs and has the best results when applied in the working out of definite ends has most claim to acceptance as true; for this reason we may be meliorists. We are always in the active attitude of response to what occurs, and our ideas are tools that become true only as events verify them. Nor can we prescribe what shall be

by any law that shall be an absolute anticipation of reality.

Pragmatism is then an empirical pluralism with some connection of the factors, and with even an irrational element as things now are. And, if there is ever to be a monism, it is a goal of achievement, a unity to be accomplished. As to distinctively theological ideas, if they "have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged." Even the conception of the Absolute has some truth so far as it brings comfort and has any consequences whatever for our life, and to this extent ought to be held.¹⁰

Strictly, pragmatism is a method or theory of truth and not a metaphysic. It claims to be radically empirical, and yet a view of the ultimate nature of reality seems to be implied, especially in the affirmation of "A Pluralistic Universe." But as the metaphysics of pragmatism is still in doubt, I shall refer briefly to distinctly pluralistic theories of reality which are of several forms. The atomism of Democritus has had many modern representatives who seek to explain the world on the hypothesis of elements evolving things according to mechanical laws. But this raises the difficulty as to the relation of mechanism and teleology and involves the question whether there can be an end, and if there is an end, must there not be some guiding Intelligence in reality? If the elements are physical reals or of unknown nature, how can pluralism explain the origin of self-conscious minds, each being in principle a unity of differences? If the elements are independent spiritual existences, how can they know each other and be conscious of unity among themselves? This objection seems to hold even of M'Taggart's interpretation of the Hegelian

Categories of Life and Cognition already explained. Moreover, how can this view account for birth and death, since these spiritual existences seem to be eternal?

The difficulties of both pluralism and absolute idealism, however, are so great that theism attempts a mediation. This requires, according to Professor Ward in *The Realm of Ends*, that the reality of the many be granted, but that God, however exalted as a self-conscious Personality, shall be thought of as finite. Does theism thus interpreted involve less difficulty than either pluralism or absolute idealism? In the first place, theism is superior to pluralism, understood as a manifold of spiritual existences which seems to be its most favourable form, in that it provides for their unity by a supreme Being that somehow embraces their individual reality in His own experience. A second advantage is that the theist's conception of God gives assurance that the pluralist's ideal will be attained of which the pluralist is not assured, since the issue according to this theory depends solely upon the action of the individuals. But divine providence cannot fail of fulfilling its purpose. In the third place, the goodness and perfection of God enriches the character of the pluralist's ideal and gives assurance of blessedness.

But now we must consider some of the conditions which theism has to provide for. It does not maintain that God is merely a transcendent Being beyond the many, but it also assumes that this Being is related to the many as no one of them is related to the rest, for the many somehow exist in and through the supreme Spirit. At this point the theist introduces the idea of creation, by which divine act the many are supposed to be given existence in a way that is different from absolute idealism. Before asking what validity the idea of creation has speculatively, let it be noted what it is supposed to provide for. It is believed

that creation gives substantial existence to finite beings, material and spiritual. The ordinary view is that this creative act occurred at a definite time and, not very consistently, it is also affirmed that the creative act begins the time order. God is supposed to put off from Himself a world of things and persons and yet be somehow in it and have knowledge of its processes. The thing of chief importance is the creation of finite persons who have freedom of initiative independent of the divine will and foreknowledge, which requires divine self-limitation both as to knowledge and power. As Professor Howison says, "Unless creators are created, nothing is really created." That is, if finite persons are really free, they may do what is not foreordained and foreknown, and the world of creatures may evolve radically new features not anticipated and not prearranged. Of course it is said that divine foreknowledge is quite consistent with entire freedom of initiative on the part of the finite, since knowledge of what will be is possible without being the cause of what is done. Whether this is possible or not depends, I think, on what is meant by the independence of free moral agents.

It is, however, time to ask if theism's conception of creation and what it implies can be regarded as a satisfactory substitute for and differentiation from pluralism and absolute idealism. That the doctrine of creation has its difficulties is readily granted. Among them are, for example, the fact that our experience of the physical world does not compel us to admit creation, nor is there anything in this experience to justify us in denying it. There is, as Kant showed us, always an antithesis to the assumption of a First Cause, for the world of things and even selves may be eternal. Besides, if creation occurred at a finite date in the past, what could have been God's motive to create then and not before? Why should God wait, as Hartmann says, "half an eternity content

without a good that ought to be" ? (quoted by Ward). Nor can we conceive of creation as a putting forth from God of a substantial existence, for, as Spinoza says, "one substance cannot be produced by another" (*Ethics*, i. 6). Creation, then, can only mean the dependence of the world upon God, which implies that the creation of the world signifies something involved in the essence of God, or, as Hegel says, "without the world, God is not God." But here we are again upon the absolute idealist's ground, for the idealist asserts the dependence of the world upon God. The theist also has difficulty as regards the knowledge and self-consciousness of God. Professor Ward holds that if the divine experience is to be self-conscious, it would imply that all finite experiences are in this divine self-consciousness, and that this is simply pantheism, leaving no room for divine transcendence. On the other hand, the same writer holds that the theist's God can only be self-conscious at the cost of being finite in being and knowledge, for self-consciousness, it is held, is impossible without a not-self, which implies something that is not God. But it has been shown in this chapter that Lotze and Royce, for example, as well as many others, would deny that God cannot be self-conscious and as subject transcendent and yet immanent in the world. Instead, this school of idealists holds that only in a supreme self-conscious Intelligence can there be real unity of the many whose reality just consists in being the differentiations and self-manifestations of God.

In view of the above difficulties involved in the conception of creation, it may be said that the theist does not clearly distinguish his view of the world's relation to God from that of the idealist who identifies God with the Absolute. Indeed, the strength of the doctrine of creation lies very largely in the impossibility of our conceiving how the finite can be at all, whatever our theory of reality may be. Since we

always feel a sense of this mystery of finitude, we are easily led to grant that there may be such a special creative act on God's part as the theist teaches, yet theoretically the theist has very little advantage over those who identify God with the Absolute. Strictly, the theist's God should be a finite God, but how is this possible? Can there be a self-limitation of divine knowledge and power sufficient to make room for the caprice of free moral agents? Such is the theist's primary motive for his theory.

Overlooking these inherent difficulties of the doctrine of creation, let it be noted that the theist deals with the problem of evil in a manner that has much to commend it. One thing is clear, if God exists, nothing is absolutely evil, and the problem of evil cannot be altogether insoluble. This theism makes evident by maintaining that the *possibility* of evil is essential to the world's perfection but *actual* evil is not, otherwise to replace it by good, to put virtue in the place of vice, would only diminish, not increase, the world's perfection. What is meant by saying the possibility of evil is essential to the perfection of the world is that this perfection has to be wrought out by personal selves who, in their striving after good, often do evil in the exercise of their own self-guidance. Whatever moral evil there is, then, is not absolute evil, since it comes to be only through the striving of finite persons who may do either good or evil and by whom the good has to be realized if it is to be at all. But this does not mean that the evil as actual is essential to the perfection of the world. This is one of the strongest arguments in favour of the theistic doctrine of creation and goes far towards counter-balancing the objections against it, as well as apparently differentiating theism from absolute idealism, which, it is held, regards evil itself an essential factor in the world of differentiations in which the divine unity is manifested. Herein also theism not

only recognizes the hard facts of experience which so strongly appeal to the pragmatist and the pluralist, but it gives a more significant interpretation of the place of evil in the world than either affords.¹¹

Our discussion has reached a point where we would welcome a way of escape from the difficulties that seem to attach to every theory of reality. Höffding proposes that we hold to the Kantian distinction between the theoretical and practical reason and with Schleiermacher make all theological ideas symbolic expressions of the religious consciousness whose chief characteristic is a form of feeling. The same thing, for example a storm at sea, may be considered from the standpoint of knowledge and from that of value. To understand the storm at sea, we have to explain it by natural causation, but, at the funeral of the victims, the same event is explained in terms of value "by saying that God wished to give those left behind a sign that they should depart from the error of their ways."¹² Thus knowledge and the feeling of value are two orders that run parallel through our experience.

Since religious experience is a form of feeling, and "all feelings express the value that an event in the inner or outer world has for us," it is necessary to understand further the nature of feeling, value, and religious experience. Feelings are pleasurable or unpleasurable according as some need of the subject is satisfied or not. Values are properties possessed by a thing or event which, in relation to a subject capable of feeling, produce an immediate satisfaction or serve as a means to procuring it, and are, therefore, mediate or immediate. Values are also the pre-suppositions of means and ends in relation to activity. Religious experience is religious feeling and derivative, for it is "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence." Appropriating a scientific term, we may call the "conservation of value the characteristic axiom of religion" and the

feeling for the fate of values in reality the religious feeling and the essence of religious experience. The different religions express this axiom in forms suited to the people and the age.

What now is the function of religious ideas in relation to this feeling for the fate of values? They are, of course, secondary, and have no claim to scientific truth. Religious ideas are simply "symbolical expressions for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men in their struggle for existence." These expressions of the inner life of feeling differ with the age and people, as is shown by the varying conception of God, which is not a scientific term but a symbol of religious feeling and represents the presentiment, which arises at the limits of knowledge, "that the principle of the world of values is in the end identical with the principle of causal connection within existence—that it is one and the same thing which enables us to find values in existence and which makes this existence comprehensible to us." "From the religious point of view, God, as the object of faith, means the principle of the conservation of value throughout all oscillations and all struggles, or, if we like to call it so, the principle of fidelity in existence." These expressions of religious feeling exhibit a progressive development through the myth and the legend to the dogma and symbol and are akin to poetry in character. In a living dogma can still be traced the original affective interest which led to it. The ideal dogmatic would require that every dogma should spring immediately out of religious feeling and form, in relation to other dogmas, a logical harmony, which was the ideal of Schleiermacher and Newman. In this development of dogma, the hope is that we shall come "to shape our innermost and most essential experiences into images so powerful that we shall never be able to consign them to oblivion."

The axiom of the conservation of values carries with it the implication that reality is not presented to

us as complete but as in process of becoming. Indeed, reality itself is a postulate, and it may be that it is for ever in the toils of becoming, so that the continual appearance of new empirical content is no mere accident. The issue must also depend in part upon us, for personality is the centre of value and experience, and, though their individuality seems to tend to disunion, there is being wrought out a unity of personalities which is the highest and holiest good. This unity of life marks the goal of religious thought. Thus what is usually called dogma—and the same may be said of theology—is only poetry, not, however, “vague moods and imaginings, but the spontaneous and living form in which that which has been actually lived through in moments of violent excitement clothes itself. Some such process as this underlies all dogmas and symbols taken at the moment of their birth.”

It is with much approval that one follows Höffding's skilful attempt to make room for both knowledge and faith. The conception of the conservation of values in reality is of profound significance and comes near being all that can be desired. But, if religious ideas are mere symbols of values, some value would fail to be conserved, for knowledge is of value, and these ideas at least seem to have a cognitive meaning. How far must we go in admitting that our idea of God as personal spirit, for example, not to mention the more specific conceptions of Christian theology, has no scientific worth as knowledge? Everything seems to turn, in this entire discussion, finally upon the relation of religious experience and its ideas to knowledge.

Only a few words can be given to the difficult problem just mentioned. (*a*) With the pragmatist—and many of the idealistic school—we may say that knowledge is no abstract thing but is only an idea or rule of action that is embodied in experience, and that works, if it is real and true. If so, religious ideas, so far as they “work” and receive verification in experi-

ence, so far as they conduct us securely from point to point in experience, are as much knowledge as any scientific law which can do no more for us. (b) Is there not a sense in which all ideas are symbols, even scientific and mathematical conceptions, as well as religious ideas? This Höffding himself grants. But does a difference of degree in the symbolic character of religious ideas as compared with other ideas make it impossible to find a cognitive element in religious ideas? (c) Again, Höffding—and this is true of Schleiermacher and his school—seeks to find the essence of religion in feeling, considered as mere feeling, of which nothing can be said. But psychological analysis shows that there are no such feelings unrelated to ideal elements. Now the relation of the elements of conscious life is such that, although sensations may probably occur without an accompanying feeling as in the indifference zone, feelings occur with sensations rather than in pure isolation from ideational content.¹³ These ideal factors present with feelings of whatever quality must be relatable to the other ideational contents throughout the entire experience, thus placing the ideas accompanying religious feelings upon the same basis as other ideas which it is granted enter into knowledge. But since there is an intellectual need of coördinating all our ideas, religious ideas not only have a content which may, but must, be harmonized with other conceptions in a unity of knowledge in which alone the mind can rest satisfied. (d) Kant's criticism may be again repeated here, namely, that the principle of natural causation is relative only. But those who regard religious ideas as mere symbols, base knowledge upon a universal application of the causal relation as the only principle of scientific explanation and of knowledge. We may also remind ourselves of Wundt's *psychical causality* which is indeed related to physical causality but not contradictory to it, dealing precisely with those psychical combinations such as

values and ends which lie outside the sphere of physical causation. Practically the same thing may be expressed in another way by saying with Lotze that "intuitions of another species fall to our lot, such as the senses can never supply, and such as constitute just that religious cognition which obtrudes itself upon us with immediate certainty."¹⁴

There is, then, a final identity between reality and value. It has already been shown that Bosanquet believes the value of the Whole is not to be represented as the termination of a series of phenomena but as identical with the parts. Whatever has a place in being is thereby both within the rational unity of reality and has its unique value. Lotze, too, places the final reason for the world's existence in the divine satisfaction and the satisfaction of finite spirits capable of experiencing and enjoying reality. Lotze even says the beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics, and that the ground of what is must be sought in that which should be (Conclusion of *Metaphysics*). There are also many others who hold that that which should be and finally is can only be in the form of self-conscious experience of the divine and finite personalities in intimate relation. Here I think we find the goal for which thought searches. It is not, however, a position that admits of demonstrative proof. There are other views, such as Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable Power, or of Hartman's Unconscious Thought and Will, or of Bradley's super-rational, super-personal Absolute, or the conception of God as a community of finite spirits, and many other forms of pluralism with its doubtful unity. None of these views, nor even that of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* of "consciousness, or rather a supra-consciousness that is at the origin of life," seems sufficiently satisfactory, however ably developed.¹⁵ We seem shut up practically to a choice between two views. The first is an idealism which regards God as self-conscious Spirit differenti-

ated in finite persons whose self-conscious experience is taken up into the divine experience. Thus God is Absolute in the sense that no existence fails to be embraced within the divine self-manifestation. The idealist plainly acknowledges the mystery of finitude, and has practically no explanation of it except the formula that it belongs to spirit just to manifest itself in a unity of differences and to be self-conscious in this realization of thought and will.

The second view is that of the theist, who shrinks from saying that God is Absolute in the sense of embracing all the finite, especially our thought and will, and, in the place of the mystery of finitude which the idealist acknowledges, the theist offers the doctrine of creation, by which there is supposed to be some sort of divine act by which God in self-limitation of His knowledge and power gives independent existence to finite persons who may do good or evil in the realization of their personality. But there really is very little to distinguish the theist from those to whom God is the Absolute; even the theist often affirms that God is Absolute, nor does he make it clear that he means more by creation than the dependence of the world upon God. Whatever independence the theist intends to give to the finite by the doctrine of creation seems to be cancelled by his other doctrine of divine preservation and conservation of the world that has been created, and by the doctrine of divine immanence.

Our chief purpose has been to enquire whether the Christian conception of God as self-conscious Personality is at all confirmed by the speculative thought of the present time. This, I believe, has been shown sufficiently for our purposes, although I am aware of many details and difficulties that cannot now be even mentioned. If there is any wavering between rival conceptions of reality, it is a thoroughly pragmatic principle that the scale turns at last in favour of that which accords best with those intellectual, aesthetic,

ethical, and religious values that our conduct of life cannot permit to be crushed.¹⁶ Faith is the dominant factor which determines what is finally held to be true. "The ultimate object of all philosophy is to bring a meaning into things, or rather to reveal the meaning which underlies all things. In the last analysis, however, this meaning is not a matter of knowledge, but of volition and faith. What the philosopher himself accepts as the Highest Good and final goal he projects into the world as its good and goal and then believes that subsequent reflections also reveal it to him in the world. . . . It is our own loves and hates, our desires and aversions, our wills and not our understanding, that place before us the goal which is worthy to be the final meaning of all."¹⁷ Thus we build upon the idea of perfection which springs up in our experience the philosophy which will satisfy not only the mind but the heart.¹⁸

Let our faith, then, not without deep reason, as we have seen, declare that we know God, and utter itself in the impressive thought that we are constituent factors in the life of God who participates in our own life and self-existence. The eternal nature of God is to find His realization in a society of selves of which He is also a member—a kingdom of Spirits, enjoying, suffering, and triumphing in the pursuit of ends sought as something to be experienced with satisfaction. But is there no supreme end that to the divine Mind is most worthy of realization in the world-order? Could God make His end in the world's creation other than the Supreme Good which self-conscious spirits are capable of experiencing and enjoying? This Highest Good alone can give meaning to existence, for there is no final significance in anything apart from its relation to some being capable of appreciating it.

Still more fascinating is the thought that finite selves may be so essential to the fulfilment of the

divine purpose in His eternal self-realization that their ceaseless existence is required for the perfect exhibition and fulfilment of that purpose which involves the very being of God Himself. Theoretically a dependent being like man can exist only so long as the unconditioned source of existence continues to maintain it ; it may also be granted that, if any dependent being ever ceases to have value for the divine purposes, there would be no reason for its further continuation. But we may confidently return to the thought, which seems to "work" best, that the divine life is realized in and through finite selves who, as active centres of experience, share in the working out of the purpose of the being of God, in consequence of which the world-order of nature and of spirit acquire a living significance and is, even as Professor James says, "A Pluralistic Universe" (see Lect. V. and VII.). Shall we not, therefore, always have some part in the abiding purpose of the being of God ?

A better understanding of the place of thought in our conduct of life is at hand. Thought is a servant in the employ of life, and the servant is not greater than his lord. The search for a consistent view of the world is not undertaken solely for its own sake, although we have intellectual needs that clamour for satisfaction which is a factor in the Good. The results of our thinking are guides in directing life to its true destiny, which is larger than we are able to conceive, for so does faith outrun knowledge. Truths are features of our experience which need to be lived if they are to be finally accepted. Whatever cannot stand the test of actual living cannot have permanent worth. Thought is, therefore, primarily a function of, a means to, life, but is not able to compass all our experience and must accept much on trust.

"Faith, trust, authority, are accordingly words not unfit to designate the final relation of the human spirit to the universe of reality. . . . We submit in

faith to the *authority* of our spiritual constitution when it moves us to assent to what can be only imperfectly comprehended.”¹⁹ And yet this poor fragment of knowledge is indispensable as a guide, for we have by means of it to measure up against the universe that surges about us. Our knowledge is only a frail craft, and yet we do commit ourselves to it and make a not altogether unsuccessful voyage. What faith is here! —wellnigh the boldest faith of all, for do we not profess that the products of our minds are enough in accord with the universe to enable us to deal with stern reality successfully? By how many other signs and symbols than reason is our course guided! Thus even the most complete knowledge that we have owes its existence to faith in reason and the rationality and final goodness of the universe, and means the communion of the finite mind with the divine Intelligence. Even so does philosophical faith open the way for the religious beliefs which are only a vaster trust. Some such contribution is philosophy able to make to theology.

CHAPTER XII

SOME CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES AND MODERN THOUGHT

THE belief in God as a personal spirit in direct relation with men has been shown to be well grounded in speculative thought. But the Christian faith gives to its conception of God as Personality such a vital content that it may easily appear to be in danger of being regarded as an "overbelief." It seems important therefore, to determine the relation of modern thought to these vital Christian beliefs.

At the outset emerges a question concerning which there is wide difference of opinion, namely : What are the vital Christian beliefs and how do we know them ? Many hold that whatever the writers of the New Testament have said should be accepted as the final truth concerning the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and His relation to God and men. This position is rendered absolute by the assumed divine inspiration of the Scriptures. Others distinguish between what are more immediately the sayings of Jesus and the interpretative, apologetic element due to the authors themselves which deals especially with the birth, life, death, resurrection, and titles of Jesus as the Messiah, the Son of Man, the Son of God. If this element is to be regarded as secondary, it would seem as though believers of another age would be freed from submissively accepting it except so far as it harmonizes with knowledge from other sources. It would then be of the highest importance critically to

discover the vital truths due directly to Jesus as an historical character, for they might be more readily brought into relation to modern thought if separated from secondary elements due to others. The relative merits of these different conceptions of the Scriptures need not be further discussed than to say that there are certain clearly defined teachings of Jesus that both schools accept which we shall try to relate to modern thought.

It is important to observe that no attempt is made to regard the truth of philosophy as a premise from which Christianity follows as a conclusion, but, assuming the Christian faith, philosophical thought may be used to confirm and support the faith and at the same time be that faith in the form of thought so far as thought is able to express it. But, from the standpoint of religious experience, the Christian faith may be in some respects richer than its intellectual expression, but there cannot be an irreconcilable difference in content. Accordingly, each of the doctrines considered will be stated first in its practical religious significance, and then it will be shown how it might be interpreted theoretically, and in what respects the modern speculative basis of theology excels the ancient.

In the very beginning of our enquiry, as Dr. W. N. Clarke has so well shown, is the fact that Jesus and the writers of the New Testament did not to any extent teach a theology in the sense of a science of God. Both gave a practical expression of religious experience. Jesus was "exclusively a religious teacher" whose words are "simply words of real life and practice. If they sound metaphysical, the context turns them to religious use. The synoptical Gospels contain very little that requires even such help from a context, for the synoptical teaching obviously moves in the practical and religious realm. The baptismal formula illustrates the point as well as

anything : if we attribute this to Jesus, still it is the practical Trinity, object of practical faith and devotion, to which the passage bears witness, and not the metaphysical doctrine of which historical theology has been so full. If we attribute to Him all that the Fourth Gospel quotes as from His lips, the case is still essentially the same, for in these utterances the intent is to serve religion. . . . In fact, if one were to read only the words of Jesus, unaffected by theological development, he would scarcely have any metaphysical doctrine of God at all. He would have a vivid and powerful conception of Him, but it would live and move and have its being in the atmosphere of religion." Indeed, the law and the prophets are summarized in the commandments to love God supremely and "thy neighbour as thyself," which shows that Jesus is not an ascetic or a mystic, but would have men faithful to one another in all their relations. Nor is it correct to say that the religion of Jesus would save a man from the world in which modern science invites him to high achievement.¹ Rather does the life of Jesus encourage us to the highest achievement in the world as it is with the consciousness of love both to God and men. The modern movement to improve the condition of society through more intimate personal relations, aided by applied science, is entirely in harmony with the spirit and method of Jesus, who rejoiced to save men as the physician of both body and soul ; nor did Jesus lose sight of the individual case of need in devotion to an abstract ideal of the good.

Out of the life and death of Jesus recorded in the Gospels arose Christianity, and the remainder of the New Testament reveals in some measure the experience of the early Christians. But it is still true, as in the teaching of Jesus Himself, "that emphasis falls first of all upon the practical aspect of the conception of God. God appears in relations with men. Metaphysical aspects of His being are scarcely in sight . . . the God

of those who learned of Jesus was like the God of Jesus himself, a God at hand, in closest relations with men, and known in His intimate work of redemption and saving help. . . . Within the New Testament we have indeed the beginning of Christian theology, and find views of God that move within the field of metaphysics. Yet in the apostolic writings theology has scarcely at all become self-conscious, and the metaphysical touches are all in the interest of religious faith and life. The modern theological mind has found in the New Testament far more theology, strictly so called, than is really there, and needs to recognize more simply the vast excess of religion over theology in the sacred books " (p. 40, Clarke). Consequently, the practical religious teaching of Jesus and the writers of the New Testament forms the constant subject of formal interpretation by successive generations in the light of the truth of each age as it passes. Were Christianity to stand or fall with the formulations of the early centuries or any subsequent period, it would be unfortunate. It was the assumption of an identity between Christianity and the formulations of the Christian faith in an earlier age that led Strauss with some show of reason to say that the history of Christian doctrine is the refutation of Christianity itself. Hence the importance of recognizing the purely practical religious character of the teaching of Jesus and the authors of the New Testament. This teaching it is our duty and privilege to interpret in the light of other truth, and our claim is that the science and philosophy of to-day afford a new and better basis for interpreting the practical teachings of Jesus and His disciples than could have been found in the first centuries. Just in what sense this is true we hope to show.

How, then, did Jesus think of God ? Jesus speaks out of His consciousness of God as His Father, and this filial relation is the source of His knowledge of God.

It is implied that all genuine knowledge of God grows out of the filial relation. Only those who actively respond to this filial relationship with God can truly know God. Hence the knowledge of God no longer depends upon correct doctrine or intellectual insight but upon living in this filial relationship. To Jesus God was real, the Heavenly Father, and, while sin was in the world, it was not a moral dualism. "Sinful men were still God's own, their sinful life was still lived under responsibility to Him, and when they came to repentance, He welcomed them as His own returning to Himself." God Himself seeks to bring the sinful home, and they are encouraged to find refuge in God as their Saviour. God's loving-kindness invites them. The God of Jesus does not want mere obedience to commandments but a life like His own in character and love. Jesus does not tell how God came to be Father to men or to Himself. The Fatherhood of God is simply a fact of which all may avail themselves and which will enrich and fulfil human life. Jesus also implies that men ought to live in full harmony with God's Fatherhood, for, when they live rightly, they live in accordance with it. Jesus presses home upon all the fact that they really belong to the divine Father. Jesus simply takes this filial relation as a fact. All belong to the Father, and Jesus shows them how to fulfil this relation, and, though they may not be aware of it, the Father's love, care, and discipline surround them. The same principle of the divine Fatherhood holds of the kingdom of God, which expresses the relation with God into which men are brought. Though the divine Sovereignty is undiminished, it is transfigured by the light of the divine Fatherhood, and thus the "kingdom" is still a family rather than a governmental or official relation.

The elements which Jesus in this manner contributed to the conception of God concern life itself rather than forms of doctrine. It is ethical, and no

service of God which does not involve inner moral life is acceptable. God is perfect goodness possessing all that the human heart and judgment can approve as worthy. God is not far away but in most intimate relations with men as the Father who loves them but hates their sin and would save them from it. He hears their prayers and would manifest Himself through their lives. God is the supreme ideal and goal of faith and hope, for Jesus reveals God as Father, sonship to whom fulfils human life and destiny, and He gives assurance that men may enter into this relation. These truths Jesus brought home to men in two ways. "On the one hand He has taught that what God was to Him in His own life God would be to any man. On the other hand He has made the impression that the high goodness of purity and love that appeared in Jesus Himself was the truest representation of God that has ever appeared in this world of men, and was an adequate expression of God in human life. This twofold teaching is the most effective manifestation of God that was ever made." Early Christian experience appropriated the new life in God that Jesus had revealed. Those who had learned of Jesus came to know God as Jesus knew Him, for they were convinced that in Jesus they saw manifested the divine character. Identifying themselves with Christ, they became conscious of a new inner life. "God, God in Christ; God in men; Father, Son, and Spirit; these were the forms that the thought of God assumed under the interpretation which the new experience gave it." These were the experiential elements which lie at the basis of the historical doctrine of the Trinity, but they are the simple forms of a joyous experience while it is metaphysical and abstract.²

Since Jesus claims that His conception of God and men is true, the problem whether God and men in their relations are or are not what Jesus taught

cannot be escaped either by holding that religious conceptions are merely useful symbols, or by adopting a theory of knowledge that makes all conceptions useful guides in action but symbolic of some unknown existence. Such a view of knowledge prevents us from knowing God to be really a personal Life, and compels us to say that we do not know God, perhaps not even that He is, and, if He is at all, He would be above and beyond any attributes that we are able to predicate of Him. There are, however, other forms of modern thought that seem to permit us to say that we do; even by the speculative reason, know God, and appear to agree with the simple direct message of Jesus concerning God and His relations with men better than the philosophy of the early centuries in which Christian theology was founded. God was at that time thought of, partly under the influence of Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism, as far separated from the evil material world in which man lives. The doctrine of the Logos as mediator between the distant God and His world was used, then and since that time, with many protestations of mystery to express the dignity and function of Christ. In the controversy at Nicaea, Athanasius was really trying to think of God as a self-conscious, self-determining Personality in relation to men; but it is only modern thought that enables us to speak of the Deity with some show of reason as a self-conscious, self-determining Personality having His life in and through a world-order and a kingdom of selves, a social unity, who in short is the Father of spirits. This has been shown in the preceding chapter.

Likewise modern thought agrees well with the simple teaching of Jesus concerning God as Father, who is what Jesus conceives Him to be so that those who look upon Jesus understandingly really see God manifested, and when they in turn experience for themselves this direct relation to God as sons, they

have the Spirit of God indwelling in them. Why is this not the meaning of the Trinity from the standpoint of Jesus' own experience? The same thing may be expressed in a more formal way by saying that the divine Mind best understood as self-determining, self-conscious Thought and Will is a Life objectifying itself in a world-order and a kingdom of selves. Each of these selves is in very truth the child of God, and God indwells and is that individual life. But these selves are different and unique, true, though incomplete, individuals. Nor does the fact that all have their life in God destroy the different individuality of each self. Jesus may be thought of as unique and different from others in His individuality and sonship as His own experience requires, and this is all that is necessary, for He encourages us to believe that we too are His brethren and children of the Father, and that it belongs to us to fulfil this high ideal of life by responding adequately, as Jesus did, to the relation that we sustain to the divine Father. In this manner it is true that we behold God in Christ, and that what Christ is God is, which is to say, Christ is God, and the divine Spirit is in us Holy in the sense that to consciously identify ourselves with the will and purpose of God is to seek to live ethically in harmony with the Father. Consequently, His Spirit in us is Holy and Sanctifying. Thus is God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

The objection may be made to what has just been said that it asserts only the divine immanence and leaves no room for the transcendence of God. It does indeed affirm the divine presence in every portion of the world and in human life, and, consequently, the omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience of God must follow from His immanence as the ground and source of all that is real, for all is the divine thought and will in objective form. But is there any sense in which God may be said to be more than His world

and transcend it ? The divine immanence and transcendence are both provided for in the view of reality which grounds the world-order in self-conscious, self-determining Mind best understood in terms of Personality. In this sense God as subject transcends the objective world-order, yet is in it after the analogy of the human personality that is both in the objects known and yet knows the self as other than these objects. So God's life is more than any single mode of His objective manifestation and more than the mere sum of these modes, for that divine life just consists in a full self-conscious experience of the unity of these modes of manifestation, each known to be what it is in the whole but differentiated from other forms of the divine self-revelation.

It is in this manner that man's existence is to be understood. Man—individual men—are, like all else, objective expressions, even modes of the divine energizing, but each man is in himself a unique individual and different from his fellows and from those forms of the divine activity which are for us the natural world, and other than the divine Personality, as Lotze says, by the fact of possessing being-for-self, since centres of personal experience are mutually exclusive.

[As to the method of man's coming to be what he is, it may be granted that he stands in relation to other forms of life as their fulfilment, and, consequently, that his existence on earth may have been conditioned by a long series of lower forms. It is probably also more correct to say that man's rationality was at first so mingled with animal impulses as scarcely to be distinguishable ; in fact, man with millenniums already lived has not yet reached the full evolution of his being when he shall be entirely subject to his rational, spiritual nature. He is still in the process of attainment, and yet man's life and his history are the objective manifestation of the divine Mind that founds and

sustains the world-order whether physical or social and spiritual. The term creation is often used to express the same thought but with the implication that the world and man after creation deal with a merely transcendent God. But we would also hold to the divine immanence, of course affirming at least as much mystery in the relation of the divine and human personalities as those who hold to a divine creation of man as an independent being, and the next instant affirm his entire dependence upon his Creator. In the preceding chapter it was shown that the root of the doctrine of creation is the mystery of finitude and means the dependence of the world upon God. This mystery and dependence we also maintain. The problem really is the relation of the divine and human personalities. Transcendence and immanence are spatial conceptions and inapplicable to this spiritual relation. We do better to think of the divine and human personalities as centres of experience whose being-for-self constitutes the uniqueness and individuality of each which are mutually other just by the act of being centres of self-conscious experience. It is important to notice that the categories of self-conscious life and its social relations afford the best means of dealing with the problems of ontology. These social categories enable us to say both that men find their lives in their fellows and in their God and also that the divine Personality is realized in and through finite personalities, and thus is the creative source, even the Father of spirits, sustaining direct relations to His children, yet transmuting them in the unity of His own experience in which each is more than any single individuality can be in isolation, nor is any one able to see the infinite meaning of his own life in the mind of God. As already shown in the preceding chapter, Bosanquet strikingly illustrates the relation of God to men by the relation of the poet Dante to his *Divine Comedy*, in which each character

is real in a real world of time and space, but all are factors in the unique experience of the poet where they are known in their full significance. Likewise the spatial and temporal relations of men are real and have their complete significance in God, who in His unique experience, is distinct from the world of things and persons.³

The relation of the Absolute to the finite, of the eternal to the temporal is at best "an ugly broad ditch," as Schelling said of Hegel's failure to explain it satisfactorily. Royce throws some light upon the problem by using our own time-span as a guide. Our present time is apprehended both as a whole and yet as a succession of parts arranged in an irreversible order just as we experience and know a melody both as a whole and yet as a real succession. But our time-span is limited both as to the number of factors embraced in it and as to the rate of their succession which must not be too slow or too rapid to form a present time. It is possible to think away these limitations and to conceive of a mind that can embrace in its time-span *totum simul* all events however numerous, slow or rapid, and yet know these events as a real succession. "An eternal consciousness is definable as one for which all the facts of the whole time-stream, just so far as time is a final form of consciousness, have the same type of unity that your present momentary consciousness, even now within its little span, surveys. But if for the divine mind some still more inclusive form takes up our time-stream into a yet larger unity of experience, all the more is what we mean by temporal succession present together for the Absolute Experience. Nor does this mean that at this, your present human and temporal instant, at this hour of the clock, the divine and final moment of consciousness has just now the future and the past before it at a glance. For your own grasp of the contents of your passing instant of consciousness

faces at once a series of successive events, but also does not therefore bring before your insight all the successive contents of any present moment at any one temporal point within that present moment. What your own passing consciousness is to grasp at once, within the range of its own time-span, consists of facts which are successive one to another. Now our assertion is that precisely such a grasp of successive facts in one unity of consciousness is characteristic of the Absolute Consciousness in its relation to the whole of time, precisely in so far as the temporal form of realization is valid at all. And that this temporal form has its place in the final unity we know, just because time is for us the *conditio sine qua non* of all ethical significance.”⁴ This view of the relation of the divine Personality to the finite consciousness, of the eternal to the temporal, has of course its difficulties which cannot now be considered. But it tends to confirm the faith that our personal lives, with all their strife and change, are yet really known and experienced by our Heavenly Father, who, though He knows us altogether, yet shares our sorrows and defeats, our hopes and joys, but is also forever mindful of what we are in His own eternal and perfect purpose.

The subject of miracles is one that causes the theologian much difficulty, for he is obliged to deal especially with the miraculous deeds of Jesus and the Apostles recorded in the New Testament. The obstacle to the admission of the miraculous is the scientific conception of the inviolability of natural laws. I wish to show the conceivability of the unique event which is so different from the normal that it may be called miraculous. Hence the conceivability of the miracle concerns its relation to the scientific conception of natural law. This involves also a proper understanding of the general significance of the laws of nature which are supposed to be violated by the miracle, though of course nothing could be a miracle

if it did not stand in antithesis to the normal and uniform.

Primitive man peopled the world with superior beings to whom he in his fear and weakness was accustomed to appeal for aid, and whose miraculous interventions in the course of nature were to be expected. While the conception of God was developed and enriched, the miraculous relation to the world and to man survived even in the highest religions. With the increasing exaltation of God the world was at last viewed as a separate existence proceeding according to its own changeless laws. Then it became important to discover how God could enter His world in order to manifest His wisdom and grace for man's sake in some special providence. But this view of the world, whenever it occurs, betrays the influence of the mathematical and physical sciences and gives to natural laws a fixity and universality that cannot be maintained. We are all inclined to yield to this Platonic type of thought to which the miraculous is an abomination. This is the view of Eucken, for example, who regards a miracle as irreconcilable with the scientific conception of inviolable natural law.⁵

Natural laws are, however, strictly human formulations following upon objective experiences which have priority and are given for constructive thought. Berkeley, for example, considered the laws of nature to be the order in which objective experiences are divinely produced in us and no obstacle to the miracle. Hume questioned the law of causation itself and showed that the necessity we attribute to it depends upon habitual customary experience resulting in the association of the idea A with that of B so that when we experience one we inevitably expect the other. But all natural laws are causal laws and express only a high degree of probability, the contradictory of which is conceivable. Kant also said that the understanding makes nature and its laws in response to the given

sense material, and that to universalize physical causation is to dogmatically transform a relative into a universal principle. Lotze, too, shows that natural laws are our secondary constructions following upon primary objective experiences. James says: "We have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. . . . Reality is still in the making and awaits part of its completion from the future. . . . It is still pursuing its adventures. . . . In the nature of truth processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth. . . . On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it."⁶

The same dependence of truths, including laws of nature upon a reality that is "still pursuing its adventures," is shown by Bergson in his *Creative Evolution*. The mechanistic conception of the world is a form of intellectualism made up of what life leaves behind in its onward movement. The intellect is at home with the solid and reaches most satisfaction in the static. But intellect and materiality have developed together, and both are derived from a wider and higher form of existence, even from "consciousness, or rather a supra-consciousness, that is at the origin of life." Intellect is really a product of this higher form of existence, yet it boldly assumes itself possessed of all the essential elements of the truth and would put its categories upon all, not admitting anything new. But intellect is not thus endowed with categories and priority. Rather is intellect relative to the needs of action from which its very forms may be deduced. "The causality which our intellect seeks and finds everywhere expresses

the very mechanism of our industry in which we continually recompose the same whole with the same parts, repeating the same movements to obtain the same results. The finality it understands best is the finality of our industry, in which we work on a model given in advance, that is to say, old or composed of elements already known. . . . But that each instant is a fresh endowment, that the new is ever upspringing" the intellect cannot admit and so misses the mobile, the living, true duration, for "the intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life." Robbed of its priority, the intellect cannot set limits to or predict what only may be on the basis of its spatially formed, mechanistic conception of a static world-order. Instead "the universe endures . . . and duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new." ⁷

What has been said is sufficient to show that there is nothing in the conception of natural laws to forbid the admission of a unique event which a miracle is supposed to be. Mill puts the case clearly when he says that the miracle "is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt; and the only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle is the improbability that any such cause existed." To those who believe in God there are always "two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural and an unknown natural agency; and they must judge which of the two is most probable in the particular case. In forming this judgment an important element of the question will be the conformity of the result to the laws of the supposed agent, that is, to the character of the Deity as they conceive it." ⁸ Surely the divine goodness and perfection condition all that occurs, and we have already shown that the world is the objective, progressive manifestation of the divine Spirit. It may now be maintained that

even the trustworthiness of the uniformities of nature cannot be satisfactorily conceived without viewing the natural order as subservient to the moral and spiritual ends of the divine Personality, thus giving to reality as a whole a moral significance. In fact one virtually assumes God when one assumes order. It may even be that God will occasionally depart from His usual order of activity in His world if His moral purpose concerning men would be better promoted. Hence the miracle, though an irregular, local, and single event compared with the natural order, becomes a means to a moral end which has relation to man's spiritual well-being. "Miracles are in that case divine or rational acts, proper to a universe that includes persons under moral relations; while they would be out of place in a universe of things wholly under physical or mechanical relations. . . . The legitimate idea of a miracle is found in its teleological reason." ⁹

While thus establishing the possibility of a miracle under certain conditions, it must not be forgotten that the miracle concerns only the method of divine providence in dealing with men. The religiously vital thing is to know the moral will of God and to enter into fellowship with him and be loyal to this fellowship. It is certain also that "if miracles have never occurred, God's providence is complete without them. . . . If there are miracles, however, God's providence includes them and gives them meaning. . . . God's providence is in general the administration of a settled and trustworthy world. His method is based in part upon what we call the uniformity of nature which in the large is a blessing to mankind. If God works miracles in the world . . . they will serve some special ends in His providence that could not otherwise be served so well." But Christ Himself disparaged the faith that was founded upon them, "and it is time for theology to take this position without reserve." It is,

however, left to each one to determine in specific cases whether the natural or the miraculous method has been employed, for, to the believer in God, both are ultimately different modes of realizing the divine perfection and goodness.¹⁰

There are two other Christian doctrines or beliefs that involve the production of something that is not directly explicable by natural causes, namely, prayer and moral freedom. What has just been said concerning the conceivability of the miracle as a unique event out of harmony with the known laws of nature is applicable to the belief in the efficacy of prayer and moral freedom. Consider first the efficacy of prayer. Jesus prayed and taught the disciples to pray to the Heavenly Father who would hear and answer them, and we are exhorted to pray without ceasing expecting to receive an answer. Like the belief in God, prayer is not due to the persuasion of reason but to the needs of the heart that have their antecedents in the longings and strivings for life in the course of human development, and reach forth into the life yet to be. We pray before we are able to give good reasons for doing so, nor is it easy to give reasons at all. Given the proper occasion, prayer comes in some form as certainly as fear or joy. Imagine some great danger, or a sudden grief—alas! too real and frequent in our brief life. Our response is remarkable, and perhaps not very intelligent,—a cry, a look upward, a crushing feeling of helpless frailty and dependence break up our hearts with overwhelming emotion, a longing for comfort, a reaching out to—God?—to Father? Yes, as instinctively as a child to its parent—an act in which the struggles of countless generations towards the Source of Life is concentrated. But is prayer only a cry? Or, is it effective, and in what does its effect consist? Perhaps we might answer in the first place that this deeply seated prayer-impulse of our nature has its correlate in reality, and this has an ultimate

meaning just as knowledge implies truth to be known, or love an object to be loved. There is, however, at least a change produced in the one who prays and experiences relief and peace, just as it composes the mind to tell another our troubles, even though we know that nothing can or will be done. We at least are changed, and the utterance has brought a measure of courage to bear the burden. No more need be said concerning this familiar subjective effect of prayer.

Prayer has also a clarifying effect upon our thoughts concerning the requirements of life, and, other things being equal, the one much given to prayer will have a clearer conception of duties in relation to others and a greater sense of harmony with the universe. The exhortation to prayer and meditation, if it is properly understood, means at least in part that this reflection and self-expression will enable us to deepen our conceptions of what we ought to strive for and show how we ought to modify our ideals of action in order to attain our best good. Prayer, listened to, or uttered in another's presence, has the added strength of social intercourse, tends to make clear the common needs of the heart, and does much to bind us together in spiritual fellowship. Prayer thus comforts and increases sympathy and love for one another.

Our next question is not so readily answered. Has prayer an objective effect? Besides the change in the subjective condition, is the universe any different after the prayer from what it was before? Certain beneficial effects of prayer upon the health cannot be denied, since calmness of mind and hope which prayer induces tend to recovery while anxiety and mental unrest have an injurious result. But these physical consequences are closely connected with the subjective already mentioned and need not be followed further. Our question, however, has another meaning, namely, Does God produce a new event of which our prayer is the conditional antecedent? Does God

hear us and bring some new fact into existence to meet and satisfy our need in answer to our petition? Positive proof fails here, but it is a general belief, and there are some things that may be said in favour of the affirmative. It being our purpose to be as faithful as possible to the common religious experience, the following suggestions may be made. In view of our place in the universe it is a general truth that whatever we do has far-reaching consequences throughout the realm of existence. It is therefore entirely conceivable that our prayers may be the condition of such results. Moreover, all that has been said in connection with the miracle about natural laws as our formulations in response to objective experiences might well be repeated here to guard against the view that the world is a closed system which would make everything not following upon natural laws impossible. In other words, there may be new facts due directly to the Source of Life. Again, Professor James makes much of the doctrine that our self has a border region which has been called "subliminal"; that it is in this region of the soul that we have communication with the spirit world, or, if we wish to say so, with God; that here we experience such inflowings of energy from that other world that real effects are produced in the phenomenal world of which we are conscious. Both physical and spiritual changes may thus be accounted for. Prayer will then be a special form of inner communion with that spirit world, a process wherein work is really done, producing effects both psychical and physical. This is certainly an interesting *suggestion*—I assume it is not meant for more—which may serve to confirm our faith in the efficacy of prayer.¹¹

A final suggestion concerning the effects of prayer is the simple and practical one from analogy with what happens between finite persons. Suppose two friends have quarrelled and one entreats the forgive-

ness of the other. The prayer for forgiveness cannot have even the subjective effect of relief and peace unless the friend actually changes his attitude towards the offender. The restoration of harmony is possible only on condition that both parties change and experience the harmony. In this case the prayer has what may be called an effect upon the other. Likewise, if we are right in thinking of God as Personality, why may we not hold that the subjective results of prayer experienced as relief, calmness, and peace are sure tokens that the Divine Self has really changed in response to our petition? If conceived relations tend to become established truths according as they prove themselves valuable in the conduct of life, surely the belief that our prayers really produce changes in the divine Person, whose being is not exhausted in His world, may not be carelessly put aside as false.

Closely related to the belief in prayer is the belief in practical freedom. To some extent prayer for spiritual help implies that the subject has been free to wander away from that harmony with the Divine which is the true normal state. Christian faith holds that we cannot serve two masters, but that we may have whichever we choose. We have freedom to enter into the straight and narrow way that leads to life or into the broad way that leads to death. At once the problem of the freedom of the will and the nature of right and wrong, good and evil, arises. It may be treated from three different but related points of view, psychological, social, and the philosophical, which presupposes the other two. Psychology can deal with the so-called free act of will only on the assumption that it has its conditions like every other mental state. It is then seen that we as selves develop and our volitions are the expression of our self-hood as we seek to realize what we conceive to be our good. In this good is involved our social relations, for we cannot attain our free self-realization except in and

through the life of others. On the other hand our evil doing in this struggle for the good is equally an expression of ourselves in our social relations. The satisfactory treatment of these subjects must be left to the psychological and social sciences as we have room for only a few words upon the philosophical relations of the problem.

Philosophy has to determine what the freedom of will means in a general view of reality. This involves a treatment of the meaning of individuality and our personal relation to each other and to God as the supreme Source of all existence. This question has been considered in some detail in the previous chapter, which may now be recalled (Chap. XI. p. 291 f.). Idealism, as represented by Green, the Cairds, Royce, and others, holds that it belongs to man to become organized into a self-determining life which is to become free in the degree that completeness of organization is attained. Perfect freedom is found only in consciously identifying ourselves with God and being in real harmony with Him. On the other hand, sin is failure to fulfil the ideal of what it is to be a real man; the deeper one sinks into sin, the farther towards the abyss of unreality does he fall. Interpreted in this way, the so-called unreality of sin has in it the depths of hell itself. But, like all theories of being, idealism has its difficulties. Its critics say that the finite person is robbed of true individuality and freedom, for, if God has His life in and through the finite, it means that there is already a perfect unity in which nothing really new can occur—at least there can be nothing that is able to withstand the absolute law of the whole.

On the other hand, there is a group of writers differing indeed as compared with each other, but agreeing in affirming that the really new does occur even through man's free act. For James, as has been said (p. 330 f.), reality is still in the making; the universe "still

pursues its adventures"; there are real possibilities, real chances, forced options before men who make themselves good or bad, promote or hinder the fortunes of the universe itself. From a somewhat different point of view, Bergson shows that the "consciousness or supra-consciousness" from which our intellect is derived is ever putting forth new forms in a "creative evolution." The intellect and materiality are both developed together from this supreme Source. The intellect is most at home with the solid, the spatial, and spreads out its knowledge in static, fixed forms that are beside each other like the parts of space. But the intellect thus misses the free, the new, the true duration of living experience, in consequence of which, if we wish to get rid of the "contradictions implied in the problems of causality, freedom, personality, . . . we have only to go back to the real and concrete self and give up its symbolical substitute." It is just the immediate, personal experience that is modified by and takes up into itself former experiences and cannot be resolved again into these earlier experiences which makes it impossible, for example, to extend the physical law of conservation of energy to conscious processes, and makes it possible to hold that "the outward manifestations of this inner state will be just what is called a free act, since the self alone will have been the author of it and since it will express the whole of the self." All attempts to explain what is done by antecedent states, or to foresee what will be done, or to ask if at the moment of acting a different course was equally possible, is to forget "that the self grows, expands, and changes as it passes through the two contrary states" and to become the victim of the pictorial, spatial representation of the two courses which makes them appear as two things, the one not taken seeming to still remain as what might have been instead of the other.¹² Bergson thus makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of the will by freeing

it from the inevitable determinism that attaches to impersonal thought relations, and by finding the freedom in the most inward and immediate experiences of the personal self. But is this really different from Kant's restriction of the causal law to objective relations, or from idealism as represented, for example, by Royce, who first frees the question from the problem of causation by showing that cause and effect is a relation that depends upon the constructive activity of the individual subject, and that this individuality in its free self-expression is a form of the Absolute Will, under limitations? But it is impossible to go farther into the discussion. Enough has been said to indicate the nature of the problem that lies at the basis of the simple Christian belief that we may or may not obey God.¹³

Another aspect of the problem of freedom is the relation of human sin, ignorance, and suffering to the existence of a perfect and good author of the world. Can these "be reconciled with a final moral trust in the Power that is revealed in external and spiritual existence?" The arguments in reply to this question show that it would be a contradiction to affirm free persons and yet, because of divine perfection, to deny the possibility of these persons doing what ought not to be done. To be a person, then, implies the capability of making the self bad. This is not properly called divine permission to do evil, but is the inevitable contingency involved in the ideal of moral personalities who are to work out the moral ideal in themselves which can be realized only in personal form. Consequently, men may do evil and keep themselves evil, yet God be perfect in goodness. But suppose every person were to do evil and keep himself evil, might not such a world of evil persons be consistent with and enforce the perfect ideal of the perfect God? This introduces a question which concerns what the temporal world is, viewed from the standpoint of the eternal

divine purpose, but its further treatment is more appropriate in connection with the Christian doctrine of salvation (see p. 346 f.).¹⁴

The further interpretation by Christian doctrines of the relation of God and men really consists of an analysis of the conception of a Perfect Personality of whom, under the influence of Jesus, we dare to think as our heavenly Father. The usual catalogue of divine attributes and their relations is made up of analytic judgments which add nothing to the conception of God, although they may be useful in helping us to understand the implications of the conception of God as our Father in Heaven. But these attributes have already been assumed in the conception itself, for, as Kant said, having admitted that God is personal and our heavenly Father, we cannot consistently deny His love, wisdom, holiness, providence, Saviourhood, and the other attributes whose nature and relations form those elaborate theological structures consisting simply of skilfully linked analytic judgments which present in detail the content of their assumptions. Such theological constructions are exposed to the simple but effective objection that it is not necessary to admit such a conception of God as forms the point of departure, and, if so, there would be no contradiction in denying both subject and predicate of these analytic judgments, thus reducing the entire theological structure to nothing.

A reply to this objection may be made. It has been shown in this and the preceding chapter that there is good reason for holding that the world-order is the expression of self-conscious Mind and Will. If so, it is easy to find implied in that supreme Being perfect love, wisdom, and holiness, even that Saviourhood which is characteristic of Christianity. It is here that Jesus' consciousness of God was so remarkable. In His experience, Jesus knew this deeper nature of the supreme Mind that is the source of all.

Because Jesus made this experience so visibly manifest, others were convinced that God is as Christ experienced Him and could with truth, as can we, say that Jesus is God and God is Jesus, meaning thereby, in the first instance at any rate, that the character of Jesus is the character of God the Father, and that there is a real unity and sameness between God and Christ and ourselves when we have the mind of Christ; thus are we true sons of the Father because the same Spirit is in each sanctifying and binding together in one, even as God and Christ are one. Such an understanding of Christ and God and their relations to each other and to ourselves brings satisfaction to mind and heart.

This conception of human relations to God and Jesus Christ makes it possible to say something concerning our destiny and its fulfilment, for it means an identity between the ideal end of man, Jesus and God, of which we may speak as the good. The divine goodness is a practical concept and must be interpreted from practical human life. Goodness in God and man is in principle the same and involves love, wisdom, and holiness. It consists in the adequate fulfilment of the relations sustained. This requires wisdom to know these relations, and a high moral judgment concerning them as they really are, and love consisting in devotion to the well-being of all concerned in these relations. In treating of these elements of divine and human goodness, the most satisfactory order is love, holiness, and wisdom, which are imperfectly in man, perfectly in God. Love is the fundamental element about which holiness and wisdom stand as servitors. It is a love that is devoted to the best, the most completely worthy; a wisdom that is the adequate knowledge of means and ends in the fulfilment of all that holiness demands and love requires of God towards His world and men and of men toward God and one another.

The divine love, holiness, and wisdom together

mean that the universe is being directed according to these elements that constitute the divine goodness, even the divine Life. There is far more involved in this simple statement than we can express. It means that our life has moral significance for us and for the universe. Out of the unity of these elements of goodness in the divine character rises abundant hope for us, for it means divine Saviourhood. God is not merely holy, which would make Him terrible for the erring to contemplate. Love becomes the deliverer striving to bring men back to normal life in relation to God and to one another. Love desires to save unto the uttermost, and holiness can be divine only if it issues in providing for the salvation of the unrighteous. It is simply untrue to say that the divine holiness is chiefly retributive and punitive justice towards the transgressor. Purity cannot be sufficiently asserted against the impure and unworthy by condemnation and punishment. "A God who did nothing to save a sinful race of which He is creator could not be worshipped as holy. . . . A God whose holiness was as well satisfied with punishing sinners as with saving them would not be a holy God at all, for His so-called holiness could be satisfied without insisting on the highest good."¹⁵

What a relief it is to turn from bewildering soteriologies to the divine Saviourhood which Jesus taught. But Jesus is often regarded as though He only were Saviour who with some difficulty persuades God to forgo the terrors of punishment by removing some governmental or other obstacle to the sinner's restoration. But Jesus says salvation originates in God. God's love shines in the face of Jesus. What Jesus does, God does in and through Him. Jesus was in the world to serve God by serving men—the love, the seeking to save—all this is of God and makes God known to us. "If ye had known me, ye would have known my Father also." Neither in the words of

Jesus nor in His attitude toward either God or men is there any intimation that His Father needed or desired any transaction, directed to Himself, in order that it might be possible for Him to be a Saviour and for men to be saved. Instead, Jesus as Saviour is for men the expression and equivalent of God as Saviour. God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. In what Jesus did we see what God was doing. The words "I and the Father are one" relate to the work of salvation and assert that the sheep of the Son's flock are the sheep of the Father's flock also, since Father and Son are one in Saviourhood. "The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world, not because the Father was not the Saviour, but because He was. . . . As is Christ, so is God." ¹⁶

If then the divine goodness leads us to believe in God as our Saviour, salvation can only mean that men are to be saved unto the Highest Good of which they stand in need, which is the same in principle in God and men. We have seen that the divine goodness means love, wisdom, and holiness in the unity of character. Measured by this standard, men are lacking, and yet every man has the capacity of love and devotion. The cultivation and deepening of this love, which is the supreme element in God and man (1 Cor. xiii.), enriches each life if it is properly directed. Every one has relations to others at every point of his being, and to fulfil these relations adequately and with due appreciation of real values and with the right spirit of devotion constitutes his moral task. In order to do this not only knowledge but wisdom as the application of knowledge to these known relations is required. It is clear that in these respects men are not perfect as the heavenly Father is perfect, yet the normal character for men is the same in principle as the actual character of God, though of course still human and less complete. If so, all that God requires is that each man be normal or his true self, which he can be only

when he identifies himself with Jesus in the sense of appropriating the kind of life exhibited in Him, which is the same as God's. Thus man puts himself into harmony with the divine will.

Holiness originally means wholeness. God is whole, complete, adequate. Men are not, but the divine Saviour would bring all to this state, which is to love what is most worthy, to know what should be done in the complex relations surrounding each life, and to do it wisely and with the whole self. Moreover, it means a development of capacities till one becomes what the divine Father purposes concerning each of His children. Here it is fitting to learn a lesson from the human parental relation. The father ever sees in his child what he may be and what he hopes for, and satisfaction for both father and child is possible only in fulfilling the self that both father and child anticipate. Likewise we become right in the sight of our heavenly Father only when we enter willingly, though it may be feebly, upon the way whose end is the life designed for us by the Father's love and wisdom. It involves change in our loves till they centre upon objects that are in harmony with the larger life for which the Father destines us, and an enlargement of our understanding that we may be quick to know what the way of true life requires.

This life to which we are to be saved involves all that we call moral goodness and more, for the Good is more comprehensive than the ethical. "The end, the right and only right end, of man, lies in the fullest and freest realization of powers in their appropriate objects. The good consists of friendship, family and political relations, economic utilization of mechanical resources, science, art, in all their complex and variegated forms and elements. There is no separate empty and rival 'good will.'"¹⁷ If so, our relation to nature and the entire range of human activity is involved in God's purpose concerning us. Indeed,

the divine Life is manifested in the world and in mankind to realize the end of existence, which is the good. This view agrees with the interpretation of Jesus which refuses to regard Him as an ascetic, but finds Him faithful to human relationships and deepening their significance through the motive of love to the Father and His children. It is, however, no easy task to live this broad, full life. It involves the sense of strife within and the feeling of obligation and duty to choose remote rather than immediate ends, the broader, more rational instead of the narrowly conceived order of action, the social instead of the merely individual, the higher instead of the lower self. The authority of duty and conscience is just this restraint that the broader, more rational, more far-reaching point of view of concrete moral situations has over the easy, habitual, pleasurable, comfortable way of acting that cannot attain the larger life. To take the one course is to enter upon the upward way, the other does not lead unto abundant life.

No abstract law of God to terrify the transgressor with threats of penalty and to be an obstacle to his attainment of the good destined for him need be erected here, for nobody has ever been able to tell the content of such a law except by coming down to each man's immediate relations to himself, to others, and to God. Sin can then be only the concrete, particular acts that militate against true selfhood by inducing conditions in the agent and in others which prevent the normal life. These unfavourable conditions are ultimately personal in form : first, negatively, since the character of the doer is such as not to afford occasions that will evoke in others efforts towards the higher life ; secondly, by causing others to adjust themselves positively to the perverted individual, thus hindering their own advance and possibly leading them astray. There is also an indirect personal effect of wrongdoing through the physical whenever

one through ignorance, neglect, or abuse lives a physically unclean life, and fails to make a proper use of material possessions or to develop the resources of nature, thus failing to do his part in bringing about the complex good of existence, already referred to, of which the ethical is only an important factor. This means that the material, commercial world is not evil, a view which is a survival of the ancient conception of matter as evil ; rather is the complex life of the present spiritual and the sphere in which the spiritual is to have its development and fulfilment. A cloister life might seek to realize a separate moral goodwill, but it would be without content.

The ancient doctrine of the origin of sin in the fall of the first man is giving place to its modern equivalent of a better understanding of the physiological and psychical nature already reviewed (Chap. X.). Our life is a unity of the physical and the psychical which develop together with marked crises in the progress to maturity. The child is, as it were, a plant out of God's earth, out of the race life and the local community of which each individual is largely a product, though in some degree moulded by his own initiative. The so-called " vitiosity of nature " is only the psychic fact that in the first stages of development the sensuous, impulsive, instinctive life dominates, and many do not pass far beyond this level. From the beginning, however, organizing processes take place and proceed rapidly after the rational element begins to prevail. But there need be no wonder that in this slow development from the level of sensuous, impulsive, instinctive activity to full self-conscious personality, men do both what does and what does not accord with their true being. The ancient phrase, *posse non peccare* (able not to sin), is not in harmony with our psychological development, for, if each has the task of moulding his life into a character that may be called good, and if virtuous action can only be the expression of virtuous

character, surely an original state without a character attained is not able not to sin, which requires that one should have adequate insight into his relations and decide to do whatever fits the situation, being both subjectively and objectively good. But it is only through development that one becomes able not to sin, and even then he will often commit the sin of omission due to inadequate insight into his relations or to failure fully to recognize the importance of carefully determining the significance of the relations which he sustains. In brief, there is no real self either good or bad till it is attained, and in a sense it is true that "we only possess ourselves in so far as we are the author of ourselves."¹⁸

Three things are clear from what has just been said : first, that men will do what ought not to be done ; secondly, that all are engaged in seeking the good and in some sense are striving for the ideal ; thirdly, that the attainment of the true self through personal thought and will is of so much importance in the economy of God's universe that evils done along the way are secondary and no essential part of the end, and in their very nature are to be overcome. Enough has been said already concerning the first point ; of the second, many are in doubt, for how can the sinful man be seeking the good ? Is moral development, as Hegel said, from innocence through sin to virtue ? He who sins is a divided self. He is seeking something that to him seems good even in his saddest most deeply sinful hour. His bitterness and hate show that he is not a brute, but a man forming his own ideals and loving something not as yet found but sought for, and, so far as he searches, he has in him the upward tendency. To say that a man really loves the evil, knowing it in the moment of his choice to be absolutely evil, is to affirm a psychological impossibility. Rather does he take as good what to another is not. The terribleness of his condition is just that he is such a

self as can take as his good what really is not. The hope is that, after many failures, he will awaken to choose as his good those objects which do promote and fulfil his true self. It would not be inappropriate to call this change conversion.¹⁹

In what now does man's restoration consist? In the first place, it is not a restoration if it is implied that individual men are to be put back where they once were, but the term restoration may be used in the sense of placing men in right relations and enabling them to fulfil their life. Nor need we think of an abstract law of God, conceived in the spirit of Mediaeval Realism, whose violation admits no possibility of setting aside the offence. There simply is no such law, except for some thinker who does not understand that life, even reality itself, grows and develops, and that laws are human formulations of processes immanent in the individual and the world in which he lives. Nor may we think too severely of the transgressor and terrify him with the threat of an angry God. Did not God make this man and should not the divine Father bear the responsibility of this man's creation? Is not this transgressor sustained in his existence by the immanent God to such an extent that it is almost impossible to show how any human life can be even in a relative sense independent of God? Did not God make the human race of which this sinful man is a product? But he is also in a large measure the product of the particular social community in which he was born and lives. Is not society partly responsible for his sin, since it did not institute and maintain those physical, civic, and political conditions which would make possible, encourage, and promote his attainment of the rational, spiritual self? Of course, the individual man is to some degree responsible, but to what degree, after allowing for all the conditions determining his existence, cannot be decided by an appeal to some official or governmental decree. Jesus seems to have

had these complex relations of human life in mind, for He did not condemn except in the sense of that aversion which a perfectly normal life feels towards the abnormal and injurious. Instead, Jesus looked upon the multitudes as sheep without a shepherd, which He could not have done without desiring to be their shepherd, that He might bring them into the green pastures and beside the still waters and gather them into the fold.

Jesus also is not misrepresented when we say that good homes, schools, and social institutions of every sort that tend to assist and elevate men are among the means to that fulness of life in which their chief good consists.²⁰ Jesus' message is that God the Father manifests His Saviourhood in bringing about this fulness of life in His children through the employment of the wisest means. We behold in Jesus the perfected relation of sonship to God the Father and welcome the inspiring message that we too may enter into the same relation. Jesus' message is good news and induces us to arise and go to the Father's house confident of a welcome, glad to trust ourselves to Jesus' simple direct truth. Just to know in Christ the nature of God and what it really means for us, if true—this draws us away from those courses in which true life cannot be found, fills the heart with love, creates a new motive for living, gives a new outlook upon life and upon our fellows; it makes us kin with nature, fills us with reverence for life, even of dumb animals that find it sweet, for the little child upon whom the mother invokes blessing. Who has fathomed the depths of Life from its simplest form to man in his loftiest moments with his face uplifted to his Creator? Why not find God everywhere, in His earthly as well as in His heavenly temple? And then to know that this God is as Jesus and so our Saviour who loves and seeks to win us makes the message of Jesus the power of God unto salvation.

The love of God as our Saviour is identical with the love of Jesus who bore forgivingly the injustice of men yet sought to do them good. He was faithful unto death, even the death of the Cross, which is the supreme manifestation of that love that makes atonement for the sins of others. There are at least two ways of interpreting the significance of the death on the Cross. One is that it is the supreme work of reconciliation or atonement wrought "outside of us, in which God so deals in Christ with the sin of the world that it shall no longer be a barrier between himself and men."²¹ Back of this conception of the death on the Cross is the Law and the idea of Christianity as an elaborate plan of discharging the debts of the sinner. The other way of thinking of the death on the Cross is to see in it the inevitable issue of Jesus' faithfulness to what He believed to be His mission. He brought light and love, but the darkness comprehended it not and hate could not endure the love. It is a fundamental principle of life that the good bear in their own persons the evil-doing of others, but in doing so the supremacy of goodness, righteousness, and love become manifest. An atonement for sin must be made, otherwise sin would be the successful rival of goodness. Jesus' faithfulness unto death was necessary if men were ever to know the full significance both of their sin and of the love that is both willing and able to bear it. To know this love of Jesus works more mightily than threats and fears. The good news of Jesus' message should lead us to return with Him gladly to the Father, whose perfect love will not let us go unsaved.

As to which of these views of the work of Christ is nearer the truth is a matter of personal decision. It is, however, possible that each of these conceptions of Jesus' death on the Cross may lead us astray by preventing us from finding in God Himself the final source of redeeming, saving love. Jesus intended to

give us a new conception of God and of His relations to us, and if, by reason of speculations as to the Cross, we fail to find God and His inexhaustible love, holiness, and wisdom, we miss the very thing for which Jesus lived and died. Let us then return to Jesus' own consciousness of the filial relation to the Father in which we too have a part with our Elder Brother in the Household of Faith. Here we ought to be permitted, as Professor Royce shows, unrestrained by any special theory of the person of Jesus, to see in Him one who so vividly realized that only in the kingdom of heaven could men find their true life that He devoted Himself to the mission of winning them to their true place in the divine Community. Human sin led to His sacrifice, but His atoning deed was "so wise and so rich in its efficacy that the spiritual world," after it, was "better, richer, more triumphant amidst all its irrevocable tragedies than it was before" sin occurred (*The Problem of Christianity*, i. 322). Out of the love springing up in Jesus the disciples built up the Church, in which St. Paul especially found the very presence of his Lord. Only in this Church or divine Community can the fulness of salvation be attained.

The conception of God forbids the restriction of the divine omnipotence to any special sphere. The divine omnipotence must be brought into relation to the divine love, holiness, and wisdom, and must therefore be effective in the moral realm in which personal wills find expression. Certainly we have a will of our own; so has any child more or less, but a wise, loving parent, even in our poor human experience, more often than not wins by love, care, and training, so that the child enters into the way of the good life. But how much more certain to win the wayward is the heavenly Parent, whose perfect wisdom can discover ways in which to fulfil the holy aims of perfect love toward His children whom He has brought

into existence. Just as in the human family the love of the home is the protection, inspiration, and strength of everybody in it, so in the world-kingdom of God the Father, which cannot be a less secure place than the earthly home. An unwise human father might require every omitted service, although his child stands before him repenting in tears and beginning to live in accord with the father's will. But the wise human father—and the idea of divine Fatherhood is based entirely on this analogy—deals with the child in view of what he is to be, and such a father acts at all times consistently with the ultimate ideal. But if God must punish just for the sake of punishment, how shall God be justified in view of His love, wisdom, and holiness? Any punishment for the sake of punishment, any blotting out of the individual in human society because of violation of law is a condemnation of the society that makes the law, since it did not maintain conditions which would enable better men to be produced. Likewise, if God has no other resource than just to punish according to some fixed law, a being who could so conduct the universe and administer affairs as finally to win the erring unto a fulness of life would be superior. It is a poor moral order that can affirm itself finally only by penalties whose infliction results in the deterioration or extinction of the personal agents in whom it purposes to be realized. At this point emerges one of the profoundest truths of Jesus' message. It is that the Father's love and forgiveness bring the sinful into harmony with the divine purpose. In this profound sense Jesus is the end of the law, and the good swallows up the evil in the love of God through which men are finally saved unto righteousness. As Eucken says, we come to rebel against mere justice with its hard severity and exactness, however necessary in the world as it is. We demand a new order of things in which a world-conquering love shall be supreme.²² But is not this precisely the message

of Jesus that God is love and Saviour whose love will not let us go, and who can never be satisfied with a sinful remnant that will not yield? What is the love that will not let the sinner go? What is an *overcoming* love but a love that gives full play to another's will, yet finally brings that will into a glad surrender? Otherwise love suffers, and the greater the love the more intense the disappointment. But is God to be finally unable to realize the holy ideals which love conceives concerning His children? Does He lack power to use and wisdom to discover the means of leading His children to obedience? Fortunately we have no chart of the future, for it is like asking how long eternity is to set limits to the efficacy of the divine love. It is practically and religiously well that we are here left in ignorance except as faith and hope anticipate what is behind the veil.

In what has just been said, we have already passed into the realm of metaphysical conceptions. The Christian doctrine of life that no one can by his own unaided powers atone for his sin; that no one can have his true life except in the kingdom of heaven, the Church, the divine community filled with the Holy Spirit,—all this presents us with the problem of interpreting the universe as a divine community (Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, ii. 10 f.). It is necessary only to refer to the conception of reality already frequently expressed. The social categories have been the means of interpretation, and they lead to the view that the universe is spiritual and the expression of self-conscious mind in a unity or community of individuals whose reality consists in manifesting some aspect of the divine purpose. This philosophical conception of reality affords an important confirmation of the Christian conception of the kingdom of heaven—the invisible Church, in which alone our life can have its supreme good.

The Christian doctrine of redemption implies belief

in immortality. In religious thought, sin and death have long been joined together. It has been held that all suffering and death are the consequences of sin. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ezek. xviii. 20). "The wages of sin is death." It seems to follow that if redemption from sin is to be complete, it must involve redemption from death. Of this Christian faith has no doubt, for "the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. vi. 23). It is insufficient to regard redemption as confined to restoration from the sin of this present life. Resting all upon the resurrection in Christ, St. Paul says, "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable" (1 Cor. xv. 19). But Jesus is believed to have triumphed over death and the grave, and to have brought life and immortality to light. The Christian consciousness, therefore, holds firmly to the belief in the future life; we shall live again, or, rather, shall continue to live only with a larger, richer experience and sphere of activity. What is to come is "far better," indeed "gain," so that it is not unreasonable even to long "to depart"; but as there are still unfinished duties here, we with patience "abide in the flesh," confident "that what is mortal will (may) be swallowed up of life" (2 Cor. v. 4). More need not be said to express the essential content of the Christian belief in immortality.

The Christian doctrine of immortality enlarges and enriches a belief that lies deep in the human mind.²³ No speculation has ever indeed proved immortality, and without doubt Christian faith goes far beyond the deductions of reason. Nevertheless these grounds for the belief are not without avail as supports for the Christian faith in the final redemption from death. The following suggestions are offered, not because they represent all the grounds of hope that might be presented, nor because they add any really new factor to the Christian faith, but because they serve to indicate

lines of thought that might be followed further in support of the belief.

1. In the first place, the Power that brought us into existence in this life takes us out of it. As we had nothing to do with our beginning, so is our end not in our control. We only use what we are. It is something to live with the thought that we belong to the universe and our destiny is bound up with its destiny. This was the consolation of Epicureans and Stoics, and Marcus Aurelius was not far wrong when he exclaimed, "O Universe, I wish all that thou wishest."²⁴ The gentle Pliny, describing his experience at the destruction of Pompeii in A.D. 79 when his uncle, Pliny the naturalist, perished; says: "I might boast, that during all this scene of horror, not a sigh or expression of fear escaped from me, had not my support been founded in that miserable, though strong consolation, that all mankind were involved in the same calamity, and that I imagined I was perishing with the world itself."²⁵ Likewise, in the moment of keenest grief over the death of our beloved, comes the gentle whisper, "Neither you nor the beloved did this thing"; and while the heart cries out for an answer to its questioning, there is the vague recognition of the presence of some Power that has our beginning and ending, or continuation, absolutely in its control, which affords a measure of comfort. That the heart seeks and finds a greater assurance is true.

2. Self-consciousness as such seems to be able to conceive neither its beginning nor its cessation, perhaps, as T. H. Green suggests, for the very good reason "that it has no origin" and no end.²⁶ Who can find in his present state of consciousness anything to indicate that there is to be a final moment? No period of unconsciousness makes any break in the continuity of our self-conscious life. The two sides of the interrupted "stream of consciousness flow together again." This might also suggest that our present

life is only an interval of interruption in a larger stream of consciousness whose parts flow together again in an eternal life of which we even now have intimations, and, in comparison with its glory, this life is only like a confused dream. But we become acquainted with the fact of death by what happens in our environment. Others tell us that we must die. Both the observed fact and the information come to us as a surprise so intense that a deep sense of mystery creeps over us. We do not understand. Rather is it true, as Kant said, that the time-relation itself depends upon the subject which is thus not in time but is already, by its own nature, eternal. Hence the belief in immortality which amounts to the denial that death is what it seems to be. And the astonishing belief arises that death must be only the beginning of a larger and better living ! Is there in the entire universe of thought a bolder, more confident flying in the face of the apparent significance of observed facts ?

3. We have already spoken of the room for the belief in God supplied by our needs and by the demand that our lives find their completion in a divine Helper. But the meaning of our life would seem to be incomplete if cut short at any definite point. Such is the first thought that comes to us, but it must be given a deeper significance if it is to receive our entire confidence ; for is it not conceivable that the special ideal purpose which constitutes the reality that we have in the divine plan may not require an endless existence ? Hans Christian Andersen has a beautiful fairy-tale of the little tree in the forest that was mourning because it served no great purpose like its neighbours ; but finally it was made a glorious Christmas-tree and, for a brief season, was highly honoured ; but it suffered keen disappointment afterwards because it was thrown away as something no longer needed. Is there a possibility that our life's purpose shall sometime be completed, if not here, then at some point in

the limitless future? We almost shudder at the thought of endless, ceaseless life. If all the good and all the purposes within our sphere of attainment were fulfilled, what reason for our longer continuance? Would not a quiet dropping out of existence be fitting? So it is not enough to say that the completeness of life requires immortality, unless we can so conceive this completeness that it avoids the idea of a finished work no longer needing to be carried on. Our next paragraphs endeavour to show how this may be possible.

4. A life brought to its completion does not necessarily imply cessation of activity so far as that end is concerned in which the essential reality of the individual person consists. Completeness of life properly means perfection of our being; but perfection, as in the exhortation, "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," does not mean that we shall become infinite, but rather that we shall be adequate to whatever we have to do, an activity that fulfils its end with nothing lacking. This activity, in perfect harmony with the purpose of our existence, can be limited only by the value of this purpose of our being in the final summing up of the meaning of all things. This turns out to be what is struggling for expression in our hope of immortality. We are trying to overcome the unbearable thought that, whatever our worth may be, it is yet so limited that sometime it may be set aside as finished.

5. It may be some consolation to reflect that meanings rise above the limitations of time, and are, in their nature as factors in the divine thought, eternal, and cessation can never apply to them, for the eternal purpose depends for its constancy upon the continuity of the factors entering into it. Likewise, it would seem reasonable to hold that our destiny is an essential factor in the divine purpose because it has a meaning in the meaning of that purpose. We may even say

with Eucken, that we grow younger as we succeed in implanting in our self-hood eternal principles that are unaffected by temporal changes; or with Bosanquet, that our value as individuality is embraced in the value of the Whole, but the Whole cannot perish nor can the parts so far as they participate in it.²⁷

6. The moral order, which may be regarded as the expression of God's nature and purpose, would seem to require the permanency of the relations which it implies. Is not righteousness "grounded on the personal relationship which on the side of feeling is love? Are not the terms in which we express value mere abstractions apart from permanent personality? Could we respect a God whose ends were realized only in His own self-centred consciousness, and for whom love was merely a temporary incident, whose object was called into existence only to be dismissed again from the scene?"²⁸ But if we give sufficient thought to the Christian conception of the kingdom of God, it appears as a society of persons who have their life in the supreme Spirit, whose harmonious unity is that of loving personal fellowship, leading to the wonderful truth that the self-hood of God is inseparable from the self-hood of finite spirits. If the Father is necessary to our existence, can we avoid the thought that the Father's life could not be the life that it is except in and through the life of finite spirits and the purposes they represent within His own eternal world-embracing purpose? Thus our life is indeed from God and returns to God.²⁹

7. Since the realization of the moral ideal is a factor in the divine purpose, and can take place only in personal life, the ultimate meaning of the moral end requires the continuation of every personality having part in its fulfilment. The meaning of the moral drama of the universe implies the permanence of its characters, each standing for itself and exhibiting success or defeat in working out the ideal. The

same truth may be somewhat differently expressed in the conviction that the moral ideal realized only in personality cannot be finally trustworthy, if the extinction of personal life ultimately occurs.³⁰

8. Belief in immortality rests largely upon the fact that love never acknowledges that its object has ceased to be, and that we continue to love those who have been taken from us. But what an ominous suggestion is contained in the fact that time in some measure softens our bereavement and the intensity of the love diminishes! Our earliest years are not remembered in maturity. When memory begins to record the past clearly, only the most prominent features of life and of our relations with loved ones are retained. If this be true of the few decades here, might not this life with its present interests be forgotten at an incredible distance of time, a million years for example, or be reduced to a fleeting pulse of memory? If so, our belief in immortality would be almost meaningless, for it now promises the continuity of our self-conscious personality and the fulfilment of our most precious hopes. The only reply that seems possible is that even our imperfect love shall be perfected and fulfilled, for it can only spring from an eternal source.³¹ Besides, we are the children of our heavenly Father who is wise and mighty enough to fulfil our love for Himself and for His other children whom we know and love in this life. But here it is that we turn in humility from mere reasoning to those incomparable beliefs that centre in Him who said, "I am the resurrection and the life." The ground of this hope in Jesus is confidence in Him as revealing the principle of life which can only mean a life that abides. There grows up the assurance that the way of life has at last been found, and henceforth it is only necessary to walk therein. Having found the principle of life in Christ, there need be no anxiety about the future, for principles are ultimate. Identifying myself with the finally real in

Christ, it matters not what happens, since I shall miss nothing that can ever be possessed, for there is nothing of value for the seeker after the Highest Good to obtain outside or beyond the principle of Life in Him. Such is the believer's hope to which the words of Professor James, expressing the need of trust where proof fails, are appropriate : " If religion be true and the evidence for it still insufficient, I do not wish . . . to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side." ³²

There are still many phases of Christian doctrine that cannot now be even mentioned, but enough has been said to show how rich is the message of Jesus concerning God in relation to the world and to us. The moral kingdom of God realized in persons unites the natural and spiritual in itself, and is the end which gives meaning to reality. If the God and Father of Jesus really exists, and is conducting the world and our affairs in love, wisdom, and holiness, it is a joy to participate in the work of bringing in His kingdom on earth, for we are assured that we have a real work to do, a real contribution to make, and that God our Father will not cease to work through us in the fulfilment of His eternal purposes which affords us hope of immortality.

Although the message of Jesus as it has been interpreted is far richer and more vital than the conceptions of modern thought, reference may be again made in conclusion to their harmony. We are assured that God is self-conscious, self-determining Intelligence and Will ; that the universe is His immediate expression, progressively realizing the divine thought as a unity of differences and a whole of value which includes all other values ; that human life with its variety, individuality, and value has its being in the Supreme Self ; that society, and its civil, political, and religious institutions, is grounded in the divine Mind ; that these institutions have value only as they make it

possible for each of us to be what we are to be as persons in the divine purpose ; that the universe is in process of becoming, and that we are each determining factors in the end ; that truths are such because they are verified in our experience of reality and hence are reliable in the conduct of life,—these are examples of principles prevailing in modern thought which afford a present basis for theology that more directly confirms and supports the Christian faith than the intellectual environment in which the first formulations of that faith were produced.³³

CHAPTER XIII

THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THEOLOGY

IN the immediately preceding chapters an attempt has been made to set forth some of the present tendencies of thought to which the theologian should not be indifferent. A few words may now be said in conclusion concerning the scope and method of theology.

What is it to form a theology? What conditions and tests are recognized? What is the value of the theology that results? What in particular is Christian theology? The Christian believer, whether called theologian, philosopher, or any humble seeker after truth, may, in reflecting upon his religious experience, make his assumptions and purpose which are to determine the character of his theology whatever he chooses. That there is little uniformity in the assumptions and purpose of theologians is shown by the fact that there is no fixed science of theology to which appeal may be made, nor has it a generally accepted definition.¹

There may, for example, be a theology whose purpose is to express in systematic form whatever is contained in some external source regarded as authoritative. Such a theology cannot exceed the prescribed limits. To the Roman Catholic, this authority is derived from Christ and the Apostles, the Bible, Tradition, the Church, the Councils, and the Pope. Infallibility is the mark of each and of whatever is declared to be the truth. Among Protestants, the

Bible, Confessions, and Creeds have frequently been put in the place of the infallible Church or Pope. As Sabatier has shown, the systematization of doctrines derived from such sources may be called theology, and may be useful, but can scarcely be a science.²

Again, the believer may continue to recognize the authority of the Church, as Cardinal Newman did, and with him endeavour to reconcile its theology with the method and results of modern science, so far as to admit that the form of doctrine has undergone a development in accordance with the conditions of the age and people. Newman held that there is a development of doctrine in the Bible itself through the prophets to Jesus and the Apostles, nor does the process stop with them. There is, however, a changeless, original "deposit of faith" which the varying forms of doctrine never completely express, but of which they are signs. In view of the inadequateness of the human mind to distinguish divine truth from error, the Church is appointed by God to be "the arbiter of all true doctrine and holy practice to her children. We feel a need, and she alone of all things under heaven supplies it." This conception, however, really confines theology to what has validity for the Church as the final standard of truth.³

Alfred Loisy, a representative of the present liberal movement within the Catholic Church, says that after long reflection and even suffering he undertook

"... to show how the essential of Catholicism can survive the crisis of contemporary thought, how the Church can justify its past, and assure itself of the future." "Why not find the essence of Christianity in the fulness and totality of its life which shows movement and variety just because it is life, but, inasmuch as it is life proceeding from an obviously powerful principle, has grown in accordance with a law which affirms at every step the initial force that may be called its physical essence revealed in all its manifestations? Why should the essence of a tree be held to be but a particle of the seed from which it has sprung, and why should it not be recognized as

truly and fully in the complete tree as in the germ ? ” Consequently, “the truly evangelical part of Christianity to-day is not that which has never changed, for, in a sense all has changed and has never ceased to change, but that which in spite of all external changes proceeds from the impulse given by Christ, and is inspired by His spirit, serves the same ideal and the same hope.” “It is always the living gospel, not spirit merely, but body also from the beginning.” “The Church can fairly say that in order to be at all times what Jesus desired the society of His friends to be, it had to become what it has become ; for it has become what it had to become to save the gospel by saving itself.” ⁴

This is certainly a brave attempt to unite the subjective with the objective, the individual with the social, the uniqueness of Christ’s Gospel with the modern biological conception of development, and has much in its favour ; but, because Loisy intends to confine the objective and social expression of the Gospel within the limits of Catholicism, he can only at last, like Newman, submit his theology to the authority of the Church, a position inconsistent with scientific method and historical criticism which he would make his own. Loisy also errs in holding that the Protestant cannot, as we shall show that he may on another basis, combine in his theology the subjective and the objective, the individual and the social.

On the other hand Harnack, whom Loisy sharply criticizes in behalf of the vitally objective and historical, attempts to get back to primitive Christianity as it appeared in Jesus and in His immediate disciples. The dogma that has developed as the expression of this original kernel protects and conserves it, but, like a husk, changes and decays. The value of dogma depends upon its fitness for its function. Thus doctrinal formulations are something foreign to the original element. Such a view, of course, is distinguished from that of Newman and Loisy by the rejection of the regulative function of the Church divinely appointed to select and establish the doctrine

to be accepted as the truth because of harmony with the original essence of the revelation. Since, however, God is regarded as incomprehensible by the natural reason, reflection upon religious experience can only produce theological systems that are little more than related symbols of faith with no value as knowledge of the divine Being.⁵

A still more radical view of theology is represented by the present tendency to substitute for it a psychology of religion for which religion and religious sentiment are collective names for "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they consider to be divine."⁶ Concerning these facts there are two orders of inquiries, of which the first is psychological, and deals with the origin, nature, and history of religious phenomena and leads to "existential judgments"; the second concerns their importance, meaning, or significance, and leads to "judgments of value," whose test is the pragmatic one of how they "work" in the whole of experience. Whatever is more than this psychological study of primary religious phenomena consists of "over-beliefs, build-up performed by the intellect into directions of which feelings originally supplied the hint." "We must, therefore, bid a definite good-bye to dogmatic theology." Instead of a theology, let there be a psychological study of religious experiences, reaching "existential judgments" and judgments of their "value" in the conduct of life.⁷

In sharp contrast to these views is the constructive idealist's conception of theology, both in relation to the distinctive principle of Christianity as it appeared in Jesus and in relation to the significance of dogma in its development. According to this conception the principle that appeared in Jesus was indeed an expression of the Infinite, but while the principle has not changed in its essential content, it has unfolded in the

gradual development of Christian thought to the present time. Each step in the process is required to exhibit the eternal truth, and contains implicitly those that are to follow. Form and content develop together. Thus the historical significance of the different doctrines is restored to its proper place. The principle of Christianity is indestructible "because it is the only rational interpretation of the facts of our experience in their totality." But the form which this principle assumes in our day cannot possibly be identical with what is maintained to have been its primitive form ; in other words, it must be regarded as participating in that process of evolution which applies to the whole history of man ; consequently the Christianity of the present is the result of the development of the past, but is real Christianity. Its theology consists in a determination of what Christianity is now in the manifold life of the present. Christian theology is nothing less than the philosophy of the Christian religion in which God is really known, although, as befits our state, incompletely.⁸

It is evident that these different conceptions of what theology is depend upon the assumptions made and the purpose in view, and as these vary widely, there is no uniformity of opinion as to what theology is, or as to its worth if it is at all. It is now desirable to find a way out of these difficulties at least for ourselves, since theology is in the first instance chiefly a personal construction. We, like others, cannot avoid determining the character of our theology by our assumptions and purpose.

What, then, does Christian theology assume and what is its purpose ? It assumes that the needs of life find their satisfaction in Jesus. Its purpose is to form a view of the significance of the life and work of Jesus in relation to our needs which shall meet the practical standard of being the most satisfying to mind and heart, of verifying itself in our entire experience,

and of opening the way to a clearer vision of God, Christian theology, therefore, describes and explains the consciousness of God as determined by reflection upon the life and work of Jesus, and finds its verification only in its tendency to promote, enrich, and deepen religious experience in all its relations.

It is, then, important to know exactly what the life and work of Jesus were if they are to determine our consciousness of God in relation to ourselves. But where shall this knowledge be found? Shall we limit ourselves to the results of the critical examination of the New Testament writings which seems to show that the Logia or Words of Jesus give perhaps our most direct information of Him? How much more shall be added? Shall the interpretative supernatural element of the Synoptics? Shall we enlarge the scope of our literary sources to embrace the whole Bible, and shall the Bible be treated as a natural development of the Christian community or as a divinely miraculous product? Shall we, with Eucken, say that "whoever seeks the content of truth in religion need not trace its humble beginnings nor follow its tedious ascent, but may at once consider it in the highest stage of its development"? Whatever the difficulty of discovering exactly who Jesus was, and what He really said and did, the desirable thing is to learn what Jesus' own moral and religious consciousness of His relations to the Father was, and make it, as Wobbermin says, the norm by which we measure our own and the centre that gives unity to our entire experience.⁹ This would oblige us to bring our religious thought into harmony with our scientific and philosophical knowledge which, because of its universal character, transcends the historical and particular. From this standpoint it is necessary to find in Jesus' moral and religious consciousness eternal principles, to separate them from their historical form, to unify them with all other principles known to us and to apply them to

the conduct of life. Moreover, it is psychologically unavoidable that the interpretation of any or all of the sources of information concerning Jesus be determined largely by the ethical and religious consciousness of the interpreter, and some sort of unity must be shown to exist between the individual and the objects of his consideration if mere subjective individualism is to be obviated.

The fact is, however, that the present religious consciousness is so complex that any one of its phases may be abstracted and made the object of analysis and scientific treatment whose result might accordingly be called a theology. This is precisely what is done, and there is nothing but the pragmatic rule of practical interests to determine which feature of the religious consciousness shall be made the object of theological reflection, and what the scope of that reflection shall be. For example, there is certainly a distinct scriptural "world" in which Christian thought moves freely about Jesus as the central figure. As a Protestant Christian, therefore, let me begin by assuming that the Bible is the Word of God, and that it shall be my purpose to set forth its content in systematic form, which I may call theology, or possibly Biblical theology, though the name is unimportant. This task is complicated by questions as to how the Scriptures are to be understood as divine revelation. Is the Word of God the whole Bible or a part, or contained in the whole or a part? Shall the Bible be taken literally, or treated as literature and subjected to the standards of literary criticism? The systematic arrangement of scriptural teachings is of highest importance for clearness, instruction, and ministry. The mind moves gladly in this scriptural and doctrinal world. Its scenes and conceptions become so vivid that they assume a value approximating real existences, like that of the Platonic ideas. The patriarchs and prophets, the Saviour and apostles,

have become distinct figures in the Christian consciousness, and in a lesser degree so has Shakespeare's Hamlet and Bunyan's Christian. The Bible is the most widely known book, its scenes are pictured in the mind of a large part of the race, and these mental images become vivid and real because they are the "visible" forms of moral and religious experiences which are repeated in ourselves. As one looks upon the Roman Forum or Coliseum and thinks of the events that took place there, that life becomes real again in the living present. Likewise, to follow the Biblical characters in their struggles is an assistance in winning victories in present conflicts. Consequently, the preaching of the Word, worship, the Sunday-School lesson, private meditation, and historical and theological discussion serve to keep the Biblical conceptions and images fresh and vital, and strengthen the hold of the moral principles they represent upon the conduct of the individual and of the community.

Thus far the interpretation of the Bible has been viewed as the work of the individual. But now comes the question as to the unity between these personal interpretations. While there can never be a complete identity, the psychology of religious experience shows that both the nature of the individual and the material offered for reflective analysis and systematization give promise of some degree of unity in the result. A profound reason for the "authoritative" character of the Bible is to be found in the fact that the Scriptures are an objective expression of the larger race-life in which we participate. Since the Bible is the depository of human experience, it so fully interprets ourselves to ourselves that we attribute to the written words some mystic "divine authority." If what the Bible says fails to lay hold of mind and heart, no amount of coercive authority could give it a place in such a man's life, for such authority and religion are mutually exclusive. It is only because the heart of mankind

has during the ages poured out its sorrow, prayer, and hope and expressed in these Scriptures its growing comprehension of itself, of the world, and of God that our hearts find healing. Given this supreme record of human experience, the Bible, and the conscientious reader, and the way is open to salvation, and his theology, though primarily personal, will contain many important universal elements. This is rendered all the more certain by the fact that even the intellectual constructions of the individual are in some sense a product of social co-operation.

At this point the objection may be expected that I have not yet given any adequate idea of what Christian theology is. I can only repeat that whatever theology is depends upon what is assumed and upon the purpose in view. I began by assuming the Christian consciousness whose constructive analysis is the task of Christian theology. I also assumed that a large part of the Christian consciousness is centred about the Bible, and that the theologian might limit his purpose to the presentation of its content in systematic form. Undoubtedly the Christian theologian will have to embrace much more in the scope of his purpose, if he is adequately to represent the Christian consciousness, but how much more is largely optional. Indeed, perhaps nothing can be left out of the "Queen of the sciences"! To Biblical revelation might be added the history of the Christian social consciousness in which Christian truth may be supposed to be more fully exhibited. Alfred Loisy in his criticism of Harnack is right in emphasizing the importance of the objective and social for the understanding of the nature of Christianity, but Loisy errs in holding that the Protestant cannot consistently do this, for we have already shown that, psychologically, the individual cannot be understood apart from social relations, and that there is both an individual and social religious mind, in inseparable relation, with a memory which

is the history of the Christian community, that is, of the Church and its doctrines. Social psychology makes it necessary that the theologian who would be faithful to the whole of Christian experience should consider the social and historical. Accordingly, to Church History and Historical Theology may be assigned the task of presenting in logical form the expressions of the Christian social consciousness in its living development from the life and work of Jesus of Nazareth.

Still again, since Christian experience is only one aspect of experience in general, the question as to the relation of part to whole is inevitable. That is to say, what is the relation of theology to other sciences, indeed, to the entire range of scientific investigation, and to philosophy which tries to form a consistent and satisfactory view of all our experience? Of course, one may refuse to satisfy this intellectual impulse to bring our religious ideas into harmony with all the rest of our conceptions by assuming that Christian theology is limited to the Bible regarded as containing or being a supernatural revelation which is unrelatable to the knowledge of our natural reason, and that the theologian is, in consequence, not required to do more than to set forth consistently what these writings teach. However useful this may be, I do not believe one can long be content, by such an assumption, to remove the province of his investigation beyond the reach of the rest of his knowledge. Instead, the impulse to find reason everywhere is strong, as is shown by the fact that, when Christian thought cannot definitely organize the entire products of reflection in other spheres of experience about its own principle, belief in its own ultimate reasonableness is unshaken.¹⁰ There will always, indeed, be an irreducible element in the facts of religious experience, as well as in those of science, for they are both sufficiently mysterious and worthy of our humility and reverence. But, if one does enter

upon theological investigation feeling it necessary to take into consideration the whole of knowledge, let him be prepared, not only to appropriate what science and philosophy contribute to his task, but also fairly to face the difficulties of each, which in the end react upon the solution of his own problems.

However, before enlarging the scope of theology, the motive of doing so is worth considering. Is the motive a calm determination to get at the truth for the truth's sake? Or, is this motive mingled with a sort of fear or nervous anxiety, as the following remarks suggest?

If the good which is promised to the believer is finally to be his, what more is lacking? Why enter upon a metaphysic of Christianity and make the universe Christian and its forces simply the instruments for carrying out the Christian ideal? Is there not, on the contrary, a feeling that the world is foreign to the Christian, that the forces of the world have to be conquered and guarded against lest they defeat the spiritual life? Nature has no gentle, lovely character to render her tractable. It is true there are the sunbeams and the flowers, but what about the lightning and the earthquake, the terrible storms and the preying of one life upon another, with the pain of disease and the terror of death? But man himself is often more cruel in his power than the brute. And yet the doctrine of the Incarnation attempts to add to the dignity and worth of the Person of Christ as Saviour by making Him the creating Cause of the natural world. Great controversies have taken place over the absolute nature of the Person of Christ, who has been conceived as the Logos, the creative Power, after the manner of Greek speculation, as well as the Lord of the Messianic kingdom of the Hebrews.

As a matter of fact, however, mere *power* has no worth in itself. One does not read a treatise on physics expecting to find wise counsel for the conduct of life,

because it deals with natural forces. But, if one is to build a bridge or manage an electric current, the knowledge of physics is indispensable. To place Christ in the world of Might, even as creative Power, is sadly to miss what He really is to life. The motive for doing so is not truly scientific, but springs chiefly from the anxiety to see the entire universe subordinated to the Supreme Good that we hope for in Christ as the fulfilment and perfection of our life. We would make Christ the Supreme Power in order to be assured that no power can prevent the consummation of the ends that seem most worth realizing, but we have no interest in the "Power" as such. Consequently, the effort to explain the world according to Christian principles is not entirely due to a disinterested scientific impulse, but is in part owing to an anxious hope that nothing can be found to shake our trust. As a purely scientific or speculative theory, there is nothing to prevent the acceptance of a materialistic conception of reality and the most radical doctrine of evolution of one species from another, except some other theory scientifically more correct. The fact is, however, that the blessings we hope for in the fulfilment of our spiritual destiny prevent us from weighing scientific theories with critical impartiality. Instead, we rest our hopes upon Christ and then, with the case pre-judged, we search for corroboration of our faith, by no means with the acknowledgment that we are ready to give up our faith if we do not find such confirmation. The chances are that it would appear to be a sort of virtue to cling to our faith, all the more firmly, despite those facts of experience which do not agree with what we cannot endure to doubt.

It is, then, a serious question whether the theologian should undertake to form a theory of the universe with Christ as the central truth. Nevertheless, these intense religious experiences are mingled with a strong intellectual necessity to unite the principles of faith

as completely as possible with science and philosophy, all of which ministers to the spiritual life. Nor do I think one can in the last analysis accept the teachings of Christianity as true, however guaranteed, unless the mind is able in a large measure to fit them into the entire intellectual framework of personal experience in the modern world, whose science and philosophy, as has been shown, not only afford a far more favourable constructive basis for the expression of Jesus' view of the Father's relation to men than the science and philosophy of the age in which Christian theology first developed, but require that we return to the vital message of Jesus and express this message in forms suitable to present needs.¹¹

This brings us back to personal life, which furnishes much of what enters into the construction of theological systems. We ourselves are merged in the complex life of the present and our theologies represent our religious experience, which is the primary fact. However indispensable our theologies may be as fulfilling an important function in the spiritual life, each requires to be lived if it is to be completely true and real. This immediate relation of every theology to personal experience seems to me to be a sufficient reply to the constructive idealist, to those who make religious conceptions mere symbols, and to the pragmatist: no one can be a self-conscious personality without striving to unify his religious ideas in some sense with his entire complex and diverse experience, but this does not mean that he reproduces the idealist's "absolute" theology, if such there be; besides, all our ideas are in some sense secondary and symbolic of activity that involves the subject, and it is not peculiar to religious ideas to be so; and, lastly, but again from within the personal life, that is true which "works." Likewise theological conceptions become a sort of chart of life. Jesus stood at the centre of things in the sense of expressing the norms that ought to be the con-

trolling principles of activity if life is to be conducted in harmony with reality. These conceptions introduce new values into experience and cause our action to turn upon new points of emphasis. Besides, this chart of life has a value of its own for purposes of study, and the relations of the theological conceptions themselves may be profitably investigated. Such is the functional significance of theology, which thus becomes a relatively good "working hypothesis," and true in the sense that it is ever more completely verified in experience, giving expression to our needs and re-enforcing the demands we make upon ourselves and upon one another.¹²

What, then, shall be the fate of any theological system constructed by a given individual or generation? Let it be welcomed as the utterance of some mind that has had precisely that experience of reality. If a man casts himself upon Jesus and identifies himself with what he finds in Jesus, why is he not a Christian, though he may not think as others do? It is always possible that the fulness of God should be revealed in some individual so uniquely that the intellectual formulation may rightly differ from that of other minds.¹³ But, when severed from the living experience in which they were born, theological doctrines are like the branches cut off from the vine. There is no life-current running through them, nor can they bear fruit, unless it is possible to engraft them into another living experience. Even though no one is able to use the theological doctrines produced by another, they have already served an important function in their author's life.

It has already been explained how the individual's experience and, consequently, his religious ideas have in them universal elements which prevent theological constructions from being merely personal and subjective. He reads the same Bible as others in which the experience of the race is reflected; he himself is a

fragment of a vaster social life that has a past and a present; he has largely, but, of course, not entirely the same needs as others which require like satisfactions, and the conceptions which express them must form to some extent a unity with the thoughts of others. Besides, the believer's place in the world as he co-operates with his fellows constitutes him and them factors of being in general. Thus our thought and knowledge are not divorced from the cosmic process. The more successfully our experiences are organized through the medium of thought and brought into harmony with themselves and with the experiences of our fellow-men, the more completely organized does being itself become. "Thought's own work appears thus in a cosmic light. The goal that thought sets before itself . . . is to establish a constant connection between our methods and hypotheses and the real processes of Being. If thought succeeds in approaching this goal, then Being itself becomes more rational than it was before, because a new constant and harmonious relation has been wrought out and now is realized."¹⁴ Why is it not true, then, that our thoughts, our theological systems while they live in our experience, express through the medium of the human soul the divine Spirit's utterance and contribute to the unification of the world-life? If so, each one's thought of his religious experience is itself at once a factor of that experience and of the Life that is the moving principle of all existence. Nor is the belief unfounded that what enters into our personal conception of the human relation to God is a divine message. Thus one forms his theological doctrines primarily in the light of his entire experience as the expression of his own soul to himself, believing that he has so learned the meaning of the Father's voice. If others can make use of what is thus given objective form, as perhaps they may because of intimate social relations, it will be only a further step in the harmonious organization

of human experience by which future action may be more adequate and satisfying.

It should be remembered, however, that in proportion as a theological system becomes all-inclusive, it becomes in part at least unfaithful to the concrete religious experience which is the true reality. There must, then, be a proper relation between theology and life. As Sidgwick, in view of the many values and norms of activity, thinks it better to call ethics a study rather than a science of conduct,¹⁵ so may theology not inappropriately be called simply organized thinking in the service of religious experience, studying religious beliefs from many sides in order to learn what deeds of will are fitting in the subject's present relations. Such studious reflection upon religious experience will also, when expressed, minister to the life of the religious community, making communication and mutual edification possible. The different results of theological thinking are not regrettable, for they may be regarded as signs of real and varied experiences which cannot be entirely embodied in fixed objective formulas. It is rather a condition of vital religious experience that the theological activity of the mind should be made constantly to serve, however variously, in subordination to the living faith.

A final suggestion may be made concerning theological instruction. Psychological analysis makes it clear that the social religious consciousness alone can have a history formed about doctrines that are the products of the co-operative thought of the members of the religious community. These doctrines are the objective mind of Christian society.¹⁶ Although the individual is inseparable from social relations, he reacts upon this objective thought according to the needs and conditions of his own individuality. While the theological instructor may set forth the results of his own reaction upon this objective mind as the best conception he can form of what Christianity means in

the light of its history and his own experience of it in the present, let him do so with the sole aim of arousing the student to do likewise, treating his instructor's thoughts as only a factor in that objective mind of the Christian community to which he in turn must adjust himself as a condition of his own spiritual development. But let the theologian, of whatever rank, enter upon his heritage of intellectual freedom which science, philosophy, and the growth of the Christian consciousness have prepared for him. Nor is this inheritance appropriated without a struggle. To be stripped of our Augustine or Luther or Calvin or Wesley and to stand alone with the *fact* of Christianity, that is, to stand intellectually alone with Christ in order to determine His place in *our* world of truth, humbles us with a sense of our limitations. But there is no other way, for to seek relief by the adoption of another's thoughts is delusive comfort and is to fail of our privilege. It may be that by saying what we think of our relations to God, Christ, and our fellow-men in the light of what is given for guidance in the past and present, we shall assist each other, not only to think more wisely but, also, to minister to each other's spiritual welfare and vision of God, whom to know is Eternal Life, the Supreme Good.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

THE following references are to literature which has been found helpful in writing the portions of the chapters in which the exponent figures occur. The works mentioned frequently represent somewhat different views, but these differences have been useful in the formation of my own judgment. The literature of the subjects discussed is large, and I have not attempted to give a Bibliography, but only to mention a few of the many authors to whom indebtedness should be acknowledged.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

LITERATURE: James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Lotze, *Logic*, Introduction and secs. 1-4, 331; Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, 3rd ed. pp. 298-301; Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 1 f.; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. p. ix; Creighton, *Logic*, part iii.; Bosanquet, *Logic*, i. chap. i. secs. 1-6; Sigwart, *Logic*, secs. 40-42; Edward Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, i. chaps. i-iii.; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, Lectures I-III.; G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*; Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, chaps. i-iv.; Wundt, *Ethics*, i. part i. chap. ii.; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, part i.; Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*, i. chap. viii. and part ii.; Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*; Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* (1901), pp. 15, 27-31, 53-58, 400 f., 425 f., 438.

CHAPTER II

THE ANTECEDENTS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

1. Page 13. A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, i. chap. i. 1, 2; Denney, *Studies in Theology*, p. 1 f.
2. Page 13. Edward Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, i. 31-32.
3. Page 13. A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 6.
4. Page 14. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i. pp. 1-21.

5. Page 14. Herodotus, ii. 53; Menzies, *History of Religions*, p. 281.

6. Page 14. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i. p. 39; Menzies, *History of Religions*, p. 289. Compare C. P. Tiele's *Elements of the Science of Religion*, ii. p. 57, for criticism of the theory of Creuzer, which I do not think is involved in what has been said. Compare also Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, Einleitung, i. 2.

7. Page 14. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i. p. 133; Baldwin, *Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy*, Art. "Orphic Literature."

8. Page 15. Zeller, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy*, p. 26.

9. Page 15. Zeller, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy*, sec. 7.

10. Page 16. Bakewell, *Source-Book in Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 5-66, 99, 212, from which quotations are taken; Plato, *Phaedo*; Plato, *Theaetetus* (Scribner Ed.), par. 172; *Republic*, bk. vii.; Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, chaps. i. and iii.

11. Page 18. Zeller, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy*, p. 111.

12. Page 20. Plato, *Republic*, bk. vi. 502 D, 506 B; Bakewell, *Source-Book in Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 192, 197.

13. Page 21. Weber, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 92-94; Plato, *Timaeus*; Bakewell, *Source-Book*, pp. 160-168.

The term non-being, $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$, and the term matter, $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, have had different interpretations in the history of ancient thought. The terms are often not easily distinguished. The school of Parmenides, 470 B.C., identified non-being with empty space and, since everything that is must be full, empty space has no existence. For the atomists, the void or space or non-being must be real, for the void is necessary for the movement of the atoms. Plato, who denies empty space as a fact, assumed a relative world of non-being, the counterpart of ignorance, as the opposite of his Ideas, and, interpreting it also as space, regarded it as the matrix out of which the world was created. Aristotle attempted to give the term non-being a dynamical interpretation. "As all nature moves between the potential and the completed, the potential $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota$ at once is and is not. On one side, it is the medium, the matter, through which the form realizes itself; and it is also the restraint which prevents the full exhibition of form and which is responsible for failures and deviations from the main line of development." Being a naturalist, Aristotle may have had in mind the fact that eggs and seeds are all very much alike, but the animals and plants developed from them are very different.

"Accordingly his $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota$ is germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. Matter, which he associated with stuff, lumber, metal, is that undifferentiated element of a thing which it must possess to have even germinal being. Since matter is, in itself, indeterminate, it is also in itself unknowable; but it is both determinable by form and knowable, even sensible, through form." Form is for Aristotle not prior to matter, but a development of it as, for example, the soul which is an outgrowth of the body. Pure form, however, as ultimate actuality or God, is prior to potentiality.

The Stoics drop the dualism that seems to have been in some sense in Plato and Aristotle, and regard matter and mind as different aspects of the same thing, a sort of compound of the $\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma$ of Anaxagoras and the "central fire" of Heraclitus. In Philo, matter assumes a positive character since it is impure and evil, making it impossible for God to

enter into direct relation with it. In Neo-Pythagoreanism, there is a sharp dualism between spirit and matter, the former being the good, pure principle in life, the latter the bad, unholy principle. In Neo-Platonism, non-being as empty space, privation, the absolute opposite of pure being, limits the manifestations of being and is the cause of evil. In Gnosticism, the oriental dualism predominates. The material world (ὅλη) stands in sharp contrast to the world of the good. The world of evil is full of active energy and hostile powers. Gnosticism also probably responds to Greek influence in the dualism between spirit and matter, so that it may be said, Gnosticism combines the Greek opposition between spirit and matter, a higher and lower, with the Zoroastrian dualism of two hostile worlds standing in contrast to each other like light and darkness. Out of the combination of these two dualisms arose the teaching of Gnosticism, with its thorough-going pessimism and fundamental asceticism.

Various forms of the dualistic tendency appear also in the New Testament writers, in the Apologists, and in Christian theology which cannot now be considered (Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, *Ency. Brit.*, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*; E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Thinkers*).

14. Page 23. Plato, *Theaetetus* (Scribner Ed.), pars. 176-177; *Republic*, bk. ii. par. 501; Lotze, *Logic*, sec. 317.

15. Page 23. Plato, *Republic*, p. 532; A. Bakewell's *Source-Book*, p. 213 f.

16. Page 24. *An. Post.* i. chaps. i. and xviii.; Edward Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, i. p. 277; Aristotle, *De anima*, 408 b 19.

17. Page 25. Aristotle, *De anima*, iii. 5, 430 a 10.

18. Page 25. Aristotle, *De anima*, i. 412 a 4; *Ethics*, i. 1. 1.

19. Page 25. Aristotle, *Ethics*, x. 7. 1; Bakewell, *Source-Book*, p. 266.

20. Page 26. Bakewell, *Source-Book*, pp. 227-234; Aristotle, *Met.* xi. chaps. vi. vii. ix.

21. Page 28. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, trans., pp. 155-158.

22. Page 31. Bakewell, *Source-Book*, pp. 269-339.

23. Page 31. Edward Caird, *Evolution of Theology*, ii. 122-123.

24. Page 33. Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen grosser Denker*, 1904, p. 93 f.

25. Page 35. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 108; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, part i. chap. vi.

26. Page 35. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, secs. 105-115.

27. Page 36. Curtius, *History of Greece*, ii. p. 52; A. Holm, *History of Greece*, i. chap. xi.

28. Page 38. T. K. Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, pp. 117-284; G. S. Goodspeed, *Israel's Messianic Hope*, pp. 199-272; Moulton, *Literary Study of the Bible*, pp. 252-324; Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 167 f.; Caird, *Evolution of Theology*, ii.; Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*; Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Art. "Wisdom."

29. Page 40. Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, div. ii. vol. iii. pp. 362-374; Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 190-248; for Bibliography, p. 467.

382 A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

30. Page 40. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 114, 3, 4; Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Art. "Philosophy."

31. Page 43. Bakewell, *Source-Book in Ancient Philosophy*, for translation of Plotinus, pp. 340-393; Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen grosser Denker*, pp. 117-121; Schürer, *The Jewish People*, etc. div. ii. vol. iii. p. 362 f.; Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans.), i. pp. 336-364; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. chaps. iv. v.; Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, ii. Lectures III-V.

32. Page 50. Baur, *Church History*, i. p. 12 f.; also Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, chaps. iii-vii.

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY

1. Page 52. Lotze, *Logic*, sec. 317; James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 47-112; Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 1-85.

2. Page 54. Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 448 f.; James Orr, *The Bible Under Trial*, p. 179 f.; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 296 f.; Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 22-52; Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 217 f.; G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, pp. 189-201; Weiss, *Introduction to the New Testament*, sec. 7; also *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, sec. xi.; Gilbert, *Jesus*, pp. 1-236; Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity* (trans.), i. pp. 1-116, ii. 243-278; Edward Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, ii. Lect. VI.; Kaftan, *The Truth of the Christian Religion*; Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, chap. i.; Harnack, *What is Christianity?* p. 24; also *The Sayings of Jesus* (trans.), pp. 163-172, 228-252.

3. Page 56. F. C. Baur, *Church History*, i. p. 36 f.; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, i. 58-76; also *What is Christianity?* p. 55.

4. Page 57. Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 171 f.; Baur, *Church History*, i. p. 73; Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.

5. Page 59. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 129, 136; Cooley, *Social Organization*, chap. xv.; Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, i.

6. Page 61. G. B. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, p. 6; Lotze, *Metaphysic*, sec. 27.

7. Page 63. Plato, *Republic*, bk. iii. pars. 386-389, 621, Scribner Ed.; also *Phaedo* and *Apology*.

8. Page 65. Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen grosser Denker*, p. 139 f.; C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, ii. Lect. VIII.; Alfred Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* (1909), p. 165 f.

Professor Royce, in his work on *The Problem of Christianity*, holds that there are three essential Christian ideas: First, that "the salvation of the individual man is determined by some sort of membership in a certain spiritual community, a religious community, in whose life the Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression and the spirit of the Master is to obtain its earthly fulfilment" (i. 39). This is what Jesus called the kingdom of Heaven. For Paul, the love that springs up in Jesus develops into a community, a Church, which was for him

the very presence of his Lord. Second, that "the individual human being is by nature subject to some overwhelming moral burden, from which, if unaided, he cannot escape." The third idea is that of atonement provided by the divine plan for the redemption of mankind. Royce seems to attribute to Paul rather than to Jesus the recognition of the importance of the social relations in the individual's salvation expressed in the conception of membership in the divine community, and it is true that the apostle was instrumental in establishing and developing the Church. But I think that the importance of the social relations in the salvation of the individual is implied in Jesus' preaching of the kingdom of Heaven and of the filial relation of men to God, who are consequently to love and serve one another as children of the Heavenly Father. Outside of this filial relation in the kingdom there is no true life to be found. Surely Jesus knew the moral burden of men and their helplessness if unaided. His love passed beyond condemnation as unnecessary that it might provide a way of escape in the atonement through which men have entrance into the kingdom and eternal life.

9. Page 70. Ladd, *Theory of Reality*, p. 83.

10. Page 73. Höfding, *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 137, 151; James, *The Will to Believe, Pragmatism, A Pluralistic Universe*.

Additional references on the chapter: W. A. Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*; M. Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, chaps. ix-xi.; M'Giffert, *The Apostolic Age*, p. 31 f.; Weizsacker, *The Apostolic Age of the Christian Church*, bk. i.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

1. Page 75. Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. x. chap. viii.

2. Page 75. Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 438.

3. Pages 76 and 82. Indebtedness is acknowledged to the following: Gilbert, *Jesus*; Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, also *The Sayings of Jesus*; Pfeiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*; Caird, *Evolution of Religion*; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church*; Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*; Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*.

4. Page 82. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 122; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, i. 226-286.

5. Page 83. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Preface, sec. i.; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 251.

6. Pages 83 and 87. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, secs. 122, 124, 125; Baur, *Church History*, i. p. 235 f.; Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies*, bk. vii. chaps. viii-xiii., xvii-xix.; Schaff, *Church History*, ii. sec. 124, also p. 483 f.; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 270 f.; Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church*, chap. vi.; Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*.

7. Pages 84 and 88. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, i. 157, ii. 21.

8. Page 89. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, bk. i. chap. x. 1.

9. Page 89. Tertullian, *On Prescriptions against Heretics*, chap. xiii.
10. Page 90. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. 40-46; Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 173 f.
11. Page 90. Tatian, *Address to the Greeks*, chap. iii.
12. Page 90. Tertullian, *On Prescriptions against Heretics*, chaps. xii. xxi. xxxvii.
13. Page 91. Clement, *Stromata*, vol. i. chap. ix.
14. Page 91. *Ibid.* vol. i. chaps. ii. and vii.
15. Page 91. *Ibid.* vol. i. chap. v.
16. Page 91. Schaff, *Church History*, ii. p. 33.
17. Page 91. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, chaps. xxviii. and xxxii.; Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*.
18. Page 92. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, chap. ii.
19. Page 92. Schaff, *Church History*, ii. p. 103.
20. Page 93. *Ibid.* ii. 104-120.
21. Page 94. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, secs. 131-144; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. p. 172 f.; Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures* (1888), pp. 126-129; on the whole subject, pp. 171-282.
22. Page 95. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. 170-177, 224.
23. Page 96. Justin Martyr, *First Apology*, chap. xxi.
24. Page 96. *Ibid.* chaps. xii. xiii.; *Second Apology*, chaps. x. xiii.
25. Page 97. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. 220-221.
26. Page 97. *Ibid.* ii. 235; Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, p. 155.
27. Page 99. Clement, *Stromata*, bk. i. chaps. i. iv. v.; Charles Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, pp. 29-57.
28. Page 99. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. p. 328.
29. Page 100. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists*, sec. iv.; Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, pp. 159-164.
30. Page 101. Origen, *De principiis*, bk. iv. chap. i. 11.
31. Page 101. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. 336.
32. Page 101. Origen, *De principiis*, bk. i. chap. i. 5, 6.
33. Page 102. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists*, pp. 159-161.
34. Page 102. Origen, *De principiis*, bk. i. chap. ii. 2, 3, 4.
35. Page 103. *Ibid.* bk. i. chap. ii. 8.
36. Page 103. *Ibid.* bk. i. chap. ii. 2, 3; Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk. v. chap. viii.
37. Page 103. In the following order: Harnack, *History of Dogma*, ii. 356-358; Origen, *De principiis*, bk. i. chap. iii. 7, Preface, 4; chap. viii. 4.
38. Page 105. Athanasius, *Discourse against the Arians*, Discourse I. chap. ii. 5.
39. Page 108. *Ibid.* Discourse I. secs. 5-39; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ii. p. 326.
40. Page 108. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*, secs. 2 and 5.
41. Page 108. Athanasius, *De incarnatione verbi Dei*, secs. 4, 6, 8, 26, 27.
42. Page 108. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, iii. p. 140.
43. Page 109. *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, second series, iv., Prolegomena, chap. iv. 1; Kaftan, *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, i. 93-100; Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, chap. vii. This author says (p. 207) that a party called the *Alogi* rejected the Gospel of John

as spurious because they regarded the application of the conception of the Logos to Jesus as a new and dangerous doctrine. Wernle, *Beginning of Christianity*, ii. chap. viii. ; Gilbert, *Jesus*, p. 62 f.

CHAPTER V

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

LITERATURE: Westcott, *The Canon of the New Testament* ; Casper René Gregory, *The Canon and Text of the New Testament* ; A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, pp. 113-136 ; G. B. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, chaps. iii. iv. ; Sabatier, *Religions of Authority*, bks. i. ii. ; Schaff, *Church History*, iii., also *The Creeds of Christendom* ; Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine* ; Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ* ; Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen grosser Denker* ; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion* ; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, and *Monasticism and the Confessions of Augustine* ; *History of Philosophy*, by Erdmann, Weber, De Wulf ; Lea, *History of Inquisition*, i. ; Buckley, *Short History of Natural Science* ; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of Roman Empire*, vi. ; Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy* ; A. H. Newman, *Church History*, *History of Anti-Pedo-Baptism*, *History of the Baptists* ; Neander, *Church History* ; Green, *History of England* ; Seebohm, *Era of Protestant Revolution* ; Calvin, *Institutes* ; Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire* ; Ranke, *History of the Popes* ; Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* ; Paul Sabatier, *Modernism* ; Motley, *The Dutch Republic* ; Sheldon and Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrine* ; Goldwin Smith, *The United States Political History* ; Carroll, *The Religious Forces of the United States*.

CHAPTER VI

A NEW PHILOSOPHY: THROUGH SELF TO WORLD AND GOD

1. Page 139. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk. ix. chaps. ii. iii., bk. x. chap. xii. ; Pfeiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, ii. p. 291 f. ; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. p. 230.
2. Page 139. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. p. 71.
3. Page 139. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 312-316 ; also Sabatier, *Religions of Authority*.
4. Page 140. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 315.
5. Page 140. Augustine, *De civitate*, bk. xi. chap. xxvi.
6. Page 140. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, part iv.
7. Page 140. Veitch's edition of Descartes, Introduction, p. xxii ; Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, i. 6-42.
8. Page 141. Veitch's Descartes, Axiom V. p. 270.
9. Page 141. Veitch's Descartes, p. 37.
10. Page 141. *Ibid.* p. 40, conclusion of part iv. of the Method ; p. 142, conclusion of Meditation V., "the experience of our waking moments" as interpreted by reason.

386 A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

11. Page 141. Veitch's Descartes, Axiom V. p. 270; Method, part iv.; Meditations, iii. v. vi.
12. Page 142. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. p. 80.
13. Page 142. *Ibid.* i. p. 95.
14. Page 143. *Ibid.* p. 98.
15. Page 143. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, xxxix. xciii.; Weber, *History of Philosophy*, p. 300.
16. Page 143. Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. i. chap. i, 2.
17. Page 144. *Ibid.* bk. ii. chap. viii. 8-10.
18. Page 144. *Ibid.* bk. iv. chap. iii. 6.
19. Page 144. Berkeley, *Principles of Knowledge*, pp. 30, 34. See also the Dialogue, "Divine Visual Language."
20. Page 144. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. i. part i. sec. 4.
21. Page 144. *Ibid.* bk. i. part iv. sec. 6.
22. Page 145. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. p. 86.
23. Page 145. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface, First Edition; Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. p. 9 f.
24. Page 148. Kant's Preface to Second Edition. See Watson's *Selections*, p. 11.
25. Page 148. References in text to Abbott's translation of Kant's *Theory of Ethics*.
26. Page 151. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by J. H. Bernard, p. 38; Watson's *Selections*, p. 320.
27. Page 151. See 25 above.
28. Page 152. Bernard's translation of *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, p. xii. Page references in text to this work.
29. Page 152. *Ibid.* pp. 1-18.
30. Page 156. Abbott's translation of Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, 216 f.
31. Page 156. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. pp. 80-86.
32. Page 157. Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, Abbott's translation, p. 241 f. Compare also James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 1 f.; also Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?*, p. 12.
33. Page 157. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 113-117.
34. Page 158. Kant's *Theory of Ethics* (Abbott), p. 43; also *Prolegomena to Metaphysics*, trans. p. 42.
35. Page 158. Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, quoted p. 420.
36. Page 159. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 152.
37. Page 159. *Ibid.* p. 160; Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, p. 526 f.
38. Page 160. Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, Prolegomena, pp. 128-129; Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 518-519.
39. Page 160. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 153; Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 524-534.
40. Page 160. *Microcosmus* (Scribner's), ii. 673-676.
41. Page 161. Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 463; Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 535-568.
42. Page 162. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 172 f.
43. Page 162. *Ibid.* pp. 176-180.
44. Page 163. *Ibid.* p. 216 f.

45. Page 164. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 222 f.; also Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, Prolegomena, p. 111; Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, on the Romantic school, ii. p. 139 f.; Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, 569-613.
46. Page 165. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 217; also Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, especially part iii.
47. Page 166. Weber, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 518, 519.
48. Page 167. *Ibid.* pp. 524-528; Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, pp. 334-362; also his translation of the Introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of Fine Art*, pp. xiii-xxxiii.
49. Page 168. Kuno Fischer, *Descartes and his School*, p. 159 f.
50. Page 169. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*; Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.
51. Page 169. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, ii. p. 688 (Scribner's); also *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 88.
52. Page 170. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 499, 527, 531 f.
53. Page 170. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. p. 42; also i. The Supplementary Essay.

CHAPTER VII

A NEW THEOLOGY: I. RELIGION AS THE GOOD WILL

1. Page 172. *Contra Celsum*, iii. 28.
2. Page 172. A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 747.
3. Page 172. G. B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, pp. 137-141.
4. Page 173. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. 124. On the entire subject see Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, part i.
5. Page 173. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. p. 124; also Augustine, *De catechiz.* iv.
6. Page 174. G. B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, pp. 143-147; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vi. pp. 58-68; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. pp. 14-20.
7. Page 175. Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. ii. chap. xvi. sec. 2; Stevens, *Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, pp. 152-155.
8. Page 176. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vii. 119 f.; A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 728 f.
9. Page 177. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, p. 157 f.; A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 740 f.; Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 142 f.
10. Pages 179 and 186. Abstract from the German of Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, Works, vol. vi. pp. 95-301. Compare Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 108 f.; also, for text, *Universal-Bibliothek*, pp. 1231-1232.
11. Page 188. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 46-47.
12. Page 188. Kant, *Theory of Ethics* (Abbott), pp. 180, 260.
13. Page 188. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, part i.
14. Page 188. Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. p. 98 f.

CHAPTER VIII

A NEW THEOLOGY: II. RELIGION AS KNOWLEDGE

1. Page 190. Quoted by Neander, *Church History*, i. 532.
2. Page 191. References are to the German of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, with commentary by Bolland, published by A. H. Adriani, Leyden, 1901, vol. i. Compare also Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, pp. 133-170.
3. Page 200. M'Taggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, chap. viii.
4. Page 205. Windelband, *History of Philosophy* (Tuft's trans.), p. 633; Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, i. 279.
5. Page 205. Pfeiderer, *Development of Theology*, pp. 130-132.
6. Page 206. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 634, "Mind or Spirit is nature in its otherness"; also, on the following paragraphs, see Pfeiderer, *Development of Theology*, pp. 135-152.
7. Page 207. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. p. 415 f.
8. Page 207. John Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. p. 24 f.
9. Page 208. *Ibid.* i. pp. 155-156.
10. Page 208. *Ibid.* ii. p. 158.
11. Page 209. George H. Sabine, "Concreteness of Thought," *Philosophical Review*, vol. xvi. p. 162 f.

CHAPTER IX

A NEW THEOLOGY: III. RELIGION AS FEELING

1. Page 211. Baur, *Church History*, ii. p. 10.
2. Page 212. Neander, *Church History*, ii. 400-402; A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 258 f.
3. Page 212. Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 493. See the Savoyard Vicar's Profession of Faith, in *Émile*. Compare John Morley, *Rousseau*, vol. ii. chap. v.
4. Page 213. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 296, 16; Falekenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 305-309; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 496.
5. Page 213. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 303, 3, 4; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 110, 130-135; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, chap. vi.
6. Page 214. Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 117 f.; Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 304, 3; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 527; Lotze, Preface of *Microcosmus*.
7. Page 215. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 304 f.; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 118; Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 501; Jacobi, *Werke*, iii. 424-426; Morley, *Rousseau*.
8. Page 215. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, Aph. 106, 1-11.
9. Page 216. Pfeiderer, *The Development of Theology since Kant*, p. 310.
10. Page 216. Ewald Flügel, *Thomas Carlyle's Moral and Religious*

Development, N.Y., Holbrook & Co., 1891. The following selections from Carlyle are noted in the text: *Miscellanies*, v. p. 51; *Sartor Resartus*, bk. ii. chap. ix., bk. iii. chap. viii.; *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, p. 252; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 377 f.

11. Page 221. Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 194-195, quotation from Schleiermacher.

12. Page 221. Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, pp. 20-24.

13. Page 221. Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, sec. 4, 4.

14. Page 222. Schleiermacher, *Psychologie*, *Phil. Werke*, vi. pp. 184-185, 428-429, 506; vii. 67-74.

15. Page 222. *Ibid.* pp. 198-212, 461-462, 520-521; also E. H. Holland, *Philosophical Review*, vol. xv., on "Schleiermacher's Development of Subjective Consciousness," p. 299.

16. Page 223. Schleiermacher, *Chr. Glaubenslehre* (Bibl. Theol. Klassiker), sec. 51.

17. Page 223. *Ibid.* i. sec. 4, p. 95.

18. Page 224. *Ibid.* i. sec. 5, pp. 99-101.

19. Page 224. *Ibid.* ii. sec. 66, p. 120.

20. Page 225. *Ibid.* i. 116-117.

21. Page 225. *Ibid.* i. sec. 9.

22. Page 225. *Ibid.* i. sec. 10, pp. 136-139.

23. Page 225. *Ibid.* i. sec. 11.

24. Page 226. *Ibid.* i. sec. 14, p. 156; sec. 15, p. 184

25. Page 226. *Ibid.* i. sec. 16.

26. Page 227. *Ibid.* i. sec. 28; also *Zur Darstellung des theol. Studium*, sec. 214.

27. Page 227. *Ibid.* i. p. 240 f.

28. Page 228. *Ibid.* i. 207-208.

29. Page 228. Schleiermacher, *Zur Darstellung des theol. Studium*, sec. 5; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 206-210; also *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 202.

30. Page 228. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, sec. 315, 10; Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 20; Schleiermacher, *Chr. Glaubenslehre*, sec. 50.

31. Page 229. Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, ii. 196.

32. Page 230. Pfeiderer, *Development of Theology*, p. 106.

33. Page 230. Schleiermacher, *Zur Darstellung des theol. Studium*, sec. 214.

34. Page 231. *Ibid.* sec. 5.

35. Page 232. Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, pp. 87, 88.

36. Page 233. G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, ii. 326; Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 282; King, *Development of Religion*, pp. 328, 340.

37. Page 234. Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, pp. 75, 82-88; Stählin, *Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl*. For Bibliography on Ritschl see Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology*, chap. i. The exposition given in the text is based on the following passages in the order named: Ritschl, *Theologie und Metaphysik*, pp. 7-15, 37, 41, 43; *Justification and Reconciliation* (Scribner Ed.), pp. 20 f., 391-394, 19-20, 204, 205, 207, 16, 17, 194-199, 200, 203, 212, 326, 9, 13, 3, 24, 25.

38. Page 241. Pfeiderer, *Development of Theology*, p. 185.

39. Page 241. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 222 ; *Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 15.

40. Page 241. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 223-224.

41. Page 242. *Ibid.* pp. 204-205.

42. Page 242. For a less favourable interpretation of this point compare Steinbeck, *Theologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 78-82.

43. Page 242. For a like view see Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, secs. 3 and 4 ; also Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*.

44. Page 243. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 228-238. Compare also Lotze, *Microcosmus*, bk. ix. secs. 4 and 5.

Additional references on the chapter : Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century* ; W. A. Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*, pp. 112-287 ; George Cross, *The Theology of Schleiermacher* ; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 278 f.

CHAPTER X

THE RELIGIOUS SELF AND THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Page 252. Bergson, *Time and Free Will* ; also *Creative Evolution* ; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* ; Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* ; King, *The Development of Religion* ; Tracy, *The Psychology of Childhood*, chap. vi. ; Cooley, *Social Organization* ; Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*.

2. Page 254. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 195 f. ; Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 218.

3. Page 255. Starbuck, p. 152 ; Pratt, chap. vii. ; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lects. I. IX. X. ; Sully, *Studies of Childhood*, p. 120 f.

4. Page 256. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 14 ; Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 145-155.

5. Page 257. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 279, 283, 292, 296, 323.

6. Page 258. G. S. Hall, *Adolescence*, ii. 331-352, 362.

7. Page 259. Schleiermacher. See preceding chapter.

8. Page 259. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, ii. 182 f.

9. Page 259. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, 215 D ; on the Psychology of Religion, see pp. 95-321 ; also his *Psychology*, chap. vi. 261-263.

10. Page 259. Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, chaps. i. ii.

11. Page 259. See this book, Chaps. VII. VIII. IX.

12. Page 259. Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 231 f. ; Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, third ed., pp. 3, 4, 249-251 ; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, chap. ix. ; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 511 f.

13. Page 259. James, *Psychology*, ii. 291 ; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 313-329, 490-543.

14. Page 261. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 12, 91 ; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, ii. chaps. iv. vi. ; also *The Problem of Christianity*, ii. ; Cooley, *Social Organization*.

15. Page 265. Harnack, *What is Christianity?*; also *History of Dogma*, vii. 267-274; Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, 215 D.
16. Page 266. James, *Psychology*, ii. 297.
17. Page 270. On the biological function of consciousness, see Angell, *Psychology*, p. 63; James, *Pragmatism*, Lect. II.; Hall, *Adolescence*, ii. 329 f.; Dewey, "Beliefs and Realities," *Philosophical Review*, March 1906.
18. Page 276. On the views presented in the text, compare Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 357, 433, 438; Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 110; also the works of Royce, James, and Baldwin already referred to above.
19. Page 278. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 334 f.
20. Page 280. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 231 f.
21. Page 281. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 498.
22. Page 283. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 489 f.; Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 380 f.; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, ii. Lects. VIII. IX.
23. Page 234. King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 276; Hume, *Natural History of Religion*.
24. Page 284. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 441 f.
25. Page 285. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 206; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 420-423.
26. Page 285. James, *Psychology*, i. 315.
27. Page 286. Ladd, *Knowledge, Life, and Reality*; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 511-516; G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, p. 182.

CHAPTER XI

THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD

1. Page 287. W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 70; A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, i. 252; Denney, *Studies in Theology*, chap. i.
2. Page 289. Lotze, *Microcosmus* (Scribner's), ii. 663-667; Hegel, *Logic*, secs. 50, 68.
3. Page 289. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Müller trans.), ii. Supplement.
4. Page 290. Riehl, *Science and Metaphysic*, pp. 1-23; Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Introd. sec. x.; Ladd, *Theory of Reality*, p. 29; also "The Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century," *Philosophical Review*, Sept. 1905; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 2-27; Hodgson, *The Metaphysics of Experience*, i. 3; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. 16; Green, *Works*, ii. 200.
5. Page 293. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, secs. 36, 67, 68, 28; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 32, 81-82, 87, 118-119, 438, 445, 457.
6. Page 294. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 157, 189, 380 f.
7. Page 297. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Preface, p. ix, i. 306-342, 414-417; ii. chaps. vi.-x.; also *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. ii.

392 A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

8. Page 300. Lotze, *Metaphysics*, secs. 60, 70, 94, 98; *Microcosmus*, bk. ix. chap. iii. 4, bk. ix. chap. iv. 4, 5; *Outlines of Metaphysics*, pp. 151-152; Plato, *Republic*, vi. par. 509.
9. Page 301. M'Taggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, chap. iii. pp. 64-65, opposing Lotze's argument for the self-consciousness of the Absolute.
10. Page 303. James, *Pragmatism, The Meaning of Truth, Some Problems of Philosophy, A Pluralistic Universe*; Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?*, p. 12 f.; Tröltzsch, *Psychologie und Erkenntnisstheorie*, p. 22 f.
11. Page 308. James Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, part ii.
12. Page 308. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*. Quotations from translation by B. E. Meyer, Macmillan & Co., pp. 17, 10-12, 106-108, 93, 192, 115, 134-135, 273, 202, 209, 247, 248, 376, 383, 75-78, in order.
13. Page 311. Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, secs. 7, 22; *System der Philosophie*, pp. 76-82.
14. Page 312. Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, secs. 3, 4.
15. Page 312. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*. For a more detailed account of his view see the following Chapter, p. 330 f.
16. Page 314. Lotze, *Practical Philosophy*, sec. 17; *Metaphysics*, sec. 68.
17. Page 314. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 313-335.
18. Page 314. Wundt, *System der Philosophie, Einleitung*.
19. Page 316. A. C. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, ii. 130. On the entire chapter see Albee, "The Present Meaning of Idealism," *Philosophical Review*, May 1909.

CHAPTER XII

SOME CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES AND MODERN THOUGHT

1. Page 319. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, p. 24. In Chap. IV. p. 75 f. it was said that the early Christians, including the New Testament writers, began to interpret Jesus in a general view of the universe. It is, however, to be noted, as Professor Clarke says, that whatever appears to be metaphysical is subordinated to the practical and religious. For example, John i. 1-18; Col. i. 15-17; Heb. i. 2, 3, contain metaphysical conceptions that reflect the philosophy of that time, but their practical religious use is evident. It is, then, correct to say that the faith in Jesus is the constant factor, while its interpretation varies from age to age with the views of successive generations.
2. Page 322. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 36-38.
3. Page 327. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 357-386.
4. Page 328. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. 425 f., ii. 335-452.
5. Page 329. Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 407.
6. Page 330. James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 223-227, 257, 273; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 147-218.
7. Page 331. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pages as follows: pp. 261, 152, 187, 206, 164, 165, 11.

8. Page 331. Mill, *System of Logic*, chap. xxv. sec. 2.
9. Page 332. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, ii. chap. i.; also p. 237 f.
10. Page 333. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 202-212.
11. Page 335. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 511 f.
12. Page 338. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 199 f.; *Time and Free Will*, pp. 136, 148-154, 166, 175.
13. Page 339. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, i. Lect. X.
14. Page 340. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, ii. 162-212.
15. Page 342. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, p. 128.
16. Page 343. *Ibid.* p. 216; also John iii. 16; Rom. v. 8; John viii. 28, xiv. 10, viii. 19, x. 30; 1 John iv. 14.
17. Page 344. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 300.
18. Page 347. Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 133.
19. Page 348. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, secs. 110-113, 154; M'Taggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, chap. vi.
20. Page 349. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 49-53.
21. Page 350. James Denney, *The Death of Christ*, p. 145.
22. Page 352. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, chap. xx.; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 189; also *Works*, ii. 335-549; Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 324 f.; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, ii. Lect. X.; also *Philosophy of Loyalty*, Lects. VII. VIII. Bosanquet in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. ix, warns against emphasizing social conditions to the neglect of the fact that "the poor . . . are generally just as good as other people," and that "the essentials of happiness and character are the same throughout the social whole."
23. Page 354. See Chapter II., especially the doctrines of Socrates and Plato, although many others give less clear teachings of another life. For an elaborate sketch of these views see Salmond, *The Doctrine of Immortality*.
24. Page 355. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, bk. iv. 23.
25. Page 355. Pliny, *Epist.* vi. 16 and 20.
26. Page 355. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 114.
27. Page 358. Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, pp. 213, 221, 342 f.; also *Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, 147 f.; Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 7, 127, 131, 284-290.
28. Page 358. Bawden, *Philosophical Review*, March 1906, art. "Evolution and the Absolute."
29. Page 358. This practical truth that God has His life in and through the finite receives theoretical support in the view that finite persons are essential manifestations of God and could not cease or be replaced by another without a break in the eternal manifestation of the Absolute. This implies some form even of pre-existence. See M'Taggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, chap. ii.
30. Page 359. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 189.
31. Page 359. Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 354 f.
32. Page 360. James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 27. The present discussion assumes that the chief problem of immortality concerns the continuation of self-conscious personality. Immortality is at best a reasonable faith. Other aspects of the question may be found, for example, in James, *Human Immortality*; or in Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, p. 315, where the theory of increase of spiritual energy is applied to the problem.

33. Page 361. If it is objected that the discussion of Christian doctrine in relation to modern thought has not been adequate, it is readily granted, for the problems involved are very complex. If the objection means, however, that I have not sufficiently supported the doctrines considered by modern views, I can only say I hope I have not permitted my desire to find some confirmation of Christian beliefs to cause me to misrepresent the spirit and tendency of modern thought.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THEOLOGY

1. Page 362. An interesting diversity of definition is found in a symposium on "The Task and Method of Systematic Theology," by Warfield, W. A. Brown, and G. B. Smith, *Am. Journal of Theology*, vol. xiv. pp. 192-233. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 319, says: "Theology, which has been so often regarded as the antipode of science, is coming more and more to be recognized as one of its advance guards. Or, as a modern theologian (Tröltsch) has expressed it, it stands as a buffer between the Church and scientific thought—as a buffer which both sides make use of as it suits them." Tröltsch says: "Theology clings to science, and yet is no science, but a utilization of scientific culture for ecclesiastical ends" (quoted by Höffding, p. 404). Royce says that for the modern man "it is a waste of time to endeavour to prove the usual theses of dogmatic Christology by any collection of accessible historical evidences. Such historical evidences are once for all insufficient." Rather should our "Christology be the practical acknowledgment of the Spirit of the Universal and Beloved Community" (*The Problem of Christianity*, ii. 427 f.).

2. Page 363. Sabatier, *Religions of Authority*, Introd.; also pp. 335-379.

3. Page 363. J. H. Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine*, chap. ii. sec. 6; Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 9, 10, 20.

4. Page 364. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* (1909), pp. x, 13, 16, 115, 116, 149, 150; Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 42, 80.

5. Page 365. Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 43; Sabatier, *Religions of Authority*, pp. 339, 349; Harnack, *What is Christianity?* and *History of Dogma*, vii. p. 268; G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, p. 198.

6. Page 365. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 31.

7. Page 365. James, *ibid.* pp. 4, 5, 18, 19, 431, 455.

8. Page 366. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, pp. 45, 186.

9. Page 367. Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 1 f.; Wobbermin, *Grundprobleme der systematischen Theologie*, part ii.

10. Page 371. Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*, bk. iv. chap. 18.

11. Page 374. Compare Strong, *Systematic Theology*, i. p. 2: "The aim of theology is the ascertainment of the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, and the exhibition of these

facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a formulated and organic system of truth." Also same author, *Christ in Creation*, pp. 1-15; Denney, *Studies in Theology*, p. 1 f. A more satisfactory view in Clarke's *Christian Doctrine of God*, p. 4.

12. Page 375. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 330-332; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 73 f.; Lotze, *Microcosmus* (Scribner's), ii. 482-488.

13. Page 375. *Contemporary Review*, May 1907, art. "Dogma and Progress," by G. F. Barbour.

14. Page 376. Höffding, *The Problem of Philosophy*, p. 137; James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 106, 116, 123-126, 321-330.

15. Page 377. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 1-2; E. D. Burton, "The Relation of Biblical to Systematic Theology," *Biblical World*, December 1907.

16. Page 377. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, bk. ii.; Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, bk. v.; Fairbanks, *Introduction to Sociology*, chap. iv.; Cooley, *Social Organization*, part i. chaps. i. ii., part iii.

INDEX

- Adolescent period and conversion, 254; allegory of, 258
 Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, 106
 Alexander the Great, 27, 33, 37
 Alexandrian syncretism, 94 f.
 Allegorical method, 87, 101
 Ames, E. B., referred to, 253
 Ammonius-Saccas, 41
 Anabaptists, 124
 Anaxagoras, 17, 30
 Anseim, 172 f., 190
 Apologists, 90 f., 133
 Ariens, Arius, 105 f.; Arian controversy, 104 f.
 Aristotle, 12, 13, 17; philosophy of, 23-27; 61
 Arminians, 130, 176
 Athanasians, 104, 116
 Athanasius, 93, 105, 108, 113
 Atonement, theories of, 171, 177; social relations of, 272-274; 339-343; 350
 Augustine, 75, 93; on Trinity, 110-112; 114, 115, 140, 173, 190, 211
 Authority, 120 f.; in religion, 262; 316, 369 f.
 Bacon, 143
 Baldwin, dialectic of personal growth, 261
 Basilides, 86
 Beautiful, Kant's theory of, 148-157
 Bergson, 58, 252, 330, 338
 Berkeley, 144, 329
 Bernard, 121, 211
 Bible, Christianity restored by, 168; as "conversion writ large," 258; as authoritative, 278, 362; its universality in the social mind, 368 f., 375
 Bonaventura, 211
 Bosanquet, 293, 326, 358
 Bradley, F. H., 32, 170, 283
 Brotherhood of Man, Christian and Greek views of, 70 f.
 Caird, John and Edward, 207, 291
 Calvin, 5, 130, 175
 Canon of New Testament, 76, 89
 Cappadocians, 98, 110
 Carlyle, 216-218
 Celsus, objections to Christianity, 94 f.
 Christian Beliefs, what are they and how know them, 317 f.
 Christianity, as conception, 51; universalized, 55; finality of, 61.
 Church, Fathers, 33; at Antioch and Jerusalem, 56
 Church, Roman, 57, 87; in middle ages, 118-121
 Clarke, W. N., referred to, 318 f.
 Cleanthes, hymn of, 30
 Clement of Alexandria, 99 f.
 Coleridge, 211, 215-216
 Comte, 169
 Constantine, 106
 Conversion, how produced, 254, 274 f.
 Covenant, 34
 Creation, advantages of theory of, 304 f.; as dependence on God, 306
 Creeds, significance of among Protestants, 131-132
 Daniel, prophecies of, appropriated, 77
 Dante, 294
 Democritus, 17, 29
 Descartes, 140 f.
 Dewey, referred to, 134
 Divinity of Christ, 78 f.
 Drews, Arthur, on myth theory, 60
 Dualistic element, in Plato and Aristotle, 19, 24 f.
 Eckhart, 212
 Empedocles, 17; in relation to Marcion, 87
 Empiricism, 141 f.
 Enlightenment, 187, 212
 Epictetus, 31 f.

398 A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

- Epicureans, 28
 Essence of Christianity, 12
 Eucken, referred to, 329, 352, 358, 367
 Evil, Christian views compared with Greek, 66; psychological and social nature of, 273; theist's view of, 307
 Evolution, in relation to man, 325 f.
 Existential judgments, 365
 Experience, unity of, 258, 265, 266, 269
 "Faith-philosophy," 213 f.
 Fall of man, 346
 Feuerbach, 240 f.
 Fichte, 158-162
 Fischer, Kuno, 12
 Freedom, Kant's postulate of, 148; Christian belief in, 339
 "Fulness of time," 50, 59
 Gnostics, gnosticism, 82, 86, 93
 God, psychological nature of belief in, 279-284; development of idea of, 284-286; as personal, 288; proofs for existence of, 288; as unity of community, 300; Jesus and God, 320; attributes of as analytic judgments, 340 f.; Saviourhood of, 342; law of, 345 f.; relation of divine omnipotence to the moral realm, 351 f.
 Goethe, 216
 Greek culture related to theology, 12
 Greek moral conceptions and Christianity, 66
 Greek religious ideas and Christian, 61 f.
 Green, T. H., criticism of Kant's limitation of knowledge, 156
 Grotius, Hugo, 176
 Hall, G. S., 258
 Hamann, 213
 Hamilton, Sir William, 218
 Harnack, 59, 243, 264, 364
 Hartmann, 169, 305
 Hebrew, prophets, 34; wise men, 35 f.
 Hegel, 9; philosophy of, 162-168; philosophy of religion, 190-204; Hegelian school of theology, 204-210
 Heraclitus, 16, 19, 30
 Herder, 213
 Heredity, 253
 Hermann, 243
 Hesiod, 14, 16
 Höfding, use of symbols of value, 308 f.
 Holiness, 344 f.
 Homer, 14, 16, 63
 Howison, quoted, 305
 Hume, 144 f.
 Huss, 123
 Immanence, 325 f.
 Immortality, 49; Plato on, 62 f.; Kant's postulate of, 148; 286; 354-361
 Incarnation, Hegel's view of, 201; 213, 372
 Individual, social nature of, and relation to, community, 271
 Individualistic methods, 251
 Individuality, in mystic union with God, 32
 Infallibility, dogma of, 127
 Irenaeus, 89, 90, 97, 172, 211
 Jacobi, 213
 James, 254, 270, 302, 315, 330, 338
 Jesus, as Messiah, and Son of God, 53, 77; Son of Man, 77; the sayings of in relation to Gospels, 52, 76, 319; His self-consciousness and consciousness of God, 54, 64; Jesus and the historical, 75; titles of, 79, 96 f., 318; divinity of, 104; place of in Christian consciousness, 278; His thought of God, 320
 Jewish Christianity, 77 f.
 Jewish-Greek thought parallel, 38-42
 John, Gospel of, 53, 76, 80
 Judaism, 10, 76, 82
 Justin Martyr, 95, 115, 172
 Kaftan, 243
 Kähler, summary of views, 81
 Kant, 9, 56; philosophy of, 145 f.-158; Kant and Hegel, 162; theory of religion, 177-189; referred to, 287
 Kingdom of God, 63, 64; as divine community, 352
 Lactantius, 12
 Ladd, G. T., referred to, 290
 Law, as formulation of experience, 230 f.
 Leibnitz, 142; a figure of, 281
 Lessing, 212
 Locke, 144 f.
 Logos, 16, 30; of Philo, 40, 81; 97-104; 108, 114, 133, 323

- Loisy, Alfred, 59, 363 f.
 Lotze, 6, 236, 242, 290, 298 f.
 Love, in relation to holiness and wisdom, 341 f.
 Lucian, 105
 Lucretius, 30
 Luther, 123, 130, 157, 175
- M^cTaggart, on Hegel's Trinity, 200 ; view of God as community, 300 f.
 Mansel, 218
 Marcion, 83, 86, 90
 Melancthon, 126
 Meliorists, 302
 Messiah, 53 f. ; 77 ; Gnostic view of, 84
 Mill, J. S., 169, 219 ; on the miracle, 331
 Miracle, Greek view of, 35 ; Jesus' deeds, 54 ; metaphysical relations of, 328-333
 Modernism, 128 f.
 Mystic element, in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, 33 ; mediaeval, 211-212 ; 297
- New humanity, 63
 Newman, J. H., 364
 Nicene Council, 106 f.
- Omnipotence, in the moral sphere, 351 f.
 Origen, 99 ; 100-104 ; 115, 173
 Original sin, Kant's view of, 178 ; Hegel's view of, 201 ; psychological nature of, 346
 Orphic "theologians," 14
- Papias, 52
 Parmenides, 16, 19
 Paul's views of Jesus, 78-80
 Paul of Samosata, 105
 Paulsen, referred to, 280
 Penalties in relation to individual, 352
 Personality, not lost in Christianity, 62 ; influence of upon views, 260 ; psychology of, 270
 Pfeiderer, referred to, 241
 Pharisees, controversy with, 55
 Philo, 40, 81, 84
 Philosophy, nature of, 12 f. ; relation to Christian beliefs, 287 f.
 Plato, 13, 17 ; philosophy of, 18-23
 Plotinus, 17, 41, 43-50, 61
 Postulates, significance of, 148 f.
 Power, Christ as, 373
 Pratt, J. B., referred to, 256
- Prayer, psychology and relations of, 333 f.
 Psychological principles, illustrated by religious development, 1 f.
 Psychology, as applied to religious experience, 252 f.
 Psycho-physical parallelism, 254
 Punishment and law, 348
 Purposefulness, Kant's theory of, 148-155
 Pythagoras, 16
- Racovian Catechism, 176
 Rainy, referred to, 84
 Realism, in theology, 176, 348
 Reformation, 9, 128 ; principle of, 135, 139, 178, 186, 203
 Reformers, 129 ; within Church, 125
 Religion, definitions of, 1 ; primitive and positive, 2, 14 ; an implicit metaphysic, 13
 Religious consciousness, factors of, 253 f.
 Restoration, psychological and social nature of, 274 ; in what consist, 348 f.
 Resurrection, 56
 Riehl, Albrecht, 290
 Ritschl, 9, 178, 188, 233-244
 Roman Church. *See* Church
 Romantic School, 162 f.
 Rome, victory over Greece, 28
 Rousseau, J. J., 212
 Royce, 170 ; on problem of reality, 294-297 ; on time relations of God, 327
 Rule of Faith, 88-91 ; 105, 109
- Sabatier, referred to, 264
 Sacred writings, in relation to civilization, 11
 Salvation, in theory of Plotinus, 46 ; Christian, 348 f.
 Schelling, 160, 162, 166, 178, 327
 Schiller, doctrine of the "beautiful soul," 213
 Schleiermacher, 9, 178, 188, 219-233, 282
 Scholasticism, 170, 177
 Schopenhauer, 169
 Scribes, 77
 Self-hood, psychology of, 270 f.
 Semitic, 34
 Seneca, 32
 Sin, and personality, 274
 Social inheritance, 278
 Social mind, 262, 264 ; and history, 272

400 A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THEOLOGY

- Socinians, 176
 Socrates, 17, 18
 Sophists, 18
 Spencer, Herbert, 169, 218
 Spinoza, 141, 147, 229
 "Splendid Vices," 121
 Staupitz, and Luther, 124
 Stevens, G. B., referred to, 172
 Stoics, 30 f.
 Strauss, 60, 205
 Subliminal self, 253 ; in prayer, 335
 Supernatural world, psychology of, 260, 368

 Tatian, 90
 Tauler, 212
 Tertullian, 12, 90, 97
 Theological instruction, 377
 Theological reconstruction, age of, 257
 Theology, relation to experience as primary, 4 ; factors entering into historically, 11 ; a working hypothesis, 249 ; in New Testament, 75, 318 ; definitions of, 362, 365 ; as the psychology of religion, 365 ; assumptions of, 366
 Theories of Redemption, 171
 Theory of Knowledge, applied to theology, 5-8
 Thought, in relation to the real, 267
 Transcendence, of God, 325
 Trent, Council of, 126

 Trinity, 103, 110, 111, 112 ; Hegel's view of, 199 ; religious meaning of, 322

 "Ugly broad ditch," 327
 Union, of Eastern and Western thought, 33 f.
 Unity, of conscious experience, 258 f.

 Valentinus, 86
 Value, conservation of, 259, 309 f. ; of the whole and of the part, 294 ; place of in existence, 299, 300
 Value judgments, 365. *See also* Ritschl

 Ward, James, in *Realm of Ends*, 304 f.
 Watson, John, 292 f.
 Wisdom, relation to Greek thought, 36-39 ; in relation to love and holiness, 341
 Wise men, 35-36
 Wolff, 145
 Wundt, on psychological causality, 311

 Xenophanes, 16

 Zeno, and Kant's moral law, 31
 Zwingli, 124

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